A Grand Strategy for America (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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Other books in the series. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs 1 - 10 of books. It is likely to remain the world's preeminent power for at least several decades to come. What behavior is appropriate for such a powerful state? To answer this question, Robert J. Art concentrates on "grand strategy"—the deployment of military power in both peace and war to support foreign policy goals. He first defines America's contemporary national interests and the specific threats they face, then identifies seven grand strategies that the United States might contemplate, examining each in relation to America's interests.

Art makes a strong case for selective engagement as the most desirable strategy for contemporary America. It is the one that seeks to forestall dangers, not simply react to them; that is politically viable, at home and abroad; and that protects all U. Art concludes that "selective engagement is not a strategy for all times, but it is the best grand strategy for these times. Civil Wars Active between and Appendix B.

International Wars Active between and Foreword by Richard C. The International Setting 2. America's National Interests 3. Dominion, Collective Security, and Containment 4. Isolationism and Offshore Balancing 6. Selective Engagement and the Free Hand Strategies 7. This means the United States is far less threatening to great powers that are situated oceans away, the authors claim. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching U. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors.

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Finally, when the United States wields its security leverage, the authors argue, it shapes the overall structure of the global economy. Ted Carpenter, senior fellow at the Cato Institute , believes that the proponents of primacy suffer from the "light-switch model," in which only two positions exist: Selective engagement is a strategy that sits in between primacy and isolationism and, given growing multipolarity and American fiscal precariousness, should be taken seriously.

It is imperative for a major power that wishes to preserve its strategic insolvency. Otherwise, overextension and national exhaustion become increasing dangers. Nevertheless, the United States must refrain from using military might in campaigns that do not directly deal with U. Posen has argued that the four schools of U. Proponents of liberal hegemony favor a world order in which the United States is a hegemon and uses this power advantage to create a liberal international system and at times use force to enforce or spread liberal values such as individual rights, free trade, and the rule of law.

The United States strives to retain overwhelming military power, under a theory that potential competitors will not even try to compete on the global stage. It also retains an extensive network of permanent alliance commitments around the world, using the alliance system both to advance and retain hegemonic power and to solidify emerging liberal political systems.

According to Posen, this strategy sees "threats emanating from three major sources: The chief difference on foreign policy between Republican and Democratic proponents of liberal hegemony, according to Posen, is on support for international institutions as a means to achieving hegemony. Proponents of a grand strategy of restraint call for the United States to significantly reduce its overseas security commitments and largely avoid involvement in conflicts abroad. America would take advantage of what Posen calls a "remarkably good" strategic position: Other great powers are at present weaker than the United States, close to one another, and face the same pressures to defend themselves as does the United States.

Restraint proponents also emphasize the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, which tremendously raise the stakes of confrontations between great powers, breeding caution, rather than rewarding aggression. Restraint proponents also argue, drawing on thinkers like the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, that military force is a blunt, expensive, and unpredictable instrument, and that it accordingly should only be used rarely, for clear goals. Restraint is distinct from isolationism: Restraint, however, sees economic dynamism as a key source of national power and accordingly tends to argue for a relatively open trade system.

Some restrainers call for supporting this trade system via significant naval patrols; others suggest that the international economy is resilient against disruptions and, with rare exceptions, [29] does not require a powerful state to guarantee the security of global trade. In offshore balancing, the United States would refrain from significant involvement in security affairs overseas except to prevent a state from establishing hegemony in what offshore balancers identify as the world's three key strategic regions: Offshore balancing is associated with offensive realist theories of state behavior: Political scientist Richard K.

Betts has detailed some of the critiques hold by some skeptics regarding the feasibility and practicability of strategy, Betts argues "[t]o skeptics, effective strategy is often an illusion because what happens in the gap between policy objectives and war outcomes is too complex and unpredictable to be manipulated to a specified end. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. For grand strategy in wargaming, see Grand strategy wargame.

Prehistoric Ancient Post-classical Early modern Late modern industrial fourth-gen. Blitzkrieg Deep operation Maneuver Operational manoeuvre group.

Military recruitment Conscription Recruit training Military specialism Women in the military Children in the military Transgender people and military service Sexual harassment in the military Conscientious objection Counter recruitment. Arms industry Materiel Supply chain management.

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Also of interest

You may improve this article , discuss the issue on the talk page , or create a new article , as appropriate. War, Peace and International Relations: The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. The Fall of the Roman Empire: United States Army in World War 2: War in the Pacific, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. The New York Review of Books. The Strategy of Selective Engagement".

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