Applied Business and Management Research: Exploring the principles and practice of research in Africa

The two statements are significant in two ways. The first is that, even though that individual is said not to be a person, he is nonetheless acknowledged as a human being , not a beast or fish. It is pretty clear that the statement implies a distinction between the concept of a human being and the concept of a person: The second significant thing the statements imply is the assumption that there are certain fundamental norms and ideals to which the conduct of a human being, if he is a person, ought to conform, that there are moral virtues that an individual has the capacity to display in his conduct and ought to display them, if he is a person.

The reason for the judgment that an individual is not a person if he behaves or does not behave in a certain way is that that individual's actions and behavior are considered as falling short of the ideals and standards of personhood. The position here is this: This judgment is not a descriptive judgment at all, even though it can be used descriptively, as when in a forest one hunter made that judgment to his colleague hunter who thought he saw a beast and was about to shoot it: Thus, a descriptive use of that judgment would be obvious and easily understood.

What I am concerned to point up in the present circumstance is the normative form of the judgment. A rider would be in place here: Now, the denial of personhood to a human being on the grounds that his actions are not in accord with certain fundamental norms and ideals of personhood or that that individual fails to display certain virtues in his behavior is morally significant and worth noting.

It means that human nature is considered in Akan metaphysical and moral thought to be essentially good, not depraved or warped by some original sin; that the human being is capable of doing good. It does not mean, however, that personhood, in this model of humanity, is innate but is earned in the ethical arena: Every individual is capable of becoming a person inasmuch as he has capacity for virtue—for performing morally right actions—and should be treated at least potentially as a morally responsible agent.

The view expressed in this proverb seems to be at variance with the notion of the moral-neutrality of the human being discussed earlier in connection with character section 3. First, it may be taken as implying that God created the human being actually to do good, that is, to actually behave virtuously and to always make the appropriate moral choices.

Second, it may be interpreted as meaning that God made the human being capable of moral choice, that is, that the human being was merely endowed by his creator with the moral sense to distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong. The first interpretation implies that the human being has been determined to be good—to actually pursue virtue: If the human being were created or determined actually and always to do good, there would never have been a concept of evil or vice bone in Akan moral language, since no human being would, in that kind of moral context, commit a vicious or evil act.

In light of the evil and unethical actions of individual human beings, the first interpretation which implies that the human being is resiliently good cannot be accepted as the correct meaning of the maxim, for it is plainly contradicted by our putative moral experience. The first interpretation also subverts moral-neutrality, a consequence that eliminates moral choice—basic to the notion of a moral person. The second interpretation of the view that the human being was created good or, to be good , implies that the human being merely has the capacity for virtue: This means that the human being is endowed with moral sense and, so, has the capacity for both virtue and vice; his judgment on some moral issue could go either direction: Thus, the notion of moral neutrality is preserved.

The human being can then be held as a moral agent: The correctness of the second interpretation of the view that the human being was created good, as argued in the foregoing paragraphs, can have an anchor also in the Akan notion of tiboa: This is a conception of an inner urge relevant to moral practice. Tiboa is held, among other things, as creating a sense of guilt in the individual, convicting him or her of wrong deeds.

Since response to a moral rule is ultimately an individual or private affair, the notion of tiboa conscience is of great importance to our moral life. It is by virtue of tiboa that the notion of self-sanctioning in moral conduct becomes intelligible. Because of its power to induce a sense of guilt, tiboa is held to influence the individual's moral choice, decision, response, and attitude. The reality or phenomenon of moral choice is a rejection of the notion of a fixed or settled moral character of an individual that derives from the presupposition—albeit false—that the human being is born virtuous.

The activity of tiboa is in line with the moral neutrality of the human being at birth. The activity of tiboa assists moral achievement and, thus, moral personhood. Like the Akan people and others, the Rwanda or, Ruanda people also have the concept of conscience. Maquet in Forde, There indeed are external social sanctions which are useful as deterrents from prohibited behavior; but in moral motivation feelings of moral guilt and shame are traceable also to kamera or tiboa.

Observations have been made by a number of scholars that Africans are a very—even a notoriously—religious people, that religion so deeply permeates all spheres of their lives that it cannot be distinguished from nonreligious aspects of life, that in the African traditional life there are no atheists, and that the African cultural heritage is intensely and pervasively religious. That some connection may exist between religion and morality is conceivable in an environment that is widely alleged to be pervasively religious.

But the nature of the connection needs to be fully clarified.

The connection has been taken by most scholars to mean that African moral values and principles derive from religion, implying that African morality is, thus, a religious morality Opoku, The claim implies in turn that the moral beliefs and principles of the African people derive from those of religion, that religion provides the necessary justification for moral values and beliefs, and that moral concepts, such as good, bad, right and wrong, are defined or, must be defined in terms of religious prescriptions or commands. However, there are other scholars, such as Godfrey Wilson, Monica Wilson, Maquet, Wiredu, who deny the religious basis of the moral systems of the societies they studied.

Odera Oruka and D. These are unambiguous statements of the nonreligious foundation of the morality of at least some African societies. The claim, made by many scholars, that African morality is founded on, or derives from, religion cannot, in my opinion, be upheld, if by morality we are referring to social principles and norms that guide the conduct of people in a society. One reason is that, unlike Islam or Christianity, the traditional, that is, indigenous, African religion is not a revealed religion whereby divine truth is revealed to a single individual who becomes the founder.

It is true that African religious experience certainly features mystical or highly spiritual encounters between human beings that is, priests, priestesses, diviners, etc. Such encounters occur in divinations, spirit mediums, communication with the dead, and other forms of the mystical experience. But, it may be noted, such mystical or spiritual encounters or contacts take place in an atmosphere that was already religious; they are some of the manifestations of African religion, of African spirituality. I define spirituality as a heightened form of religiosity reached by certain individuals in the community who have, or claim to have, mystical contacts with the supernatural, the divine.

It would be correct to assert, however, that the encounters are the results , rather than the sources, of religion in Africa in the traditional setting. This is a telling point that implies the independence autonomy of the moral attitudes of the people with regard to the conduct of the spiritual beings. Attitudes to [the gods] depend on their success [i.

Busia in Forde, The moral disapprobation of the people with regard to the actions—particularly the unsuccessful actions—of the deities constitutes the ground for the extinction of some of the deities from the Akan, possibly the African, pantheon. The fact that the behavior of a supernatural being is thus subject to human censure implies that it is possible for a deity to issue commands that can be considered unethical by the practitioners of traditional religion.

All this implies, surely, that it would be correct to assert that, rather than regarding African ethics as religious or, religious-based , it would be more correct to regard African religion as ethical. In a revealed religion, what is revealed is generally elaborate and can be conceived to include moral principles and ideals as part of the will of God thus revealed. A morality that is founded on religion is thus a necessary concomitant of a revealed religion. Since the indigenous African religion is not a revealed religion, there is no way by which the people would have access to the will of God that contains elaborate moral principles upon which a coherent moral system can be erected.

In the context of a non-revealed religion, then, to make divine or supernatural commands the source of moral values and principles would be conceptually impossible. Now, how are the moral concepts of good, evil, right and wrong understood or defined in African ethics? Thus, what is morally good or right is not that which is commanded by God or pleasing to God or any spiritual being, or that which is in accordance with the will of a spiritual being.

The responses revealed, on the contrary, an undoubted conviction of a humanistic—a non-supernatural—origin of moral values and principles, a conviction that provided insight into the Akan conception of the criterion of moral value. In light of the non-revealed nature of traditional African religion, it can be said that the view regarding the non-religious non-supernatural origin of moral principles and values would resonate on the moral terrains of most other African communities.

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The sources of African morality in the traditional setting, then, must be held as independent of religious prescriptions or supernatural powers. The views of the traditional thinkers indicate that what is good is constituted by the deeds, habits, and behavior patterns considered by the society as worthwhile because of their consequences for human welfare.

The goods would include such things as generosity, honesty, faithfulness, truthfulness, compassion, hospitality, happiness, that which brings peace, justice, respect, and so on. Each of these actions or patterns of behavior is supposed or known to bring about social well-being.

African Ethics

In Akan moral system or African moral system generally , good or moral value is determined in terms of its consequences for humankind and human society. All this can be interpreted to mean that African morality originates from considerations of human welfare and interests, not from divine pronouncements. Actions that promote human welfare or interest are good, while those that detract from human welfare are bad.

It is, thus, pretty clear that African ethics is a humanistic ethics, a moral system that is preoccupied with human welfare. In African conceptions moral values originate from the basic existential conditions in which human beings organize and conduct their lives. McVeigh made the following observation:.

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Statements and references made in the immediately foregoing paragraphs indicate the nonreligious foundation of African ethics. Now, having removed African ethics from its alleged religious moorings, where do we moor it? The answer, based on the foregoing references, is that we moor it to the preoccupations of the African society with human welfare and social harmony, to reflections on the existential conditions in which human beings function. Not being a revealed religion, traditional African religion can be characterized as a natural religion, a religion that derives from the peoples' own reflections on this complex world and their experiences in it.

The African metaphysic, to be sure, is a theistic metaphysic; yet it does not nurture a theistic or supernatural ethic. And so it is, that the moral values of the African people have a social and humanistic, rather than a religious, basis and are fashioned according to the people's own understanding of the nature of human society, human relations, human goals, and the meaning of human life with its emotional features.

Because God is held by the African people not only to be the overlord of the human society but also to have a superbly moral character, and because the ancestors ancestral spirits are also supposed to be interested in the welfare of the society they left behind , including the moral life of the individual, religion constitutes part of the sanctions that are in play in matters of moral practice. Thus, religion cannot be totally banished from the domain of moral practice, notwithstanding the fact that the moral values and principles of the African society do not derive from religion.

Humanism—the doctrine that takes human welfare, interests, and needs as fundamental—constitutes the foundation of African ethics. It is the warp and woof the African moral life and thought. Indeed, African prayers and other acts of worship are brimful of, or characterized by, requests to the supernatural beings for material comforts, such as prosperity, health, and riches. And, even though the African people do not consider God and other supernatural beings as the sources of their moral values and principles, nevertheless, they are ever aware of the powers of the supernatural beings and are ever ready to exploit their munificence for the promotion of human welfare, prosperity, and happiness.

These two concepts, humanity and brotherhood, feature prominently in African social and moral thought and practice. They are among the moral or human values that constitute the basic—perhaps the ultimate—criteria that not only motivate but also justify human actions that affect other human beings. In African terms, humanity is not just an anthropological term; it is also a moral term when it comes to considering the relations between members of the human species.

But the notion of brotherhood is essentially a moral notion, for it is about the relations between individual human beings that make for their own interest and well-being. There is some affiliation between humanity and brotherhood in African ethical conceptions: The Akan maxim literally means: There is, thus, a limit to the area of cultivation of land. But this, the maxim invites us to realize, is not so in the cultivation of the friendship and fellowship of human beings; the boundaries of that form of cultivation are limitless.

For, humanity is of one kind; all humankind is one species, with shared basic values, feelings, hopes, and desires. Thus, even though the African people traditionally live in small communities and are divided into different ethnic or cultural groups and into clans and lineages with complex networks of relationships, nevertheless, they perceive humanity to embrace all other peoples beyond their narrow geographic or spatial confines, to constitute all human beings into one universal family of humankind.

Even though this family is fragmented into a multiplicity of peoples and cultures, nevertheless, it is a shared family—a shared humanity—the relationships among whose members ought to feature a certain kind of morality: The common membership of one universal human family constitutes should constitute a legitimate basis for the idea of universal human brotherhood or unity. This idea is depicted in, for instance, the Akan maxim:.

The maxim asserts unmistakably that a human being can be related only to another human being, not to a beast. Implicit in the African perception of humanity is the recognition of all persons, irrespective of their racial or ethnic backgrounds, as brothers. But the word is also used, significantly, by persons between whom there are no blood ties; thus, the word is used comprehensively. A practical translation of the idea of brotherhood leads to such social and moral virtues as hospitality, generosity, concern for others, and communal feeling.

Several writers, including European travelers to Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, have remarked upon these virtues as practiced in African social and moral life. A Briton who spent about three decades in Central Africa from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the early part of the twentieth century made the following observation:. Most people, including foreign visitors to Africa, often testify, in amazement, to the ethic of hospitality and generosity of the African people.

That ethic is an expression of the perception of our common humanity and universal human brotherhood. As regards the African conception of the worth and dignity of the human being, there is time to refer only to a couple of Akan maxims. One such maxim is:. In this maxim a human being is depicted as beautiful. That which is beautiful is enjoyed for its own sake, not for the sake of anything else. What the maxim is saying, therefore, is that a human being is to be enjoyed for his or her own sake.

It means you should be open to the interests and welfare of others and feel it a moral duty to offer help where it is needed. To enjoy a human being also means you should recognize the other person as a fellow individual whose worth as a human being is equal to yours and with whom you undoubtedly share basic values, ideals, and sentiments. Thus, the main intent of the maxim is to point out the worth of a human being and the respect that ought to be given to her by virtue of her humanity.

Recognition of the worth of a human being is, according to the maxim, more important than caring for wealth. Kenneth Kaunda describes in some detail how the enjoyment of people is expressed in practical terms:.

African Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

It is the human being that counts: I call upon gold, it answers not; I call upon cloth, it answers not; it is the human being that counts. The maxim says that it is only the human being that is of real value, for in times of need or distress, if you appeal to gold and other material possessions they will not respond; only a human being will.

For these reasons, the worth of the human being is of the ultimate consequence and ought therefore to be given the ultimate consideration.

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From such maxims one can appreciate why human welfare and concern constitute the preoccupation of African ethics. The notion of the common good features manifestly in African ethics. The part of the motif relevant to moral thought is the single stomach, and it is to the significance of this that I wish to pay some attention. The common stomach of the two crocodiles indicates that at least the basic interests of all the members of the community are identical. It can therefore be interpreted as symbolizing the common good , the good of all the individuals within a society.

The common good is not a surrogate for the sum of the various individual goods. It does not consist of, or derive from, the goods and preferences of particular individuals. It is that which is essentially good for human beings as such, embracing the needs that are basic to the enjoyment and fulfillment of the life of each individual.

If the common good were the aggregate of individual goods, it would only be contingently, not essentially, common and, on that score, it would not be achieved in a way that will benefit all the individuals in a society. If the common good is achieved, then the individual good is also achieved.

Thus, there should be no conceptual tension or opposition between the common good and the good of the individual member of the community, for the common good embraces the goods—the basic goods—of all the members of the community. Sometimes they motivate him to do more and better work. Other times they can lead to frustration and reduced efficiency.

You can end a conflict through violence or war and by destroying your opponent. You can also end a conflict by surrender and capitulation. Or, you can temporarily de-intensify a conflict by deceiving your opponent. Yet, we do not regard such options as conflict resolution.

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And they do not resolve a conflict, anyway. The conflict remains; it may or may not just lose its intensity. Conflict negotiation intervenes directly in the relationships of power, authority and influence within the group French and Bell It is easier to resolve or help resolve a conflict stemming from a clash of interests.

It is more difficult to deal with a conflict that emanates from a clash of values. And it is even more difficult to handle a conflict in which at least one party's basic human needs are not satisfied. That is why such conflicts usually are deep-rooted and intractable. The change effort is directed at the work relationships among members. The technique is an imposed structure for controlled negotiations between parties in which each party agrees in writing to change certain behaviours in return for changes in behaviour by the other.

The behaviours relate to the job. I am referring not only to the conflict of the management-versus-union kind but also to more widespread symptoms of 'them and us' that appear in organisations going through rapid change. Conflict can appear in many situations - for example, during restructuring, when two organisations merge, or when problems occur between a company and outsourcing partner. When organisations fundamentally change the way they operate, shifts in power and conflicts of interest are not only likely - they are inevitable. These differences can be healthy for an organisation and its members, or they can sap energy from the people involved, and result in missed deadlines, increased costs, and broken promises to customers and other stakeholders.

To reduce the opportunities for conflict long-term the following organisational values can be introduced and constantly re-stated:. Use the test below to assess whether a conflict is being approached positively or is becoming unhealthy. If there is a 25 per cent difference between the current situation and your desired state, there is a problem to address.

Do not assume that your assessment is self-evident. A programme such as this will never get off the ground unless enough key stakeholders agree there is a problem with the relationship, not merely with performance. It is also important not to delay taking action. When relationships have deteriorated beyond a certain point, the downward spiral builds its own momentum and is unlikely to get better without positive intervention. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 represents serious conflict and 10 represents total cooperation, assess your organisation on each of the scales below.

Mark each scale with an X for the current situation, and a O for your desired state. If there is a 25 per cent difference in the totals, then your organisation has a problem to address. These should work with the group to resolve the conflict. They should be people from outside the teams involved with no bias or vested interests other than to achieve a positive outcome. Whoever you choose will have their impartiality questioned. So if their position, reputation or behaviour indicates any allegiance, their effectiveness will be severely handicapped and they are likely to become part of the problem rather than the solution.

The facilitators will be unable to influence fundamental issues that only top managers have the power to change. People will also question the validity of the programme unless it has visible backing from senior managers. In addition, symptoms of conflict at operational level are often related to a negative interpretation of messages coming down from the top of the organisation. Meet the team members and set the context for the work to come. This involves making it clear that the facilitator's role exists first to address the breakdowns in relationship that are preventing progress, and second to help create working methods that promote co-operation.

Facilitators should expect to encounter mistrust initially. They must show that they are not there to apportion blame, and should avoid billing themselves as experts whose job it is to tell everyone what they've been doing wrong up until now. Arrange for facilitators to meet each individual in a private setting, to discuss how the situation affects them personally. This will build trust between team members and facilitators, which is vital when dealing with emotional issues. The challenge here is to create empathy without bias one way or the other.

It can be tempting to sympathise with someone's dilemma or to become critical of his or her behaviour - either of which will compromise neutrality. Conflict resolution is a truly multidisciplinary field. It is an amalgam of psychology, philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology, law etc. Which elements are or should be the dominant ones, depends on the situation at the time and those involved in the conflict. However, the psychological aspects appear to be a little more important than other aspects. Therefore, it is important to pay more attention to the psychodynamics of conflict and its resolution.

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The skills you learn on this course prepare you for launching your own business and set you up for a career in areas such as:. After you leave the University, you can get help, advice and support for up to 5 years from our Careers and Employability service as you advance in your career. The course is all about thinking in an innovative and creative way. Learning about leadership, strategy and entrepreneurship as well as having experience working with a company has been a great benefit.

Each unit on this course is worth a certain number of credits. In each year, you need to study units worth a total of credits. For example, 4 units worth 20 credits and 1 unit worth 40 credits. On this course, you can do an optional work placement year between your 2nd and 3rd years to get valuable experience working in industry. We use the best and most current research and professional practice alongside feedback from our students to make sure course content is relevant to your future career or further studies.

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During his career he's worked for many organisations, including: Nicholas has extensive expertise within the fast-moving consumer goods FMCG industry, working with entrepreneurs and firms from small and medium-sized enterprises to multinational corporations.