Telegraf und Telefon als Konkurrenten (German Edition)
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Petersburg, im Dezember Die Neutralsprache das Idiom neutral hat 22 Buchstaben, und zwar 5 Vokale: Die Vokale werden wie folgt ausgesprochen: Nebeneinanderstehende Vokale werden getrennt ausgesprochen, z. Die Konsonanten werden immer wie folgt aus- gesprochen: Ausnahmen hiervon bilden blos s und h, wenn sie zusammenstehen sh ; sie werden dann wie seh im deutschen Worte Schale ausgesprochen.
Die Betonung' geschieht nach folgender Regel R. Derjenige Vokal wird betont, welcher unmittel- bar vor dem letzten Konsonanten steht, — wenn ein solcher Vokal im Worte vorhanden ist, z. Der Aeeusatiy unterscheidet sich von dem No- minativ durch seine Stellung im Satz, und zwar steht der Nominativ vor dem. Verbum, der- Accusativ nach dem Verbum. Wenn man auf einen bestimmten Gegenstand hinweisen will, so kann man die Demonstrativpronomina gebrauchen: Man imtersclieidet Stammadjektive, z.
Wenn der Stamm auf -ik auslautet, so wird die Endung -al anstatt -ik gebraucht, z. So — wie wird durch tale — kuale wiedergegeben, z. TO es tcUe grand kucUe mi, Sie sind so gross wie ich. Jedes Adjektiv kann auch substantivisch gebraucht werden und wird dann wie ein Substantiv dekliniert, z. Um aus einem Adjektiv ein Verbum zu bilden, kann man nicht die aUgemeinen Verbalsuffixe verwenden, sondern, der Deutlichkeit halber, ent- weder das Verbum esitr, sein, oder eins von den Suffixen -ifikar oder -eskar, z.
Die Kardinalzahlen [welche auf die Frage knant? Die Ordnungszahlen [welche auf die Frage kuantini'? Kardinalzahl, und zwar an das letzte Wort derselben, gebildet, z. Die BistribntlTzahlen [welche auf die Frage a kuant? Wenn ein Bruch bei einer ganzen Zahl steht, so wird die ganze Zahl durch die Konjunktion e mit dem Bruch verbunden, z. Die Batumsangrabe geschieht folgender- massen: Die sieben Wochentage heissen: Die genauere Zeitangabe geschieht in fol- f ender Weise: Das possessive Reflexivpronomen ist: Es wird anstatt sie und lor gebraucht, wenn es sich auf das Subjekt des Satzes bezieht, in welchem es steht.
Dem Personalpronomen tu entspricht das Pos- sessivpronomen tue. Die interrogativen und zugleich rela- tiven Pronomina. Wenn das Geschlecht der besprochenen Personen oder Tiere hervorgehoben werden soll, so kann kel die Endungen -0 und -a annehmen, z. Kel sinior es votr fratr? Kel siniora es Totr matr? Welche Dame ist Ihre Mutter? Singular un — otr; der eine — jeder. YO am du liebst Sie lie- voi am ihr Sie lieben. Zur Bildung des Konditionalis der Tergangenheit braucht man den Konditionalis der Gegenwart des Hilfsverbums avar und das Partizip des Passivs des betr.
Person wird die Konjunktion ke, dass, gebraucht, z. Der Infinitiv der Tergangrenlieit kann, wenn es der Sinn des Satzes durchaus fordert, dass die Vergangenheit angedeutet werde was ein sehr seltener Fall ist , — durch das Suffix -avar oder durch den Infinitiv des Hilfsv erbums avar, haben, mit dem Partizip des Passivs des betreffenden Verbums gebildet werden, z. Das Partizip der Znkunft wird durch das Suffix -erant gebildet, z. Bisierantj einer der lieben wird.
Das Partizip der Yergang-enheit bekommt das Suffix -ared, das der Zukunft -ered, z. Das Gerundiv wird durch das Suffix -and gebildet, z. Folgende Tabelle giebt ein anschauliches Bild der Konjugation des Verbums amar, lieben. JLmatel esate timedl I. Die reflexiven Verben werden nach fol- genden Regeln konjugiert R. Person des Singular und Plural im Indikativ, Konditionalis und Imperativ wird das dem Subjekt entsprechende Personalpronomen [mi, vo, noi, voi] dem Verbum nachgesetzt, z. ItLYavi noil wollen wir uns wa- schen! Die Gegenseitigltelt wird durch das Pronomen unotr oder durch das Adverb reslproke be- 24 Grammatik der Neutralsprache.
Die Frage, sowohl die direkte als die indirekte, wird durch die Konjunktion eske, ob, ein- geleitet, wenn nicht schon ein Fragewort im Satze ist Z. Eske vo TOlu skribar? Mi no konos, eske it plis a vo. Libr de ki es sn tahU Wessen Bach liegt auf dem A ki vo donav florl? Wem haben Sie Blumen ge- geben? Wen straft der Vater? Ko ki vo esav in teatr? Kuant paroli vo av skribed? Man unterscheidet Stammadverbien und abgeleitete Adverbien. Die Stammadverbien sind folgende Z. Die Frageadverbien sind folgende: Dient ein Adverb zum Determinieren eines Verbums, so steht es immer nach diesem Verbum, z.
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Eine Ausnahme von dieser Regel bildet das Adverb no, welches immer vor dem Verbum steht, z. Nokuanrle mi esav in Paris; niemals war ich in Paris. Kausu plnvi noi restero dome; des Regens wegen werden wir zu Hause bleiben. Die StammprSpositionen sind folgende Z.
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- Full text of "Woerterbuch der Neutralsprache: (idiom Neutral) neutral-deutsch und Deutsch "?
Tersn; nach, hin, in der intr; zwischen. In plas de ; seknantu kommand de; anstatt. Die Stammkonjunktionen sind folgende Z. Die Stamminterjektionen sind fol- gende Z. Um die Aussprache mit der Schreibung in Einklang zu bringen, d. Anker d, anchor e, ancre f; — Meter d, meter e, metre f; — Bibel d, Bible e if, — so werden im Auslaut zwei oder drei Konsonanten nebeneinander geschrieben, z. X wurde durch ks ersetzt, z. Ulis- bedeutet etwas nicht Gutes oder Misslungenes: Pferd und Wagen ; ylamaj Gefieder. Es ist gestattet, nach Belieben, jede der beiden Formen zu gebrauchen.
Sankt-Peterlmrg, 8 februar Lachou, injenier in Boulogne sur Seine; Fransia. Respondante votr letr de 1 februar , direk- torad de sosietet de relsrut S. Peterburg, a termin 8 april loku S. Peterburg e a kondisioni sekuant: Aparati deb esar adresed a shef de stasion Peterburg de relsrut nomed e deb esar asekured per vo e pro votr kont; if aparati u partii de ili esero ruined u perded in voyaj, vo deb mitar nemediate otri, plasu aparati e partii ruined e perded.
Vo prend su vo garantad de funksion rekt de aparati durantu un anu da resivasion de ili per ofiseri de relsrut nomed.
Mon esero payed a vo no plu tarde ka un seman po resivasion definitiv de aparati. Direktorad nomed av honor pregar vo, sinior estimed, avisar di akseptasion de ist komision no plu tarde ka 15 februar Shef de seksion ekonomik President de direktorad N. Kristiania, 27 februar A doktor de medisin P. It es ver, ke ekspresioni mult spesiale medisinik no ankor eksist in diksionar nomed, ma it no es ob- stakl pro skribasion de artikli sientifik in ist lingu, kause ist ekspresioni es paroli internasional.
Skribasion in idiom neutral don profiti sekuant in komparasion ko kelkun lingu nasional: Libri e broshuri sientink publiked in ist idiom potes esar lekted per omnihom in original, 2 traduksion no plu es nesesar, 3. Publikasion de idiom neutral interesero et votr -filio, kel kolekt postmarki, kause ist idiom es lingu praktikal pro korespondad ko kolektatori in otr landi.
Steht neben einem ab- geleiteten neutralsprach- Hchen Wort ein zweites in Klammem, z.
Bedeutung gebraucht wer- den kann. Die neben den Namen chemischer Elemente in Klammern angegebenen Buchstaben, z. Hauptwort, zeigt das weibliche Ge- scMecht an, z. Person sing, des Imperativ an, z. Tanne pinus abies l. Uberfluss haben, -ad, s. Anbe- tung, -atar, s. Adjektiv, Ei- genschaftswort, -ik , a. Anschlag, Kund- machung, -ar, va. Ereignis, Zu- fall, -e, adv. Herberge, Gast- hof, -ar, va. Allegorie, -ik alegorik , a. Alkali, Laugen- salz, -ik alkali k , a. Alchimie, -ist, al kimist , s. Muha- medanisch; ameriksLii, a.
Anar- chismus, -ist, anar- ki st , 8. Anatomie, -ik anatomik , a. B,mante, liebend, in lie- bender Weise; Tid ante, lachend. Jahr -ik anual , a. Leibgedinge, Apanage, -arj va. Apathie, -ik apa- tik , a. Appetit, [nung, api, s. Beifall spen- apo, int.. Apologie, Ver- teidigungsrede, -ik apo- logetik , a. Armee, -ik, de armi, a. Artillerie, -ist a r - tilerist , 8. Un- verdrossenheit, Beharr- lichkeit.
Asso- ciation, -ed, part. Sicht, Ansicht, Hinsicht, Anbetracht. Zeugnis geben, zeugen, 54 atinar — avar. Atlas Karten- sammlung , [letisch. Falle, Schlinge, -ar, va. Pro- nomen aut selbst, z. Autor, Urheber, autorisar, va. Siina- ved; einer der geliebt worden ist. Winke geben, Nachricht geben, -asion, s.
Ball Tanzgesell- balad, s. Bankrott, fa- siar bankrot, vn. Barren, Riegel, -ar, va. Barbe Fisch , [bar. Niedrig- keit, -ifikary va. Grund, Grundlage, hast, 8. Stab, Stock, -ar, va. Beneficium, Vor- ' benevolent, a. Klotz, Block, blokar, va. Bonbon, Zucker- bon-tempe, adv.
Rand, Saum, Bord, -rtr, va. Buffett, Schenk- bufon, s. Bude, Laden, butir, 8. Schuld, ausstehende Zahlung, -ar, va. Veruntreuung , Unter- schleif, Defraudation. Wahn8inn, Wahn- witz, Irrereden, -ar, vn. Verlangen, For- derung, -ar, va. Nenner , eines Bruches. Zahn- laut, [t, d, n, — 8, sh, z, j]. Dessert, Nach- desert, a.
Despot, Gewalt- herrscher, -ik, a. Diabet, Harn- ruhr, -ikj a diabetisch. Unterschied, Differenz, difteri, s. Diphtong au, eu, ei , digestar, va. Kunstliebhaber, Dilettant, diligent, a. Ausdehnung, Dimension, dimision , s. Dynamik, -dl, dinamit, s. Ruhr, -ik di- senterik , a. Diskus, Wurf- scheibe, [diskontieren. Disput, Streit, -ar, vn. Zeitschrift, Jour- divan, s. Anteil, Divi- divin, a. Wohnung, Wohn- sitz, -ar, vn. Mitgift, Aussteuer, duplpunkt, s. Drama, Schau- durar, vn. Dauerhaftigkeit, -antu, drapdesak; Nastuch. Dusche, dresrtr kaval; bereiten, drog, s.
Zweifel, -ar di kk; eben, s. Dublon, Pistole machen, -ifikar se, vr. Landesverordnung, editar — eksitar. Verfinsterung eines Gestirns, -arj va. Ekliptik, Son- eko, 8. Experi- ment, Versuch, -ar, va. Elektro- technik, -ist, s. Abzeichen, Sinn- embrion, s. Enthusias- mus, Begeisterung, -ar, va. Fallsucht, -ik, epileptik , a. Epilog, Schluss- episkop, s. Epoche, Zeitab- schnitt, Zeitpunkt.
Simerant, einer der lieben wird. Wesen, Wesen- heit, Essenz. Bedeckung, Ge- leite, -ar, va. Stapelplatz, Uber- nachtungsort, Etappe. Ewig- keit, [-al, a. Hunger, avar famel; hungern, -ik, a. Spuk, Hirnge- fantomz apar; es spukt. Pharmacie, Arz- neibereitungskunst, -ik farmaseutik , a. Februar, -an oder de februar; a. Kind Sohn oder Tochter , -o, 8. Philosophie, -ik filosofik , a. Geissei, Peitsche, -ar, va. Biegsamkeit, -asion fleksion , s.
Hurerei trei- ben, -asion, s. Esse, Schorn- stein, Ofenrohr. Gewalt, Kraft, -ar, I va. Bruch, Bruch- frambos, s. Schwindsucht, -ik ftisik , a. Amt verrichten, funktionieren, wirken. Wut, Raserei, -ar, vn. Huhn Hahn oder Henne , -o, sm. Galicien in Spa- nien. Galizien in galium, 8. Eltern, -asion, Zeugung, Generation.
Geologie, -ik geologik , a. Gla9ik mar , a. Golf, Meerbusen, gom, 8. Grad, Stufe, ar, va. Schwere, Wich- tigkeit, [vieren. Granate Ge- gren-batar, va. Kummer, Sorge, Gram, -ar, vn. Grosshandel, -ist grosist , s. Krieg, -ar ko kh, vn. Bewohner, Ein- wohner, -ahl, a. Harnisch, Pferde- geschirr, -ar, va. Obergewalt, Hegemonie, heksa-, prf. Herold, heraldik, s, Heraldik, Wap- herb, s. Irrlehre, Ketzerei, hermafrodit, s. Hysterie, -ik hi 8 terik ,a. Verehrung, in honor de; zu Ehren des. Horizont, -ik horisontal , a. Erdboden, Erdreich, human, a. Espanta, Spanien; patria, Vaterland.
Kaiser, Gebieter, -ato- riky a. Individuum, -ik individual , a.
Full text of "Worterbuch Der Technic Und Des Handels"
Infanterie-, -ist i n f a n - terist , s. Neigung ha- ben, neigen, -asion, s. Feuer-, Feuer- wehr-, -er, s. Instrument - kompleks , s. Ausleger, Dol- metscher, Interpret, -arj va. Erfin- dung, -aior in ventor , s. Umkehr en,um- investigar, va. Feldzug, Heer- zug kampestr, a. Kannibale, Men- schenfresser, -ik, a.
Kaper [Bluten- knospe des Kapernstrau- kapel, s. Kapriole, Bock- sprang, [eigensinnig. Distel, [fasten, karem, s. Karte, kart geografik; Landkarte, kartilag, s. KasptA; mar , a. Fall, Vorfall, Kasus, in omni kasu; jeden- falls. Katalepsie, Starrkrampf, -iifc kata- leptik , a. Staar Krank- katastrof, s. Kaukasus Ge- birge , 'ia, s. Grund, Ursache, -ar, va. Pferd; Springer Schach , -an, s. Pferde- knecht, -a, 8. Kavallerie-, -ist, ka- val er ist , S.
JBLelle, Klarheit, vokal klar; heller Vokal a, e, i, o, u. Gesetzbuch, Codex, kodisil, 8. Bestellung, -ar avanse; vorausbestellen. Vergleich; Stei- gerung gramm. Mitleid, Er- barmen, -ar, va. Komplex, Ge- samtmasse, -ar, va. Konfession, Bekenntnis, Religions- konfet, s. Vertraulich- keit, -ik konfiden- sial , a. Erlaubnis, Be- willigung, -ar, va. Kirchen Versamm- lung, KonziL konsili, s.
Konsultation , Bera- tung. Festland, Kon- tinent, -ik kontinen- tal , a. Konter- bande, -ar, va. Vertrag, Kon- trakt, -ar, vn. Bekehrung, Konversion, -ator, s. Mutmassung, Vermutung, -ar, va. Saite, Sehne, kordial, a. Strick, Seil, -et, 8. Korsika, [leib, kort, 6. Kotelett, Brat- koton, 8. Chronologie, Zeitrechnung, -ik kro- nologik , a. Kruppe, Kreuz eines Pferdes, -ad, s. Zank, Streit, -ar, vn. Kufe, Butte, -er, s. Verehrung, Kultus, kultel, s. Quotient, kup , 8. Coupon, Zins- abschnitt, Zinsschein. Sorge, Pflege, War- tung, Kur. Lauf, Kurs, -ar, vn. Vetter oder Cou- sine.
Couvert, Um- schlag, -ar, va. Lip- penlaut, Lippenkonso- nant. Gleichgewicht verlie- rend, labil. Jammer, -ar di kk, vn. Lanze, Speer, -ar, va. Brief, -e oder me- diw letr; brieflich. Linie, Strich, -ar, va. Mmet de union ; Bindestrich. Erlaabnis, Befug- nis, Licenz. Aalraupe, Aal- Lo tarin gia, s. Montag, -an oder de lundi, a. Lupine, Wolfs- lupul, 8. Mahagoniholz, Amarantenholz, -an oder de m. Brust, Mutter- brust, Euter, -ar, va. Art und Weise, Manier, in manier de; in der Weise von, nach Art des.
Manifest, -ar, manipalar — materi. Dienstag, -an und de m. Marsch; Zug Schach , -ar, va. Menge, Masse, mashin, s. Materie, Stoff, -ik material , a. Mittels- person, -asionj s. Medizin Wis- senschaft , -istf 8. Mediteran mar , a. Mezzanin, Halb- mesenteri, s. Mimose, Sinn- min — mod. Vermindern, lindern, mil- dern, verkleinem, -eskavy vn. Barmherzig- keit, Erbarmen, -os, a. Mitra, Bischofs- mobil, a.
Modell, Muster, Schablone, -ar, va. Molluske, Schal- moment, 8. Erinnerung, Mah- nung, -ar, vo. Ungeheuer, -os, mont, 8. Denkmal, Monument, -ik, a. Beweggrund, Ver- anlassung, -avj va. Bewegung, -ator motor , S. Viel- heit, Menge, -e, adv. Fusspunkt, Nadir, naft, 8. Natur, -ik na- tural , a.
Ekel erregen, -os, a. Holland, Niederlande, -n, a. In short, the occupation ensured that colonialism mattered. Much like the division of Africa in , the drawing of new borders after World War II took place in Germany and occurred without the consent or advice of those affected.
These plans included five major aims: Perhaps of greatest long-term significance was the division of Germany into four zones of occupation, one each administered by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France. Indeed, such a plan would have assuaged Soviet fears of the reemergence of a strong German state. Even President Franklin D. First the American and British zones unified politically and economically, forming an entity known informally as the Bizone, or Bizonia.
Then the French zone joined as well, creating Trizonia. The Marshall Plan and the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in represented further efforts by the Western Allies to rebuild a strong and friendly Germany, a Germany that could serve as an ally and a buffer against the communist East. The Soviet Union, understandably more fearful of renewed German strength after massive losses in two world wars, responded by blockading Berlin, pushing the already strained partnership between the Allies to the brink of war.
From this point there was no going back, and the joint administration of Germany vanished. May saw the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany out of the three western zones. For an updated version of this argument, see Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: Cambridge University Press, Still, military occupation continued in the western zones until , and even after its official end Western Allies maintained military bases in the Federal Republic.
Soviet troops remained in Germany even longer, until More significantly, neither German state enjoyed full sovereignty; only after all parties involved had ratified the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany in did Germany become a fully sovereign state under international law.
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German critics of the Western Allies wasted no time in attacking the economic policies implemented in the western occupation zones and the Federal Republic, drawing explicit connections to colonial exploitation. The General Assembly has indicated it plans to address these at some point. August in Berlin Berlin: Sekretariat des Nationalrats der Nationalen Front des dekomratischen Deutschland, , 12, 7. Die Remilitarisierung Westdeutschlands , no.
Nonetheless, accusations of Soviet or Russian colonialism in Eastern Europe did surface from time to time in the s and s, and even dogged the Soviet Union on into the late s. Indeed, the lyrics do almost as much to differentiate the natives of Trizonia from other natives as it does to compare them: Culture and spirit, Goethe and Beethoven: Comparisons could only go so far. This resistance was tied not only to preserving the traditional place of Goethe and Beethoven, but also to concerns about how American consumer culture threatened German sexuality and gender roles, and femininity in particular.
Such fears went back to the nineteenth century but took on greater urgency thanks to the sexual upheaval caused by war and occupation as well as the need to reconstruct society from the ground up. Ironically, the reactionaries East German propaganda accused of acting as puppets for US imperialist interests were some of the most vocal opponents of cultural colonization—as one would expect if these individuals truly were reactionaries. While younger West Germans sought to Americanize themselves through American films and music, West German businesses adopted and adapted American business practices: Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Alexander Stephan New York: Integration with the rest of western Europe and the West more broadly helped West Germans achieve these goals.
Conflict and Cooperation Between Two Cultures, , ed. More significantly, such integration would help make possible the continued rebuilding of West German society and the West German economy. Both of these treaties explicitly sought to prevent another European war by making one impossible through economic integration. Such integration meant establishing a customs union and a common external tariff as well as harmonizing agricultural, transport, and trade policies across member states. Per the terms of the Treaty of Rome, the trade benefits that members enjoyed— most notably the customs union—were not limited to the European continent.
As mentioned above, trade in and with the colonies of other powers was by no means a novelty of the postwar period, but the removal of obstacles such as customs and tariffs was. When negotiations about the possible membership of the United Kingdom began just a few years later, the situation had changed dramatically. As State Secretary Lahr noted, until that point the benefits of association had been limited to certain parts of Africa, creating a division.
Associating the members of the Commonwealth would address that problem to a certain extent, but create new ones as well. Nobody would have thought then that they would become independent in short order. This sparked some concern in West Germany, especially as the war dragged on and the horrific nature of the violence there became known. Yale University Press, , While West Germany sought integration with Western Europe and the United States, integration that for better or worse also committed the Federal Republic to certain colonial projects, East German leadership pursued similar goals that embedded it not only in the socialist camp but within a worldwide anti-imperialist movement.
This movement included not only the Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern Bloc but also countries such as India and Yemen. East German officials intended their anti-imperialist and anti- colonial rhetoric to secure for East Germany not only a place within the community of socialist countries that emerged after World War II, but a prominent one.
In this endeavor the branding of West Germany and its chief ally, the United States, as neo-colonialist was as important as East German self-identification with anti-colonialism. Indeed, the Scientific Archives at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs kept records of West German neo- colonialist statements for use in propaganda and anti-colonialist literature. This list included quotations from politicians as well as other prominent individuals and the West German press. For example, the Scientific Archives quoted conservative member of the Bundestag Dr. Africa would have needed European rule for at least half if not an entire century.
Increasingly, the Federal Republic stood accused of using organizations like the EEC to further the aims of German imperialism in Europe and around the world. The instruments used to this end are the EEC, Euratom, and the like. Time and time again the SED and the state sought to paint West Germany as the most dangerous neo-colonialist power in Europe, second in the world only to the United States.
This SED aimed such propaganda not only at the German people in order to discredit the government in Bonn, but also at the rest of the socialist and anti- imperialist camps in an effort to enhance the place of East Germany within each. The more dangerous the SED could portray West Germany to be, the more important a contribution East German officials could claim to make. Foreign policy and propaganda planning emphasized this: But it is always important to note that in comparison to the period before World War II the balance of power has changed in Germany to the detriment of the imperialists on account of the existence of the GDR.
The broad, shared political interests of German and American imperialism are primarily derived from the fact that the two are the most strongly interested in a reordering of the world and are therefore at present the most aggressive powers in the imperialist camp. Their efforts are focused on intrusion into the economies of the other capitalists countries, on the penetration and redistribution of colonial territories, on the subordination of economically less developed countries, on the dissolution of friendly relations between the non-socialist countries.
In addition, as an occupying power American imperialism exercises a strong influence on developments in West Germany. East German officials repeatedly suggested that West German neo-colonialism— especially in Africa—threatened not only the well-being of peoples striving for political and economic independence. The main objective of the neo-colonialist policies of West German imperialism is to involve Africa in the prospective planning and preparation of military ventures against the socialist camp and, by means of economic and military penetration, to develop African states into a military-strategic reserve and raw material bas southern flank of NATO.
West German imperialism is thereby pursuing the goal of consolidating its own economic and military position in the western military alliance. In the Federal Republic, by contrast, the s brought considerable changes to West German attitudes towards colonialism. These changes reflected not the success of anti-colonial propaganda emanating from East Berlin, Moscow, or any colonial capital, but rather the realities of colonial warfare and the very real possibility of self-rule and even independence. The participation of Germans in both conflicts as members of the French Foreign Legion and indigenous liberation armies only reinforced the impact of such headlines.
Proximity to the war in Algeria made it possible not only for reporters but politicians to visit the country and gather their own impressions as well. No longer would West Germans confine themselves to questioning the tactics of colonialism; the legitimacy of colonialism itself as a strategy was fair game as well. It must be litigated as a political trial in all European countries against colonialism. Initial reports on the uprising focused on atrocities committed against Europeans to an even greater extent than during the initial years of the war in Algeria.
It was not until well after the conflict and Kenyan independence that the full extent of European violence became known, but by the closing months of the uprising some details had begun to reach the British—and by extension, West German—press. While stories of eleven deaths in Kenyan prisons due to misconduct paled in comparison to reports out of Algeria—and the full extent of events in Kenya, for that matter—they contributed to the idea gaining support in West Germany that maybe, just maybe, exploitation, abuse, and violence were not symptoms of colonial mismanagement but colonialism itself.
What had begun as a trickle became a flood as decolonization spread from its limited beginnings in Asia to the African continent. In the aftermath of failed uprisings in East Germany and Hungary the successful and often bloodless at least for the time hand-over of power doubtless held great appeal. Many in West Germany remained unsure how well new states would fare without Europe. The danger that they might fall back into their earlier barbarism is otherwise all too great. Indeed, the next chapter will demonstrate that aid, education, and training were all ways in which the West German state sought to live up to its responsibilities as a member of the EEC and as a member of the postwar community of nations while pursuing its own goals as well.
Similarly, trade, investment, and other business opportunities were some of the ways by which West German businesses took advantage of the opportunities that the EEC and the postwar order made available to them. The at least partial embrace of decolonization and the end of colonial rule did nothing to guarantee the demise of European imperialism.
While West German business and conservative politicians trumpeted the humanitarian nature of major development projects, critics on both sides of the inner German border recognized the aspirations of West German big business and did their best to make their voices heard in opposition. Aid and development were at the center of debates about colonialism, decolonization, and the postcolonial world after Algeria—debates that now featured a mainstream opposition critical not only of particular colonial policies, but colonialism in general as well.
Or, as it came to be known in the post-war period, development and modernization. Although the 73 Volker Rolf Berghahn, ed. Afterwards, the experience of violence in the war fundamentally altered the way people thought about colonialism but did little to alter West German policy towards present and former colonies. European colonies and, increasingly, former European colonies attracted the attention of a variety of Germans in both states for the many economic and political opportunities they appeared to present. They believed that Western Europe needed its colonies in the aftermath of World War II more than ever; Africa, they hoped, would provide Western Europe with the raw materials it needed to rebuild, the markets it needed to grow and prosper, and the strategic upper hand it needed to combat Communism.
State and party officials in East Germany saw a path towards the future that led through Africa as well, but for them it was a path out of a diplomatic and political wilderness. This would, in turn, provide East German officials with momentum in their efforts to overcome the Hallstein Doctrine and put an end to their isolation on the international stage.
But similarities in practical application belied any ideological differences, and instead of alternatives East German offerings looked more like cheap imitations. Ultimately it was a change of policy in West Germany, and not the limited success East Germany enjoyed in Africa, that secured East German officials the recognition they craved.
Still, Africa and the rest of the colonial, decolonizing, and postcolonial world remained an important rhetorical battlefield for both German states, one in which they would continue to face off until the bitter end. Ortlieb, Europas Aufgabe in Afrika, 4th ed. Despite this somewhat narrower point of view, several of the plans to result from it in the immediate postwar decade were nothing short of grandiose. Business, industry, and private citizens suggested time and time again to the West German Foreign Office new ways and reasons to take advantage of the colonial situation after or even to regain a German colonial foothold.
Some of these may have made some sense; many required the Foreign Office to politely explain the realities of UN Trusteeships and the politics of decolonization. One letter to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer made a simple case for colonial expansion: Why not the former colonies in Africa? Although such views appeared only rarely in correspondence with the Foreign Office, they were not unique. For the most part West German businessmen sought returns on investment, not the return of former German colonies.
Indeed, some remained in operation until the mids, when West German law finally forced them to reorganize into limited liability or joint-stock companies. The Otavi Minen- und Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, for example, was founded in to exploit copper deposits and build a railroad in German Southwest Africa. In it became Otavi Minen AG and to this day it continues to trade in minerals around the world.
This and other surviving colonial companies—as well as newer West German businesses— took full advantage of the new opportunities West German membership in the EEC afforded them. They also took advantage of efforts by the West German government to promote the development of newly independent states, securing lucrative contracts for the construction of infrastructure and other projects in Africa with the help of West German and Western European credits.
In Togo, for example, West Germany and the EEC helped finance the construction of a new harbor designed by a firm in Bremen and located in an area surveyed by a West German technical college with the help of a West German drill ship. The dam would also make irrigation possible in nearby areas. Anti-colonialists in West Germany criticized the government for cooperating with racists and colonialists, but propaganda out of East Germany consistently went further, accusing the West German state itself of racism and neo-colonialism.
Such attacks reflected East German ideological commitments, but also a certain pragmatism. Where many in West Germany saw economic opportunities, East German officials saw political opportunities: Finding and securing a place in the socialist camp came relatively easy to East Germany after World War II, but the rest of the world proved a harder nut to crack.
For decades East German officials found themselves waging a losing battle for diplomatic recognition. State and party officials contrasted East German anti-colonialism with the supposed neo-colonialism of West Germany. Sometimes they were right; many West German firms did indeed hope to make a profit in Africa, for example, and often the plans these firms developed did not make successful long-term national development a priority. Other times, what East German criticisms decried as neo-colonialism might more accurately be described as the latent vestiges of a colonial mindset that, by the late s, was quickly going out of style.
And finally East German critics frequently employed charges of neo-colonialism simply as an effort to taint West German programs, policies, organizations, or individuals. Whatever the validity of East German accusations, in a national context they were meant to win support from the German people. We must make it clear to the German people that colonial politics and imperialist ambitions are not in accordance with the interests of the German people. It is important to demonstrate that Wilhelmine colonial policies were policies that the German taxpayer paid full price for, and that it was demagogy when it was said that German workers need colonies.
These were the politics of imperialism and not of the people. The government in Bonn, which pursues openly neo-colonialist policies, has no right to speak on behalf of the German people, because it is the government and representative of monopolists and militarists. Its politics are in stark contradiction to the national interests of the German people!
The United Nations provided one natural venue for the SED to plead its case, both with regards to the continuing injustices of colonialism and in terms of a just settlement of the German question. From its inception the United Nations recognized the need to deal with issues of colonialism; its charter, signed on June 26, by the 50 states present at the UN Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, deals with colonial issues in three chapters.
Although the Charter explicitly promotes self-determination, the compromises necessary for its creation meant that it did not specify how soon colonial power should grant their colonies independence. However, despite such progress—which included a large number of states obtaining independence in —the UN General Assembly felt that decolonization was not taking place as quickly as it should. Despite its relative ineffectiveness the United Nations still played an important role in the international debate over decolonization beginning in the s, serving as a forum where all sides could be heard.
Although neither German state was a member of the United Nations until , both made use of this forum throughout the s and s. The Federal Republic sent a permanent mission to the United Nations and obtained official observer status in the early s, while the German Democratic Republic frequently addressed the General Assembly in letters and documents condemning the continued abuses of colonialism, supporting the UN Charter and resolution , and laying much of the blame for the problems facing the colonial and decolonizing world at the feet of the United States and, increasingly, West Germany.
But the Bonn government is today one of the chief supporters of Portuguese colonialists in Angola and Mozambique and a direct ally of the bloody Verwoerd regime. The UN Charter proclaims the principles of equality of large and small states, but the stated objectives of the Bonn government include the domination of Europe and the pursuit of neo-colonialist domination in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In direct contrast are the attitudes of the government of the other German state, the West German Federal Republic. Closely aligned with the colonial powers in NATO, above all France, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal, it supports the continuation of policies aligned with colonialism.
By supporting the colonial interests of its NATO partners, it realizes its own as well. Therefore it makes available to the colonial powers in great numbers weapons and funds for the continuation of brutal terror against oppressed peoples and promotes the recruitment of West German citizens as mercenaries for the colonial powers. In this regard East German protestations failed. Such failure did not prevent the SED from sending envoys to other international organizations to spread the same gospel, however.
From the very beginning, the Politburo conceived of East German participation as an opportunity to win international support regarding the German question. Instead, they sought to maximize both in whatever combination seemed most effective. Despite ideological differences, both states ultimately pursued policies of political and economic engagement that closely resembled one another.
West and East Germans described and justified very similar efforts to make advances in the colonial world in totally different ways, ways permitted by their respective institutional and discursive political structures. In the West this meant a focus on the opportunities colonialism created for colonized and colonizer. In the East, the evils of colonial exploitation had top billing.
This deeper resemblance despite superficial dissimilarities emerged time and again as both states sought to promote friendship and cooperation and to provide aid and assistance to newly independent states. Friendship and Cooperation, Aid and Assistance In the late s both East and West Germany began to actively court the affections of former colonies around the world, and given the increasing pace of decolonization in Africa, much of their attention gravitated there.
Both states sponsored organizations intended to promote friendship and facilitate cultural and social exchange, and both states implemented policies designed to assist in the development of viable economic and political systems. Such practical similarities notwithstanding, however, East German rhetoric persisted in efforts to differentiate the two postwar German states, denying similarities between East and West German organizations and policies and instead decrying West German efforts as neo-colonialist while trumpeting East German anti-colonialist equivalents. Two organizations with nearly identical names provide the clearest parallels.
In the Federal Republic the German Africa Society emerged in to fill the void left by the West German Foreign Office, which dealt with political matters, and the Afrika-Verein, which primarily concerned itself with business and economics. What began as a group of 32 individuals in its first year of existence grew to over members by early The SED also charged the society with helping newly independent African nations meet their cultural and educational needs, including the training of national cadres.
The first of these took place in October as a means to address a lack of interest in and knowledge about Africa. It boasted African guests from 33 countries. Unfortunately, despite—or perhaps because of—significant public funding the Society ran into problems by its third Africa Weeks, forcing a postponement.
Der deutsche Imperilaismus und China , Studien zur Kolonialgeschichte und Geschichte der nationalen und kolonialen Befreiungsbewegung Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, , West German tactics, real or exaggerated, ultimately backfired: Unlike the Peace Corps, neither group became wildly popular. In East Germany this was by design, as the Brigades—like the East German Africa Society—were intended to do as much in the way of propaganda as development work. Both of these goals were frequently expressed in terms of colonialism: Anti-colonialist rhetoric alone, however, could not win the recognition East German officials desired.
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The SED recognized this, and realized that anti-colonialist movements and new postcolonial states wanted concrete assistance and aid. Instead, East German efforts to buy friends took other forms. From the s through the s East Germany sent finished goods to developing socialist countries and desperate communist parties.
West Germany quickly became a world leader in providing aid and assistance to developing countries. At least, that is what the Federal Ministry of Economics claimed in when it reported that the FRG had given 65 countries almost 23 billion DM since Many individuals in the Federal Republic—especially those with political leanings left of center—saw such help as a responsibility and a chance to do for others what the United States had done for Germany after World War II: European nations should know this from their own experience, since to a large part they have a form of development aid—the Marshall Plan—to thank for their reconstruction after the Second World War.
One letter to Wischnewski complaining about calls for increased aid to developing countries summed up a number of common arguments: Who helped us out? Entwicklungshilfe in neuer Sicht. Aid and assistance from West Germany often met with skepticism from developing countries and criticism from East Germany. Erhard himself recognized the fears of countries on the receiving end of aid as mistrust stemming from the colonial period, and for this reason encouraged the careful selection of particular economic projects rather than simply dumping large amounts of capital into developing countries.
As other colonial powers loosened their grasp—or, in the face of France, finally let go after burning themselves badly—Portugal and its empire attracted increasing attention from all sides. While earlier projects like the construction of a new harbor for Togo attracted criticism from East Germany for neocolonialism, it was not until the Cahora Bassa Dam project that the Federal Republic had to endure any significant attacks against its development policies.
The project, initially developed during the administration of conservative Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, ran into heavy criticisms in the early s when the new SPD administration under Willy Brandt choose to go forward with it after other states like Sweden had backed out. Attacks came not only from East German propaganda, but from student and leftist groups in West Germany.
Indeed, it was the Cahora Bassa Dam project that mobilized larger numbers of West Germans, especially students and other younger West Germans, to transform the work of the establishment- oriented Angola Committee into a widespread movement in the Federal Republic against Portuguese colonialism.
Many worried that the economic gains to be had from the dam would only serve to prop up the Portuguese position in Mozambique indefinitely. Has Kenya, for example, accused the English of developing too much infrastructure in the colonial period? And does Ethiopia to this day still enjoy the network of roads developed by the Italians during the few years of the occupation, roads that have hardly been improved.
Debates about the Cahora Bassa Dam project reflected the new frame through which West Germans saw colonialism after the war in Algeria, but in their intensity they represented something of an outlier. Only the related issues of South West Africa and South Africa provoked similarly passionate responses.
Although the end of French rule in Algeria and decolonization more generally brought great changes for former metropoles, in West Germany it did more to change the way people thought and spoke than what they or the West German state actually did. By , for example, West Germany had committed over DM 51 billion to developing countries, compared to only DM million from the GDR—a significant portion of which the East German government never actually granted. Cambridge University Press, , Some of the more popular items included printing presses and typewriters—given their anti-militaristic rhetoric, the closest the state or party wanted to come to the weapons or ammunition more immediately useful in a liberation struggle was uniforms or motorcycles.
From the point of view of many in the Federal Republic, the former colonies and developing countries where West German advisors and experts served were all too susceptible to influence and coercion from the East. One even feels a little like a garrison along the Siegfried Line facing an eastern attack carried out not with tanks and infantry but with loans and economic advisors. This did not, however, mean the SED had to make a choice between framing their aid and assistance as being anti-monopoly capitalism or anti-colonial. Rather, they were one and the same.
At the same time, and with the same motivation, the party took cases of discrimination and racism seriously, such as complaints from an African May Delegation that visited the Leipzig Zoo in The second article recounts many of the same incidents, including questions such as whether or not the African visitors lived in houses back in Africa. Other cases of racism received considerably more attention and reflected more than just ignorance and curiosity. Rather, such racism seems to have been learned in postwar Germany, inadvertently taught by Americans and hardened by concerns about proper female social and sexual activity in the wake of Klaus M.
For East German officials, however, the true sentiments Germans had for decolonizing and formerly colonized peoples did not matter as much as the image of East Germany as a friendly, peace-loving, anti-colonialist state that had overcome the forces of racism and imperialism that had marred the German past. Princeton University Press, As a result, accusations of West German neo-colonialism and proud boasting about East German anti-colonialism functioned on a variety of levels and, East German officials hoped, would be appropriate for a number of different audiences in Germany and around the world.
Ultimately, however, anti-colonialism gained East Germany little more than sympathy: Indeed, anti-colonialism would not gain a significant foothold in West Germany until the late s, and not as a result of East German propaganda. Moreover, even after some West Germans—largely students and leftists— began to criticize colonialism and imperialism in large numbers, another group continued to view colonialism and the German colonial past in particular quite differently.
Service in the Foreign Legion brought Germans from both postwar states to the battlefields of Vietnam and Algeria, where they fought—and many died—on behalf of a colonial power in decline. Some German Legionnaires, given the opportunity, took up arms against the French, joining the Vietnamese or Algerian struggle against French colonialism. More importantly, responses in both the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic reflected the attitudes towards colonialism that dominated the discourse in each society. On the one hand, Germans from both states expressed shock and outrage: On the other hand, East German reporting and propaganda went further, explicitly criticizing France for treating West Germany as a colony from which to recruit soldiers for its colonial wars, attacking the West German government for its complicity and even cooperation in making these colonial wars possible, and fomenting desertion and defection among Germans serving in the Legion.
While some on the left in West Germany expressed similar views— especially members of SPD youth organizations—the closest most West Germans came to colonial critiques was to debate the present and future status of West German sovereignty. The vast majority of West Germans, disheartened as they were to see Germans dying for a foreign power, for France no less, questioned not the legitimacy of French military action in Vietnam and Algeria but rather the legitimacy of French recruitment for the Foreign Legion.
Although they may not have recognized it, for West Germans the French Foreign Legion represented another direct connection to European colonialism. Like more formal arrangements including NATO and the European Economic Community, the Foreign Legion committed West Germans to the maintenance of colonial rule in the face of a threat widely—if inaccurately—understood to be emanating from Moscow. In the case of the Foreign Legion, this commitment came at the level of the individual rather than the state.
Still, at any level this commitment reflected not so much an enthusiasm for colonialism as a pragmatism that accepted the logics of colonial rule at face value. Similarly, in East Germany the Foreign Legion served as yet another target for anti-colonialist propaganda. Criticizing the Foreign Legion in West Germany Although it did not always attract the same degree of attention it did in later years, German membership in the French Foreign Legion predated the post period significantly.
More often than not this collection of foreign and French soldiers fought for France overseas; after Louis Philippe created the Foreign Legion in in order to circumvent new restrictions on the service of foreign troops in the French army the Legion saw its first deployment in Algeria. In its first few decades Legionnaires fought in Spain, Italy, and even Mexico, but during the Third Republic the Legion began to earn its reputation as a colonial force, expanding and solidifying French control in North Africa, Madagascar, and Indochina.
German membership took off after the Franco-Prussian War ended in as demobilized soldiers joined the Legion. Indeed, some of the Germans who enlisted at that time may well have fought against the Legion during the Siege of Paris, the first time For more on the Legion and Germans serving in it, see Eckard Michels, Deutsche in der Fremdenlegion Similar deployments in World War I and World War II brought the Legion back to France to fight against the German army once again, and, as before, when the Legion returned to Algeria and elsewhere after those wars it did so with increased German membership.
After its creation in , the Legion provided a destination for soldiers from disbanded foreign regiments. These soldiers—and later Legionnaires, as well—could even earn French citizenship upon completion of a full tour of duty. Nor was French citizenship the only avenue by which Legionnaires could start a new life: From early on the Legion attracted less desirable elements of French and European society, including criminals, failed revolutionaries, and others eager for a fresh start.
Romantic images of the Foreign Legion to this day feature a group of misfit outcasts fighting bravely in exotic locales against barbarous indigenous peoples. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, popular wisdom suggested that the Legion played host to the dregs of society as well as those otherwise respectable elements in search of adventure.
Soldiers, especially young soldiers or career soldiers with few other skills, found in the French Foreign Legion an opportunity to continue to ply their trade. This prospect of employment proved a powerful draw, Many Germans were well aware of this history. With hundreds of young German men applying every month, the Legion found itself with a steady flow of soldiers to fight French wars in Indochina and Algeria. Given the large numbers of Germans, however, what might otherwise have been a French effort to maintain control of its empire became a European one. One quoted an official figure of More troubling to many West Germans than the relatively large role Germans were playing in maintaining colonialism, however, were the absolute figures: Of course, this did not prevent the West German press from guessing.
During the war in Vietnam, estimates in the press ranged from 40, German members of the Legion in to 50, Germans killed in Vietnam alone by They also suggest that mounting West German concern about these figures had inspired hysterical overestimation on the part of the press, the state, and even ordinary citizens.
As the war in Vietnam and then in Algeria progressed, the consistently high numbers of Germans recruited into the legion eclipsed the total number of Germans serving in terms of importance within West German public discourse. In a story appeared in Die Welt indicating that the collection camp in Offenburg produced an entire company of men each week— to Germans a month. West German citizens, the press, and even some politicians criticized the French for abusing their position as an occupying power in order to fill the ranks of the Foreign Legion.
Even more outrageous to West Germans was the recruitment of minors into the Legion. Outrage spread as reports of these incidents became increasingly common. The West German state responded to complaints about recruiting tactics and the age of potential Legionnaires as best it could, but given the circumstances after World War II by and large its hands were tied. Even after the occupation ended the state enjoyed little success in dealing with these issues and failed to placate West Germans incensed at the large numbers of young men and even boys dying halfway around the world.
For many who joined in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the choice was one born of practicality. After France exploited its position by heavily recruiting in prisoner-of-war camps. For those Germans who joined, the Legion provided an early escape from these camps and a rare guarantee of steady employment in the form of a five-year enlistment. Then they switched over to the hundreds of thousands of young prisoners in the prisoner of war camps in the French motherland. The Legion established collection camps, recruiting stations, and other facilities in cities like Kehl, Landau, and Offenburg throughout its zone of occupation, and many Germans from all over the country willingly made their way to these locations.
Given the steady drop of the franc between and it is difficult to pinpoint how much these recruits earned, but one recruit recalled earning 15, francs each month during his training and 20, francs during his deployment to Indochina. West Germans recognized the socio-economic forces at work, but anger grew nonetheless; how could the German economy ever hope to recover if young able- bodied men went off to fight in the Foreign Legion instead of remaining in Germany? The feeling that France was taking unfair advantage of the postwar situation permeated nearly all discussions of the Foreign Legion.
Of course, the press also sensationalized these stories in an effort to attract and keep readership, playing up rumors and gossip suggesting that among the POWs joining the Legion were Nazis, SS men, and war criminals. Propaganda, they suggested, could hardly enhance the already romantic image of the Legion, and the opportunity for steady work the Legion provided spoke for itself. Contrary to French claims, recruiters made promises to young German men that bore little resemblance to the realities of life as a Legionnaire. Bedenkenlose Werbemethoden treiben Tausende Verzweifelter in die Fremdenlegion.
As the group set up camp they received word of a local restaurant where they could eat and drink their fill for next to nothing. Upon further investigation, however, they discovered that the restaurant—located at the end of a narrow ally and patronized by Frenchmen in uniforms—had a reputation. Drugged beer as well as rigged card games and other tricks brought the proprietor more than enough revenue per head to make up for the cheap food and drink he advertised to travelers.
Fortunately they were able to escape, returning to Germany from Marseille via freight train. Hoffman and his compatriots were then transported to the German city of Kehl, just across the Rhine from Strasbourg. From Kehl the recruits were to be taken to Marseille, but the night before Hoffman escaped and fled to the American occupation zone.
One reporter experienced Foreign Legion violence firsthand: The second, Paul Berendes, vanished while still only seventeen years old, but letters received by his parents suggested the young man worked as a laborer for the Legion until his eighteenth birthday, at which point he became a soldier. A survey of 40 Germans who escaped the Legion in , for example, found that none had been forced into service. In addition to the mere presence of the French as an occupying force, which created opportunities in and of itself thanks to the proximity it created to potential recruits, French sovereignty in its zone of occupation poked holes in West German laws that might otherwise prevent citizens from joining the Legion.
A particularly upsetting abuse of authority in the minds of many was the use of French military transports to bypass border checkpoints and bring German recruits to France. When asked to allow the Germans to present their papers, the driver refused and sought the assistance of the nearby French gendarmerie. Despite West German efforts, the French officers raised the barrier and allowed the transport through. A number of West Germans turned with increasing frustration to the West German state.
Some of these were the products of limitations put on the West German state as a result of World War II and the occupation, but others were the result of political calculations on the part of the Adenauer government. West German law technically contained provisions outlawing the recruitment of Germans for service in foreign armed forces.
Like much of West German law, the Strafgesetzbuch StGB , or criminal code, actually dated back to the criminal code of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Imperial Germany, which in turn built upon the laws of the North German Confederation. There exists at this time no legal basis for interfering with recruitment.
There is nothing contained in the Basic Law against recruitment for foreign military service. Allied Control Council Law Nr. You will not receive any protection from us. They usually receive no answer to their letters. Nach deutschem Recht verboten - Besuch im Sammellager Offenburg. The SPD especially as well as other, smaller parties repeatedly asked the government whether it was aware of the problem and how it intended to respond.
Failures on the part of West German officials to affect any change when it came to German service in the French Foreign Legion came not for wont of trying. Politicians and bureaucrats in West Germany made efforts to secure the return of German Legionnaires, limit recruiting, and warn young men about the dangers posed by the Legion.
Between January and December , over one thousand additional applications arrived, fifty of which resulted in the release of the Legionnaires in question. Such limitations made progress difficult on many fronts; only in its efforts to inform and warn German youths did the state enjoy anything more than a small degree of success. In reality, however, the government lacked not only the ability to get tough on recruitment but also, to some extent, the will: Key differences between French and West German law complicated the issue; like West German law, French law set the age of majority at twenty-one years.
However, the regulations governing the Foreign Legion permitted the recruitment of members from the age of eighteen without restriction. In West Germany, by contrast, Germans under twenty-one years old could only sign the sort of contact committing them to service in the Legion with the assent of their parents.
Due to its status as an occupying power, however, French law trumped West German law, and throughout the s and s West German responses to inquiries made by parents remained overwhelmingly consistent: Even then chances were slim. Still the letters came, from the parents of Heinrich Balzer, 18 years old, and of Klaus Klapetek, Secretaries read and passed these letters along to members of parliament, the president, and the chancellor.
Some parents, desperate to make an impression, pleaded for help on account of special circumstances. Concern about the age of German recruits for the Foreign Legion did not appear fully formed in the German psyche. In September, a seventeen year old boy in Cologne seeking work narrowly avoided recruitment by two foreigners promising work in Koblenz.
Essener entrann der Fremdenlegion aus einer Kaserne in Koblenz. In addition to criticizing French recruitment tactics, West German parents and politicians attacked the very notion of Germans fighting for France in the colonies. Some critics argued that enough Germans had already died in World War II; others simply objected to the idea of Germans fighting under a French flag, often against other Germans. Few raised the issue of colonialism, except to contend that the French should defend their own empire rather than having Germans do it for them. Only the far left called into question French claims that Vietnam represented not a conflict between French colonial-imperialism and a national liberation movement but one—like the war in Korea—fought to protect the western world from communism.
Even when West German commentators questioned the degree of sovereignty the nascent Federal Republic truly enjoyed the vast majority did not seriously pause to consider whether or not West Germany had become a French colony, or a colony for the Western Allies for that matter. French exploitation of a combination of legal limitations imposed by the Allied Control Council and illegal activity along the French border to fill the ranks of the Foreign Legion provided plenty of fodder for discussions about West German sovereignty.
The smuggling of German recruits across the border near Schweigen, for example, occurred only weeks before parliamentary debates about the ratification of the General Treaty intended to restore to the Federal Republic nearly all the rights of a sovereign state. The incident ensured that this debate about sovereignty took place not only amongst West German politicians, however, but in the public.
Tens of thousands of Germans are dying there for the glory of France without France once mentioning this German contribution. Like their counterparts in West Germany, they expressed outrage at the tactics recruiters used and the age of those they recruited. They watched with alarm as unemployment and other societal shortcomings drove Germans to make a living by putting their lives on the line—perhaps not for the first time—and doing it for a foreign power, no less. What set the East German responses apart, however, was the addition of a strong anti-colonialist bent.
At the prompting of SED leadership the East German press and state officials criticized France for using Germans to fight a colonial war, attacked the West German government for its complicity and even cooperation to this end, and appealed to those Germans who ended up in the Foreign Legion to abandon their posts or even defect and join the fight against French and West German colonialism and neo-colonialism. Even as France cast large numbers of Germans into the role of colonizer, East German propaganda attempted to use this fact to discredit colonialism and imperialism, unmask rampant militarism in the West German government, and spread the anti-colonialist cause.
East German statements condemning the tactics of recruiters or lamenting the extent to which such tactics succeeded represented concerns shared with West German citizens, politicians, and members of the press, but the language and context in which East German propaganda expressed these sentiments returned time and time again to French imperialism and French colonialism. Defending young Germans from the French Foreign Legion was good politics. Domestically, it touched a nerve that ran through East and West German society; given the devastation and loss of life that occurred during World War II, children and young adults had become even more important to societal reproduction than otherwise might have been the case.
More broadly speaking, keeping young Germans out of the Legion meant not only hindering French efforts to maintain a crumbling colonial empire but also the promotion of an alternative relationship between peoples that no longer depended on exploitation and inequality. Our youth are much to precious to us that we could sacrifice them for dirty colonial wars or deliver them to German militarism to serve as canon fodder. Our youth should not die for profit interests, but live for Germany! Our youth should not be the enemy of another people, but rather should live strive in beautiful friendship with the youth of all nations towards lasting peace.
To these ends, East German propaganda presented the French Foreign Legion as agents of colonialism and imperialism that oppressed and exploited not only the peoples of Vietnam and Algeria, but of Germany as well: Indeed, many Germans likely remembered only too well the stationing of African soldiers in occupied Germany after World War I, a decision that triggered harsh, racist backlash. The occupation allowed French recruiters unique advantages in recruitment, but as the French government never tired of reminding West and East Germans, the decision to join the Legion was a voluntary one—at least most of the time; the same cannot be said of French colonial troops.
Furthermore, complaints about recruitment tactics after World War II were not unique to occupied Germany; similar stories appeared in Switzerland, Denmark, and other countries which clearly were not in danger of becoming French colonies. Moreover, German troops did not fight in the regular French army, which allowed only French citizens and subjects; instead, they fought in the Foreign Legion, not as colonial subjects, but as colonizers. As though recognizing this discrepancy, by the mid s East German propaganda largely gave up on the idea of West Germany as a colony in favor of a view that portrayed the West German state as an ally of Western colonialism and imperialism—indeed, as a neo-colonialist power unto itself.
Critical Essays Westport, Conn.: University of Michigan, Now Herr Adenauer wants to do the same on a larger scale. West Germany would rearm, but its military would come under the authority of a group of Western European states including France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. While it was intended as an alternative to West German membership in NATO and aimed at defense against a potential conflict with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, East German propaganda painted the European Defense Community as another example of Adenauer and the West German state selling out, sacrificing the interests of the German people for their own imperialistic and militaristic ends.
In materials prepared in for upcoming West German elections, one East German radio broadcast included an appeal from an Algerian citizen to oust Adenauer: It is the Adenauer government that makes it possible for our oppressors to continue to deploy the Foreign Legion in battle against the Algerian people. It is the Adenauer government that makes millions of Marks available to the French government in order to rescue it from the financial, social, and political abyss to which the criminal war in Algeria and the brave resistance of the Algerian people have led it.
And therefore the French colonists can only continue their war of exploitation against our people with the help of their allies, the government of West Germany foremost among them. And only thus can the French paratroopers still commit their atrocities against the civilian population of Algeria, because the German soldiers in the Foreign Legion help them. Adenauer and the West German government, then, were as guilty as any French imperialist.