Financial Principles & Promises: Personal Training for Financial Fitness
Or does some underlying third factor e. To give a more concrete example, individuals with higher levels of financial literacy might better recognize the financial benefits and be more inclined to enroll in a savings plan offered by their employer. On the other hand, if an employer automatically enrolls employees in the firm's saving plan, the employees may acquire some level of financial literacy simply by virtue of their savings plan participation.
The finding noted earlier that most individuals cite personal experience as the most important source of their financial learning Hilgert et al. While this endogeneity does not rule out the possibility that financial literacy improves financial outcomes, it does make interpreting the magnitudes of the effects estimated in the literature difficult to interpret as they are almost surely upwardly biased in magnitude. In addition, unobserved factors such as predisposition for patience or forward-looking behavior could contribute to both increased financial literacy and better financial outcomes.
Other unobserved factors like personality Borgans et al.
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Despite the challenges in pinning down causality, understanding causal mechanisms is necessary to make effective policy prescriptions. If the policy goal is increased financial literacy, then we need to know how individuals acquire financial literacy. How important is financial education? And how important is personal experience? And how do they interact? If, on the other hand, the goal is to improve financial outcomes for consumers, then we need to know if financial education improves financial outcomes assuming it increases literacy and we need to be able to weigh the cost effectiveness of financial education against other policy options that also impact financial outcomes.
What evidence is there that financial education actually increases financial literacy? The evidence is more limited and not as encouraging as one might expect. One empirical strategy has been to exploit cross sectional variation in the receipt of financial education. Studies using this approach have often found almost no relationship between financial education and individual performance on financial literacy tests.
This empirical approach has obvious problems for making causal inferences: Nonetheless, the lack of any compelling evidence of a positive impact is surprising. There is definitely room in the literature for more research using credible empirical methodologies that examine whether, or in what contexts, financial education actually impacts financial literacy. In the end, we are more interested in financial outcomes than financial knowledge per se. The literature on financial education and financial outcomes includes several studies with plausibly exogenous sources of variation in the receipt of financial education, ranging from small-scale field experiments to large-scale natural experiments.
The evidence in these papers on whether financial education actually improves financial outcomes is best described as contradictory. Several studies have looked toward natural experiments as a source of exogenous variation in who receives financial education. Skimmyhorn uses administrative data to evaluate the effects of a mandatory eight-hour financial literacy course rolled out by the U. Because the roll-out of the financial education program was staggered across different military bases, we can rule out time effects as a confounding factor in the results.
He finds that soldiers who joined the Army just after the financial education course was implemented have participation rates in and average monthly contributions to the Federal Thrift Savings Plan a k -like savings account that are roughly double those of personnel who joined the Army just prior to the introduction of the financial education course. The effects are present throughout the savings distribution and persist for at least 2 years the duration of the data.
Using individually-matched credit data for a random subsample, he finds limited evidence of more widespread improved financial outcomes as measured by credit card balances, auto loan balances, unpaid debts, and adverse legal actions foreclosures, liens, judgments and repossessions. The first of these studies concludes that financial education mandates do have an impact on at least one measure of financial behavior: In addition to examining natural experiments, researchers have also randomly assigned financial aid provision to evaluate the impact of financial education on financial outcomes.
For example, Drexler et al. Their sample of micro-entrepreneurs was randomized to be in either a control group or one of two treatment groups. Members of one treatment group participated in several sessions of more traditional, principles-based financial education; members of the other treatment group participated in several sessions of financial education oriented around simple financial management rules of thumb. Relative to the control group, the authors find no difference in the financial behaviors of the treatment group who received the principles-based financial education; they do find statistically significant and economically meaningful improvements in the financial behavior of the treatment group who participated in the rule-of-thumb oriented financial education course.
The results of this study suggest that how financial education is structured could matter in whether it has meaningful effects at the end of the day, and might help explain why many other studies have found much weaker links between financial education and economic outcomes. In a small randomized field experiment, Collins evaluates a financial education program for low and moderate income families and finds improvements in self-reported knowledge and behaviors increased savings and small improvements in credit scores twelve months later , but the sample studied suffers from non-random attrition.
Finally, Choi et al. Using administrative data, they find statistically insignificant differences in future savings plan contributions between the treatment and the control group, even in the face of significant financial incentives for savings plan participation. Additional non-experimental research using self-reported outcomes and potentially endogenous selection into financial education suggests a positive relationship between financial education and financial behavior.
Altogether, there remains substantial disagreement over the efficacy of financial education. While the most recent reviews and meta-analyses of the non-experimental evidence Collins et al. Of the few studies that exploit randomization or natural experiments, there is at best mixed evidence that financial education improves financial outcomes. The current literature is inadequate to draw conclusions about if and under what conditions financial education works. While there do not appear to be any negative effects of financial education other than increased expenditures, there are also almost no studies detailing the costs of financial education programs on small or large scales Coussens , and few that causally identify their benefits towards improved financial outcomes.
To inform policy discussion, this literature needs additional large-scale randomized interventions designed to effectively identify causal effects. Randomized interventions coupled with measures of financial literacy could address the question of how best to measure financial literacy while also providing credible assessments of the effect of financial education on financial literacy and economic outcomes. A starting point could be incorporating experimental components into existing large scale surveys like the NFCS; for example, a subset of respondents could be randomized to participate in an on-line financial education course or to receive a take-home reference guide to making better financial decisions.
Measuring financial literacy before and immediately after the short course would test if financial education improves various measures of financial literacy in the short-run. A subsequent follow-up survey linked to administrative data on financial outcomes e. Studies along these lines are needed to identify the causal effects of financial education on financial literacy and financial outcomes, identify the best measures of financial literacy, and inform policy makers about the costs and benefits of financial education as a means to improve financial outcomes. Given the current inconclusive evidence on the causal effects of financial education on either financial literacy or financial outcomes, there remains disagreement over whether financial education is the most appropriate policy tool for improving consumer financial outcomes.
Finally, some who do not believe the research demonstrates positive effects support other policy options Willis ; ; In this section, we place financial education in the context of the broader research on alternative ways to improve financial outcomes. As economists, we start this section with the question of market failure: Is there a need for public policy in improving financial knowledge and financial outcomes, or can the market work efficiently without government intervention?
If, like other forms of human capital, financial knowledge is costly to accumulate, there may be an optimal level of financial literacy acquisition that varies across individuals based on the expected need for financial expertise and individual preference parameters e. In both papers, investments in financial literacy have both costs time and monetary resources and benefits access to better investment opportunities which may be correlated with household education or initial endowments. Because they save more, they value better financial management technologies more than those with lower incomes, and they rationally acquire a higher level of financial literacy.
These models suggest that differences in financial literacy acquisition may be individually rational.
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Consistent with this supposition, Hsu uses data from the Cognitive Economics Survey which includes measures of financial literacy for a set of husbands and their wives to examine the determination of financial literacy in married couples. She finds that wives have a lower average level of financial literacy than their husbands cf. Women, however, have longer life expectancies than their husbands and many will eventually need to assume financial management responsibilities. She finds that women actually acquire increased financial literacy as they approach widowhood, with the majority catching up to their husbands prior to being widowed.
More generally, limited financial knowledge may be a rational outcome if other entities—a spouse, an employer, a financial advisor—can help individuals compensate for their deficiencies by providing information, advice, or financial management. We don't expect individuals to be experts in all other domains of life—that is the essence of comparative advantage. Specialization in financial expertise may be efficient if it allows computational and educational investment to be concentrated or aggregated in specialized individuals or entities that develop algorithms and methods to guide consumers through financial waters.
Although low levels of financial literacy acquisition may be individually rational in some models, limited financial knowledge may create externalities such as reduced competitive pressure in markets which leads to higher equilibrium prices Hastings et al. Such externalities may imply a role for government in facilitating improved financial decision making through financial education or other mechanisms.
For example, if present bias leads consumers to save too little, financial institutions whose profits are tied to assets under management have incentives reduce consumer bias and encourage individuals to save more. In other contexts, however, firms may have incentives to exploit cognitive biases and limited financial literacy. What evidence is there on whether markets help individuals compensate for their limited financial capabilities?
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Unfortunately, many firms exploit rather than offset consumer shortcomings. Opaque and complicated fees are widespread, and several empirical papers link these fee structures to shortcomings in consumer optimization. Ausubel analyzes a large field experiment in which a credit card company randomized mail solicitations varying the interest rate and duration of the credit card's introductory offer. He finds that individuals are overly responsive to the terms of the introductory offer and appear to underestimate their likelihood of holding balances past the introductory offer period with a low interest rate.
He finds that a lower teaser rates leads to substantially higher levels of debt, even several months after the teaser rate expires, and that the higher debt results from lower payments rather than higher purchases or cash advances. Evaluating non-randomized offers to potential customers, he shows that banks do not randomly assign teaser rates but dynamically price discriminate by targeting offers to consumers who are more likely to permanently increase their balances.
Given that many firms are trying to actively obfuscate prices, it should not be surprising that there is little evidence that firms act to debias consumers through informative advertising or investments in financial education. In models of add-on prices, firms can hide prices or make them salient.
Similarly, firms can invest in advertising that lowers price sensitivity, focusing consumer choice on non-price attributes, or in advertising that increases price competition by alerting customers to lower prices. In models of informative advertising, firms reduce information costs and expand the market by informing consumers of their price and location in product space.
In contrast, in models of persuasive advertising, firms emphasize certain product characteristics and deemphasize others to change consumer's expressed preferences. For example a financial firm could advertise returns for the last year rather than management fees to convince investors that they should primarily evaluate past returns when choosing a fund manager.
A financially literate consumer may be unmoved by this advertising strategy, but those who are less literate might be persuaded and end up paying higher management fees. When the privatized system started, the government presumed that firms would compete on price management fees and engage in informative advertising to explain fees to consumers and win their accounts.
Instead, firms invested heavily in sales force and marketing, and the authors find that heavier exposure to sales force appropriately instrumented resulted in lower price sensitivity and higher brand loyalty. This in turn lowered demand elasticity recall equation 2 and increased management fees in equilibrium. Importantly, informative advertising itself may be a public good. For example, advertising that explains the value of savings to individuals can benefit both the firm that makes the investment and its competitors if it increases demand for savings products in general. On the other hand, persuasive advertising attempts to convince customers that one product is better than another so that the benefits accrue to the firm that is advertising.
The market may underprovide informative advertising in equilibrium because of the inherent free rider problem. They find evidence that if firms face advertising constraints, persuasive rather than informative advertising maximizes profits. This suggests a role for government to remedy underprovision of public goods.
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In particular, these results suggest that financial products firms would welcome a tax that would fund public financial education as it would expand the market e. Even if firms do not have incentives to facilitate efficient consumer outcomes, a competitive market may generate an intermediate sector providing advice and guidance. This sector could provide unbiased decision-making-assistance that would lower decision making costs and efficiently expand the market.
However, classic principal-agent problems may make such an efficient intermediate market difficult to attain. Two recent studies highlight the limits of the financial advice industry as incentive-compatible providers of guidance and counsel on financial products and financial decision making. They find that many advisors act in their personal interests regardless of the client's actual needs and that they reinforce client biases e.
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Similarly, Anagol et al. As in the previous study, scripted customers present themselves to the agents with differing amounts of financial and product knowledge. They find that life insurance agents recommend products with higher commissions even if the product is suboptimal for the customer. They also find that agents are likely to cater to customer's beliefs, even if those beliefs are incorrect.
Finally, instead of debiasing less literate consumers, agents are less likely to give correct advice if the customer presents with a low degree of financial sophistication. Overall, this section suggests that are several potential roles for government in improving financial outcomes for consumers. First, government can help solve the public goods problems which result in underinvestment in financial education. Second, government can regulate the disclosure of fees and pricing. And third, government can provide unbiased information and advice.
If there is a role for government intervention, what form should it take? We have already summarized the literature on financial education. Briefly, there is at best conflicting evidence that financial education leads to improved economic outcomes either through increasing financial literacy directly or otherwise.
So while the logical public policy response to many observers is to increase public support for financial education, this option may not be an efficient use of public resources even if it will likely do no harm. Because the financial literacy literature currently offers only limited models of behavior that give rise to the observed differences in financial literacy and economic outcomes, it is difficult to turn to this literature to design policies that address the underlying behaviors that lead to low levels of financial literacy and poor financial decision making.
However, the literatures in behavioral economics and decision theory have developed several models that are relevant, and policies from this literature that address behavioral biases like present bias and choice overload may provide templates for effective and efficient remedies. Several papers in this vein have already had substantial policy influence. They find that participation in employer-sponsored savings plans is substantially higher when the default outcome is savings plan participation automatic enrollment relative to when the default is non-participation.
First, automatic enrollment simplifies the decision about whether or not to participate in the savings plan by divorcing the participation decision from related choices about contribution rates and asset allocation. Second, automatic enrollment directly addresses problems of present bias which may result in well-intentioned savers procrastinating their savings plan enrollment indefinitely.
Finally, the automatic enrollment default may service as an endorsement implicit advice that individuals should be saving. These results collectively motivated the adoption of provisions in the Pension Protection Act of that encourage U. In simulations, they find that neutralizing the impact of advertising on preferences results in price-elastic demand. These results suggest that centralized information provision and regulation of both disclosure and advertising are important to ensure that individuals with limited financial capabilities have access to the information necessary for effective decision making and to minimize their confusion or persuasion by questionable advertising tactics.
In the government attempted to increase fee transparency in the privatized social security system by introducing a single fee index which collapsed multiple fees loads and fees on assets under management into one measure. Prior to the policy, investor behavior was inelastic to either type of fee or, indeed, any measure of management costs. In contrast, after the policy, demand was very responsive to the fee index. This example suggests that investors can be greatly helped by policies that simplify fee structures and either advertise fees or require that they are disclosed in an easy-to-understand way.
This example also highlights the potential pitfalls of ill-conceived regulations. Although the policy shifted demand, it had little impact on overall management costs. This is because the index combined fees according to a formula and firms could game the index by lowering one fee while raising another. Not surprisingly, firms optimized accordingly another example of obfuscated pricing as discussed earlier.
The government eventually responded by restricting asset managers to charging only one kind of fee, obviating the need for a fee index. Hastings in progress evaluates two field experiments as part of a household survey the EERA referenced in Table 2 to further understand the impact of information and incentives on management fund choice by affiliates of Mexico's privatized social security system.
Households in the survey were randomly assigned to receive simplified information on fund manager net returns the official information required by the social security system at the time presented as either a personalized projected account balance or as an annual percentage rate. In addition to that treatment, households were randomly assigned to receive a small immediate cash incentive for transferring assets to any fund manager that had a better net return or a higher projected personal balance.
Rather, individuals who receive the small cash incentive are more likely to change fund managers for the better regardless of the type of information received. These preliminary results suggest that incentives that both address procrastination and that are tied to better behavior may be more effective than financial education as financial education does not carry with it any incentive to act. We note that these results are still short-run and preliminary as they are based on a follow-up survey. Final results will depend on administrative records for switching which are not subject to problems inherent in self-reports.
They suggest that evaluating consumers along two dimensions, their preference heterogeneity and their level of financial sophistication or, in the parlance of this paper, their financial literacy , may help narrow the set of appropriate policy levers for improving consumer financial outcomes. At one extreme, take the case of stored value cards, a product used by a large number of unsophisticated consumers and for which consumer preferences are relatively homogeneous. This is likely to be more efficient and cost effective than attempting to educate consumers in an environment in which firms are less stringently regulated.
In contrast, if consumers are financially knowledgeable and have heterogeneous preferences other approaches may make more sense. Although Campbell et al. At the other extreme, there are products like hedge funds that cater to individuals with tremendous preference heterogeneity and that require a sizeable amount of financial knowledge for effective use. The latter condition may seem like a perfect reason to justify financial education.
We would counter, however, that in such a context it may be difficult for public policy to effectively intervene in providing the level of financial education that would be required. For products for which extensive expertise is required, it may be more efficient to restrict markets to those who can demonstrate the skills requisite for appropriate and effective use.
Overall, the literature suggests that there are many alternatives to financial education that can be used to improve financial outcomes for consumers: Although none of the studies that we reviewed here ran a horse race between these other approaches and financial education, many of them show larger effects than can be ascribed to financial education in the existing literature. Expanding these studies to other relevant markets such as credit card regulation, payday loan regulation, mortgages, and car or appliance loans present important next steps in understanding how best to improve consumer financial outcomes.
FINANCIAL LITERACY, FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
In this paper, we have evaluated the literature on financial literacy, financial education, and consumer financial outcomes. This literature consistently finds that many individuals perform poorly on test-based measures of financial literacy. However, there is little consensus in the literature on the efficacy of financial education.
The existing research is inadequate for drawing conclusions about if and under what conditions financial education works. The directions for future research depend in part on the goal at hand. If the goal is to improve financial literacy, the directions for future research that follow hinge on financial literacy and the role of financial education in enhancing financial literacy.
One set of fundamental issues relate to capabilities. What are the basic financial competencies that individuals need? What financial decisions should we expect individuals to successfully make independently, and what decisions are best relegated to an expert? To draw an analogy, we don't expect individuals to be experts in all domains of life—that is the essence of comparative advantage.
Most of us consult doctors when we are ill and mechanics when our cars are broken, but we are mostly able to care for a common cold and fill the car with gas and check our tire pressure independently. What level of financial literacy is necessary or desirable? And should certain financial transactions be predicated on demonstrating an adequate level of financial literacy, much like taking a driver's education course or passing a driver's education test is a prerequisite for getting a driver's license.
If so, for what types of financial decisions would such a licensing approach make most sense? Another set of open questions relate to measurement. How do we best measure financial literacy? Which measurement approaches work best at predicting financial outcomes? And what are the tradeoffs implicit in using different measures of financial literacy e. A third set of issues surrounds how individuals acquire financial literacy and the mechanisms that link financial literacy to financial outcomes.
How important are skills like numeracy or general cognitive ability in determining financial literacy, and can those skills be taught? To the extent that financial literacy is acquired through experience, how do we limit the potential harm that consumers suffer in the process of learning by doing?
Is financial education a substitute or a complement for personal experience? We need much more causal research on financial education, particularly randomized controlled trials. Does financial education work, and if so, what types of financial education are most cost effective? Much of the literature on financial education focuses on traditional, classroom based courses. Is this the best way to deliver financial education?
More generally, how does this approach compare with other alternatives? Is a course of a few hours length enough, or should we think more expansively about integrated approaches to financial education over the lifecycle? Or, on the other extreme, should financial education be episodic and narrowly focused to coincide with specific financial tasks? There are many other ways to deliver educational content that could improve financial decision making: How effective and how cost effective are these different delivery mechanisms, and are some better-suited to some groups of individuals or types of problems than others?
Should the content of financial education initiatives be focused on teaching financial principles, or rules of thumb? In the randomized controlled trial of two different approaches to financial education for microenterprise owners in the Dominican Republic discussed earlier, Drexler et al. How robust is this finding? Even if we can develop effective mechanisms to deliver financial education, how do we induce the people who most need financial education to get it?
School-based financial education programs have the advantage that, while in school, students are a captive audience. But schools can only teach so much. Many of the financial decisions that individuals will face in their adult lives have little relevance to a year-old high school student: How do we deliver financial education to adults before they make financial mistakes, or in ways that limit their financial mistakes, when we don't have a captive audience and financial education is only one of many things competing for time and attention?
Finally, what is the appropriate role of government in either directly providing or funding the private provision of financial education? If financial education is a public good Hastings et al. If so, what form would that take? If instead of improving financial literacy our goal is to improve financial outcomes, then the directions for future research are slightly different.
The overarching questions in this case center around the tools that are available to improve financial outcomes. This might include financial education, but it might also include better financial market regulation, different approaches to changing the institutional framework for individual and household financial decision making, or incentives for innovation to create products that improve financial outcomes.
With this broader frame, one important question on which we have little evidence is which tools are most cost effective at improving financial outcomes? For some outcomes, the most cost effective tool might be financial education, but for other outcomes, different approaches might work better. Moreover, automatic enrollment and contribution escalation are less expensive to implement than financial education programs. What approaches to changing financial behavior generate the biggest bang for the buck, and how does financial education compare to other levers that can be used to change outcomes?
Despite the contradictory evidence on the effectiveness of financial education, financial literacy is in short supply and increasing the financial capabilities of the population is a desirable and socially beneficial goal. We believe that well designed and well executed financial education initiatives can have an effect. But to design cost effective financial education programs, we need better research on what does and does not work. We also should not lose sight of the larger goal—financial education is a tool, one of many, for improving financial outcomes.
Financial education programs that don't improve financial outcomes can hardly be considered a success. Unfortunately, we have little concrete evidence to provide answers.
We have a pressing need for more and better research to inform the design of financial education interventions and to prioritize where financial education resources can be best spent. To achieve this, funding for financial education needs to be coupled with funding for evaluation, and the design and implementation of financial education interventions needs to be done in a way that facilitates rigorous evaluation. We thank Daisy Sun for outstanding research assistance.
When citing this paper, please use the following: Annual Review of Economics 5: NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. Madrian, and William L. See Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman in progress for details on the survey and data. There is also a large literature in the economics of education documenting the fact that large increases in real spending per pupil in the United States has led to no measurable increase in knowledge as measured by ability to answer questions on standardized tests.
Aggregated over 30 million account holders, this is a large savings even before allowing for secondary competitive effects, and in equilibrium it is virtually costless to implement. The following datasets with financial literacy questions that are referenced in this article are currently publically available. Health and Retirement Survey: National Financial Capability Study: National Center for Biotechnology Information , U.
Author manuscript; available in PMC Aug Hastings , Brigitte C. Madrian , and William L. Author information Copyright and License information Disclaimer. See other articles in PMC that cite the published article. Abstract In this article we review the literature on financial literacy, financial education, and consumer financial outcomes. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow? After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than today, exactly the same as today, or less than today with the money in this account?
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Footnotes NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. The effects of perceived and actual financial knowledge on credit card behavior. Inst, Indian State Univ. Wealth accumulation and the propensity to plan. Understanding the incentives of commissions motivated agents: Credit Power for Real Estate Professionals. Catching the American Dream. Personal Finance Under One Hour. Stop the Retirement Rip-off.
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