Die Entwicklung der Identität (German Edition)

For this analysis, it has to be kept in mind first that in about 40 percent of the respondents in both samples could not be classified on the voting question because they either did not know or refused to answer, or indicated they would not vote. In addition, in the West the present government received only 34 percent and in the East a 21 percent share of a potential vote. In the early summer of , there is not a single type in both parts of Germany where the conservative-liberal government can muster a majority. This is a major change certainly with the Positivists who were favoring the present coalition all along, but also for the Eastern Internalizers and the Western Externalizers.

However, in the East the two types of Externalizers and Negativists, who put the blame for the problems with unification on the West Germans, are still a stronghold for the postcommunist PDS. In sum, though, one can maintain that the differences with respect to how the process of unification is perceived, are no longer related to the partisanship of the respondents in a similarly clear-cut fashion as before. While such data was not available for the survey, the authors of this article were permitted access to three questions which were asked by the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in the same study from which the typology was derived see Table 8.

It varies between o statistical independence and 1 perfect dependence. It only measures the degree of covariation between two variables, but does not indicate its direction. These differences, it was argued, reflect both the effects of political socialization under totalitarian rule and of context, particularly the high rate of unemployment in the East this latter point is strongly emphasized by Zelle The support of Hans-Joachim Veen and Carsten Zelle in providing access to this data is highly appreciated.

While it is not possible to derive a causal interpretation from these cross-sectional data, we can reasonably speculate that lagging acceptance of democratic rule and the favorable recollections of socialism are both welded together with a feeling that the West Germans have not done enough to make unification work in the East, as epitomized by the economic strains there.

In the West, the attitudes on democracy and socialism are as in and, other than in , not very much related to leftright vote intention: By contrast, in the East these attitudes are still substantially shaped by partisan cues, not the least because there still exists a strong pds at the extreme left which crystallizes the frustrations and dissatisfactions in the new Lander regarding the unification process.

In this sense, the consolidation phase in the East has, even seven years after the transformation of the political system, not yet come to an end. Based on social-psychological identity theories, the reasons for this development have become a little clearer. The threat to the social identity of the East Germans through unification has been underestimated, and they are now reconstructing their biographies in a manner which helps them to establish a positive self image: Since the constitutional and practical logic of unification makes the West Germans the most plausible reference group for East-West comparisons, it therefore cannot come as a surprise that these comparisons for reasons of Eastern identity-building must result in a distancing process.

For one, the economic strains have increased to a point where the name of the political game is no longer the distribution of growth, but of losses in the German welfare state. The process of reaching unity has not yet fully started even in , and more changes and conflict are around the corner, not least in the light of the upcoming national election in September In addition, the analyses have shown that beyond these concrete policy strains, West Germans and East Germans also represent differences in socialization experience regarding their expectations of what a democracy is supposed to be.

Arzheimer, Kai, and Markus Klein. A Political System after the Shock: September , Washington D. Bauer-Kaase, Petra, and Max Kaase. The Germans on the Path to Inner Unity? Gesellschaftliches Zusammenwachsen durch Integration der Elite? Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Deutschen Einheit.

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Democratic Attitudes in the Two Germanies. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien. Die Entwicklung der Demokratievorstellungen der Deutschen seit ihrer Vereinigung. Sonderheft der Zeitschrift Leviathan. Wann ist ein Unterschied ein Unterschied?

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Berichte zum sozialen und politischen Wandel in Ostdeutschland, Band 3. Eine Felduntersuchung in Ost-und Westdeutschland. Jagodzinski, Wolfgang, and Steffen M. Werner Weidenfeld, and Karl-Rudolf Korte eds. Handlungslogiken und-ressourcen im Prozefi der Transformation. Werner Weidenfeld and Karl-Rudolf Korte eds.

Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer, and Hellmut Wollmann. Arbeitslosigkeit und Reformblockaden unterminieren das Vertrauen in die politische und wirtschaftliche Ordnung. Zur ldentitat einer geteilten und wieder vereinten Nation. Weil, and Mary Gautier eds. Theoretical and Empirical Studies. Research on Democracy and Society, vol. Die Politik sollte nicht einem falschen Gemeinschaftsmythos folgen. Veen, Hans-Joachim, and Carsten Zelle. Veen, Hans-Joachim, and Jutta Graf. Walz, Dieter, and Wolfram Bunner. Weidenfeld, Werner, and Karl-Rudolf Korte eds. Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit. Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im vereinigten Deutschland.

For this purpose, the German doctrine is contrasted with French constitutional law. In some countries, such as India 1 and to some extent the United States, 2 this idea is referred to principally as the basic structure doctrine. The core constitutional provisions are seen as the identity of the constitution. Moreover, in particular after the well-known 4 Lisbon judgment of the German Constitutional Court 5 the notion of constitutional identity is currently used primarily to justify constitutional limits on European integration, the domestic applicability of European Union law, 6 and international legal obligations.

In this article, I would like to address the following question: Where does the idea of constitutional identity come from in German constitutional thought, and how is it connected to explicit material limits on constitutional amendments? I will examine how the concept of constitutional identity has evolved within German constitutional history since , 8 the year in which the first Germany-wide constitution entered into force. This perspective demonstrates the theoretical ideas and historical constellations under which the notion of constitutional identity could evolve and helps demystify the legal concept.

I will show that during the period of the Constitution of , the concept of constitutional identity was, in principle, unknown. However, on the question of whether the Constitution of contained implicit limits on constitutional amendments relating to the federal structure, we find similar arguments deployed Section 2.

The notion of constitutional identity was first introduced during the period of the Weimar Constitution, in , by Carl Schmitt and Carl Bilfinger. It was used within their different theories to justify implicit constitutional limits for amendments to the Weimar Constitution Section 3. During the drafting of the GG, no reference was made to the notion of constitutional identity, but explicit material limits on constitutional amendments were introduced Section 4.

It was only after the GG came into force that the notion of constitutional identity re emerged in German constitutional doctrine, and has become particularly important for constructing constitutional limits on the European integration Section 5. I conclude with a comparison with French constitutional law in order to show the peculiarities of the German doctrine Section 6. The Constitution of 9 established the first German federal state with a constitutional monarchy as a political system. In accordance with the constitutional law of a constitutional monarchy, the Constitution of did not provide for a special body to adopt constitutional amendments.

The Constitution of did not include any material limits on constitutional amendments. Therefore, the majority of constitutional lawyers argued that there were no unamendable constitutional provisions. Although the theoretical arguments for implicit limits on constitutional amendments were essentially based on the federal principle and the particular historical circumstances surrounding the Constitution of , 26 the rationale used to advocate implicit material limits on constitutional amendments resembled in two important ways the arguments used in support of the doctrine of constitutional identity.

First, both were based on a general distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental constitutional provisions. Second, a distinction was made between the institutions constituted by the Constitution, on the one hand, and the drafters of the Constitution on the other. The concept of constitutional identity was first developed under the Weimar Constitution of The notion of constitutional identity was first introduced in by the constitutional lawyers Carl Schmitt and Carl Bilfinger, both of whom were critical of democracy.

These theories were developed because the Weimar Constitution did not contain material limits governing constitutional amendments Section 3. The Weimar Constitution did not establish material limits on constitutional amendments. Article 76 of the Weimar Constitution stated that the Constitution could be amended through the legislative process. Other formal thresholds that were discussed during the drafting of the Constitution i. They based their arguments on the wording of article 76 and on the theoretical assumption that the Reichstag the then parliamentary assembly was both the legislature and a constitution-making body.

Rather, it was at the disposal of the legislature. Thus, unlike the Weimar Constitution, the US Constitution distinguishes between legislative and constituent power. A legally relevant constituent power outside the constitution was not recognized. Against this background, Bilfinger and Schmitt developed, using different theoretical arguments, implicit material limits governing constitutional amendments.

First, the notion of constitution does not in itself lead to the conclusion that an existing order cannot be dissolved. Second, the assumption that a constitution is a harmonious order is a fiction. Third, the aesthetics of a constitution cannot be advanced as a legal argument. According to Schmitt, the will of the constituent power in principle: The boundaries of the authority for constitutional amendments result from the properly understood concept of constitutional change.

They may do so, however, only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the constitution as an entirety is preserved. Schmitt expressly argued that the unamendable parts of the Weimar Constitution could not be listed or specified. Nor did Schmitt specify how the people could act as the constituent power.

In this way, he elaborated an absolute figure of the constituent power of the people , which was accorded not only revolutionary power to establish a constitution but also a permanent absolute legal power on the basis of natural law 72 occupying a position both above and alongside the constitution.

On this basis, the constituent power always has even under an existing constitution the power to make fundamental political decisions. The criticism levelled against Schmitt is obvious. As a consequence, the constituted powers have only very limited power to amend the constitution and the development of the constitution through the established constitutional bodies is, to a large extent, excluded. Such material limits are not derived from the constitution itself, but from doubtful theoretical assumptions underpinning a general theory of constitutions, 83 namely, the idea of constitution as a harmonious legal order or the fundamental decision of an absolute and non-regulable figure of constituent power.

In historical continuity with the previous Constitutions, the Grundgesetz provides that it can be amended by law. Article 79 3 GG states: However, when drafting the eternity clause, the authors of the GG did not refer to the concepts of Schmitt and Bilfinger. The published discussions do not address the distinction between constituent power and constituted powers, 86 the distinction between constitution and constitutional law, 87 or the idea that a constitution is a harmonious system.

Rather, as a result of the historical events that occurred during the Weimar Republic and the rise to power of the Nazi party, 88 two aspects were important to the drafters. Second, the main argument in favor of the eternity clause adopted by the subsequent Bonn Parliamentary Council, 91 whose function was to draft the final text of the German Constitution, was the desire to deny potential future revolutions their legitimacy in accordance with the GG standards. Second, there was disagreement concerning whether there should be any material limits on constitutional amendments.

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The discussion focused on whether such a provision would in fact be superfluous this was the argument advanced by the Social Democrat politician Rudolf Katz or whether such a provision was necessary in order to deny any future revolution its legitimacy that was the position of the Free Democrat politician, Thomas Dehler. However, there was a general consensus that such a provision could not prevent revolutions. One would have to imagine further that, one day, Mr. Molotow comes pale-faced to Stalin and says: Thomas Dehler underlined the importance of such an eternity clause as pursuing the crucial aim of preventing revolutionaries from relying on the constitution to justify their revolution.

The view advanced by Thomas Dehler prevailed, in part due to his resilience and membership of the General Editing Committee Redaktionsausschuss of the Parliamentary Council. The development of the concept of constitutional identity under the GG has been subtle and elusive.

However, we can identify three main steps that have contributed to the development of the current concept of constitutional identity. Second, the German Constitutional Court used the notion of constitutional identity in order to develop constitutional limits on the domestic application of European law and refered to the eternity clause in order to develop general limits on the transfer of sovereignty rights to the European level Section 5. In a final step, in its well-known Lisbon judgment and subsequent case law, the Court reintroduced the notion of constitutional identity in connection with the eternity clause in article 79 3 GG, expressly linked it to a certain idea of constituent power and further specified the content of constitutional identity Section 5.

As a first step, the notion of constitutional identity has been reflected in legal writing. It was the later Constitutional Court Judge Brun-Otto Bryde who, in his higher doctoral degree in , first developed an express legal concept of constitutional identity within the GG not based on article 79 3 GG. The second step is twofold.

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First, the notion of constitutional identity was used by the German Constitutional Court in order to develop limits on the domestic application of European secondary law Section 5. Second, the eternity clause was used in order to develop general limits on the transfer of sovereignty rights to the European level 5.

The notion was not used within the framework of the eternity clause, but within the framework of article 24 1 GG. Article 24 1 GG allowed Germany to transfer sovereign powers to international organizations and was, at the time, the legal basis for participating in European integration. In the Solange I decision, the Court had to decide whether the fundamental rights protected by the GG limited the supremacy of European law in the case at hand: It decided that, in principle, a regulation had to be in conformity with the fundamental rights of the GG, since there was at the time according to the German Court no adequate protection of fundamental rights at the level of the EU.

This means that article 24 1 GG does not allow for the fundamental structure of the Constitution, which is the basis of its identity, to be changed through the legislation of an international organization in place of a constitutional amendment. According to the Court, article 24 1 GG does not provide any authority—whether for the legislation of an international body or for the German legislature itself—to alter the basic structure of the Constitution by means of an amendment to the European treaties.

The power conferred by Article 24 1 of the Constitution, however, is not without limits under constitutional law. The provision does not confer a power to surrender by way of ceding sovereign rights to international institutions the identity of the prevailing constitutional order of the Federal Republic by breaking into its basic framework, that is, into the structure which makes it up.

At that time, it was not absolutely clear, whether the concept of constitutional identity was linked to article 79 3 GG and an absolute limit on the transfer of sovereignty rights, or whether it was a new independent legal concept, meaningful only within article 24 1 GG, with the consequence that it was only a relative legal concept. That means that, in the event that a treaty transferring sovereignty rights is contrary to the constitutional identity, an express amendment of the GG is necessary in order to transfer sovereignty rights in accordance with article 24 1 GG.

One reason for this might be the fact that, in , article 23 1 GG was introduced as the legal basis for the transfer of sovereign powers to the European level. In this judgment, the Court examined for the first time the question whether European integration itself i. The Court started to develop, at the basis of the eternity clause, general limits on the transfer of sovereignty rights to the European level. These limits, based on article 79 3 GG, included the democracy principle and—as discussed in an orbiter dictum — the loss of German statehood which is not expressly protected by article 79 3 GG and is read into the eternity clause.

The Maastricht judgment is also important because it accorded article 79 3 GG the function of ensuring the preservation of the Constitution. The possibility of amendment adopted by the constituted power and legitimation by means of a popular referendum was expressly rejected. From the perspective of the principle of democracy, the violation of the constitutional identity codified in article In this respect, the constituent power has not granted the representatives and bodies of the people a mandate to dispose of the identity of the constitution.

No constitutional body has been granted the power to amend the constitutional principles which are essential pursuant to article The Federal Constitutional Court monitors this. To the extent that it is not limited by natural law principles, only the constituent power of the people can dispose over the constitutional identity and provide the people with a new constitution.

The manner in which the German people can exercise this will is not apparent from the judgment. However, one can infer that the Court intended to refer to article of the GG. The current version of article GG was introduced in the context of German reunification. This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect. This re-wording of article GG has led to intense discussions among legal writers of the purpose and function of the new article GG and its relationship to art icle 79 3 GG.

The approach taken by the Court in its Lisbon judgment accords with the current line of thinking pursued by certain legal writers, and, in particular, with previous and current arguments by the Constitutional Court Justice, Peter M. Huber, which argues that article 79 3 GG does not apply within the context of article GG. According to this approach, article GG addresses the constituent power of the people, which is regarded as a power in the legal sense outside the constitution and article 79 3 GG addresses only the constituted powers.

They argue that the constituent power has only conferred limited competence on the constituted powers and has reserved its right to decide on the substance of article 79 3 GG. Consequently, the material limits contained in article 79 3 GG do not apply within the scope of article GG. Since its Lisbon judgment, the Court has further refined the concept of constitutional identity. The expression, said the jury, was indicative of the fact that the authorities failed to recognise or to acknowledge the political dimension of the murders for a number of years. Reducing these atrocities down to a term used for Turkish street food, they continued, discriminated against the murder victims and marginalised an entire social group due to their ethnic origin.

Migration is not only changing the appearance of many places and cities in Germany, it also leaves its traces in German culture, most of all in the German language. What are the tangible consequences of this phenomenon?

German language: words and ‘un-words’ of the year

All social changes and developments and all historical events are reflected in the way we use language. Today, the debate surrounding the link between the German language and German identity tends to heat up whenever concerns arise that our language is deteriorating — which, in turn, could impact negatively on our identity. One recurrent topic of discussion is the spread of anglicisms throughout the German language.

This has produced what is known as Denglish , a hybrid language that has become commonplace thanks to the internet. Nina Janich and Germany-Alumna Prof. The strength of the link between the German language and national identity also becomes apparent when looking at the literature and life stories of Germans living in exile. For many German writers who left Germany during the Third Reich , their native language became by far the most important element of their identity, a piece of home that they held on to for dear life.

In the same way society is subject to constant change, our language, too, is in constant flux yet remains an important part of our identity.