Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: Full Text of 1909 Edition (Illustrated)

Of the French writers I shall refer to Cauwelaert, who says that Avenarius' philosophical standpoint in the Prolegomena I. Of the German writers, I shall name Rudolf Willy, Avenarius' disciple, who says that "Avenarius in his youth — and particularly in his work of — was totally under the spell ganz im Banne of so-called epistemological idealism.

And, indeed, it would be ridiculous to deny the idealism in Avenarius' Prolegomena, where he explicitly states that "only sensation can be thought of as the existing" pp. Here is the paragraph in full: Are there really philosophers capable of defending this brainless philosophy? Professor Richard Avenarius is one of them. And we must pause for a while to consider this defence, difficult though it be for a normal person to take it seriously.

The proposition that motion produces sensation is based on apparent experience only. This experience, which includes the act of perception, consists, presumably, in the fact that sensation is generated in a certain kind of substance brain as a result of transmitted motion excitation and with the help of other material conditions e. However — apart from the fact that such generation has never itself selbst been observed — in order to construct the supposed experience, as an experience which is real in all its component parts, empirical proof, at least, is required to show that sensation, which assumedly is caused in a certain substance by transmitted motion, did not already exist in that substance in one way or another; so that the appearance of sensation cannot be conceived of in any other way than as a creative act on the part of the transmitted motion.

Thus only by proving that where a sensation now appears there was none previously, not even a minimal one, would it be possible to establish a fact which, denoting as it does some act of creation, contradicts all the rest of experience and radically changes all the rest of our conception of nature Naturan-schauung. But such proof is not furnished by any experience, and cannot be furnished by any experience; on the contrary, the notion of a state of a substance totally devoid of sensation which subsequently begins to experience sensation is only a hypothesis.

But this hypothesis merely complicates and obscures our understanding instead of simplifying and clarifying it. However, even this bit of the remaining content of experience is only an appearance. We have purposely quoted this refutation of materialism by Avenarius in full, in order that the reader may see to what truly pitiful sophistries "recent" empirio-critical philosophy resorts. We shall compare with the argument of the idealist Avenarius the materialist argument of — Bogdanov, if only to punish Bogdanov for his betrayal of materialism!

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In long bygone days, fully nine years ago, when Bogdanov was half "a natural-historical materialist" that is, an adherent of the materialist theory of knowledge, to which the overwhelming majority of contemporary scientists instinctively hold , when he was only half led astray by the muddled Ostwald, he wrote: To the first category belong the images of phenomena of the outer or inner world, as taken by themselves in consciousness Such an image is called a 'sensation' if it is directly produced through the sense-organs by its corresponding external phenomenon.

Petersburg, , P- 2I6. And a little farther on he says: And even in , when with the gracious assistance of Ostwald and Mach Bogdanov had already abandoned the materialist standpoint in philosophy for the idealist standpoint, he wrote from forgetfulness! For every scientist who has not been led astray by professorial philosophy, as well as for every materialist, sensa tion is indeed the direct connection between consciousness and the external world; it is the transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness.

This transformation has been, and is, observed by each of us a million times on every hand. The sophism of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that it regards sensation as being not the connection between consciousness and the external world, but a fence, a wall, separating consciousness from the external world — not an image of the external phenomenon corresponding to the sensation, but as the "sole entity.

Since we do not yet know all the conditions of the connection we are constantly observing between sensation and matter organised in a definite way, let us therefore acknowledge the existence of sensation alone — that is what the sophism of Avenarius reduces itself to. To conclude our description of the fundamental idealist premises of empirio-criticism, we shall briefly refer to the English and French representatives of this philosophical trend. Mach explicitly says of Karl Pearson, the Englishman, that he Mach is "in agreement with his epistemological erkennt-niskritischen views on all essential points" Mechanik, ed.

Pearson in turn agrees with Mach. Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 2nd ed. For Pearson "real things" are "sense-impressions. Pearson fights materialism with great determination although he does not know Feuerbach, or Marx and Engels ; his arguments do not differ from those analysed above.

However, the desire to masquerade as a materialist is so foreign to Pearson that is a specialty of the Russian Machians , Pearson is so — incautious, that he invents no "new" names for his philosophy and simply declares that his views and those of Mach are "idealist" ibid. He traces his genealogy directly to Berkeley and Hume.

The philosophy of Pearson, as we shall repeatedly find, is distinguished from that of Mach by its far greater integrity and consistency. Analysis of Sensations, p. Preface to Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 2nd ed. We shall have occasion to deal with the particularly confused and inconsistent philosophical views of these writers in the chapter on the new physics.

We shall now proceed to examine how Mach and Avenarius, having admitted the idealist character of their original views, corrected them in their subsequent works. Such is the title under which Friedrich Adler, lecturer at the University of Zurich, probably the only German author-also anxious to supplement Marx with Machism, writes of Mach. Adler, "Die Entdeckung der Weltelemente zu E. Adhering to an opportunist Centrist stand, it disguised its betrayal of the proletarian revolution and subservience to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie under a mask of Leftist phraseology.

One of Adler's articles has been translated into Russian in the symposium Historical Materialism. And this naive university lecturer must be given his due: At least, he puts the question point-blank — did Mach really "discover the world-elements"? If so, then, only very backward and ignorant people, of course, can still remain materialists. Or is this discovery a return on the part of Mach to the old philosophical errors? We saw that Mach in and Avenarius in held a purely idealist view; for them the world is our sensation.

In Mach's Mechanik appeared, and in the preface to the first edition Mach refers to Avenarius' Prolegomena, and greets his ideas as being "very close" sehr verwandte to his own philosophy. Here are the arguments in the Mechanik concerning the elements: It is a matter of the connection of these elements. Neither exists separately; both exist in conjunction. Only temporarily can we neglect either. Even processes that are apparently purely mechanical, are thus always physiological" op. We find the same in the Analysis of Sensations: In another functional dependence they are at the same time physical objects" Russian translation, pp.

When we, however, consider its dependence upon the retina the elements K, L, M , it is a psychological object, a sensation" ibid. But as that term already implies a one-sided theory, we prefer to speak simply of elements" pp. Indeed, it is not one-sidedness we have here, but an incoherent jumble of antithetical philosophical points of view. Since you base yourself only on sensations you do not correct the "one-sidedness" of your idealism by the term "element," but only confuse the issue and cravenly hide from your own theory.

In a word, you eliminate the antithesis between the physical and psychical, "The antithesis between the self and the world, sensation or appearance and the thing, then vanishes, and it all reduces itself to a complex of elements" ibid. For, if elements are sensations, you have no right even for a moment to accept the existence of "elements" independently of my nerves and my mind.

But if you do admit physical objects that are independent of my nerves and my sensations and that cause sensation only by acting upon my retina — you are disgracefully abandoning your "one-sided" idealism and adopting the standpoint of "one-sided" materialism! If colour is a sensation only depending upon the retina as natural science compels you to admit , then light rays, falling upon the retina, produce the sensation of colour. This means that outside us, independently of us and of our minds, there exists a movement of matter, let us say of ether waves of a definite length and of a definite velocity, which, acting upon the retina, produce in man the sensation of a particular colour.

This is precisely how natural science regards it. It explains the sensations of various colours by the various lengths of light-waves existing outside the human retina, outside man and independently of him. Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc. The existence of matter does not depend on sensation. Sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product of matter organised in a particular way.

Such are the views of materialism in general, and of Marx and Engels in particular. Mach and Avenarius secretly smuggle in materialism by means of the word "element," which supposedly frees their theory of the "one-sidedness" of subjective idealism, supposedly permits the assumption that the mental is dependent on the retina, nerves and so forth, and the assumption that the physical is independent of the human organism.

In fact, of course, the trick with the word "element" is a wretched sophistry, for a materialist who reads Mach and Avenarius will immediately ask: It would, indeed, be childish to think that one can dispose of the fundamental philosophical trends by inventing a new word. I, Leipzig, , S. Take Petzoldt, for instance, the last word in empirio-criticism, as V.

Lessevich, the first and most outstanding Russian empirio-criticist describes him. Lessevich, What Is Scientific [read: Having defined elements as sensations, he says in the second volume of the work mentioned: II, Leipzig, , S. One speaks of what hurts one most! And the good Petzoldt imagines that he helps matters by the reservation that sensation must not be taken as something only subjective!

Is this not a ridiculous sophistry? Does it make any difference whether we "take" sensation as sensation or whether we try to stretch the meaning of the term? Does this do away with the fact that sensations in man are connected with normally functioning nerves, retina, brain, etc. If you are not trying to evade the issue by a subterfuge, if you are really in earnest in wanting to "guard" against subjectivism and solipsism, you must above all guard against the fundamental idealist premises of your philosophy; you must replace the idealist line of your philosophy from sensations to the external world by the materialist line from the external world to sensations ; you must abandon that empty and muddled verbal embellishment, "element," and simply say that colour is the result of the action of a physical object on the retina, which is the same Compare this with what Mach says after all his elucidation of the "elements" Analysis of Sensations, p.

At first we are assured that the "elements" are something new, both physical and psychical at the same time; then a little correction is surreptitiously inserted: Adler Fritz did not gain very much from "the discovery of the world-elements"! Bogdanov, arguing against Plekhanov in , wrote: I cannot own myself a Machian in philosophy. In theas saying that sensation is a result of the action of matter on our sense-organs. Let us take Avenarius. The most valuable material on the question of the "elements" is to be found in his last work and, it might be said, the most important for the comprehension of his philosophy , Notes on the Concept of the Subject of Psychology.

The author, by the way, here gives a very "graphic" table Vol. Elements, complexes of elements: Corporeal thingsIncorporeal things, recollections and fantasies. This is as though a religious man were to say — I cannot own myself a believer in religion, for there is "only one thing" I have borrowed from the believers — the belief in God. This "only one thing" which Bogdanov borrowed from Mach is the basic error of Machism, the basic falsity of its entire philosophy.

Those deviations of Bogdanov's from empirio-criticism to which he himself attaches great significance are in fact of entirely secondary importance and amount to nothing more than inconsiderable private and individual differences between the various empirio-criticists who are approved by Mach and who approve Mach we shall speak of this in greater detail later. Hence when Bogdanov was annoyed at being confused with the Machians he only revealed his failure to understand what radically distinguishes materialism from what is common to Bogdanov and to all other Machians.

How Bogdanov developed, improved or worsened Machism is not important. What is important is that he has abandoned the materialist standpoint and has thereby inevitably condemned himself to confusion and idealist aberrations. In , as we saw, Bogdanov had the correct standpoint when he wrote: Bogdanov did not trouble to give a criticism of this earlier position of his. He blindly believed Mach and began to repeat after him that the "elements" of experience are neutral in relation to the physical and psychical.

Here we have the true source of all Bogdanov's philosophical misadventures, a source which he shares with the rest of the Machians. We can and must call it idealism when "the elements of physical experience" i. There is not a trace here of recent philosophy, or positivist philosophy, or of indubitable fact. It is merely an old, old idealist sophism. And were one to ask Bogdanov how he would prove the "indubitable fact" that the physical is identical with sensations, one would get no other argument save the eternal refrain of the idealists: I am aware only of my sensations; the "testimony of self-consciousness" die Aussage des Selbstbewusstseins of Avenarius in his Prolegomena 2nd German ed.

Bogdanov trusting Mach accepted a reactionary philosophical trick as an "indubitable fact. In his philosophical wanderings the physicist Mach has completely strayed from the path of "modern science. One of the circumstances which helped Bogdanov to jump so quickly from the materialism of the natural scientists to the muddled idealism of Mach was apart from the influence of Ostwald Avenarius' doctrine of the dependent and independent series of experience.

Bogdanov himself expounds the matter in Book I of his Empirio-Monism thus: Avenarius therefore characterises these two realms of experience respectively as the dependent series and the independent series of experience" p. That is just the whole trouble, the doctrine of the independent i. For once you have recognised that the source of light and light-waves exists independently of man and the human consciousness, that colour is dependent on the action of these waves upon the retina, you have in fact adopted the materialist standpoint and have completely destroyed all the "indubitable facts" of idealism, together with all "the complexes of sensations," the elements discovered by recent positivism, and similar nonsense.

That is just the whole trouble. Bogdanov like the rest of the Russian Machians has never looked into the idealist views originally held by Mach and Avenarius, has never understood their fundamental idealist premises, and has therefore failed to discover the illegitimacy and eclecticism of their subsequent attempts to smuggle in materialism surreptitiously. Yet, just as the initial idealism of Mach and Avenarius is generally acknowledged in philosophical literature, so is it generally acknowledged that subsequently empirio-criticism endeavoured to swing towards materialism.

Cauwelaert, the French writer quoted above, asserts that Avenarius' Prolegomena is "monistic idealism," the Critique of Pure Experience is "absolute realism," while The Human Concept of the World is an attempt "to explain" the change. Let us note that the term realism is here employed as the antithesis of idealism. Following Engels, I use only the term materialism in this sense, and consider it the sole correct terminology, especially since the term "realism" has been bedraggled by the positivists and the other muddleheads who oscillate between materialism and idealism.

For the present it will suffice to note that Cauwelaert had the indisputable fact in mind that in the Prolegomena sensation, according to Avenarius, is the only entity, while "substance" — in accordance with the principle of "the economy of thought"! Oskar Ewald, the author of the book Avenarius as the Founder of Empirio-Criticism, says that this philosophy combines contradictory idealist and "realist" he should have said materialist elements not in Mach's sense, but in the human sense of the term element. For example, "the absolute [method of consideration] would perpetuate naive realism, the relative would declare exclusive idealism as permanent.

Avenarius calls the absolute method of consideration that which corresponds to Mach's connection of "elements" outside our body, and the relative that which corresponds to Mach's connection of "elements" dependent on our body. But of particular interest to us in this respect is the opinion of Wundt, who himself, like the majority of the above-mentioned writers, adheres to the confused idealist standpoint, but who has analysed empirio-criticism perhaps more attentively than all the others.

Yushkevich has the following to say in this connection: Yushkevich, Materialism and Critical Realism, St. Wundt, "Ueber naiven und kritischen Realismus" [On Naive and Critical Realism], in Philosophische Studien," "Philosophische Studien" Philosophical Studies — journal of an idealist trend devoted mainly to questions of psychology, published by Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig from to From to it appeared under the title Psychologische Studien Psychological Studies.

True, this opinion of Wundt's is extremely interesting. But what is even more "interesting" is Mr. Yushkevich's attitude towards the books and articles on philosophy of which he treats. This is a typical example of the attitude of our Machians to such matters. The serf valet Petrushka loved to read books but paid little attention to the meaning. He felt interested merely how letters were combined into words. Yushkevich read Wundt and found it "interesting" that Wundt accused Avenarius of materialism.

If Wundt is wrong, why not refute him? If he is right, why not explain the antithesis between materialism and empirio-criticism? Yushkevich finds what the idealist Wundt says "interesting," but this Machian regards it as a waste of effort to endeavour to go to the root of the matter probably on the principle of "the economy of thought". The point is that by informing the reader that Wundt accuses Avenarius of materialism, and by not informing him that Wundt regards some aspects of empirio-criticism as materialism and others as idealism and holds that the connection between the two is artificial, Yushkevich entirely distorted the matter.

Either this gentleman absolutely does not understand what he reads, or he was prompted by a desire to indulge in false self-praise with the help of Wundt, as if to say: The above-mentioned article by Wundt constitutes a large book more than pages , devoted to a detailed analysis first of the immanentist school, and then of the empirio- criticists. Why did Wundt connect these two schools?

Because he considers them closely akin; and this opinion, which is shared by Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and the immanentists is, as we shall see later, entirely correct. Wundt shows in the first part of this article that the immanentists are idealists, subjectivists and adherents of fideism. This, too, as we shall see later, is a perfectly correct opinion, although Wundt expounds it with a superfluous ballast of professorial erudition, with superfluous niceties and reservations, which is to be explained by the fact that Wundt himself is an idealist and fideist.

He reproaches the immanentists not because they are idealists and adherents of fideism, but because, in his opinion, they arrive at these great principles by incorrect methods. Further, the second and third parts of Wundt's article are devoted to empirio-criticism. There he quite definitely points out that very important theoretical propositions of empirio-criticism e. Other of Avenarius' theoretical propositions are borrowed from materialism, and in general empirio-criticism is a "motley" bunte Mischung, ibid.

Wundt regards Avenarius' doctrine of the "independent vital series," in particular, as one of the materialist morsels of the Avenarius-Mach hotchpotch. If you start from the "system C" that is how Avenarius — who was very fond of making erudite play of new terms — designates the human brain or the nervous system in general , and if the mental is for you a function of the brain, then this "system C" is a "metaphysical substance" — says Wundt ibid.

It should be said that many idealists and all agnostics Kantians and Humeans included call the materialists metaphysicians, because it seems to them that to recognise the existence of an external world independent of the human mind is to transcend the bounds of experience. Of this terminology and its utter incorrectness from the point of view of Marxism, we shall speak in its proper place. Here it is important to note that the recognition of the "independent" series by Avenarius and also by Mach, who expresses the same idea in different words is, according to the general opinion of philosophers of various parties, i.

If you assume that everything that exists is sensation, or that bodies are complexes of sensations, you cannot, without violating all your fundamental premises, all "your" philosophy, arrive at the conclusion that the physical exists independently of our minds, and that sensation is a function of matter organised in a definite way. Mach and Avenarius, in their philosophy, combine fundamental idealist premises with individual materialist deductions for the very reason that their theory is an example of that "pauper's broth of eclecticism" Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy", Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Eng.

These words of Engels' refer to German professorial philosophy in general. The Machians who would like to be Marxists, being unable to grasp the significance and meaning of this thought of Engels', sometimes take refuge in a wretched evasion: On what is this opinion based? On the fact that Engels does not cite Mach and Avenarius? There are no other grounds, and these grounds are worthless, for Engels does not mention any of the eclectics by name, and it is hardly likely that Engels did not know Avenarius, who had been editing a quarterly of "scientific" philosophy ever since This eclecticism is particularly marked in Mach's latest philosophical work, Knowledge and Error, 2nd edition, We have already seen that Mach there declared that "there is no difficulty in constructing every physical element out of sensation, i.

Well, well, the titmouse first promised to set the sea on fire From one of Krelov's fables satirizing braggarts. What divergence Abweichung is meant here? The divergence of what from what? Of thought physical theory from the facts. And what are thoughts, ideas? Ideas are the "tracks of sensations" S.

And what are facts? Facts are "complexes of sensations. What does this mean? It means that Mach forgets his own theory and, when treating of various problems of physics, speaks plainly, without idealist twists, i. All the "complexes of sensations" and the entire stock of Berkeleian wisdom vanish. The physicists' theory proves to be a reflection of bodies, liquids, gases existing outside us and independently of us, a reflection which is, of course, approximate; but to call this approximation or simplification "arbitrary" is wrong.

In fact, sensation is here regarded by Mach just as it is regarded by all science which has not been "purified" by the disciples of Berkeley and Hume, viz.

Mach's own theory is subjective idealism; but when the factor of objectivity is required, Mach unceremoniously inserts into his arguments the premises of the contrary, i. Eduard von Hartmann, a consistent idealist and consistent reactionary in philosophy, who sympathises with the Machians' fight against materialism, comes very close to the truth when he says that Mach's philosophical position is a "mixture Nicht-unterscheidung of naive realism and absolute illusionism. The doctrine that bodies are complexes of sensations, etc.

On the other hand, Mach's afore-mentioned argument, as well as many other of his fragmentary arguments, is what is known as "naive realism," i. Avenarius and the professors who follow in his footsteps attempt to disguise this mixture by the theory of the "principal co-ordination. Yushkevich, to whom Wundt's opinion which he failed to understand seemed so interesting, was either himself not enough interested to learn, or else did not condescend to inform the reader, how Avenarius' nearest disciples and successors reacted to this charge.

Yet this is necessary to clarify the matter if we are interested in the relation of Marx's philosophy, i. Moreover, if Machism is a muddle, a mixture of materialism and idealism, it is important to know whither this current turned — if we may so express it — after the official idealists began to disown it because of its concessions to materialism.

Wundt was answered, among others, by two of Avenarius' purest and most orthodox disciples, J. Petzoldt, with haughty resentment, repudiated the charge of materialism, which is so degrading to a German professor, and in support referred to — what do you think? A convenient theory, indeed, that can be made to embrace both purely idealist works and arbitrarily assumed materialist premises! Avenarius' Critique of Pure Experience, of course, does not contradict this teaching, i.

Petzoldt, Einfuhrung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung, Bd. This is exactly what Engels called "a pauper's broth of eclecticism. He asserts that "empirio-criticism is not. What appeared to Bogdanov to be truth is, as a matter of fact, confusion, a wavering between materialism and idealism. Carstanjen, rebutting Wundt, said that he absolutely repudiated this "importation Unterschiebung of a materialist element" which is utterly foreign to the critique of pure experience.

Carstanjen, "Der Empiriokritizismus, zugleich eine Erwiderung auf W. Wundt's Articles], Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Jahrg. Instead of the consistent standpoint of Berkeley — the external world is my sensation — we sometimes get the Humean standpoint — I exclude the question whether or not there is anything beyond my sensations. And this agnostic standpoint inevitably condemns one to vacillate between materialism and idealism.

Avenarius' doctrine of the principal co-ordination is expounded in The Human Concept of the World and in the Notes. The second was written later, and in it Avenarius emphasises that he is expounding, it is true in a somewhat altered form, something that is not different from the Critique of Pure Experience and The Human Concept of the World, but exactly the same Notes, , S. The self is called the central term of the co-ordination, the environment the counter-term Gegen-glied. Der menschliche Weltbegriff, 2. Avenarius claims that by this doctrine he recognises the full value of what is known as naive realism, that is, the ordinary, non-philosophical, naive view which is entertained by all people who do not trouble themselves as to whether they themselves exist and whether the environment, the external world, exists.

Expressing his solidarity with Avenarius, Mach also tries to represent himself as a defender of "naive realism" Analysis of Sensations, p. The Russian Machians, without exception, believed Mach's and Avenarius' claim that this was indeed a defence of "naive realism": In order to decide who actually possesses the greatest degree of naivete, let us proceed from a somewhat remote starting point. Here is a popular dialogue between a certain philosopher and his reader:. The existence of a system of things [according to ordinary philosophy] is required and from them only is consciousness to be derived.

Now you are speaking in the spirit of a professional philosopher. Does a thing appear in you and become present in you and for you otherwise than simultaneously with and through your consciousness of the thing? Now you are speaking from yourself, from your heart. Take care, therefore, not to jump out of yourself and to apprehend anything otherwise than you are able to apprehend it, as consciousness and [the italics are the philosopher's] the thing, the thing and consciousness; or, more precisely, neither the one nor the other, but that which only subsequently becomes resolved into the two, that which is the absolute subjective-objective and objective-subjective.

Here you have the whole essence of the empirio-critical principal co-ordination, the latest defence of "naive realism" by the latest positivism! The idea of "indissoluble" coordination is here stated very clearly and as though it were a genuine defence of the point of view of the common man, uncorrupted by the subtleties of "the professional philosophers. There is nothing but a paraphrase of subjective idealism in the teachings of Mach and Avenarius we are examining.

The claim that they have risen above materialism and idealism, that they have eliminated the opposition between the point of view that proceeds from the thing to consciousness and the contrary point of view — is but the empty claim of a renovated Fichteanism. Fichte too imagined that he had "indissolubly" connected the "self" and the "environment," the consciousness and the thing; that he had "solved" the problem by the assertion that a man cannot jump out of himself. In other words, the Berkeleian argument is repeated: I perceive only my sensations, I have no right to assume "objects in themselves" outside of my sensation.

The different methods of expression used by Berkeley in , by Fichte in , and by Avenarius in do not in the least change the essence of the matter, viz. The world is my sensation; the non-self is "postulated" is created, produced by the self; the thing is indissolubly connected with the consciousness; the indissoluble co-ordination of the self and the environment is the empirio-critical principal co-ordination; — this is all one and the same proposition, the same old trash with a slightly refurbished, or repainted, signboard. The reference to "naive realism," supposedly defended by this philosophy, is sophistry of the cheapest kind.

The "naive realism" of any healthy person who has not been an inmate of a lunatic asylum or a pupil of the idealist philosophers consists in the view that things, the environment, the world, exist independently of our sensation, of our consciousness, of our self and of man in general.

The same experience not in the Machian sense, but in the human sense of the term that has produced in us the firm conviction that independently of us there exist other people, and not mere complexes of my sensations of high, short, yellow, hard, etc. Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the "naive" belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge. Is not the foregoing evaluation of the "principal co-ordination" a product of the materialist prejudice against Machism?

Specialists in philosophy who cannot be accused of partiality towards materialism, who even detest it and who accept one or other of the idealist systems, agree that the principal co-ordination of Avenarius and Co. Wundt, for instance, whose interesting opinion was not understood by Mr. Yushkevich, explicitly states that Avenarius' theory, according to which a full description of the given or the found is impossible without some self, an observer or describer, is "a false confusion of the content of real experience with reflections about it.

For the immanentists Schuppe, Rehmke, Leclair, Schubert-Soldern , who themselves voice — as we shall see later — their hearty sympathy with Avenarius, proceed from this very idea of the "indissoluble" connection between subject and object. Wundt, before analysing Avenarius, demonstrated in detail that the immanentist philosophy is only a "modification" of Berkeleianism, that however much the immanentists may deny their kinship with Berkeley we should not allow verbal differences to conceal from us the "deeper content of these philosophical doctrines," viz. The English writer Norman Smith, analysing Avenarius' Philosophy of Pure Experience, puts this criticism in an even more straightforward and emphatic form:.

So long as we seek to interpret his theory of experience in the form in which it is avowedly presented, namely, as genuinely realistic, it eludes all clear comprehension: It is only when we translate Avenarius' technical terms into more familiar language that we discover where the real source of the mystification lies. Avenarius has diverted attention from the defects of his posi tion by directing his main attack against the very weakness [i. Sometimes it means experiencing and at other times the experienced, the latter meaning being emphasised when the nature of the self is in question.

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These two meanings of the term experience practically coincide with his important distinction between the absolute and the relative standpoints [I have examined above what significance this distinction has for Avenarius]; and these two points of view are not in his philosophy really reconciled. For when he allows as legitimate the demand that experience be ideally completed in thought [the full description of the environment is ideally completed by thinking of an observing self ] , he makes an admission which he cannot successfully combine with his assertion that nothing exists save in relation to the self.

The ideal completion of given reality which results from the analysis of material bodies into elements which no human senses can apprehend [here are meant the material elements discovered by natural science, the atoms, electrons, etc. It completes only one of the two aspects which Avenarius has asserted to be inseparable. It leads us not only to what has not been experienced but to what can never by any possibility be experienced by beings like ourselves. But here again the ambiguities of the term experi ence come to Avenarius' rescue. He argues that thought is as genuine a form of experience as sense-perception, and so in the end falls back on the time-worn argument of subjective idealism, that thought and reality are inseparable, because reality can only be conceived in thought, and thought involves the presence of the thinker.

Not, therefore, any original and profound re-establishment of realism, but only the restatement in its crudest form of the familiar position of subjective idealism is the final outcome of Avenarius' positive speculations" p. The mystification wrought by Avenarius, who completely duplicates Fichte's error, is here excellently exposed. The much-vaunted elimination of the antithesis between materialism Norman Smith should not have used the term realism and idealism by means of the term "experience" instantly proves to be a myth as soon as we proceed to definite and concrete problems.

Such, for instance, is the problem of the existence of the earth prior to man, prior to any sentient being. We shall presently speak of this point in detail. Here we will note that not only Norman Smith, an opponent of his theory, but also W. Schuppe, the immanentist, who warmly greeted the appearance of The Human Concept of the World as a confirmation of naive realism See W.

Schuppe's open letter to R. Avenarius in Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Bd. Such "realism," he wrote to Avenarius, I, the immanentist philosopher, who have been slandered as a subjective idealist, have always claimed with as much right as yourself, hochverehrter Herr Kollege. And it is difficult to say who more rudely unmasks Avenarius the mystifier — Smith by his straightforward and clear refutation, or Schuppe by his enthusiastic opinion of Avenarius' crowning work.

Struve — former "legal Marxist", monarchist and counterrevolutionary, and founder of the Constitutional-Democratic Cadet Party. Menshikov — contributor to the reactionary newspaper Novoye Vremya. Lenin called him a "faithful watchdog of the tsarist Black Hundreds". Ewald, who praises Mach for not succumbing to materialism, speaks of the principal co-ordination in a similar manner: By metaphysics and transcendental realism, Herr Fried-lander, who is disguised under the pseudonym Ewald, means materialism.

Himself professing one of the varieties of idealism, he fully agrees with the Machians and the Kantians that materialism is metaphysics — "from beginning to end the wildest metaphysics" p. On the question of the "transcendence" and the metaphysical character of materialism he is in agreement with Bazarov and all our Machians, and of this we shall have occasion to say more later. Here again it is important to note how in fact the shallow and pedantic claim to have transcended idealism and materialism vanishes, and how the question arises inexorably and irreconcilably.

And that is materialism. To build a theory of knowledge on the hypothesis of the indissoluble connection between the object and human sensation "complexes of sensations" as identical with bodies; "world-elements" that are identical both psychically and physically; Avenarius' co-ordination, and so forth is to land inevitably into idealism. Such is the simple and unavoidable truth that with a little attention may be easily detected beneath the piles of affected quasi-erudite terminology of Avenarius, Schuppe, Ewald and the others, which deliberately obscures matters and frightens the general public away from philosophy.

The "reconciliation" of Avenarius' theory with "naive realism" in the end aroused misgivings even among his own disciples. Willy says that the common assertion that Avenarius came to adopt "naive realism" should be taken cum grano salis. With a grain of salt, i.

Willy, Gegen die Schulweisheit, S. In other words, the only theory of knowledge that is really created by an actual and not fictitious agreement with "naive realism" is, according to Willy, materialism! And Willy, of course, rejects materialism. But he is compelled to admit that Avenarius in The Human Concept of the World restores the unity of "experience," the unity of the "self" and the environment "by means of a series of complicated and extremely artificial subsidiary and intermediary conceptions" p. The Human Concept of the World, being a reaction against the original idealism of Avenarius, "entirely bears the character of a reconciliation eines Ausgleiches between the naive realism of common sense and the epistemological idealism of school philosophy.

But that such a reconciliation could restore the unity and integrity of experience [Willy calls it Grunderfahrung, that is, basic experience — another new world! Avenarius' "experience" failed to reconcile idealism and materialism. Willy, it seems, repudiates the school philosophy of experience in order to replace it by a philosophy of "basic" experience, which is confusion thrice confounded We have already seen that this question is particularly repugnant to the philosophy of Mach and Avenarius. Natural science positively asserts that the earth once existed in such a state that no man or any other creature existed or could have existed on it.

Organic matter is a later phenomenon, the fruit of a long evolution. It follows that there was no sentient matter, no "complexes of sensations," no self that was supposedly "indissolubly" connected with the environment in accordance with Avenarius' doctrine. Matter is primary, and thought, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development. Such is the materialist theory of knowledge, to which natural science instinctively subscribes.

The question arises, have the eminent representatives of empirio-criticism observed this contradiction between their theory and natural science? They have observed it, and they have definitely asked themselves by what arguments this contradiction can be removed. Three attitudes to this question are of particular interest from the point of view of materialism, that of Avenarius himself and those of his disciples J.

Avenarius tries to eliminate the contradiction to natural science by means of the theory of the "potential" central term in the co-ordination. As we know, co-ordination is the "indissoluble" connection between self and environment. In order to eliminate the obvious absurdity of this theory the concept of the "potential" central term is introduced. For instance, what about man's development from the embryo? Does the environment the "counter-term" exist if the "central term" is represented by an embryo? The potential central term is never equal to zero, even when there are as yet no parents elterliche Bestandteile , but only the "integral parts of the environment" capable of becoming parents p.

The co-ordination then is indissoluble. It is essential for the empirio-criticist to assert this in order to save the fundamentals of his philosophy — sensations and their complexes. Man is the central term of this co-ordination. But when there is no man, when he has not yet been born, the central term is nevertheless not equal to zero; it has only become a potential central term! It is astonishing that there are people who can take seriously a philosopher who advances such arguments! Even Wundt, who stipulates that he is not an enemy of every form of metaphysics i.

And, indeed, how can one seriously speak of a co-ordination the indissolubility of which consists in one of its terms being potential? Is this not mysticism, the very antechamber of fideism? If it is possible to think of the potential central term in relation to a future environment, why not think of it in relation to a past environment, that is, after man's death? You will say that Avenarius did not draw this conclusion from his theory? Granted, but that absurd and reactionary theory became the more cowardly but not any the better for that.

Avenarius, in , did not carry this theory to its logical conclusion, or perhaps feared to do so. Schubert-Soldern, as we shall see, resorted in to this very theory to arrive at theological conclusions, which in earned the approval of Mach, who said that Schubert-Soldern was following "very close paths" to Machism. But we have among us people who would have us regard them as Marxists, yet who bring to the masses a philosophy which comes very close to fideism. It would seem," Avenarius wrote in the Bemerkun-gen "that from the empirio-critical standpoint natural science is not entitled to enquire about periods of our present environment which in time preceded the existence of man" S.

An object cannot exist independently of our consciousness. This theory of the necessity of "mentally projecting" the human mind to every object and to nature prior to man is given by me in the first paragraph in the words of the "recent positivist," R. Avenarius, and in the second, in the words of the subjective idealist, J. The sophistry of this theory is so manifest that it is embarrassing to analyse it. If we "mentally project" ourselves, our presence will be imag- inary — but the existence of the earth prior to man is real.

Man could not in practice be an observer, for instance, of the earth in an incandescent state, and to "imagine" his being present at the time is obscurantism, exactly as though I were to endeavour to prove the existence of hell by the argument that if I "mentally projected" myself thither as an observer I could observe hell. The "reconciliation" of empirio-criticism and natural science amounts to this, that Avenarius graciously consents to "mentally project" something the possibility of admitting which is excluded by natural science. No man at all educated or sound-minded doubts that the earth existed at a time when there could not have been any life on it, any sensation or any "central term," and consequently the whole theory of Mach and Avenarius, from which it follows that the earth is a complex of sensations "bodies are complexes of sensations" or "complexes of elements in which the psychical and physical are identical," or "a counter-term of which the central term can never be equal to zero," is philosophical obscurantism, the carrying of subjective idealism to absurdity.

Petzoldt perceived the absurdity of the position into which Avenarius had fallen and felt ashamed. People can think and "mentally project" for themselves any kind of hell and any kind of hobgoblin. Lunacharsky even "mentally projected" for himself — well, to use a mild expression — religious conceptions. Elizarova that the original manuscript read: In the letter Lenin wrote: That is not true. Avenarius' theory of is a theory of thought without brain. And in his theory of , as we shall presently see, there is a similar element of idealist nonsense. Or must the existence of the earth be really made conditional, as Willy claimed, on our right at least to assume that at the given period there co-existed some system C, even though at the lowest stage of its development?

But then Avenarius makes the individual self of the person who puts the question, or the thought of such a self, the condition not only of the act of thought regarding the uninhabitable earth, but also of the justification for believing in the existence of the earth at that time. The only thing the theory of knowledge should demand of the various conceptions of that which is remote in space or time is that it be conceivable and uniquely eindeutig determined; the rest is the affair of the special sciences" Vol.

Petzoldt rechristened the law of causality the law of unique determination and imported into his theory, as we shall see later, the apriority of this law. This means that Petzoldt saves himself from Avenarius' subjective idealism and solipsism "he attributes an exaggerated importance to the self," as the professorial jargon has it with the help of Kantian ideas.

The absence of the objective factor in Avenarius' doctrine, the impossibility of reconciling it with the demands of natural science, which declares the earth object to have existed long before the appearance of living beings subject , compelled Petzoldt to resort to causality unique determination. The earth existed, for its existence prior to man is causally connected with the present existence of the earth. Firstly, where does causality come from? Secondly, are not the ideas of hell, devils, and Lunacharsky's "mental projections" also connected by causality?

Thirdly, the theory of the "complexes of sensations" in any case turns out to be destroyed by Petzoldt. Petzoldt failed to resolve the contradiction he observed in Avenarius, and only entangled himself still more, for only one solution is possible, viz. This materialist solution alone is really compatible with natural science, and it alone eliminates both Petzoldt's and Mach's idealist solution of the question of causality, which we shall speak of separately. The third empirio-criticist, R. Willy, first raised the question of this difficulty in Avenarius' philosophy in , in an article entitled "Der Empiriokritizismus als einzig wis-senschaftlicher Standpunkt" "Empirio-Criticism as the Only Scientific Standpoint".

What about the world prior to man? Thus, prior to man the earth was the "experience" of a worm, which discharged the functions of the "central term" in order to save Avenarius' "co-ordination" and Avenarius' philosophy! No wonder Petzoldt tried to dissociate himself from an argument which is not only the height of absurdity ideas of the earth corresponding to the theories of the geologists attributed to a worm , but which does not in any way help our philosopher, for the earth existed not only before man but before any living being generally.

Willy returned to the question in The worm was now removed. But Petzoldt's "law of unique determination" could not, of course, satisfy Willy, who regarded it merely as "logical formalism. What does millions of years without life mean? We shall discuss this point with the Machians later. And that means that things outside men are only impressions, bits of fantasy fabricated by men with the help of a few fragments we find about us.

Need the philosopher fear the stream of life? And so I say to myself: Either materialism or solipsism — this, in spite of his vociferous phrases, is what Willy arrives at when he analyses the question of the existence of nature before man. Three augurs of empirio-criticism have appeared before us and have laboured in the sweat of their brow to reconcile their philosophy with natural science, to patch up the holes of solipsism.

Avenarius repeated Fichte's argument and substituted an imaginary world for the real world. Petzoldt withdrew from Fichtean idealism and moved towards Kantian idealism. Willy, having suffered a fiasco with the "worm," threw up the sponge and inadvertently blurted out the truth: It only remains for us to show the reader how this problem was understood and treated by our own native Machians. Here is Bazarov in the Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism p. The question arises, what was the status of space, time and causality then? Whose subjective forms were they then?

Were they the subjective forms of the ichthyosauruses? And whose intelligence at that time dictated its laws to nature? The intelligence of the archaeopteryx? To these queries the Kantian philosophy can give no answer. And it must be rejected as absolutely incompatible with modern science' L. Here Bazarov breaks the quotation from Plekhanov just before a very important passage — as we shall soon see — namely: The history of the earth shows that the object existed long before the subject appeared, i.

The history of development reveals the truth of materialism. But does Plekhanov's thing-in-itself provide the desired solution? Let us remember that even according to Plekhanov we can have no idea of things as they are in themselves; we know only their manifestations, only the results of their action on our sense-organs. What sense-organs existed in the period of the ichthyosauruses? Evidently, only the sense-organs of the ichthyosauruses and their like. Only the ideas of the ichthyosauruses were then the actual, the real manifestations of things-in-themselves.

Hence, according to Plekhanov also, if the paleontologist desires to remain on 'real' ground he must write the story of the Mesozoic period in the light of the contemplations of the ichthyosaurus.

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And, consequently, not a single step forward is made in comparison with solipsism. Many other ideas are discussed within "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," but the general theme of the text lies in its assault upon how idealist theories explain causality, human economic and social relations, and the necessity of employing logical or interpretive abstractions in every theory or idea that humanity has ever formed. Lenin insists that consciousness is an outgrowth of nature, and that, accordingly, its contents can never fully encompass nature.

This is true regardless of whether we are considering individual, collective, or cosmic? Marx's theories regarding socialism are predicated on the collective material process of human labor, and the understanding that certain relationships--including economic and political relationships--hold true independently of the consciousness or intentions of any particular individual. Broadly speaking, individuals are organized into social classes, these classes are relatively! I deducted a single star in my rating of this book because the work sometimes gets bogged down in a lot of names and terminology, and I think the average reader who lacks any background in either philosophy or the history of Marxist theory would likely find this work exceedingly dense.

Many of the overarching concepts and theoretical positions being discussed are challenging and exciting -- and I would claim, true -- insights, but are presented within the context of an obscure conflict within the Bolshevik Party. I would like to independently review my notes on this work in the near future in order to internalize many of the actual arguments Lenin uses to challenge, for instance, Humean notions of causality, while defending the status of Marxism as a legitimate scientific theory within the social sciences. I sometimes find Marxist authors difficult to follow because their expressions are often presented in the form of blazing assertions and fiery political proclamations rather than sober analysis, but the analysis is often clearly there independently of this outward form.

The significance of the overall philosophical outlook presented in this text is quite clear to this reader. Lenin's insistence on mind-independent processes and cognition's imperfect reflection of these processes remains valuable in an age of rampant individualism, empty postmodernist navel-gazing, and the absurd violence to public life associated with an ultra-nationalist fascist? View all 3 comments. Dec 04, Bradley rated it liked it.

Lenin basically knows nothing of Kant Dec 16, Erik rated it did not like it. Lenin was far from an idiot, as revealed in this polemic against the new positivism of Ernst Mach and his Russian followers. It is, however, a disgraceful misunderstanding of Machian positivism which influenced its reception in Russia and elsewhere.

It also set back materialism, which remained the crude Marxian kind, absent all nuance. Machian positivism was in reality a sophisticated kind of materialism which included mental phenomena, such as sensations, alongside physical phenomena under the Lenin was far from an idiot, as revealed in this polemic against the new positivism of Ernst Mach and his Russian followers.

Machian positivism was in reality a sophisticated kind of materialism which included mental phenomena, such as sensations, alongside physical phenomena under the heading of elements. Elements were neither physical nor mental, but more like neutral events with individual concrete qualities, when taken one by one.

Grouped together they can be formed into either material objects or mental phenomena. It is a very advanced point og view which continued in William James and Bertrand Russell and even today perhaps in the work of Aussie philosopher David Chalmers. Lenin is best forgotten. I read Lenin's Book. Lenin's "methodology" and "philosophy of nature" in this book. Jan 28, John Victor rated it it was amazing.

Really cleared up a lot of the finer points of Marxist philosophy for me. Sep 16, Scott Bisset rated it really liked it. Amazing book Although doesn't go into the details and mainly criticizes, empirio-criticist i. One of the sections is titled the crisis in physics, yet it highlights ironical that those erroneous idealist Machian Instrumentist notions are the very basis of the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

Which very much was the thought process of Bohr and the founde Amazing book Although doesn't go into the details and mainly criticizes, empirio-criticist i. Which very much was the thought process of Bohr and the founders of the field and Materialist idealist saying that the wave function is "a mathematical abstract wavefunction" and "the wave function collapses just cause u look at it" when obviously dots would still appear on the other side of the screen even if there was no humans there.

They were against trying to to postulate a external reality. It's hilariously as alot of scientist today have this idealist symbolic materialists notation of thinking that symbols, maths is the key mover of the Universe when it's just a consistent axiomatic abstract simplfied approximate formalised description to try to explain reality, bought around through the development of political-economy. This the same position of some of Machs disciples. Abit more idealist; saying that the real elements of the world are the relationships between ideas and senses.

Pilot wave interpretation is the Antidote to this kind of idealist materialist brought about by the fake "mysticism" of quantum mechanics. What's even more hilarious is that so many scientists say that oh yeah the the results can be interpreted in either way but you know the scientific method is derived from philosophy and they are basically very specialised philosopher's and you know they could do debunk Copenhagen interpretation using Materialist dialectical materialism philosophical arguments but they say that's not scientific and we must stick to our science but again that's just specialisation of philosophy itself.

Quantum mechanics Itself is now in crisis. Scientist neglect of philosophy and Materialist dialectical arguments that could debunk it. Dialectics just being abstract generalized principles derived from a materialist conception of reality that accurately describe it. In fact over specialised because they're ignoring other subject matters and thinking their signs is a metaphysical Island divorce from everything else. I'd recommend you go to Paul cockshott his YouTube channel to find out more and read more to dialectical materialism to see how this shapes heavily Marx Engels Lenin Stalin Mao and the other Marxist Leninist is key with trying to explain economics etc and socialism in a scientific way.

Personally reading lucretius the order of things has really made big double down on the materialist philosophy and put dialectical materialism and marxism-lenninsm into a shaper a perspective and focus. Sep 22, mimosa maoist added it Shelves: Really entertaining polemic, especially in the final chapter.

One can hope post-leftist philosophies go the same way as neo-Kantianism. May 23, Cent rated it liked it. His usual argument simplistically lead to show how empirico-criticism misunderstood the position held by the materialists, which he traced from Marx, Engels, and even of Plekhanov. Lenin did not subject his form of Materialism into a critical examination, perhaps this flaw just highlights his theoretical inadequacy compare to Marx.

Lenin at this point was unaware of the existence of the Paris Manuscripts and other texts. Most of the passages he quoted from Marx only came from the Theses,which could not well represent Marx's thought. He also assumed that both Engels and Marx hold the same epistemological views, which is rather erroneous. One must also be cautious in reading Lenin's Materialism , especially when he merely adopts the idea simply because it is from Marx and Engels, and dismisses others because they are accused as form of bourgeois thinking.

Fer rated it it was amazing Apr 06, Phil Seletsky rated it really liked it Oct 08, Zarl Sharx rated it liked it Jan 22, Emma rated it it was amazing Aug 27, Michael Hiles rated it really liked it Apr 15, Linda Mulla rated it it was amazing Jul 28, Alejandro Dugarte rated it it was amazing Apr 28, Marcin rated it liked it Nov 23, Donal Fhearraigh rated it it was amazing Jun 21, Jacob Pointon rated it really liked it Nov 13, FatherMontaneli rated it it was amazing Apr 15, Olgun Dursun rated it it was amazing Jan 11, Anatole David rated it really liked it Feb 16, Brixton rated it liked it Dec 05, Anton rated it it was ok Apr 03, Phillip rated it liked it Sep 22, Joseph rated it liked it May 09, Caio Abramo rated it it was amazing Jul 20, There are no discussion topics on this book yet.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich - one of the leaders of the Bolshevik party since its formation in Led the Soviets to power in October, Elected to the head of the Soviet government until , when he retired due to ill health. Lenin, born in , was committed to revolutionary struggle from an early age - his elder brother was hanged for the attempted assassination of Czar Alexande Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich - one of the leaders of the Bolshevik party since its formation in Lenin, born in , was committed to revolutionary struggle from an early age - his elder brother was hanged for the attempted assassination of Czar Alexander III.

In Lenin passed his Law exam with high honors, whereupon he took to representing the poorest peasantry in Samara. After moving to St. Petersburg in , Lenin's experience with the oppression of the peasantry in Russia, coupled with the revolutionary teachings of G V Plekhanov, guided Lenin to meet with revolutionary groups.

Materialism And Empirio-criticism

In April , his comrades helped send Lenin abroad to get up to speed with the revolutionary movement in Europe, and in particular, to meet the Emancipation of Labour Group, of which Plekhanov head. After five months abroad, traveling from Switzerland to France to Germany, working at libraries and newspapers to make his way, Lenin returned to Russia, carrying a brief case with a false bottom, full of Marxist literature.

The group supported strikes and union activity, distributed Marxist literature, and taught in workers education groups. Petersburg Lenin begins a relationship with Nadezhda Krupskaya. In the night of December 8, , Lenin and the members of the party are arrested; Lenin sentenced to 15 months in prison. By , when the prison sentence expired, the autocracy appended an additional three year sentence, due to Lenin's continual writing and organising while in prison.

Lenin is exiled to the village of Shushenskoye, in Siberia, where he becomes a leading member of the peasant community.