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As it can be assumed that at least some of the chiefs were literate, after more than twenty years of missionary influence cf. The Rapanui flag was taken down and its display prohibited in However, it might still have been hoisted thereafter. According to Hotus et. Before going into the details of international law, it is worth to take a brief look at the global context. Throughout the 19th century, European powers increased their colonial empires and took over most of the rest of the world. In the mids, Eastern Polynesia became increasingly a target of this imperialism, until in the late s, the scramble for colonies was fully going on there as well.

The evolution of this concept of international law started with the Treaty of Westphalia in , which originated the idea of state sovereignty. Westlake published his Chapters on the Principles of International Law in , contemporary to many of the examples under review in this chapter.

A Treatise in , after international law had changed substantially following the treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. As we have seen, international law refers to the legal concepts regulating the relations between sovereign states.

According to Oppenheim, a State is defined by the existence of four conditions, which are: Only then is it regarded as a member of the Family of Nations. Its recognition as an independent State occurred in , clearly following the first example, with the three envoys being sent to pursue recognition, and explicitly receiving it in a joint declaration by Britain and France, then the two leading world powers. John Westlake thus wrote in The International Society to which we belong, and of which what we know as international law is the body of rules, comprises-First, all European states.

The same cannot be said of all Christian states, not for instance of Abyssinia [i. Given that fact, its alleged extinction and the acquisition of its territory by the United States needs to be examined under these rules. According to Oppenheim, there are four ways in which a State can be extinguished: Italicised words in the original. Emphasis in bold letters added. Instead, the alleged treaty was the result of negotiations between the United States and a puppet government of insurgents who were put in power through an intervention of the United States itself and therefore had no legal authority to transfer title of sovereignty.

Furthermore, the treaty was not ratified by the United States Senate as is required for an international treaty in the U. Accessed 8 June In summary, it can be clearly established that the United States did not acquire sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands in either of the ways permissible under international law. According to Craven, It [i. Until the territory in question is ceded to or annexed by the occupying State, its authority is de-facto only, whereas the sovereignty remains with the occupied State.

The fact that the international recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State in is based on a joint declaration by the governments of the United Kingdom and France Craven b: Indeed there is contemporary evidence that the two declarations were regarded as very similar in effect. What is a matter of law is recognition, and this was explicitly given to the three kingdoms. The second, and probably more important difference is the stated motivation for the recognition. It might thus be questionable if they could be truly considered members of the Family of Nations.

However, after their decision to abrogate the Jarnac convention in , France and the United Kingdom no longer considered the islands as recognised independent States, and France subsequently took them over without any international protests. This assertion needs to be further evaluated. According to Lassa Oppenheim, the recognition of a State, once given, cannot be withdrawn, even if a State does not comply with conditions that were set for its recognition.

If anything, the convention might have abrogated the mutual engagement of France and Great Britain not to take possession of the islands, but it could not have taken away their status as recognised independent states. The unilateral declaration of annexation by France would then be in total contradiction to international law, as it was neither a cession by the Leeward islands governments of their territory to France, nor an act of belligerent annexation since at that time France had not yet waged war against any of the kingdoms.

With the subsequent establishment of a nationalist rebel government in opposition to the existing one, the situation became enormously complex. Occasional armed hostilities between the two factions and occasional interventions by France took place for the following seven years, so that no clear established authority existed. Rather, there was a state of civil unrest. As the process of taking possession of Huahine between and involved periodic acts of violence, it might alternatively be seen as a form of military conquest.

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However, as there was never a systematic effort on the part of France to invade and subjugate the island, but rather a confusing series of diplomatic initiatives and military interventions, belligerent Saura If neither cession nor subjugation are applicable, Huahine would still be a sovereign state under French occupation, this occupation being first belligerent, then peaceful.

In finally, France waged a war against that government and in that war conquered the entire national territory, thereby annihilating its government. This could be regarded as a case of debellatio or subjugation. It Rivier, quoted in Craven b: Like in the case before, much more research needs to be done for a final evaluation. The case of Porapora is more similar to Huahine, but much less complex. The unilateral annexation of is clearly null and void, and it does not seem to have had much effect on the island anyway, since the Porapora kingdom government continued to exist for seven more years.

When the latter finally ceded its territory to France in through a document that was countersigned by the French authorities of Tahiti, this could be regarded as a treaty of cession. However, like in the case of Huahine, that document was never properly ratified by France, only implicitly through the annexation law, so that there remain doubts on the validity of that cession. Belligerent subjugation can probably be excluded, as there were apparently no armed hostilities between France and Porapora. The Kingdom of Tahiti before the establishment of the French Protectorate in would also fall into that category.

Kanalu Young describes both Oppenheim Instead, the Tahitian Kingdom came under a French protectorate. Protectorates are defined as arrangements between two States, in which one more powerful State dominates the other and manages its foreign affairs. Given this circumstance, the status in international law of the Tahitian protectorate was at first rather vague and unclear, as French officials themselves admitted.

Throughout the protectorate period, the queen of Tahiti was treated as a head of State in diplomatic protocol. The second protectorate convention of could therefore be regarded as equally legally questionable, since it was not ratified by France. The three Leeward Islands kingdoms had that status from about until their recognition in Rimatara, Rurutu and Rapa similarly were non-recognised States since the s. Since the mids, Mangareva was a non-recognised State as well. All these four island kingdoms subsequently went through a similar political evolution as Tahiti, becoming first French protectorates, then being annexed as colonies.

In Mangareva and Rapa, the political relationship with France remained unclear during the protectorate phases, and they both attempted to shake off the French overlordship until it was enforced by more or less subtle military interventions. Rurutu and Rimatara, on the other hand, entered protectorate agreements only in , and remained independent for most of the nineteenth century.

During the second half of the century, they came very close to the status of independent States despite their extreme smallness less than inhabitants each , even though they did not achieve explicit recognition. As internally sovereign States, they were nevertheless to some degree acknowledged as proper countries. The case of the Marquesas Islands and other non-State territories Territories that were not under the sovereignty of any State, whether it be recognised or not, were regarded under nineteenth century international as not belonging to any state until becoming occupied by one.

The islands in question did not have any stable centralised authority that would have been capable of entering into diplomatic relations with Western countries. In the rest of Marquesas as well as on the Eastern Tuamotus there was never anything resembling a State before the French takeover, only traditional tribal structures. That is probably the reason why the documents were written in French only and not translated into Marquesan.

In fact, none of the triplicate copies of the documents went to the chiefs themselves, only to different French government departments. As these were eventually both abandoned, I would argue that France lost its title to sovereignty again, and any other power could have taken the islands into their possession. Only on Nuku Hiva did France exercise anything like an effective colonial occupation, one could argue, since the periods of temporary abandonment of this island were relatively short.

For most of the archipelago, on the other hand, France exercised permanent and therefore effective colonial occupation only since Continuous French sovereignty over the archipelago would therefore rather begin in that year, and not in , as claimed by France. Concerning the Eastern Tuamotu islands, their acquisition by France is legally quite complex, as it involves both France and the Tahitian kingdom under French protection.

Tahiti as a State, albeit not a recognised one, acquired some of the Tuamotu islands, and subsequently claimed the whole archipelago without actually controlling it. This might be considered as some kind of an inchoate title to sovereignty by the Tahitian Kingdom. All of this was of course not really enforceable under international law, as the Tahitian State was not a recognised member of the Family of Nations.

This might thus be considered a complex form of colonial occupation, not unlike the case of the Sudan being co-colonised by Britain and its own protectorate, Egypt. The slaving raids then virtually annihilated the traditional society and left only a remnant of its former inhabitants, in a state of anarchy in both Western and traditional terms. It might have for a short moment, when the alliance between the three forces worked out and was well- coordinated, but when it broke up, there was rather anarchy on the island.

Under Dutrou- Oppenheim When the missionaries came back and Alexander Salmon became the manager in the late s, Rapa Nui evolved more constantly towards a State, and some sort of a government apparatus was established in the s under King Atamu Tekena. However, since at no point the Rapanui State was a permanent and stable institution, like it was on Tahiti, Rurutu, Rimatara and Mangareva for instance, but merely a State in formation, the issue remains unclear and can probably not be definitely resolved. Accessed 10 December A joint resolution of Congress, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the ratification of a treaty, and can have effect in domestic matters of the US only.

However, in fact the two cases are fundamentally different. What the joint resolution on Texas of did was transforming the Republic of Texas, a rebel government controlling parts of Mexican territory, into a new US state. The admission of a new state by Congress is a constitutional act, according to Article IV section 3 of the US constitution. While the US state of Texas was thus legally created by a joint resolution of Congress, sovereignty over the territory was only transferred to the United States from Mexico through the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in , which in Article V redefined the border between the two nations and did at no point presume Texas to be already under US sovereignty.

Texas represents thus an anomaly of a US state admitted before sovereignty over its territory was acquired, but it cannot serve as a precedent for an acquisition of foreign territory by a joint resolution of Congress. The subsequent agreement, on the other hand, did not have any clear legal standing, as it was never ratified by the king. The same goes for the protectorate agreement with Mangareva, which was never ratified by the French king either. However, the question again is whether any of the agreements can be considered treaties in the sense of the above quoted constitutional passage, as neither Tahiti nor Mangareva were internationally recognised States.

The constitutionality of these acquisitions is therefore difficult to assess, as the charter does not have any provision about the acquisition of colonies. It only says that the latter are ruled by particular laws. The constitutional law of the Third Republic, which was valid during the various acquisitions of Polynesian islands of the s, s and s, gives a more elaborate provision about the acquisition of territory. That of the Tahitian kingdom in and that of the Leeward Islands in Only in these two cases did the French parliament pass laws to ratify the annexation of the respective territories.

The ratification of the annexation of Mangareva, on the other hand, was done by a presidential decree, which is not a law, thus in contradiction to the constitutional provision cited above. The other acquisitions, namely of Rapa, Rurutu and Rimatara, happened without any ratification, thus are totally unconstitutional.

As we have seen before that the annexation of the Leeward Islands happened most probably in violation of international law, only the annexation of the Tahitian kingdom seems to have been done in a legally permissible way. Lois constitutionnelles de It confers upon the president the responsibility to make treaties and conventions, which have to be approved by the congress before ratification.

While the Rapa Nui annexation document of was apparently never regarded as an international treaty by the Chilean government, it was seen as such by Captain Toro when he drafted it, as the document itself explicitly mentions the need for its ratification by the Chilean government to make it valid. While the Chilean constitution neither prohibits nor endorses the acquisition of territory without ratification, the explicit requirement of such ratification in the document makes it legally questionable as well.

Rather, their behaviour was one of active agency. While in the pursuit of parity, the leaders of the different islands were well aware of their successes or failures. For example, the king and chiefs of Rapa, even under extreme duress in , still attempted to keep as much of their authority as possible under the forced agreement they signed with France.

As the forces interested in US annexation knew they would never obtain the archipelago through a treaty with its government, they plotted an unprecedented scheme instead, which would involve hijacking the Hawaiian government apparatus and letting it then be taken over by the US in an orchestrated cession. This plan was not so much the result of a coherent US government policy, but rather of the collusion of two small but influential interest groups within the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States.

The overall majority of the population was clearly opposed to annexation, as shown in the petitions, and in consequence, contrary to American traditions of democracy, no referendum was held about the annexation, since the negative result was known in advance to both the local insurgents and the US Bailleul Most of the other cases were more classical examples of imperialism.

France and Chile both tried to obtain first the consent of the local governments or tribal authorities for the acquisition of their territory, but ultimately enforced their intentions with the threat or use of violence. International rules that would have prevented this kind of acquisition were deliberately ignored, even though the Leeward Islands were recognised States that could not be colonised.

Even the annexation of the non-recognised States under protectorate was questionable in the form that France chose to do it in most cases, especially when it was done without proper ratification, which violated the French constitution. This situation, in turn, is in clear contrast to Melanesia and Australia, which were generally colonised by unilaterally taking possession, without any formal agreements with local authorities whatsoever.

This does not mean, however, that this colonial fact for most of French Polynesia and Rapa Nui needs to be accepted as unchangeable today, as international law has, since the end of World War II evolved to provide redress for that problem in the form of mechanisms of decolonisation, as will be described in the following chapter.

Starting in the late s, the process was achieved, for the time being, in all three territories by the s. Between and the early s, there were no less than fifteen organic laws and decrees, one often replacing the other within a few years. Clear legal assimilation took place only in the s. In this chapter I will describe and analyse the various legal instruments and mechanisms used by the occupiers or colonisers for this assimilation and integration. This will continue the historiographic narrative from chapter one until the mid-twentieth century.

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From , it was elected by The name had been in use since to refer to the different French-affiliated territories in the Pacific, including the Tahiti protectorate and other island possessions Regnault Its main prerogatives were the vote of the budget and other financial matters, so that it could play a significant role in the political system. The French Government subsequently abolished the representation of the outer islands and placed the latter under the exclusive power of the governor in In terms of administration, the archipelagoes were unified into one single colony, even though the different status of their inhabitants was maintained.

The governor now became virtually all-powerful. No elected representation existed anymore, only a group of appointed bureaucrats who served as advisors to the governor in an administrative council. French citizenship for Tahitians was stripped of any significance. A few structural Toullelan and Gille See also Gille It was argued that all inhabitants should be equal as French citizens, and there were attempts to undermine and eradicate Polynesian identity.

In all the government schools, French was the only authorised language. See Chapter three for a more detailed description of that movement. That was not so for both the Leeward Islands and Rurutu-Rimatara, however, which had a legal status completely distinct from the rest of the colony.

Until , French law did not apply to these areas, which were governed under separate law codes. In the Leeward Islands, France promulgated a law code after consultations with local district chiefs in , which was partly compiled out of the former law codes of the three independent kingdoms. Imprimerie du Gouvernement The law code promulgated by the French administration for the two islands in was an only slightly revised version of the previous law codes of the two small nations.

The separate legal status and law codes for the Leeward Islands and Rurutu-Rimatara were abolished. The inhabitants of the other French colonies were made into citizens only more than a year later through another decree of 7 May The inhabitants of the other French colonies were made citizens only through this law, more than a year later than those of the EFO. See also Yacono The election mode of the assembly was revised in a law of The latter institution was a parliamentary assembly for the entire French Union, including metropolitan France, the TOM, as well as associated states and territories that were not represented in the two chambers of the French parliament Yacono The council ceased to exist with the dissolution of the French Union in For a biography of this key political leader, see Buka aamu no Pouvanaa a Oopa te aito roonui no te mau fenua motu no Tahiti ; Saura b Regnault See also Regnault For the debate on the name of the territory see Regnault Key powers of sovereignty such as foreign affairs, internal security and justice, remained the exclusive responsibility of the governor, but most local service agencies were placed under the territorial government, each headed by one of the ministers.

The assembly received quasi-legislative powers in these areas. Some of his campaign activists were detained without charges. It also voted to strip the local government council of most of its powers. Under the new statute, the government council was presided over by the governor or his secretary, and its members, proportionally elected by the assembly, did not have ministerial responsibilities any more. Quoted in Regnault Translated from French by the author. The Polynesian population became not only irradiated by the tests but also increasingly westernised and alienated from their culture through the massive economic upheaval caused by this militarisation.

In April the US Congress passed an organic act to provide for the government of the archipelago. Quoted in Regnault b: Print [hereafter Organic Act]. Most colonies were ruled by appointed governors through decrees, with little to no popular participation at all. Initially, this lead to a restoration of a local political scene dominated by Hawaiian nationalists. K Wilcox, popular leader of the attempted uprising against the Bell In the end the oligarchy kept effective control even over most of the elective positions in the government.

Behind the scenes of an apparently semi-autonomous local government, the territory was dominated by the sugar plantation-based business oligarchy on one side and the US military on the other. The Hawaiian language had already been banned from the Wisniewski In fact, statehood was advocated from the very beginning of the territorial period, initially not as a proof of Americanisation, but as a way of getting the executive and judicative branches of government under popular control.

For loyal Silva a: With increasing Americanisation however, the movement for statehood shifted more and more towards a struggle for equal rights within what was increasingly perceived as a part of America, and eventually even most representatives of the oligarchy jumped on the bandwagon and supported it. This was mainly due to the Jones Costigan Act of , which limited sugar exports to the US and thus impeded the growth of the sugar industry, see supra note For a discussion of Commonwealth status see Bell See also Bell American statehood, happening without any visible protests, not even by those who had campaigned for independence or Commonwealth status before, can thus be regarded as the culmination and, for the time being, conclusion, of the process of US occupational assimilation and indoctrination.

The number of voters in the statehood referendum however, was merely , ibd: To suggest that only one fifth of the population were above voting age would be quite astonishing. For a discussion of these numbers see also Williams As late as a Chilean officer wondered whether the island was legally part of Chile at all.

Later this position would be referred to as alcalde mayor. Reprinted in Vergara He otherwise reconfirmed the edict of , so that the island was still not clearly a lawful part of Chile. Fondos para establecer un Lazareto y una Escuela en la Isla de Pascua. Funds to establish a Hospital and a School on Ester Island. This implied that the constitution was not fully applicable. However, these did nothing to bring substantial change, as all of them confirmed the dual authority of the company and the military.

The islanders were thus completely cut off from their Polynesian relatives. Cited in Fischer In , Chile seriously considered selling Rapa Nui to Japan, even though the project was later abandoned. The Rapanui people became Chilean citizens with voting rights in national elections. Locally, a municipal Fischer A local court, as a branch of the regular Chilean judiciary, was also established. Besides assimilating Rapa Nui into the Chilean administrative system, the law also created some special provisions: The islanders remained tax-exempt, land alienation to non-Rapanui individuals was prohibited, and criminal sentences were to be one degree lower than the requirements of Chilean law.

On the other hand, however, the new civil status also meant that the presence of the Chilean State increased, bringing along an influx of Chilean bureaucrats and settlers, increasing cultural Chileanisation, and a language shift to Spanish. During the military dictatorship that lasted until , all civil servants were appointed by the junta in Santiago, and a fully democratic municipality was restored only in Conclusion In the first six decades of the twentieth century, all three entities under consideration in this thesis underwent a process of assimilation into the political system of the ruling power, with various social, cultural and economic ramifications.

Although the processes were vastly different in their details for each case, as a general pattern one could say that the political system imposed by the coloniser or occupier was first used to oppress the native population and create economic opportunities for the ruling state and its settlers at the detriment of the locals. During the first half of the twentieth century, both were in a situation of inequality with, and oppression by, their respective ruling powers.

The oppression was not only political, but also, and even more so, economic: In reaction, both were eventually set on a movement towards integration into the ruling State in order to end this system of oppression and achieve equal civil rights. In order to further its assimilation of the territory, France had to first crush the local political movement and restore colonial authority, and then buy the consent of the population with the enormous influx of money associated with the nuclear testing centre.

The UN decolonisation regime The beginnings International law in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, was strongly centred on Western countries, even though in some few cases it already extended to non-Western countries as well. While earlier international agreements, like the acts of the Berlin Congress on Africa or the Covenant of the League of Nations had merely contained declarations of intent to treat the inhabitants of the colonies well, the Charter of the United Nations, enacted in June , created for the first time binding international obligations for the member states in relation to their respective overseas possessions.

The administering powers were furthermore instructed to develop self-government and promote economic, social and educational advancement in these territories, and, in article 73e, to transmit regularly information on the progress of these developments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Chapter XI, Article The resolution established a list of 74 territories on which information had been transmitted by the administrative powers according to article 73e, as well as a committee to collect that information. Transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter.

Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter. In this case there has to be total equality with other parts of the metropolitan country, and the future possibility to modify the status of the territory in respect to the metropolitan country has to be given. Factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a Territory is or is not a Territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.

The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation. Consideration of communications relating to the cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter. Article 73 did not make that sufficiently clear and both interpretations were possible.

For a further discussion of this issue, see Chapter four. Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Reproduced in its entirety at the end of this thesis as Appendix E. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic social and political development.

Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. To complement these powerful words with practical definitions, the UNGA passed resolution XV , which defined more clearly than ever before the criteria for a territory to be listed as non-self-governing, as well as the conditions for such a territory to be regarded as decolonised.

In Principles IV and V, these are clearly defined: Principle V Once it has been established that such a prima facie case of geographical and ethnical or cultural distinctness of a territory exists, other elements may then be brought into consideration. Those additional elements may be, inter alia, of an administrative, political, juridical, economic or historical nature.

Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under article 73e of the Charter. On the same day in resolution XV it determined the Spanish and Portuguese colonial possessions to be Non-Self-Governing Territories under the terms of resolution , in open confrontation with Portugal which claimed that its territories were integral parts of its metropolitan country. The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

In , these principles were once more codified as essential principles of international law through their inclusion into the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co- operation. More controversial, however, were the few cases of NSGTs that were removed from the list without becoming independent States, with the justification given by their respective administering powers that they had either become fully integrated into, or otherwise For a detailed analysis of that committee and its achievements during the s and early s, see Barbier Transmission of information under Article 73e was therefore no longer appropriate, as the territories ceased to qualify as See for example, Ahmad However, despite the stipulations of the Organic Act, the status of the territory remained ambiguous.

The achievement of US statehood was presented as a purely domestic legal process of the United States. Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter in respect of Alaska and Hawaii. Bell ; Van Dyke et al. As for the performance of the vote itself, several points were inappropriate, as they were not in accordance with the relevant provisions of UN international law.

First, there was no option on the ballot for independence. Having no option of independence in a process to determine the future political status of a NSGT could be seen as a violation of provisions in UNGA resolution , as cited above. However, another problem arising out of US statehood for a NSGT is the absence of a provision for secession of states under the US constitution, and its effective prohibition in practice since the US Civil War of the s. This is incompatible with another provision in resolution , which clearly requires that in the case of a NSGT becoming an integral part of another State, this integration should not be legally irreversible.

There must be a possibility to modify the political status of the territory in question at a later date. See also Lopez-Reyes While Lopez-Reyes argues this should have been only people of ethnic Hawaiian ancestry, this would both discriminate against the descendants of non- Lopez-Reyes Lopez-Reyes also cites the precedent of Surinam which was incorporated into its colonising power, the Netherlands, in but later chose to become independent in Lopez- Reyes Questionability of the application of the UN decolonisation regime Further analysis, however, reveals an even deeper reaching problem.

Classification of a political entity as a non-self governing territory, on the other hand, implies a non- recognised status of that territory before it became colonised, as this was the case for all the other 73 territories included in the list of NSGTs. Other recognised independent States that found themselves under foreign occupation in , like Germany under the four allies, or Japan under the United States, were not listed as NSGTs.

Classifying the entire process as illegal under international law does not make the statehood vote any more legal, of course. Not only under the UN decolonisation regime, but even more so under the laws of occupation, would the mass immigration of American nationals prior to the US statehood process be considered a violation. Only its unusual geographic setting, not territorially adjacent to the occupying State, and its US-imposed territorial political system gave it the appearance of having a colonial-style relationship with its occupier and facilitated the erroneous listing.

Regardless of whether or not some kind of inclusion on the list as a special case might have been appropriate, the United States was wrong in the way it Sai They would then not properly qualify for the questions of decolonisation appropriate in the rest of the territory treated below. It is interesting to note that the Leeward Islands were administered separately, and with a distinct jurisdictional system until , as we have seen in a preceding paragraph. There is no doubt about the unrestricted applicability of the UN decolonisation regime in its case. The existence of States in most of the territory before the French takeover does not alter this fact.

Precedence from other listed territories clearly shows that political entities which qualified as States but were not recognized before their colonisation, such as Madagascar, were seen as Non-Self-Governing Territories. Even if those States were never fully annexed and remained protectorates, they were included in the list, for instance Tunisia, Morocco, Brunei and Zanzibar. Following the Second World War, France promised in the preamble to its constitution to grant its colonies self-government.

In wording that clearly reflected Art. Faithful to its traditional mission, France intends to conduct the peoples of which she has taken care to the liberty of governing themselves and managing democratically their own affairs; ruling out any system of colonisation founded on arbitrariness, she guarantees to all equal access to public functions and individual or collective exercise of rights and liberties hereafter proclaimed or confirmed. This was not entirely consistent, however, as in contrast to the three named and other protectorates, the British protectorates of Kuwait, Maldives and Tonga never appeared on the list before they became independent.

The French Establishments in Oceania thus figured on the list among those territories about which France transmitted information to the United Nations. Pierre and Miquelon, the French Establishments in India. Initially, no official explanation was given for this selective removal. Pierre and Miquelon does not have any aboriginal population, its inhabitants being entirely of French metropolitan origin. The argument of a non-applicability of article 73e makes thus sense in regard to this territory. As for the French Establishments in India, this latter territory was subsequently annexed by the Republic of India in the s, thereafter ceasing to be a matter of French decolonisation.

The inhabitants of all French Overseas Territories became French citizens in , but only the EFO and three other territories were removed. Another argument might be that the other Overseas Territories maintained segregated electorates for white and native inhabitants despite their common French citizenship until the Loi-cadre of , whereas in French Oceania there were no distinctions in voting rights since Upon closer examination however, even this argument makes no sense, as in the simultaneously removed territory of New Caledonia, the legal segregation of the Kanak population remained in force until like in the other territories.

For New Caledonia, this unjust situation was eventually corrected through a re-inscription process in , but the case of French Polynesia remains outstanding. More recently, there have been efforts by the territorial government of French Polynesia since to pursue re-inscription of their territory. These efforts have so far been fruitless. This was shown very bluntly at the first South Pacific Conference in Fiji in , a meeting organised by the colonial powers to promote the development of Pacific island territories, in which most of the leading native politicians of the Pacific participated.

At this conference, French Oceania was the only territory not represented by an islander but by a European. One is therefore lead to assume that France deliberately tried to keep local politicians unaware of political developments in the region. Evaluation in terms of the French domestic decolonisation process Even though United Nations involvement with the EFO ended with the withdrawal from the list in , decolonisation efforts continued both within the territory and in the larger French system.

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It is therefore worthwhile to evaluate the further evolution of the territory, especially the events of , in terms of the continuing legal evolution of the status of French Overseas Territories. We have already examined the Loi-cadre and its belated implementation in the territory in The institutions were identical to those created in the other French Overseas Territories, including New Caledonia in the Pacific, various territories in sub- Fry With the implementation of that law, France ceased transmission of information on all of its territories in , later arguing that the Loi- cadre gave them a sufficient amount of self-government to make them no longer qualify as NSGTs.

Had France not arbitrarily intervened in the aftermath of the referendum, French Polynesia would most probably El-Ayouty The subsequent transfer of sovereignty to Guinea happened in a bitter break-up of all relations with France, whose officials committed acts of sabotage as a sort of revenge when they were leaving Betts See for example Madagascar in Brown But the list of chances of decolonisation goes on.

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Besides French Polynesia, there were only three other French territories with native populations whose assemblies voted to retain Overseas Territory status after the referendum, namely New Caledonia, the Comoro Islands and French Somaliland now known as Djibouti. Eventually the same happened in New Caledonia in , but the other two territories, the Comoros and French Somaliland, retained their vice-presidents and local governments. As independence movements were on the rise in these latter two territories, both eventually received a status of internal autonomy in and , respectively, with a territorial government led by an elected president, and the office of governor being replaced with a High Commissioner.

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For Djibouti see also Thompson and Adloff For a more detailed discussion of internal autonomy in those territories as a model for French Polynesia, see Chapter four. Question of French Somaliland. Question of the Comoro Archipelago. With this calculated denial of self-determination, both French Pacific territories thus clearly represent anomalies, not only under international law, but also within the larger picture of French domestic decolonisation. The case of Rapa Nui While the two previous cases exemplify inconsistent applications of the UN decolonisation regime, Rapa Nui was excluded from any international process from the very beginning.

The island did not figure on the list of non-self-governing territories, and it has to this date remained absent. This interpretation is contested by the Republic of the Comoros, which upholds its claim to sovereignty over Mayotte. The island clearly fulfilled all the requirements, primary and secondary, that were given in that resolution for a territory to qualify as a NSGT. Rapa Nui was clearly both geographically separate, and ethnically and culturally distinct from its administrative power Chile. Not listed by the UN, the island community had no idea it was entitled to an act of self-determination, and that the imposed incorporation into Chile was only one of several possibilities to decolonise.

Ironically, Chile has been a member of the UN Decolonisation Committee from the s onwards, but it never acknowledged having a colony itself. In fact, denial of colonialism seemed to be the common pattern among Latin countries, as Spain and Portugal refused to admit having non-self governing territories as well. In , 1, Rapanui signed a petition to the UN Decolonisation committee and asked for a referendum on independence, with apparently no reaction.

If more detailed research confirms this absolute lack of international awareness, Chile would be unique in its position as the only colonial power that has never been officially designated as such. As the resolution states, Spain eventually complied with the UN and agreed to transmit information on its territories, but Portugal continued its policy of denial until , when its metropolitan authoritarian regime was overthrown, and all its colonial territories were immediately granted independence.

For a detailed discussion of Portuguese colonialism and action taken by the UN in its regard, see Barbier Copy in private archives of Kekuni Blaisdell, Honolulu. This alone represents a historical anachronism and makes the three territories jurisdictional anomalies today. Numerous similar attempts by imperialist powers to conceal colonialism or manipulate the decolonisation process in Asian and African territories all failed eventually due to the scrutiny exercised by an ever more watchful UN, as we have seen in the cases of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies as well as Djibouti and the Comoros.

The other question that needs to be asked, of course, is why the three ruling powers were so keen on keeping the three Pacific Islands territories in the first place, while many other overseas possessions were given up by the same metropolitan countries relatively easily. The Philippines for example, the largest territory in the United States overseas empire, was granted independence in , at a time when a more repressive attitude would not have brought the US into much international trouble, given the attitudes of the other colonial powers.

Later, after , France did not take strong efforts to keep her African territories either, finally letting them go in without much Wei and Kamel While political opinion in the latter could be easily manipulated through either indoctrination or low-key repression, the United States would have had to fight a costly war against a large-scale anti-colonial guerrilla movement if they had wanted to keep the Philippines. This territory however was never technically a US overseas possession like the territories acquired in the Spanish-American War, but rather a UN trust territory under US administration.

The combination of mass immigration of US nationals and indoctrination of the local population had worked so well in this territory that the US did not need to suppress any independence movement, but could easily manipulate the population into accepting statehood. Even more so, as in the other US imperial possessions a nationalist spirit was well present during that time, exemplified not only by the independende of the Philippines but also the violent clashes involving the Puerto Rican independence movement see Wei and Kamel In that context, it might be useful to look at the demands of the anti-colonial movements in the various French territories.

Either incorporate the territories and extend all metropolitan social programmes to them, or grant them independence. Extending French social welfare standards to the vast African territories would have lead to the immediate bankruptcy of the entire country. Otherwise, the available resources would have had to be equally distributed among all inhabitants of the empire, which would have lead to a massive reduction of the standard of living in metropolitan France and probably incited an armed revolt of French citizens against their government. Later they switched positions, when native nationalists began advocating autonomy while the elites became staunchly pro-French.

Through post independence- arrangements with their governments, France continued to dominate many of them economically and militarily. On the other hand, incorporating a few small island territories and subsidizing them in order to bring their per-capita income closer to that of France was an affordable price to pay for the keeping of some spots of the former empire, which despite their negligible size allowed the maintaining of a worldwide chain of military bases, and thus enabled France to remain a global power.

In summary, I would argue that it was a combination of UN neglect and strategic interests of the ruling powers that led to the denial of the rights the inhabitants of the three territories were entitled to under international law. However, the deplorable processes of assimilation and refused or fraudulent decolonisation did not remain the last chapters in their political evolution.

In the second half of the twentieth century, each of In Madagascar, for instance, France maintained naval and air force bases and French companies played dominant roles for more than adecade following independence Brown On French economic and military domination in post-colonial Africa see also Betts Independence Movements and Initiatives In all three territories, the policy of oppression and assimilation has been opposed by various movements of resistence, which are becoming more and more vocal in their demands.

In this chapter I will first provide an overview of these independence movements, and then analyze and compare the various strategies that have been used by them in order to destabilize the rule by the foreigners and advance the cause of independence. The first of these covered the early territorial period in the first decade of the twentieth century and centres around the Home Rule Party, as we have seen before.

Strictly speaking, the Home Rule Party was not an independence movement, as it did not openly advocate the restoration of an independent Hawaiian government. However, it represented a force of resistance to assimilation and attempted to sustain a distinct Hawaiian identity. Overwhelmed by the ever increasing American presence, large parts of the population shifted their efforts to the achievement of equal rights as Americans rather than continuing to resist assimilation.

However, there was some resistance against the campaign for US statehood during the s and s. In spite of its rather marginal impact, this could be seen as the second phase of resistance to US assimilation. The key leader in this phase was territorial senator Kamokila Campbell, who vehemently campaigned against statehood, while advocating Commonwealth status instead, modelled on that granted to Puerto Rico in A political party in favour of Commonwealth status existed for a short time, apparently rallying Hawaiian nationalists together with Big Five oligarchic interests in their common opposition to statehood, but the party was severely beaten in the territorial elections.

The modern Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement since This third and much more important phase, referred to as the modern Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement, began in the s. It drew its inspiration partly from the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements in the United States of the s, and especially the American Indian movement that emerged at the same time. December 10, Draft for UN Human right day. Unpublished typewritten document in the private archives of Kekuni Blaisdell; Wong-Wilson For a detailed analysis of the Kalama Valley land struggle and its ramifications, see Milner Objectives included social justice, the protection of sacred sites, native rights for Hawaiians comparable to Native American rights, and reparations for the negative effects of the US invasion on the Native Hawaiian population.

Copy obtained from Kekuni Blaisdell; Churchill and Venne These can be considered the fourth phase. Copy acquired from Dennis Kanahele. As the prime minister, Noa has had informal contacts with the governments of Fiji, Tonga, and especially French Polynesia. Conceived on October 8, Reinstated on March 13, Copy acquired from Henry Noa. A related but somewhat different course of action has been undertaken by Keanu Sai and a group of supporters.

In , he founded the Perfect Title Company, in order to examine land titles and expose the fraudulent nature of land ownership in contemporary Hawaii, based on the illegalities of the s. The court verified the existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign state, but concluded that no further action could be taken without the participation of the US. Most recently, the Osorio World Court Proceedings, including a booklet descriptive of the case and its background Sai For a discussion of the arbitration case and the Security Council complaint, see also Dumberry December 9, , Kaumakapili Church.

The motivations of Spitz in this affair were not entirely clear, and private business interests were possibly the more important aspect of his action. Nevertheless it influenced Tahitians who a decade later became active in the first durable and efficient anti-colonial movement in the territory. In , he was a part, alongside Spitz, of a group of local leaders that sided with the pro- allied French exile government under De Gaulle and overthrew the pro-Vichy i.

Once more, their protest was met with repression. Both were not independence movements in the strict sense, because they did not advocate political independence. But they can certainly be called anti-colonial and anti- assimilationist, as they fought for the preservation of local identity against the onslaught of French militarisation and cultural assimilation. They were also not explicitly opposed Dorrance The modern independence movement since During most of the s and s, Sanford and Teariki represented the most anti-colonial political current. However, more radical nationalist movements that advocated outright independence once more emerged in the later s, out of frustration with the only limited achievements of the two autonomist leaders.

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