The Axis Air Forces: Flying in Support of the German Luftwaffe

He also, like Ernst Udet , head of the Technical Department, favoured dive bombers. He insisted all aircraft should have the capability, which retarded the development of capable bombers like the Heinkel He , by complicating the design, thus delaying development and production. Strategic bombing could have been carried out during the first surprise operations in June , especially on those Soviet armament works that lay within range of the He ; near Moscow and Voronezh. However, the need for counter air and ground support operations predominated in German air thinking.

Had production been brought up to a level commensurate with total war in and early , a reserve of one Air Corps could have been set aside for strategic operations to commence with air-land operations. The splitting of tactical and strategic air units, the later being formed into one unified air command, would have done much to clarify the problem of organisation.

The Strategic air units could have been freed from ground support duties which they were not trained or equipped for, while being able to carry out strategic bombing as advocated by the late General Wever. The concept of concentrating all available forces for the army, in the decisive battle became invalid, since it was the ability of the Soviets to re-arm and rebuild, through the failure of the Axis to bomb industrial regions beyond the front, that contributed to ultimate failure of Barbarossa to win a decisive victory.

Fliegerkorps IV was finally ready for operations after the publication of the Luftwaffe study Battle against Russian Armaments Industry in November However, the project was abandoned as there was no capable aircraft. In the tactical arena the Germans held significant leads against the Soviets. While the Soviets were not as primitive in aircraft design quality as believed, it was in tactical deployment, combat tactics, and training, along with accumulated experience that the Germans held qualitative superiority.

In particular, the German Finger-four tactic was better and more flexible than the Vic formation adopted by the Soviets. Moreover, all German fighters possessed radios, so they could communicate with each other. Soviet aircraft lacked this, and pilots had to communicate with hand signals. During the later conflict, radios were not used and were thus removed.

This was mostly because Soviet radios were too heavy and affected combat performance, while the Germans developed light radios. The technical differences were enough to give the Luftwaffe the edge.

The latest bomber type, the Junkers Ju 88 , could outrun the main Soviet fighter, the I, above 3, metres 9, feet. At that altitude an I could attack only if it took the Ju 88 by surprise. In July , waves of unescorted SBs would be shot down in large numbers in an effort to stop the German advance.

The Ilyushin DB-3 bomber was both faster and better armed than the British Vickers Wellington , but again, it was still vulnerable to the Bf In fighter technology, the performance capabilities were closer. The Bf F held a significant flight performance advantage over Soviet fighters. In manoeuvrability terms, the Polikarpov I and Polikarpov I could outturn the Bf , while the Soviets had more experience in the use of air-to-air rockets. However, Luftwaffe intelligence ignored the Soviet Navy with its 1, aircraft, as well as the air defence units PVO , which had 1, aircraft.

The number of aircraft that would face the Axis in the five Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev, and Odessa border districts, out of 13 military districts in the west of the country, was 5, 1, bombers, 2, fighters, close support aircraft, reconnaissance, and army-controlled aircraft. Around 4, were considered to be combat aircraft, but only 2, were thought to be modern.

Of this total, 1, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft and 1, fighters were combat-ready. Luftwaffe intelligence suggested that a ground support force of , ground- and aircrew and 15, pilots were available. It was believed that the purges of the s had severely affected the Soviet aeronautics industry, and that the Soviet Union did not possess the ability to copy foreign models, while lacking the electrometals required to do so.

They based this largely on the fact that the Soviets were importing electrometals from Germany, as part of the Nazi-Soviet pact, August Soviet air power can no longer be rated as highly as it was two years ago. The Luftwaffe had little intelligence on the VVS. Heinrich Aschenbrenner, the German air attache in Moscow was one of the few in the Nazi regime able to gain any clear insight into Soviet armaments potential, as a result of a visit to six aircraft plants in the Urals in the Spring of His analysis was ignored by OKL.

The most serious omissions were in their underestimations related to the strategic sphere. OKL had vastly underestimated Soviet production capabilities. This reflected a lack of training of the German General Staff in strategic and economic warfare matters. Though a war of attrition and the realisation of total Soviet military potential was the worst-case scenario, it was left out of any planning considerations. The relationship between the civilian sector, Soviet air rearmament, and the morale of the Soviet people were also underestimated. Civilian requirements were considered too high for production to be efficient, and Soviet determination to restrict civilian needs in favour of the war effort was underrated.

The Axis Air Forces

The Soviet ability to switch production to the Urals, a region which the Germans considered as underdeveloped, was critical to Soviet war materiel production. The Germans did not believe this to be possible. The Luftwaffe's assessment that the rail transport system was primitive also proved to be ill-founded. Reinforcements steadily reached the front during Barbarossa.

Production itself was also underestimated. In , the Soviet Union produced 2, more aircraft than Germany per year Germany was producing just over 10, A monthly total of 3, to 4, aircraft were built by the Soviets; Schmid and Ernst Udet, the Luftwaffe's director of air armaments, gave figures of per month, a serious underestimation.

Production kept up with the destruction and the Axis capture of industrial regions, and surpassed German production by 3, in , by producing 15, aircraft. This was in part due to the German belief that the Soviets had insufficient fuel supplies, particularly oil, which would undermine Soviet armaments production. The energy resources 30 percent in the Ural-Volga region, 27 percent in Soviet Asia, and 43 percent in the Caucasus were used to complete an enormous mechanisation program.

The populations' use of fuels for lighting and general civilian needs, caused OKL to assume that the Red Army and VVS could only meet peacetime fuel allocations through restrictions. It was believed that this difficulty would continue for some time. It viewed the Soviet road and rail networks as incomplete, thus the supply of aviation fuel to the VVS on the frontline would be poor and would curtail Soviet air operations.

It was also thought that the bulk of Soviet industry lay west of the Urals, and was thus vulnerable to capture anyway. Although aware that the Soviet Union intended to move 40 to 50 percent of its industry east of the Urals to continue production, the Germans viewed this plan as impossible to carry out. One of crucial failures of the Luftwaffe was to underestimate the role of civil aviation on the Soviet Union. The Germans believed that it accounted for only 12 to 15 percent of all logistical traffic, and the nature of the Soviet terrain meant that rail was relied upon to deliver around 90 percent of Soviet supplies to the front, making it the prime target.

The civil air organisation was deemed too primitive and ineffective. In wartime, it would contribute significantly to supporting logistics. Intelligence correctly predicted that the VVS was in a state of reorganisation since April , and that the restructuring was not yet complete. The OKL believed there to be 50 air divisions in reserve, and 38 air divisions and regiments in the frontline. It was believed that Soviet ground attack aviation would be attached to and support the Army Fronts and strategic bomber and fighter forces would held back for air defence.

Moreover, strategic bomber and fighter defence forces consisted of only The ground support units made up Another 25 divisions were being set up, and the number of regiments had increased by 80 per cent in the preceding two years. The German intelligence on Soviet aircraft quality was mixed. Schmid rightly deduced that the VVS was technically inferior in aircraft quality [66] operations and tactics, and would be on the eve of war.

However, they underestimated the growth and ability of the Soviet Union to rearm with new, more capable aircraft. The OKL was completely unaware that over 2, aircraft including the most modern types had been produced and were in service. The OKL had assumed that re-equipment would be slow. Intelligence also believed the Soviets had 1, heavy and 1, light anti-aircraft artillery. The Soviets actually possessed 3, of the former and of the later, as well as 1, searchlights. The organisation of Soviet operations was also considered poor. It was thought that the Soviet air forces did not possess communications.

Only radio communications, which were operated by underskilled personnel, were operational. Communications existed with the VVS air staff, military districts, air divisions and bases, but not with the flying formations which only possessed RT and other telegraphy personnel. In critical situations it was believed radio traffic became overloaded, and the lack of airborne radio capability meant the VVS could not conduct flexible operations.

The OKL's view of Soviet landing grounds was also inaccurate. The Germans considered the underdeveloped nature of the airfields and lack of installations meant that units were exposed to the elements, and could not conduct effective operations from them. The better, or first class air bases, measured in comparison to the three German grades of airbase, were thought to house command staffs and their supply administrations. What mobile airfields the Soviets maintained, were thought to be inadequate because of supply difficulties.

Of the 2, airfields in the western Soviet Union, just were considered to be of use for bomber operations. In fact, over had been extended, and more main bases were constructed between the 8 April and 15 July Not only was this taking place, but each air regiment was given its own main field, a reserve base and an emergency landing strip. It was also, by order of the Stavka , being separated from its rear organisations. The supply centres were to be organised on the forward airfields, enabling 36 air bases to operate in the western military districts and supply between two and four air divisions.

This was carried out to ensure a high state of combat readiness. Extensive aerial intelligence flights were carried out on Soviet air bases after 21 September The main units involved were the high-altitude Junkers Ju 86 , Heinkel He , and Dornier Do , which could fly so high as to be invulnerable to interception by Soviet fighters. In some cases, Soviet aviation was forbidden to try, as Stalin pursued a non-provocation policy.

The flights continued until the 15 June , with special emphasis on airfields. Despite two Ju 86s being forced to land in the Soviet Union largely intact, with exposed cameras and film, Stalin did not register any protest. In the event, the AufklObdl and its intelligence played a vital role in the overwhelming initial success in the air. He was paranoid about provoking the Germans. But when a Deutsche Lufthansa aircraft landed in Moscow without permission, Stalin grew concerned with his air force leaders. Rychagov was tortured then executed on 28 October The view of Soviet fighter aircraft, namely the I, was positive.

But the rest of the VVS' aircraft were deemed obsolete. However, the view formed of Soviet flying crews and operational personnel was not good. In the German view they lacked General Staff training and operational procedure was cumbersome, though they managed to offset some weaknesses by skilful improvisation. Operations were deemed to be lacking in flexibility in attack and defence and they suffered heavy losses for it.

Aircrews were considered brave and eager defending their own territory, but showed a lack of fighting spirit over enemy territory. Outstanding pilots were the exception, rather than the norm. Training of Soviet pilots in formation flying was poor, as it was in bombers. Anti-aircraft units showed increased progress but the Luftwaffe saw serious shortcomings in air-to-air and air-land communication. Because of the scarcity of information on the Soviet armed forces, too much reliance was placed on Russian emigres and German repatriated, especially as their attitude was one more in line with Nazi ideology; a strong belief in German cultural superiority and the National Socialist thesis of Germanic racial superiority.

The view formed of the Slavic peoples, hammered into the Wehrmacht by Nazi propaganda, prevented the Luftwaffe forming a realistic judgement of Soviet air forces. Even the usually sound and objective Major General Hoffmann von Waldau , chief of the operations staff commented on the Soviets as a "state of most centralised executive power and below-average intelligence".

Perhaps the best summation of German attitudes to intelligence were best summed up by the Chief of the General Staff, Hans Jeschonnek, uttered to Aschenbrenner in a bid to maintain the two country's relations while the Wehrmacht was engaged in the west; "Establish the best possible relations with the Soviet Union and to not bother about intelligence gathering". The Luftwaffe's general picture of the VVS was entirely correct in many aspects in the military field; this was later confirmed in the early stages of Barbarossa and in post-war British and American studies, and also in the Eastern Bloc.

Soviet sources confirm that the VVS was in a state of reorganisation before the attack, and were retraining on modern machines which made it unready for a major conflict. The deductions about Soviet tactical-operational limitations were to a large degree, accurate. In aircraft types, equipment and training, ground organisation, supply system at the operational level, the dispersal of effort and the operational commands immobility, gave the impression of an air force with limited striking power.

On the other hand, there was a systematic failure to appreciate the level of pre-war education in the Soviet military. The ability of the Soviets to improvise and compensate for disorganisation in logistics offset their failings. Extensive use of camouflage and all arms defence against air attack made the Soviets tenacious on the defensive. There was, on the German side, a failure to realise that the unfavourable ratio of Soviet air power to the vastness of territory applied even more so to the numerically weaker Luftwaffe.

Soviet aviation was heavily supported by a large industry. Hitler had forbidden air reconnaissance flights deep into the Soviet Union until shortly before the beginning of Barbarossa, and the Luftwaffe did not possess the aircraft with the range to be able to reach the Ural factories to see how vast Soviet industry was. Shortly before the invasion, German engineers were given a guided tour of Soviet industrial complexes and aircraft factories in the Urals from the 7 to the 16 April, and evidence of extensive production was already underway.

Their reports to the OKW went unheeded. Hitler's reaction was to speed up preparations; "You see how far these people are already. We must begin immediately". He believed they had fallen for a Soviet bluff. The consolidated report of the visit stressed among than other things: Other remarkable features were that up to 50 per cent of the workers were women, who were employed at work, performed [had work experience] in other countries exclusively by highly qualified personnel, and that the finished products were of an excellent quality.

Even though it maybe assumed the best factories were shown, the conclusion may also be drawn that other Soviet factories were also capable of the same standards. Soviet industry was highly productive, and on the eve of Barbarossa, possessed at least 9, frontline aircraft which made it the largest air force in the World. However, its equipment, like that of the Red Army, was largely obsolescent and suffering from prolonged use.

The Great Purges had also hit aircraft manufacturers, and the loss of personnel ended the Soviet lead in aircraft design and aeronautics. At least one designer was shot for a charge of sabotage on the crash of an aircraft, and many designers were sent to Gulags. Some 70 were shot and dies in forced labour camps. The others were later put into prison workshops, and allowed to continue their work.

The aviation industry was disrupted, severely, and while the damage caused was later patched up in , months of idleness and disorganisation contributed to the disasters in While numerically the strongest air force in the world, the VVS was an imbalanced force in comparison to the British, Americans and Germans at the time of Barbarossa. It relied on too few established designers and an over-centralised system which produced aircraft that fell behind the standards of most powers.

The VVS was also profoundly influenced by Giulio Douhet , and the theory of air power that was focused on the offensive, and bombing the enemy heartland. It was overloaded with inadequately designed bombers, which were expected to survive in combat. In production of light and strike aircraft as well as fighters was to be cut in two to allow for more bomber aircraft to be produced.

The purges affected the leadership of the VVS. In June , 91 per cent of major formation leaders had been in place for just six months. With the exception of Major General Aleksandr Novikov , commanding the Leningrad District, most would fail in their posts and pay for that failure with their lives. A critical operational omission of the VVS was the failure to disperse its aircraft. Soviet training left much to be desired. Stalin's purges had deprived the VVS of its senior and best commanders.

It heralded a debilitating decline in military effectiveness. In the event of the Winter War and the German victory in the French Campaign , the Soviet leadership panicked and Stalin ordered a hasty overhaul of the armed forces. Order , 22 December , of the People's Commissar Defence ordered the accelerated training program for pilots which meant the cutting of training time. The program had already been cut owing to an earlier defence order, , dated 14 March It put an end to the flight training for volunteers, and instituted mass drafts. In February , pilot training was cut further leading to a disastrous drop in the quality of pilot training prior to Barbarossa.

The officer corps was decimated in the Great Purge and operational level effectiveness suffered. The 6, officers lost and then the subsequent massive expansion schemes, which increased the number of personnel from 1. It still left the VVS short of 60, qualified officers in Despite the expansion of flight schools from 12 to 83 from to June , the schools lacked half their flight instructors and half of their allotted fuel supplies.

Combined with these events, training was shortened a total of seven times in The attrition and loss of experienced pilots in Barbarossa encouraged a culture of rapid promotion to positions beyond some pilots' level of competence. It created severe operational difficulties for the VVS. The alleged technical primitivity of Soviet aircraft is a myth. The Curtiss P Warhawk was among those handed over but the Soviets did not have Russian-language manuals. Even the most pessimistic German intelligence reports believed, regardless of the numerical superiority of the VVS, the Luftwaffe would be dominant over the battlefield owing to technical and tactical advantages.

Air attacks on German ground forces were not considered to be possible, while the Luftwaffe would prove decisive in the role. The units committed to the Air Fleet were both medium bomber and fighters. It was given the complete fighter wing Jagdgeschwader 3 JG 3. Supporting Army Group Centre's advance on Moscow was, initially, considered the most important objective.

Richthofen supported the Third Panzer Army on the right. The Luftwaffe's front was only miles long, but stretched miles deep. The 1st AA Corps was to help break down border fortresses. Under Kesselring, the Luftwaffe contained IV. It was also assigned to dealing with the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet.

Under Alfred Keller, the Luftwaffe contained K. Luftgaukommando I, under Richard Putzier was the Luftflotten reserve. Kampfgeschwader 30 KG 30 and I. The Luftwaffe's Chief of the General Staff, Hans Jeschonnek, wanted to begin the air attacks before the German artillery started firing. However, Hitler and the OKW decided it may give the opportunity for the Soviets to disperse their air units, and his idea was rejected.

Hitler gave the order for the air strikes on airfields to be carried out at dawn. Although many new German bomber crews had only limited training in instrument-flying, the Luftflotten overcame the problem by hand picking experienced crews, who would cross the border at high altitude, to swoop on their targets. The Germans deliberately targeted Soviet fighter air bases first, to knock out potential opposition to its bombers and dive bombers.

The first attacks began at The Soviets had been caught by surprise, their aircraft bunched together in neat rows which were vulnerable. The results were devastating. Worse was still to come. Slightly later, KG 54 attacked airfields in the area, and its 80 Ju 88s destroyed Soviet aircraft. However, the Luftwaffe and its allies were far from alone in the skies. They put up bitter resistance in the air scoring a few successes. Such was the intensity and determination of the Soviet pilots they disregarded their losses and fought with a resolve which surprised German airmen.

In several cases Soviet pilots rammed German machines. Around 19 reported incidents of ramming, known as tarans were recorded on the 22 June , but this may have been an over-dramatisation of the engagement, which involved unorthodox methods. The Stavka were stunned by the initial assault and took several hours to realise the disastrous situation and respond.

Without coordination and fighter escort, they suffered catastrophic losses, and flew, quite literally, to the "last man". They were engaged by JG 51 and all 18 were shot down. In the event, the VVS' bombers kept coming, and on several occasions the Bf s wiped out entire formations. It was only 10 hours after the first Axis attacks, at The German fighter pilots had it very easy under these circumstances; unescorted bombers in a target-rich environment.

JG 53 claimed 74 air victories for two losses. JG 51 was credited with 12 fighters and 57 bombers. JG 54 accounted for 45 air victories and 35 on the ground for one Bf damaged.

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It lost seven Bf s destroyed or damaged. At the end of the day, German reports claimed 1, Soviet aircraft destroyed on the ground alone. At first, these figures were believed to be barely credible. In fact, German officers checking the airfields, which were soon overrun by the Wehrmacht , counted over 2, wrecks. Soviet sources confirm these totals. In addition, training aircraft were destroyed. VVS Odessa, in the south lost 23 aircraft on six airbases.

The DBA and naval air forces reported the loss of aircraft. Entire units were nearly wiped out. In all, two waves of Axis attacks had struck. In the morning, the first wave destroyed 1, aircraft for two losses, while the second wave lost 33 Axis machines but destroyed Soviet aircraft. In some cases Luftwaffe losses, relevant to their strength were "shocking"; KG 51 lost 15 Ju 88s in one action. KG 55 lost 10 He s over the airfields.

In contrast other bombers units suffered lightly. KG 27 claimed 40 Soviet aircraft on the ground, for no loss. Total Luftwaffe losses amounted to 78 on 22 June; 24 Bf s, seven Bf s, 11 He s, two Ju 87s, one Do 17 and 10 miscellaneous types. Losses amounted to 90 other Axis aircraft. The balance of power in the air was altered for the next few months. The Luftwaffe had attained air superiority, if not supremacy at this point. The low German opinion of Soviet combat capabilities had been confirmed, and was bolstered by information provided by captured VVS personnel.

The Soviet bomber fleet had been practically destroyed and its remaining forces continued ineffective and costly attacks on the German rear, while Axis surprise and qualitative superiority nearly forced a collapse of Soviet air units. However, the VVS recovered once surprise had worn off, as indicated in the lessening losses on the ground, and rise of casualties in the air.

The autumn weather also provided breathing space to partially rebuild. Moreover, a number of crews survived the initial strikes on the ground, to be redeployed afresh. The Luftwaffe had been unable to destroy the VVS for those reasons. For the first eight days, the Axis put Soviet air bases under intense pressure in a bid to exterminate their air forces while providing the close support demanded by the army. The Luftwaffe played a large role in the border and encirclement battles as Soviet resistance crumbled. Luftflotte 1's KG 76 and 77 inflicted heavy losses on the Corps. It is known the 12th Mechanised Corps lost 40 tanks and vehicles to air assaults.

But a lack of specialised close support aircraft meant the Germans deployed the Ju 88 in the role, and lost 22 of them in action. They sent unescorted bombers which suffered heavily without fighter escort, which was absent owing to losses in the opening air strikes. Elsewhere, the Luftwaffe helped breakdown Soviet resistance. On 24 June, Soviet aircraft were lost. In the first three days, the Germans claimed 3, Soviet aircraft destroyed. Soviet figures put this higher; at 3, Luftwaffe losses were 70 40 destroyed on 24 June. In the next few days, the Luftwaffe delivered a series of destructive air raids on Minsk , and rendered good support to the Second Panzer Army Soviet fighter aviation achieved some success, being held back from fighter escort duties to cover the industrial cities.

Soviet bombers tried in vain to destroy German airfields to relieve the pressure. JG 51 claimed 70 on the 25 June, while the Luftwaffe claimed all together on that date. The German Army struggled to maintain the pockets when it did succeed in encircling Soviet formations.

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Often, the Red Army broke out at night, through gaps. In the day, small groups broke out, avoiding roads and obvious routes. The Luftwaffe failed to interdict because reconnaissance aircraft warned the Soviets. Richthofen developed ad hoc tactics; armed reconnaissance. The Red Army eased German operations. They did not trust the radio transmissions, so they used the telephone lines, which had been damaged by air attacks causing chaos in Soviet communications.

Dmitriy Pavlov , commander of the Western Front, complained that he could not locate his units because everything had to be hidden from enemy aviation. But the Red Army's standing instructions to fire with all weapons on close support aircraft caused a rise in German losses. Luftflotte carries out sorties on the 28 June, half that of the 26 June. On 29 June just sorties were flown.

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The proximity of German forward airfields prevented even more aircraft being lost. Disrupting communications prevented the Soviets from relieving the pocket. Semyon Timoshenko replaced him. The result was carnage. German Flak units and fighters from JG 51 decimated the formations. It was a disastrous air battle for the Soviets, which cost them, according to German claims, aircraft. After this, the VVS Western Front could muster only bombers and fighters on 1 July, from a force of 1, ten days earlier.

It was equipped with the Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik , and although only trained to land and take off in them, their crews were thrown into the fight. German fighter pilots were shocked by the effectiveness of their heavy, armour, which deflected their fire. Still, the regiment lost 20 crews killed in these battles from a force of Luftflotte 2 supported the armoured columns in relays and helped encircle four more Soviet armies near the city. Fliegerkorps VIII provided considerable support, as it was equipped for the task. Logistics were stretched and Loerzer could not direct their bomber and long-range reconnaissance units which were further to the rear.

The Panzers had outrun its air support. Guderian, though not always in agreement with Feibig's methods, was grateful for the quality of air support. The German army became spoiled with the level of air support, and wanted air power to support operations everywhere. Personalities such as von Richthofen maintained that the Luftwaffe should be held back, and used in concentration for operational, not tactical effect.

In operational terms, the Luftwaffe, and in particular Richthofen, had performed very well. Using the Flivos , forward radio liaison officers, the mechanised divisions could summon air support very quickly, usually after a two-hour wait. The Luftwaffe did particular damage to Soviet railways, which Soviet doctrine relied on, aiding the Axis armies. Although one major supply bridge at Bobruysk was knocked out, 1, Soviet workers repaired in 24—36 hours, showing Soviet resolve. The Soviet Union was too open for attacks on road intersections to have much effect on preventing supplies reaching the line, or enemy units retreating, so bridges were focused on.

The Luftwaffe continually attacked Soviet airfields around Smolensk and Polotsk. Gomel also received special attention. Luftwaffe interdiction against Soviet communications was also considerable. General Franz Halder noted:. The number of track sections occupied with standing trains is increasing satisfactorily.

In the event, , prisoners were taken in the Minsk operation. Over 1, air victories were filed by German pilots, while another 1, were claimed on the ground. Soviet sources admit to 1, losses in the air, between the 22 and 30 June. In the same period the Soviets claimed German aircraft in the air and 49 on the ground. German losses were aircraft. Some were due to enemy action destroyed and damaged. By the end of the fighting in the border areas on 12 July, the Soviet casualties had risen to 6, aircraft destroyed against German losses, plus another damaged.

The disasters of the VVS were largely down to two reasons; the better tactics used by the Luftwaffe and the lack of communications between Soviet pilots. The Luftwaffe used Rotte or pairs which relied on wingman-leader tactics. The two flew metres apart, each covering the others blind spot. In combat the leader engaged while the wingman protected his tail. Two Rotte made up a Schwarm section and three Schwarme made up a Staffel in stepped up line astern formation. It allowed the formation to focus in looking for the enemy rather than keeping formation.

Soviet aircraft fought with little regard for formation tactics, usually along or in pairs without tactical coordination. The lack of radios in aircraft made coordination worse. When the Soviets did use formation methods, the German Finger-four was much better than the Soviet V formation. It was nearly the case, as much of its forces had been largely destroyed. Luftflotte 1 controlled the skies over the battlefields. The VVS forces had lost aircraft in the air and on the ground in the first eight days.

Another had sustained battle damage. Out of SB bombers available on 22 June, had been shot down, lost on the ground and 33 damaged by 30 June. Fighter losses included Is, 81 Is, and 17 MiG-3s. The problem for the Luftflotte, was it lacked close support aircraft. It was forced to use medium bombers in the role. The plan revolved around a massive air strike, at the bridges in Daugavpils and the airfield, occupied by JG 54 at Duagava.

The Soviets had not learned the tactical lessons from the previous air battles and sent their bombers unescorted. The bombs fell short of the target, and the mission failed. Soviet sources admit to the loss of 15 and two damaged, though the Germans claimed Another attack was made in the evening of 30 June. The failure meant Ivonov was placed under arrest. On the first day of his command, he threw the 21st Mechanised Corps into action at Duagavpils to recapture the bridgehead. Despite the lack of close support aircraft, which was eased with the arrival of 40 Bf s from ZG 26, Luftflotte 1 delivered a series of air attacks, which accounted for around Soviet tanks.

It had escaped damage, owing to its assignment in the far north, near Murmansk. However, when the Panzer Army began a breakout of the bridgehead, heavy rain prevented large-scale air operations. With air superiority Luftflotte 1's KG 1, KG 76 and KG 77 interdicted Soviet communications, slowing down the Soviet ground forces, who failed to reach the area before the Germans broke out. Fliegerkorps I in particular contributed to the success, and the Panzers met only weak opposition. Some Soviet aerial resurgence was seen on 5 July, but the threat was dealt with and Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

A soviet counterattack still occurred, and wiped out a forward advance party of the 1st Panzer Division. Again, the Luftwaffe interdicted and the three bomber groups flew ground support missions at Ostrov , cutting off all supply lines to the city and destroyed Soviet tanks for two bombers lost. More Soviet air strikes against the spearheads were repulsed with high losses. On the 7 July, Soviet aviation did play an important role in slowing the German advance and forcing the Fourth Panzer Army's advance north east, to Leningrad, to stop.

They succeeded in getting among German troop and vehicle concentrations and spreading havoc on the congested bridges at the Velikaya River. But they did so at a dreadful price, and lost 42 bombers to JG Between the 1 and 10 July, the VVS flew 1, sorties and dropped tons of bombs. Army Group North reported heavy losses in equipment. Specifically the 1st Panzer Division noted these losses were caused by air attack. Franz Landgraf , commanding the 6th Panzer Division , reported particularly high losses. However, while some units had nearly been wiped out 2 and 41 SAD had lost 60 bombers , the prevented the Fourth Panzer Army from reaching Leningrad, before the Red Army prepared suitable defences.

It unlikely that the Red Army could have prevented them from doing so without the intervention of the VVS. The Soviets were now over the most critical phase. Novikov now drew the conclusion that Soviet air forces could be effective by instituting changes. All bombers were to be escorted, Soviet fighter pilots were encouraged to be more aggressive and take part in low-level suppression attacks, and more night strikes owing to an absence of German night fighter forces would be less costly. Soviet forces did increase their effectiveness. Despite Loerzer's Corps claiming Soviet aircraft destroyed in the air and 1, on the ground between 22 June and 13 July, aerial resistance was clearly mounting.

All this compelled the Luftwaffe to return to bombing airfields. Of particular concern was the taran tactic. The VVS carried out 60 of these attacks in July. The Germans closed on Lake Ilmen also. At this point, Army Group North was subjected to the heaviest air attacks thus far. Novikov had concentrated bombers from the North and North-Western Front. Flying 1, sorties they helped push back the Germans 40 kilometres and inflict heavy losses on the 8th Panzer Division. Instead, the Ju 52 transports had to bring in supplies by air.

It remain the case until mid-August. Army Group North had scored an operational victory, by advancing and securing the Baltic states, but failed to capture Leningrad or destroy the Red Army's North-Western Front. JG 3 were particularly successful, shooting down 18 bombers on 23 June.

In return, they flew 1, sorties against 77 Soviet airbases, and destroyed Soviet aircraft on the ground and 89 in the air. When the Soviet 8th Mechanised Corps resumed an attack against the First Panzer Army , support for the Corps resulted in 22 German aircraft being shot down.

Fliegerkorps IV's losses represented the lion's share of otherwise moderate German losses to date. It consisted of , mostly obsolete combat aircraft, including 86 German Ju 86 and Italian Caproni Ca. Both Axis aviation groups played a decisive role in ground support operations. Attacks of the 15th Mechanised Corps destroyed tanks by 30 June causing the Southwestern Front to withdraw. But losses were high; KG 55 lost 24 He s and another 22 damaged; KG 51's strength dropped by one-third, while KG 54 lost 16 Ju 88s put out of action. Nevertheless, air superiority was won, and Soviet rail and road communications were interdicted.

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The First Panzer Army achieved a breakthrough at Polonnoye - Shepetovka on the 5 July while Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps V assisted, destroyed 18 supply trains and wagons. However, the battles resulted in heavy attrition with both German and Soviet units being withdrawn. The Luftwaffe noted that the Soviets used their aviation to gain time, while the Red Army established a defence at Kiev. Axis aviation performed well. On the 7 July III. The VVS managed, on rare occasion to catch the Luftwaffe on the ground.

However, the battle for Moldavia ended that same day. The Romanians had lost 22, men 10, killed and 12, wounded. Its air force had flown 5, sorties and shot down 88 Soviet aircraft for 58 losses. JG 77, supported it claimed destroyed in the same period. The VVS admitted losses, but it may have been higher. Its strength fell from non-serviceable to , a decrease of German losses amounted to 31 destroyed and 30 damaged.

The second took place in the Battle for Smolensk. During the first five days of July , Luftflotte2 logged 2, sorties and destroyed Soviet aircraft for 41 losses and 12 damaged. The Shturmovik caused enough damage to delay the German attack. Meanwhile, German aviation also proved decisive. Soviet aviation concentrated on the Germans and wiped out an SS Regiment. The front became confused, with large Red Army forces moving east to escape Guderian, and powerful concentrations moving forward to block it. The Luftwaffe concentrated on both streams. Soviet aviation was continually in the air and opposing German air attacks.

On 16 July, a major effort of sorties against the Soviet 21st Army in the Bobruysk area, claiming 14 tanks, trucks, nine artillery and two anti-aircraft guns. However, plentiful air support encouraged the German army units to become reluctant in advancing without air cover. German forces became inclined to retreat if the Luftwaffe was not present in strength.

The army complained air liaison was not effective enough. But their delaying strategy tied down German forces for a month. They even succeeded in pushing back the 10th Panzer to Yelnya. The VVS, having suffered terrible losses, was now in a position of numerical and qualitative inferiority.

The Germans outnumbered the Soviets five to one in tanks, and two to one in artillery, but also two to one in serviceable aircraft. The effectiveness of German fighter units, particularly JG 51, saw the new Pe-2 units nearly wiped out. The Soviets had cleverly concentrated their air power at Yelnya, and the mixture of a decline in Luftwaffe strength to in the central sector compelled the Germans to withdraw from the salient.

SKG , the Bf equipped close support unit destroyed or knocked out tanks, 2, motor vehicles, artillery, 52 trains and 60 locomotives with wagons. In the campaign since 22 June, it had accounted for Soviet aircraft, on the ground. Still, some , Red Army soldiers escaped by Kesselring's estimate. Most escaped at night, which showed even when the Luftwaffe had air superiority, it lacked the all-weather, round the clock capability to prevent the withdrawals.

As well as using his st and th motorised regiments, each with three heavy and one light battalion, supported the Second Panzer Army. It was used to protect the ground forces, and claimed Soviet aircraft between the 22 August and 9 September, but was also used against ground targets. It claimed Soviet vehicles in the same period.

The most concerning aspect for the Axis at this stage as the lack of aircraft. In contrast, Luftflotte 2 had lost in the opening battles for Smolensk, 6 to 19 July. On the Eastern Front the Luftwaffe had lost 1, aircraft, half of its original strength. The Kampfgruppen still contributed to the fighting; claiming trains and 15 supply bridges destroyed at Orel , Korobets and Stodolishsche. Another 73 precious motor vehicles, 22 tanks, 15 rail cars had also been destroyed by German air attacks along with another 40 on 25 July. As the pocket was finally destroyed in early August, the Luftwaffe contributed with another round of claims; tanks, 1, trucks, 41 artillery pieces and 24 AAA batteries in Smolensk alone.

The intensity of the air war over Smolensk it indicated in the number of operations and sorties flown; 12, German and 5, Soviet. Published November 29th by Praeger first published January 1st To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about The Axis Air Forces , please sign up. Lists with This Book. This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Jun 01, Erhard rated it liked it. The air forces that supported the Luftwaffe and the Japanese air forces some enthusiastically, others like the Finns only out of convenience in WW II have received little historical attention.

Sometimes giving a broad historical sweep, other times emphasizing individual pilots and missions, Joseph often relies upon dubious sources, including highly partisan we The air forces that supported the Luftwaffe and the Japanese air forces some enthusiastically, others like the Finns only out of convenience in WW II have received little historical attention. Sometimes giving a broad historical sweep, other times emphasizing individual pilots and missions, Joseph often relies upon dubious sources, including highly partisan web sites.

He is definitely anti-Soviet, but sometimes glorifies the enemies of the Allies. Some of his questionable contentions include claims of deliberate American terror bombing, and US pilots shooting at opposing fliers who parachuted from stricken aircraft. With too few photos to satisfy hobbyists, and too little solid research, this book is a very mixed bag. Still, it does fill a gap. Michael Shulman marked it as to-read Mar 15, Janet Morris added it Sep 01, Jan Wallerich added it Nov 05, Michael McClure marked it as to-read Apr 27, Me0 marked it as to-read Jul 04, There are no discussion topics on this book yet.

Frank Joseph is the pen name of Frank Collin. Under his leadership, the Nazi Party of America achieved notoriety and fame when it tried to stage a march in Skokie, a largely Jewish suburb of Chicago.