Admiral William T. Sampson: A Progressive Navalist an Essay

The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied. The E-mail Address es field is required. Please enter recipient e-mail address es. The E-mail Address es you entered is are not in a valid format. Please re-enter recipient e-mail address es. You may send this item to up to five recipients. The name field is required.

Please enter your name. The E-mail message field is required. Please enter the message. Please verify that you are not a robot. Would you also like to submit a review for this item? You already recently rated this item. Your rating has been recorded.

Navigation menu

Write a review Rate this item: Preview this item Preview this item. Admirals of the new steel navy: James C Bradford Publisher: Makers of the American naval tradition. Following duty on the steam frigate Colorado with the European Squadron , another tour as instructor at the Naval Academy, and in the Bureau of Navigation of the Navy Department , he served in the screw sloop Congress. He then commanded the Alert , the training ship Mayflower , and the Swatara while on duty at the Naval Academy. On September 9, , he became Superintendent of the Naval Academy.

He was promoted to Captain on April 9, , reported to the Mare Island Navy Yard to fit out the protected cruiser San Francisco , and assumed command when she was commissioned on November 15, He assumed command of the battleship Iowa on June 15, On February 17, , he was made President of the Board of Inquiry to investigate the destruction of the Maine. The United States declared war against Spain on April 25, ; and, eight days later, Admiral Cervera 's fleet sailed from the Cape Verde Islands for an uncertain destination.

Sampson's early involvement in the conflict included his supervision of the Cuban blockade, which lasted for the duration of the war, as well as the bombardment of the city of San Juan on May 12, After initially being sent to blockade Havana itself, Sampson was given orders to intercept Admiral Cevera's squadron, but with only a vague notion of Cevera's current location, he was unable to actively pursue.

Awaiting further information on Cevera's whereabouts, Sampson sailed east to San Juan and carried out a bombardment on May 10 that lasted several days, dealing minor infrastructural damage to the city.

• Items in search results.
• Rapidshare Library Books Download..
• Kaffir Folk-Lore: Selection from the Traditional Tales!

After this preliminary bombardment, Sampson helped lead a land-sea attack on San Juan, along with General William Shafter , taking the city. On July 1, following the successful invasion, Sampson returned to Cuba, reinforcing the blockades in Santiago and Cienfuegos. The service that the new administration inherited in was in the midst of sustained growth and reform following twenty years of purposeful neglect. At the close of the American Civil War , the U. Navy had in commission more than vessels. Nearly all of the new ships were wartime purchases, hastily constructed, or made from unseasoned timber.

After the war, most were sold off or destroyed. In spite of international crises such as the Virginius Affair, contention with Great Britain over the Alabama Claims , and problems with France over a projected canal in Panama , the strength of the Navy continued to decline. By , only 48 of the Navy's vessels were available for immediate service, and these were obsolete wooden or old ironclad ships. Naval technology had stagnated in the United States, illustrated by the fact that there was not a single high-power, long-range rifled gun in the entire fleet.

In the U. Navy's newest ships were wooden-hulled steam sloops built in the previous decade. Modernization began in the early s during the administration of President Chester A. Rapid growth in overseas markets and a foreign policy aimed at U. Two years of debate on the nature of this expansion culminated with the Navy Act of , authorizing the construction of the steel cruisers Atlanta , Boston , and Chicago and the dispatch vessel Dolphin.

The American fleet that began with these greatly superior vessels came to be known as the New Navy. It was during the administration of Benjamin Harrison that the Navy's strategy began to change from defense and commerce protection to offensive fleet action. President Harrison called for the continued and rapid construction of modern warships and the acquisition of bases to maintain the U.

He later urged Congress to authorize construction of battleships , giving support to Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy's goal of making the U. Tracy proved to be an excellent administrator, and he marshaled allies for his expansionist policies in both Congress and the Navy, including Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan's involvement stemmed from his strong belief that government leaders played a crucial role in determining the growth or decay of a nation's sea power.

Navalists around the world used his publication, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, , to promote naval expansion in their own countries. American navalists' work bore fruit with the Navy Bill of 30 June , authorizing construction of three battleships later named Indiana , Oregon , and Massachusetts. Along with the battleship Iowa , authorized in , this force formed the core of a new fleet willing to challenge European navies for control of the waters in the Western Hemisphere.

While civilian leadership and U. Founded in and placed under the direction of Commodore Stephen B. Luce, the War College contributed greatly to the professionalization of the U. Naval Officer Corps at the end of the nineteenth century. By the s the curriculum at the War College featured training problems in which students drafted plans for operations in the event of war with specific countries under particular circumstances. Taylor, and later special boards convened by the Secretary of the Navy, examined the possibility of war with Spain over trouble in Cuba.

When such a conflict appeared unavoidable in early , the Navy Department had a solid body of planning studies honed by four years of debate among its leading officers. Although the realities of war would force several modifications, many of the concepts laid out in the naval plans were implemented: Perhaps more important, nearly every plan called for the purchase or charter of merchant vessels to serve as auxiliary cruisers, colliers, and transports.

Data on these vessels furnished in lists appended to the plans served as a basis for decision making in those crucial weeks before war. More or less in conformity with this strategy, Maj. Nelson Miles, Commanding General of the Army, proposed to assemble, train, and equip a small force of about 80, using the Regular Army as a nucleus. There would be ample time to prepare this force, since Miles deemed it unwise to land any troops in Cuba before the end of the unhealthy rainy season in October. The first step was to concentrate the entire Regular Army at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, where it could receive much-needed instruction in combined-arms operations.

So deliberate and cautious a plan, however, was by mid-April not in harmony with the increasing public demand for immediate action against the Spanish. With an ear to this demand, Secretary of War Russell M. He ordered the regular infantry regiments to go to New Orleans, Tampa, and Mobile, where they would be ready for an immediate descent on Cuba. The decision to mobilize large volunteer forces compounded the problems of equipping, training, and supplying the Army.

In the spring and summer of , thousands of enthusiastic but inexperienced volunteers poured into newly established camps. A taste of military life soon curbed the enthusiasm of most of them, for in the camps they found chronic shortages of the most essential equipment. Even such basic items as underwear, socks, and shoes were lacking. A steady diet of badly prepared food, unbelievably poor sanitary conditions, and inadequate medical facilities complemented the equipment shortages. Given time, the Army might have devised adequate operational plans; but public opinion, political pressures, and the trend of events demanded the launching of an immediate expedition against the Spanish in Cuba.

Admirals of the new steel navy : makers of the American naval tradition, 1880-1930

By contrast, the Spanish were ill-prepared to defend their overseas possessions from outside intervention. Their vessels stationed in Cuba and the Philippines were obsolete and intended only to help the colonial government put down insurrection. They were unable to defend themselves against the modern steel ships of the U. Spain possessed only one battleship, Pelayo, and this was an older vessel that had just been modernized.

This ship and the armored cruiser Carlos V were not ready for action until after the war began. Only four armored cruisers were available to steam across the Atlantic, and these suffered severe material deficiencies. The inch guns were missing from Cristobal Colon, and there was a shortage of ammunition for the already defective 5.

The Spanish Minister of Marine, Segismundo Bermejo y Merelo, revealed a lack of strategic planning in the vague orders given to Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete in command of a squadron of four armored cruisers and three torpedo boats. Bermejo simply instructed Cervera to proceed to Caribbean waters and defend Spanish possessions against American attack. The Spanish also lacked enough colliers properly positioned to help their ships replenish once they were across the Atlantic.

In addition, inadequate stockpiles of coal and coaling facilities at the ports in Cuba and Puerto Rico severely limited Cervera's options and ability to operate in the Caribbean. In short, the Spanish did not adequately prepare their forces and bases to defend their overseas possessions in the face of a challenge at sea.

Once war began with a well-prepared naval power, such as the United States, Spain's possessions were almost certain to be cut off from the home country. Nevertheless, the insurgent leadership, sensing victory, refused to accept anything less than independence, and the government's many political opponents made it impossible for reforms to go far enough to win over the Cuban people. When pro-Weyler forces in Havana instigated riots in January , Washington became greatly concerned for the safety of Americans in the country. The administration believed that some means of protecting U. The battleship arrived on 25 January.

Sigsbee and the officers of Maine every courtesy.

In order to avoid the possibility of trouble, the U. Navy captain did not allow his enlisted men to go on shore. Sigsbee and the consul at Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, reported that the Navy's presence appeared to have a calming effect on the situation, and both recommended that the Navy Department send another battleship to Havana when it came time to relieve Maine. Later investigations revealed that more than five tons of powder charges for the vessel's 6- and inch guns had ignited, virtually obliterating the forward third of the ship. The remaining wreckage rapidly settled to the bottom of the harbor.

Most of Maine's crew were sleeping or resting in the enlisted quarters in the forward part of the ship when the explosion occurred. Two hundred and sixty-six American sailors lost their lives as a result of the disaster. Captain Sigsbee and most of the officers survived because their quarters were in the after portion of the ship. Spanish officials and the crew of the civilian steamer City of Washington acted quickly in rescuing survivors and caring for the wounded.

Find a copy in the library

The attitude and actions of the Spanish allayed initial suspicions that hostile action caused the explosion, and led Sigsbee to include at the bottom of his initial telegram the cautionary phrase, "Public opinion should be suspended until further report. Navy Department immediately formed a board of inquiry under Captain William T.

Sampson to determine the cause of Maine's destruction. The board met in Havana on 21 February, and their investigation lasted four weeks. The condition of the submerged wreck and a lack of technical expertise prevented the board from being as thorough as later investigating groups would be. In the end, they concluded that a mine had detonated under the ship. The board did not attempt to fix blame for the placement of the device.

When the naval court's verdict was announced, the American public reacted with predictable outrage. Fed by inflammatory articles in the " Yellow Press " blaming Spain for the disaster, the public had already placed guilt on the Spanish government and called for the liberation of Cuba. The destruction of Maine did not cause the United States to declare war on Spain, but it served as a catalyst, accelerating the approach to a diplomatic impasse.

The sinking of the ship and death of U. With the threat of war larger than ever, the United States government stepped up preparations. At the beginning of March the fleet of the United States Navy consisted of five battleships, two armored cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers, six steel monitors, eight old iron monitors, thirty-three unprotected cruisers and gunboats, six torpedo boats, and twelve tugs.

Noticeably absent from this list, however, were colliers, supply vessels, transports, hospital ships, repair ships, and the large number of small vessels necessary for maintaining an effective blockade of Cuba's numerous ports. As the Navy Department's war plans clearly indicated, the government needed to purchase or contract for scores of these auxiliary ships.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt organized a Board of Auxiliary Vessels that used information in the department's war plans to prepare a list of suitable private craft which would meet the Navy's expanded needs. By the end of the war, the Navy had purchased or leased warships and auxiliaries. Another twenty-eight ships, including lighthouse tenders and the vessels of the Fish Commission and Revenue Cutter Service, had been added from existing government organizations.

After the war auxiliary vessels such as colliers, refrigerator ships, and distilling ships became a permanent part of the fleet. Secretary Long formally organized the Naval War Board in March to advise him on strategy and operations. Crowninshield, and Captain Albert S. Although it had no executive authority, the board exerted considerable influence on operations through its advisory capacity. In particular, Mahan's views often dominated. Following earlier war plans, the board recommended concentrating on Spain's outlying possessions with a close blockade of Cuba, giving the U.

Army time to mobilize sufficient strength for land campaigns in Cuba and Puerto Rico. While the Navy Department worked with the President and the War Department in developing strategy, Secretary Long began positioning naval units for the opening of hostilities. The first colliers did not reach the fleet until 3 May, nearly two weeks after the blockade began.

The protected cruisers Minneapolis and Columbia joined Schley's force before the war started. The squadron was organized to protect the U. On 20 April, Howell assumed command of the newly formed Northern Patrol Squadron, which was responsible for the protection of the coast and coastal trade from the Delaware capes to Bar Harbor, Maine. This command consisted primarily of eight old iron monitors stationed at several U. In the event of war he was to take his squadron and destroy the Spanish ships in Philippine waters.

Dewey also prepared for future operations in a region without friendly bases by purchasing the British steamers Nanshan and Zafiro to carry coal and supplies for his squadron. Anticipating a showdown with the Spanish fleet in the Atlantic theater, Secretary Long ordered the battleship USS Oregon to depart from its home port at Bremerton, Washington , on 7 March, to begin the first leg of a 14,nautical-mile journey to Key West.

The gunboat USS Marietta made the battleship's voyage quicker and easier by arranging for coal and supplies in the South American ports along the way. Oregon arrived at her destination on 26 May fully ready for operations against the Spanish fleet. Although President McKinley continued to press for a diplomatic settlement to the Cuban problem, he accelerated military preparations begun in January when an impasse appeared likely.

The Spanish position on Cuban independence hardened, and McKinley asked Congress on 11 April for permission to intervene. On 21 April, the President ordered the Navy to begin a blockade of Cuba, and Spain followed with a declaration of war on 23 April. Congress responded with a formal declaration of war on 25 April, made retroactive to the start of the blockade. International law required that a blockade had to be effective to be legal. With the absence of colliers and the Atlantic Fleet divided between Key West and Hampton Roads, the American effort was initially limited to the north coast of Cuba between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and Cienfuegos on the south coast.

In the early light of 22 April, Sampson's fleet steamed from Key West across the Florida Straits and began the blockade. Sampson believed he could reduce the defenses of Havana by bombarding the Spanish fortifications one at a time, beginning from the west. However, Secretary Long, following the advice of the Naval War Board, which expected Cervera's fleet to deploy to the Caribbean, ordered him not to risk his armored ships unnecessarily against land fortifications. The Navy Department was considering occupying the port of Matanzas, garrisoning it with a large military force, and opening communications with the insurgents.

Long wanted Sampson to keep his most powerful ships ready to escort the transports if McKinley should decide on an early army landing in Cuba. By the morning of 23 April, the advance ships of the blockading fleet were off their assigned ports. Additional vessels reinforced them over the next several days. Navy struggled during the first weeks of the war to assemble the logistical apparatus necessary to support the blockade. Ships had to keep steam up in their boilers to pursue unknown vessels as they came into sight.

Until colliers were fitted out and sent south, most of the blockading ships were forced to return to Key West to coal. Fresh water and food were also in short supply during the early days of the war. The blockade was monotonous duty broken only by the rare capture of a Spanish vessel or an exchange of gunfire with gunboats and shore batteries. A few actions were intense, such as the one at Cardenas on 11 May when Spanish gunboats drew the U.

Rapidshare Library Books Download. | Page

Navy gunboat Wilmington , the torpedo boat Winslow , and the Revenue Cutter Hudson deep into the harbor. Hidden Spanish batteries ambushed Winslow , severely damaging her, killing ten and wounding twenty-one of her crew. While under heavy fire, Hudson towed the torpedo boat out of the harbor as Wilmington covered the withdrawal with rapid fire against the Spanish guns. The most celebrated action of this type occurred on 11 May off Cienfuegos. McCalla of the cruiser Marblehead organized a party and planned an operation to cut the underwater communication cables.

Marine sharpshooters and machine gun crews in steam cutters poured a continuous fire into Spanish positions on shore, along with gunfire support from Marblehead and the gunboat Nashville , while sailors in launches dragged the sea floor with grappling hooks for the cables.