Self Harm: The Philosophical, Ethical & Policy Issues

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Then, for the perfectionist, if X is good, then it is not good in virtue of the fact that it is desired, or would be desired under appropriate conditions, by human beings. Likewise, for the perfectionist, if X is good, it does not follow that X must be a pleasant mental state or causally related to one. Perfectionist accounts of the human good, of course, can allow that some goods are experiential, but they reject the hedonistic thesis that all intrinsic human goods consist in pleasurable sensations or attitudes.

Putting nonhumanistic perfectionism aside, perfectionist goods are components of an excellent human life. Historically, as noted above, perfectionists have related these goods to the development of human nature. For example, the development of rationality is often considered to be a perfectionist good because it is a capacity essential to human nature. Following Aristotle, a number of contemporary writers have sought to develop accounts of the human good along these lines Hurka , Foot We can use the term human nature perfectionism to refer generally to accounts of the human good that relate perfectionist goods to the development of human nature.

Other writers, however, have characterized perfectionism without any reference to human nature. Here it is the existence of the objective goods, and not their relation to the development of human nature, that is highlighted. Similarly, other writers have identified perfectionism with the realization of a specified list of objective goods Finnis , Griffin , Arneson We can use the term objective goods perfectionism to refer generally to accounts of the human good that identify perfectionist goods without relating them to the development of human nature. Both types of perfectionism confront formidable challenges.

Proponents of human nature perfectionism must present an adequate account of human nature. More precisely, they must give a plausible account of the properties that are central to human nature and the development of which explain why certain activities and states are good for human beings Hurka Whether there is any account of human nature that both yields plausible results and has genuine explanatory power can be doubted Dorsey By contrast, proponents of objective goods perfectionism, having freed the identification of objective goods from dependence on the development of human nature, must explain why some things, and not others, are counted as good.

Objective goods perfectionists need not formulate an exhaustive list of these goods. They may think such an undertaking to be misguided. But they should have something to say about what makes an alleged good an objective good, one worthy of pursuit Sumner , Sher The distinction between human nature perfectionism and objective goods perfectionism helps us approach an important question in value theory.

Must perfectionists be monists, holding that there is at bottom only one form of life that is best for all human beings; or can they hold that there exists a plurality of equally good forms of life for human beings? The question is important, since it is very plausible to think that the best life for one human being may differ from the best life for another. Human nature perfectionism identifies the human good with the development of human nature. This looks like a monistic ideal, one that identifies a single form of life as best for all human beings. But, in fact, the ideal leaves many issues open.

Let us stipulate that the best life for a human being is the life that maximizes the development of his nature. Then, it still could be true that for different human beings different activities and pursuits would best promote their good. This could be true, since different people may be able to best develop different aspects of human nature.

Given their temperament and talents, some do well to concentrate on artistic pursuits, while others do well to focus on theoretical studies or athletic achievements. Moreover, even those who do well to focus on the same type of perfection, may find that some activities and goals serve this end better for them than for others.

The compatibility of objective goods perfectionism and value pluralism also can be established. One need only assume that some perfectionist goods are either roughly equal or incomparable in value Finnis , Raz Friendship and understanding, for example, may both be perfectionist goods, but they may not be comparable in a way that allows us to rank lives that realize these goods to different degrees. More generally, perfectionist goods may be combinable in different proportions, yielding a range of different types of life that are valuable and worthy of pursuit.

Nothing said here, of course, rules out the possibility that there really is only one way of life that is maximally best for human beings. The point pressed is merely that perfectionism is consistent with value pluralism. Put otherwise, if objective goods are plural and incomparable, as many recent writers maintain, then this fact about the nature of value does not undercut the plausibility of perfectionism, of either the human nature or objective goods variety. To be sure, a plausible perfectionism will recognize that pluralism has its limits.

Perfectionist value theory seeks to identify goods and activities that human beings ought to preserve, promote and engage with. It implies that some ways of living are not valuable for human beings, even if they are fully embraced. Perfectionism as a moral theory directs human beings to protect and promote objectively good human lives. As such, it can take an egoistic or non-egoistic form. Egoistic forms of perfectionism are well represented in the history of moral philosophy.

These theories direct each human being to perfect himself as much as possible, or at least to some threshold level. Egoistic forms of perfectionism need not be narrowly self-interested. Non-egoistic forms of perfectionism, by contrast, allow for such conflicts. They hold that each human being has a non-derivative duty to perfect others as well as a duty to perfect himself.

Such views, at least in principle, can direct human beings to sacrifice their own perfection for the sake of others. Whether it takes an egoistic or non-egoistic form, perfectionism is best understood as a moral theory that directs human beings to care about the perfection of others as well as themselves. This claim is consistent with recognizing, what is evidently true, that there are serious limits to our ability to bring about the perfection of others.

These limits explain why some philosophers, most notably Kant, have held that we cannot have a duty to promote the perfection of others Kant Many perfectionist goods require self-direction for their realization. We cannot compel another to develop her capacities, at least not all of them. Nor can we compel another to participate in valuable social relationships.

This valid point, however, should not be overstated. We can work to ensure that others live under conditions that are conducive to their own self-development or their own realization of perfectionist goods. Indirect promotion may be possible where direct promotion is not. The fact that human beings cannot directly bring about the perfection of others is nonetheless important. It may explain why, in practice if not in principle, a plausible perfectionism would direct each human being to be more concerned with her own perfection than with the perfection of others.

The best life for a human being might be one that simultaneously best perfects himself and best perfects others. But this possibility is unlikely. How then should this conflict be adjudicated within perfectionist ethics? Egoistic forms of perfectionism have a ready answer to this question. Non-egoistic forms, by contrast, must find a way to balance the conflicting demands. One natural response to this problem is straightforwardly consequentialist.

Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy

Perfectionism, it can be said, requires that we pursue the greatest development of all human beings at all times Hurka , 55— So understood, perfectionism gives each human being a shared comprehensive goal. This makes perfectionism a very demanding moral theory.

It is demanding in two respects. First, it demands, other things being the same, that we weigh the perfection of others equally with our own perfection. Second, it demands that, to the extent left open by the first demand, that we maximize our own perfection. Perhaps this kind of consequentialist perfectionism asks too much of us. We can imagine forms of perfectionism that relax both of its demands. Consider, for example, a perfectionist moral theory that includes an agent-centered prerogative.

Such a theory could allow that persons can favor their own perfection, to some reasonable degree, over the perfection of others and that persons need only pursue their own perfection up to some threshold level. This relaxed perfectionism would depart from the main historical defenses of perfectionism which emphasize maximization and it would not well fit the term perfectionism which connotes maximization.

But the important question is whether a view of this type is nonetheless plausible. The answer depends, in part, on whether human nature or objective goods perfectionism is the favored view. If perfection is understood in terms of the development of human nature, then a view that departs from the maximizing injunction will look less promising.

A person who has extraordinary potential for excellence, but who only achieves a threshold level of development does not plausibly achieve perfection.

Since she was capable of so much more, we should not be content with her modest achievements. Intuitively, we should judge that she has not fully lived up to the requirements of perfectionist morality Hurka , Matters look different if perfection is understood in terms of the realization of objective goods. For, on this version of perfectionism, it is plausible to hold that each human being has an agent-relative interest in leading a successful life, where success is understood in terms of the pursuit of valuable goals and the realization of perfectionist goods. A successful life, so understood, plausibly requires only a threshold realization of certain perfectionist goods, such as friendship, knowledge, and aesthetic experience.

For these reasons, a non-maximizing injunction fits better with objective goods perfectionism than with human nature perfectionism. Whatever its merits, the introduction of an agent-centered prerogative into perfectionist morality would exacerbate a problem with standard consequentialist versions of perfectionism. It would appear to give human beings a moral liberty to harm others if doing so would promote their own perfection.

A pure consequentialist perfectionism in principle could enjoin the sacrifice of those who had little potential for perfectionist achievement for those who had great potential. But such a view would at least have the virtue that those who were sacrificed would be contributing to the goal of maximum perfectionist achievement—a goal they should share if they are consequentialist perfectionists. The same is not guaranteed to hold true if the prerogative is introduced.

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Since the worry here is one that confronts consequentialist accounts of morality in general, it might be thought that perfectionist morality should take a deontological structure instead. Deontological perfectionism would hold that the goal of promoting human perfection is constrained by the requirement to respect the perfection, or the capacity to achieve it, in each human being. The structure of such a view can be glimpsed by considering the objective goods version of perfectionism. For it is plausible that the achievement of certain objective goods, such as friendship or community with others, requires that we treat others with respect.

Requirements of respect, it can be said, are constitutively necessary conditions for the realization of many perfectionist goods. This is not the place to explore the structure of such a view in detail. Nor is it the place to discuss the extent to which it represents a genuine departure from consequentialism Pettit and Smith Instead, another possible response to the worry can be mentioned.

As Rawls pointed out, perfectionism is often taken to be merely one element of a general moral theory Rawls , The moral duty to maximize human perfection must be balanced against other moral principles. Deontological constraints and agent-centered prerogatives might limit the duty to promote human perfection, but they might do so because they are derived from independent moral principles.

On this mixed view, in which perfectionism is understood as merely one element of a general moral theory, it is possible to recommend perfectionism as an agent-neutral maximizing doctrine and avoid the unwanted implications that morality is excessively demanding and that it endorses the sacrifice of some for the sake of greater overall human perfection. Perfectionist ethics has often been associated with elitist doctrines. Whether it takes a consequentialist or deontological structure, perfectionism is compatible with assigning different weights to the perfection of different human beings.

And a number of important perfectionist writers have maintained that the perfection that matters the most is the perfection of those who are capable of achieving the most. The superman version of perfectionism is an extreme view. It holds that some human lives count for much and many human lives count for nothing.

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This view should not be confused with a different and less extreme view, one that can be termed the prioritarian version of perfectionism. This view holds that we should value the perfection of each and every human being, but in aggregating human perfection we should count the greater perfections more than the lesser perfections. On a simple version of the view, greater perfections count for more than lesser perfections simply in virtue of being greater. A human life that achieves twice as much perfection as another human life has twice as much value.

But it is possible that greater perfections count for even more. On a complex version of the view, greater perfections count for more than lesser perfections in virtue of being greater and in virtue of an appropriate multiplier. More precisely, on this version of the view, an equal unit increase of perfection counts for more the greater the perfection already attained.

Accordingly, a human life that achieved twice as much perfection as another human life would have more than twice its value. The prioritarian version of perfectionism, on either the simple or complex version of the view, does not imply that the lives of those who can achieve little count for nothing. It holds only that greater perfections—a greater development of human nature or a greater realization of objective goods— have greater value. It directs us to pursue the greatest overall human perfection, where this is determined by a weighted summing of the perfection of all human beings.

Compared with the superman version, the prioritarian version of perfectionism is significantly more plausible. It captures the thought that greater achievements are more valuable than lesser achievements without denying value to the latter. It recognizes the claims of greatness without excluding all other achievements from moral concern. Still, while not elitist, prioritarian perfectionism will likely have inegalitarian implications for the distribution of resources.

But if the excellent goods are weighted more heavily, as recommended by the prioritarian version of perfectionism, then in practice this possibility may be unlikely. Much depends here on the strength of the prioritarian multiplier. The prioritarian version of perfectionism, then, may license significant inequality in the distribution of resources.

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The inegalitarian character of the view has some attractive consequences, however. We might claim that, even if some change brings a great net benefit to those who are affected, it is a change for the worse if it involves the loss of one of the best things in life Parfit , This claim, as Parfit allows, is vulnerable to counterexample. It is very hard to believe that the best artistic experience is infinitely better than a slightly less good, but still excellent, artistic experience. Viewing a Picasso might be better than viewing a Braque, but not infinitely better. It is more plausible, then, to construe the prioritarian version of perfectionism as just assigning some finite positive multiplier to the greater perfections.

But while such a view would not be vulnerable to the kind of counterexample just adduced, it would disable it from answering the Repugnant Conclusion Hurka , 81— The discussion so far has emphasized the perfectionist concern with creating and preserving the best human experiences and activities. This concern inclines perfectionism toward inequality. But it is possible to defend an egalitarian version of the view; and the history of perfectionist ethics contains a number of such examples.

Here four possibilities for developing an egalitarian version of perfectionism briefly can be mentioned. Their realization by one human being does not impede, and may advance, their realization in others. Maximum perfection, so understood, is compatible with equality of material condition Spinoza Green did, that inequality in the distribution of resources impedes the perfection of all, the rich as well as the poor. Perfectionist values, on this view, can be fully realized only in a society in which each member is roughly equal in power and status Green ; Brink , 77— Such a view would reject the prioritarian multiplier discussed above, holding instead that equal unit increases of perfection for those who achieve little count the same as equal unit increases of perfection for those who achieve much; e.

These possibilities show that there is no tight connection between perfectionism and inequality.

The degree to which perfectionism licenses inequality will depend on answers to a number of difficult questions, e. The answers to these questions are very much in dispute within perfectionist morality. Without firm answers to them, no one should reject perfectionist ethics out of hand because of a commitment to egalitarian values. Human beings should care about their own perfection as well as the perfection of others.

As we have seen, the standard of perfection is objective in the sense that it guides, or should guide, human action, even if it what it recommends is not desired. These claims explain why perfectionism assigns an important place to self-regarding duties. One has the duty whether or not one has a desire to fulfill it. The possibility of self-regarding duties of this kind are sometimes rejected on conceptual grounds. But this worry should not detain us for long.

The key point is that we can have categorical reasons to develop our nature or to engage in valuable, as opposed to worthless, activities. It is a secondary issue whether we should classify a self-regarding duty as a moral duty or as merely a categorical non-moral duty Raz , But while the worry should not detain us, it does point to an attractive feature of perfectionist ethics. Much contemporary moral theory ignores duties to oneself, whether understood as moral duties or not, and focuses exclusively on our duties toward others.

Perfectionist ethics is an important corrective to this tendency. By expanding the domain of ethical concern, it has the potential to enrich contemporary moral philosophy Hurka , 5. Different perfectionist theories offer different accounts of the content of self-regarding duties.

Generally speaking, it is useful to distinguish negative from positive duties to oneself. For example, barring exceptional circumstances, one has duties to refrain from suicide and self-mutilation. Specific negative and positive self-regarding duties are derived from the more comprehensive duty to oneself to do what one can to lead a good or excellent life. If so, then no one can have a duty to lead a good life.

Still, excluding the effects of luck, we can say that each human being will have a more or less successful life depending on the decisions they make and the options they pursue. And we can add that each human being has a comprehensive duty to lead a successful life, to the extent that it is within his or her power to do so. Stated at this level of abstraction, the perfectionist case for affirming self-regarding duties does not look particularly controversial. Resistance to it will likely derive from one of two quarters. Some will reject the very possibility of categorical duties, whether to oneself or to others.

Others will accept the possibility of categorical duties, but insist that they are limited to the treatment of others. This latter view, on its face, looks unstable. It is likely motivated by the worry that if self-regarding duties are acknowledged, then the door is open for paternalistic interference. To address this concern, we must turn now from perfectionist ethics to perfectionist politics.

The transition from perfectionist ethics to perfectionist politics is a natural one to make. Political institutions can be arranged, and state policies can be adopted, that promote or impede perfectionist values in various ways and to varying degrees. If one is committed to perfectionist ethics, then this commitment establishes a presumption in favor of perfectionism in politics.

Other things being equal, one should favor political institutions and state policies that do the best job of promoting the good in the context in which they apply. Importantly, this natural presumption can be defeated. For one thing, the political pursuit of perfectionist ends might be self-defeating. This possibility is considered below. But it will be useful to begin by assuming that perfectionist state policies can be effective in achieving their aims. Critics of perfectionist politics often reject the idea that there are objectively better and worse ways of living.

Subjectivism or nihilism about the good often stands behind anti-perfectionist commitments. But the most influential recent philosophical criticisms of perfectionist politics do not stem from this quarter. Sophisticated critics of perfectionism grant, if only for the sake of argument, the claims of perfectionist value theory. They then seek to show that perfectionist state policies, even if informed by a sound understanding of the good, nonetheless would be illegitimate. The character of perfectionist politics is best appreciated by considering these arguments and their limitations.

Many contemporary writers on politics reject perfectionism and hold that the state should be neutral among rival understandings of the good Dworkin ; Ackerman ; Larmore ; Rawls The principle of state neutrality, as it can be called, articulates a principled constraint on permissible or legitimate state action. The constraint can, and has been, formulated in different ways. As these formulations bring out, the idea of state neutrality has been understood broadly in recent political philosophy.

But most proponents of state neutrality wish to keep the state out of the business of promoting the good altogether, at least if the good to be promoted is controversial or subject to reasonable disagreement. A perfectionist approach to politics rejects the principle of state neutrality on all these formulations. For perfectionists, there is no general principle in political morality that forbids the state from directly promoting the good, even when the good is subject to disagreement. It will be helpful to spell out in a little more detail the implications of this rejection of state neutrality.

The first formulation presented above follows from a consent-based account of political legitimacy. Contemporary Lockeans do not reject state action the promotes the good, so long as the state action in question enjoys the consent of the governed Simmons Perfectionist political theory rejects consent theory and so rejects this formulation of the neutrality constraint.

The second formulation appeals to societal consensus, rather than actual consent. It holds that in large pluralistic societies, the state should not aim to promote the good, since what is considered good often will be subject to controversy. This formulation of the constraint is not extensionally equivalent to the first one, since there can be a societal consensus that an institution or practice is good and ought to be supported by the state even when there is not universal agreement on the matter.

The second formulation is vulnerable to the following objection. A state might intentionally promote a particular religion, adherence to which was backed by a firm societal consensus. This state does not look to be a neutral state. The second formulation confronts another problem. It targets the aims of state officials. But these aims are not always open to view, and state officials may have a variety of motives in mind when they make political decisions. For this reason, some have thought that it is more promising to apply the neutrality constraint not to the aims of state officials, but rather to the justifications they give in public for the decisions they make.

This yields the third formulation of the neutrality constraint. Defenders of state neutrality often defend the doctrine by appealing to the ideal of public reason. Public reasons, they argue, must be shareable in a way that excludes appeal to controversial ideals of the good.

Thus state neutrality and public justification in politics emerge as different sides of the same coin. Recently, some proponents of state neutrality have argued that the third formulation of the constraint is insufficiently demanding. State action may have an adequate neutral justification and yet remain non-neutral. For example, if state action that was designed to promote a particular religion were justified on the grounds that doing so were an effective means to serve some neutral end, such as civil peace, then the action would remain non-neutral, even if otherwise justified Patten , Kramer In response, proponents of state neutrality can propose a fourth formulation of the constraint, one that combines elements from the second and third formulations.

This formulation of state neutrality applies to both the means and ends of state action. Formulations of the neutrality constraint, such as the ones distinguished here, figure in recent influential versions of social contract theory, most notably that of Rawls and his followers Nagel ; Rawls ; Barry These views represent the chief contemporary rival to perfectionist political theory. In developing an account of political morality, these modern day contractualists instruct us to bracket our full understanding of the human good.

Only by so doing, is it possible to present an account of political morality that has a hope of securing the allegiance of citizens who hold very different conceptions of the good. The plausibility of the principle of state neutrality remains very much in dispute in contemporary political philosophy. Proponents of the principle maintain that state neutrality is necessary if the state is to respond appropriately to the fact that reasonable citizens in modern democratic societies are committed to conflicting conceptions of the good.

They also hold that state neutrality is vital to ensuring stable and mutually beneficial social cooperation in these societies. Those sympathetic to perfectionist politics counter: Much of the debate over state neutrality assumes that there is a strict incompatibility between state neutrality and perfectionist politics. But, in reality, the relationship between the two is more complex. While perfectionists reject the principle of state neutrality on its common formulations, they need not reject it on all possible formulations of the principle.

These perfectionists can claim further that the truth of value pluralism explains how fully reasonable people can adopt and pursue different ideals of the good. With this idea in mind, they could propose the following restricted principle of state neutrality. RNP restricts the scope of state neutrality to ideals of the good that are fully reasonable.

Whether or not it is a sound principle of political morality, it is a principle that both responds to the fact of reasonable pluralism and is available to the political perfectionist. Still, the principle of state neutrality, on its common formulations, remains an anti-perfectionist principle—one with wide, if not completely unrestricted, scope. Its proponents seldom present it as a foundational normative commitment, however. But how exactly would state neutrality constitute an appropriate response to this purported fact? A popular answer appeals to a moral norm of respect for persons, where persons are understood as rational agents.

To respect another person one must engage his capacity to respond to reasons. The mutual justification of political principles, it is then argued, is possible only if all citizens bracket their controversial views about the good and seek to argue from common ground. Note that this way of grounding state neutrality explains why the principle, on its second and third formulations, does not rule out state promotion of shared or uncontroversial conceptions of the good. Since a shared conception of the good could figure in common ground justifications for political principles, its promotion need not express disrespect to any citizen.

State neutrality thus applies only to disputed conceptions of the good. Suppose now that a modern state favors a disputed ideal of the good. We need to explain why this action would be disrespectful to some of its citizens. The state might favor an unworthy ideal; but if so, then its action would not be justified on perfectionist grounds. So we must assume that it favors a sound ideal.

On this assumption, how would its action express disrespect to those whose views were disfavored? Proponents of state neutrality point out that people can have mistaken views, even while being appropriately reasonable. This argument immediately invites two questions. Second, how should we construe the phrase appropriately reasonable—that is, how reasonable is appropriately reasonable? The first question is pressing, since the argument, as it stands, appears to confuse respect for persons with respect for the views that they currently endorse.

People, after all, are not stuck with the conception of the good that they affirm. As rational agents, they can revise their views in response to evidence, argument and reflection Raz If this is correct, then, so long as the state respects their capacities as rational agents, it is unclear why it must also respect their mistaken, albeit reasonably affirmed, views.

Proponents of state neutrality can respond that there is an intimate connection between the views about the good that a person affirms after reasonable examination and his social identity. By disrespecting the former, the state disrespects the latter. As one writer explains:. In considering these claims it is important to keep in mind that we are assuming that the state is favoring a sound ideal of the good over a misguided or false ideal.

If we assume further that persons with mistaken views about the good are not rationally sealed off from true beliefs about the good, then we can hold that the state in favoring the sound ideal is, among other things, attempting to engage the rational powers of its citizens.

This will be true, at least, if state officials justify their favoritism toward the ideal by appealing to the reasons that establish its soundness. By doing so, state officials arguably would show respect for all citizens understood as rational agents Galston , We have arrived at two contrasting understandings of the norm of respect for persons. For lack of better terms, let us call them Respect 1 and Respect 2.