Mandate for Change: Policies and Leadership for 2009 and Beyond

In , Uribe presented himself as a political outsider who would address problems that the two long-standing political parties in Colombia, the Liberal Party and Conservative Party, could not seem to solve, namely, to root out and end armed conflict with the FARC Wills-Otero , Indeed, the budget for the military and police force increased from 2 percent of GDP in to 6.

A milder form of neoliberalism also emerged under Uribe. Although Uribe encouraged foreign direct investment and private ownership and negotiated free trade agreements, part and parcel of the neoliberal model, he recognized that not all Colombians favored market policies. Uribe also instituted policies, such as Families in Action, providing state relief to the most vulnerable families.

The assistance programs increased the total number of beneficiaries from 83, in to 1,, in Wills-Otero , Thus, Uribe enhanced security, promoted more equitable income distribution, and implemented more targeted spending programs for the poor, all apparently as measures for helping to achieve his electoral goals. A similar situation occurred in El Salvador, where rightist leaders promoted security issues and implemented social policies to galvanize support from the masses.

Although over the decades, ARENA governments had implemented market-oriented policies, a backlash formed against neoliberalism, particularly in the early s. Oportunidades offered conditional cash transfer and microcredits to the poorest Salvadorans. As of , Oportunidades served seventy-seven municipalities, with the aim of lowering extreme poverty Koivumaeki , , ARENA cast its electoral fortunes not on adhering to the most orthodox form of neoliberalism but rather with highlighting its security competence and offering government programs for the poor.

A caveat is needed for the clarity of responsibility and political mandate theory developed here. The implication of the argument is not that rightist governments without mandates draw attention to neoliberal policies at the expense of security and social issues. Rightist governments of all stripes will support policies that give themselves the best chance of winning elections. The point here is that rightist governments holding mandates are more likely to downplay orthodox market reforms and highlight popular issues consistent with core conservative themes because voters can clearly assign responsibility under such institutional arrangements.

Although many works have investigated the variation in economic policies under leftist governments, policy differences among rightist governments in Latin America have received minimal attention. The different economic policies of rightist governments, which arguably should prefer the same policies based on their presumed ideological preferences, present a puzzle in the political economy literature.

Building on the political mandate and clarity of responsibility argument, this research helps to understand why rightist executives holding political mandates appear to go against their presumed preferences for the neoliberal model. We argued that because of the growing opposition to most orthodox market reforms, rightists holding mandates often downplay neoliberalism, particularly with regard to micro-level economic policies, and instead rely on public stances to maintain order and security, uphold conservative positions on social issues, and increase government programs for the poor to win elections and stay in office.

There are limitations to this study.

First, the years available for the dependent variable hamper efforts to extend the analysis prior to Similarly, the relatively small sample of countries and years available for rightist governments in Latin America also limit empirical investigation. Despite the limitations, the work holds important implications on policy. First, the fact that relatively few empirical works investigate policies under rightist governments in Latin America provides an opportunity to make an initial step into understanding economic policies beyond leftist governments.

Second, the research also builds on earlier studies in American and Latin American politics primarily outside of international political economy, showing the benefits of borrowing theories developed in other research areas to broaden our ideas about policies. Third, the research explains why some rightist governments support policies that seem to challenge their expected ideological preferences, helping to solve a puzzle in the literature.

The work presented here offers opportunities for further assessment of the mandate and clarity of responsibility theory. Previous work has investigated the effect of mandates on leftist governments in Latin America Biglaiser Future studies could investigate the effects of mandate and clarity of responsibility on left and right governments throughout the developing world. Is Latin America an exception? Are the factors that affect policies under left and right governments in Latin America relevant elsewhere?

Additionally, it might be useful to test the theories not only in presidential systems but also in parliamentary governments. Do parliamentary governments with dominance by one party affect economic policies relative to narrowly won elections or where the winning parties need to form a coalition? Future empirical studies also could explore the trade-off between policies that support security and social conservative values, and maintaining hands-off government policies such as neoliberalism. The takeaway from the results is that clarity of responsibility produced by political mandates potentially gives voters more voice in economic policies.

Presidential Democracies Included in the Models. Similarly, Johnson and Crisp , find that right-of-center legislatures are correlated with more market-oriented policies.

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In the context of the OECD, Boix similarly argues social democrats use the public sector to support economic growth and promote equality while conservatives employ the private provision of investment to address development. Despite the limitations, the index provides the most comprehensive measure for market openness. We do not classify coalition governments as unified because the complexities of coalition governments make responsibility less clear to the electorate Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci By excluding coalition governments from our measures of united governments, we provide the most conservative test of our theory.

Effects of unified government and presidential vote share on expected economic freedom scores full model. We thank Brandon Stewart for his research assistance. Portions of this research were supported by a Fulbright grant. His research examines the political repercussions of economic inequality and has appeared in journals including Political Research Quarterly, Politics and Policy , and Congress and the Presidency. Baker, Andy, and Kenneth F. Holmes, and Edwin J. The Database of Political Institutions.

Policy Outcomes under the Left in Latin America. Biglaiser, Glen, and Karl DeRouen. Foreign Direct Investment in the Developing World. Political Parties, Growth, and Equality: Evidence from Latin America. How Elections Shape the National Agenda. University of Chicago Press. Financial Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: Beyond Parties and Elections.

Johns Hopkins University Press. Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy in Latin America. Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective. Peterson, and James A. Sectoral Patterns from to Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America. Separate but Equal Branches: Congress and the Presidency. Globalization and Austerity Politics in Latin America. Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth M. A Framework for Analysis.

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2. Theories on Economic Policies under Rightist Governments in Latin America.
3. Mandate for change : policies and leadership for and beyond (Book, ) [www.newyorkethnicfood.com].

Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton. The Resilience of the Latin American Right. Magaloni, Beatriz, and Vidal Romero. Latin America in the s. Mobile Capital and Latin American Development. Pennsylvania State University Press. Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Comparing the Andean Countries. Morresi, Sergio, and Gabriel Vommaro. Global Capital and National Governments. Nadeau, Richard, Richard G.

Niemi, and Antoine Yoshinaka. From Economic Crisis to Reform: Bingham, Jr, and Guy D. Taking Account of the Political Context. Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility. The Roots of Electoral Change. A Fundamental Dynamic of Democratic Politics? Globalization and Its Discontents. Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America. Insights from the Rentier State Theory.

Chester W Hartman Publisher: English View all editions and formats Summary: These chapters set forth a fundamental, badly needed "mandate for change" to reinvigorate government and rethink the role of markets and civil society. Each one includes an essay supporting the proposed policies and a resource list of relevant organizations, websites, and readings. It is perfect for public policy courses at the undergraduate and graduate level. Allow this favorite library to be seen by others Keep this favorite library private. Find a copy in the library Finding libraries that hold this item Chester W Hartman Find more information about: The incoming national administration has the opportunity to make a sharp break, in both domestic and international issues, with the failed, destructive policies of the past eight years.

Publisher Synopsis Mandate for Change presents the change we really do need from a who? User-contributed reviews Add a review and share your thoughts with other readers. Add a review and share your thoughts with other readers. Similar Items Related Subjects: United States -- Foreign relations -- 21st century. Linked Data More info about Linked Data.

Home About Help Search. Privacy Policy Terms and Conditions. Remember me on this computer. Cancel Forgot your password? We will fight protectionism. We are committed to bringing the Doha Round to a successful conclusion in We warmly welcome the report by the Chair of the London Summit commissioned at our last meeting and published today.

Finally, we agreed to meet in Canada in June and in Korea in November We expect to meet annually thereafter and will meet in France in We assessed the progress we have made together in addressing the global crisis and agreed to maintain our steps to support economic activity until recovery is assured. We further committed to additional steps to ensure strong, sustainable, and balanced growth, to build a stronger international financial system, to reduce development imbalances, and to modernize our architecture for international economic cooperation.

The growth of the global economy and the success of our coordinated effort to respond to the recent crisis have increased the case for more sustained and systematic international cooperation. In the short-run, we must continue to implement our stimulus programs to support economic activity until recovery clearly has taken hold. We also need to develop a transparent and credible process for withdrawing our extraordinary fiscal, monetary and financial sector support, to be implemented when recovery becomes fully secured.

We task our Finance Ministers, working with input from the IMF and FSB, at their November meeting to continue developing cooperative and coordinated exit strategies recognizing that the scale, timing, and sequencing of this process will vary across countries or regions and across the type of policy measures. Credible exit strategies should be designed and communicated clearly to anchor expectations and reinforce confidence.

Subsequently, our objective is to return the world to high, sustainable, and balanced growth, while maintaining our commitment to fiscal responsibility and sustainability, with reforms to increase our growth potential and capacity to generate jobs and policies designed to avoid both the re-creation of asset bubbles and the re-emergence of unsustainable global financial flows. We commit to put in place the necessary policy measures to achieve these outcomes. We will need to work together as we manage the transition to a more balanced pattern of global growth.

The crisis and our initial policy responses have already produced significant shifts in the pattern and level of growth across countries.

Many countries have already taken important steps to expand domestic demand, bolstering global activity and reducing imbalances. In some countries, the rise in private saving now underway will, in time, need to be augmented by a rise in public saving. Ensuring a strong recovery will necessitate adjustments across different parts of the global economy, while requiring macroeconomic policies that promote adequate and balanced global demand as well as decisive progress on structural reforms that foster private domestic demand, narrow the global development gap, and strengthen long-run growth potential.

The IMF estimates that only with such adjustments and realignments, will global growth reach a strong, sustainable, and balanced pattern. While governments have started moving in the right direction, a shared understanding and deepened dialogue will help build a more stable, lasting, and sustainable pattern of growth. Raising living standards in the emerging markets and developing countries is also a critical element in achieving sustainable growth in the global economy.

To put in place this framework, we commit to develop a process whereby we set out our objectives, put forward policies to achieve these objectives, and together assess our progress. We will ask the IMF to help us with its analysis of how our respective national or regional policy frameworks fit together. We will ask the World Bank to advise us on progress in promoting development and poverty reduction as part of the rebalancing of global growth.

We will work together to ensure that our fiscal, monetary, trade, and structural policies are collectively consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories of growth. We will undertake macro prudential and regulatory policies to help prevent credit and asset price cycles from becoming forces of destabilization. As we commit to implement a new, sustainable growth model, we should encourage work on measurement methods so as to better take into account the social and environmental dimensions of economic development.

We call on our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to launch the new Framework by November by initiating a cooperative process of mutual assessment of our policy frameworks and the implications of those frameworks for the pattern and sustainability of global growth. We believe that regular consultations, strengthened cooperation on macroeconomic policies, the exchange of experiences on structural policies, and ongoing assessment will promote the adoption of sound policies and secure a healthy global economy. Our compact is that:.

These policies will help us to meet our responsibility to the community of nations to build a more resilient international financial system and to reduce development imbalances. Major failures of regulation and supervision, plus reckless and irresponsible risk taking by banks and other financial institutions, created dangerous financial fragilities that contributed significantly to the current crisis.

A return to the excessive risk taking prevalent in some countries before the crisis is not an option. Since the onset of the global crisis, we have developed and begun implementing sweeping reforms to tackle the root causes of the crisis and transform the system for global financial regulation.

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Substantial progress has been made in strengthening prudential oversight, improving risk management, strengthening transparency, promoting market integrity, establishing supervisory colleges, and reinforcing international cooperation. We have enhanced and expanded the scope of regulation and oversight, with tougher regulation of over-the-counter OTC derivatives, securitization markets, credit rating agencies, and hedge funds. We endorse the institutional strengthening of the FSB through its Charter, following its establishment in London, and welcome its reports to Leaders and Ministers.

Yet our work is not done. Far more needs to be done to protect consumers, depositors, and investors against abusive market practices, promote high quality standards, and help ensure the world does not face a crisis of the scope we have seen. We are committed to take action at the national and international level to raise standards together so that our national authorities implement global standards consistently in a way that ensures a level playing field and avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism, and regulatory arbitrage.

Our efforts to deal with impaired assets and to encourage the raising of additional capital must continue, where needed.

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We commit to conduct robust, transparent stress tests as needed. We call on banks to retain a greater proportion of current profits to build capital, where needed, to support lending. Securitization sponsors or originators should retain a part of the risk of the underlying assets, thus encouraging them to act prudently. It is important to ensure an adequate balance between macroprudential and microprudential regulation to control risks, and to develop the tools necessary to monitor and assess the buildup of macroprudential risks in the financial system.

In addition, we have agreed to improve the regulation, functioning, and transparency of financial and commodity markets to address excessive commodity price volatility. As we encourage the resumption of lending to households and businesses, we must take care not to spur a return of the practices that led to the crisis. The steps we are taking here, when fully implemented, will result in a fundamentally stronger financial system than existed prior to the crisis.

G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit

If we all act together, financial institutions will have stricter rules for risk-taking, governance that aligns compensation with long-term performance, and greater transparency in their operations. All firms whose failure could pose a risk to financial stability must be subject to consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation with high standards.

Starr Forum: Racing to the Precipice: Global Climate, Political Climate

Our reform is multi-faceted but at its core must be stronger capital standards, complemented by clear incentives to mitigate excessive risk-taking practices. Capital allows banks to withstand those losses that inevitably will come. It, together with more powerful tools for governments to wind down firms that fail, helps us hold firms accountable for the risks that they take.

Building on their Declaration on Further Steps to Strengthen the International Financial System, we call on our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to reach agreement on an international framework of reform in the following critical areas: Building high quality capital and mitigating pro-cyclicality: We commit to developing by end internationally agreed rules to improve both the quantity and quality of bank capital and to discourage excessive leverage.

These rules will be phased in as financial conditions improve and economic recovery is assured, with the aim of implementation by end The national implementation of higher level and better quality capital requirements, counter-cyclical capital buffers, higher capital requirements for risky products and off-balance sheet activities, as elements of the Basel II Capital Framework, together with strengthened liquidity risk requirements and forward-looking provisioning, will reduce incentives for banks to take excessive risks and create a financial system better prepared to withstand adverse shocks.

We welcome the key measures recently agreed by the oversight body of the Basel Committee to strengthen the supervision and regulation of the banking sector. We support the introduction of a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the Basel II risk-based framework with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment based on appropriate review and calibration.

To ensure comparability, the details of the leverage ratio will be harmonized internationally, fully adjusting for differences in accounting. Reforming compensation practices to support financial stability: Excessive compensation in the financial sector has both reflected and encouraged excessive risk taking.

Reforming compensation policies and practices is an essential part of our effort to increase financial stability. Supervisors should have the ability to modify compensation structures in the case of firms that fail or require extraordinary public intervention. We call on firms to implement these sound compensation practices immediately. Improving over-the-counter derivatives markets: All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end at the latest.



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OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements. We ask the FSB and its relevant members to assess regularly implementation and whether it is sufficient to improve transparency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse. Addressing cross-border resolutions and systemically important financial institutions by end Systemically important financial firms should develop internationally-consistent firm-specific contingency and resolution plans.

Our authorities should establish crisis management groups for the major cross-border firms and a legal framework for crisis intervention as well as improve information sharing in times of stress. We should develop resolution tools and frameworks for the effective resolution of financial groups to help mitigate the disruption of financial institution failures and reduce moral hazard in the future. Our prudential standards for systemically important institutions should be commensurate with the costs of their failure.

The FSB should propose by the end of October possible measures including more intensive supervision and specific additional capital, liquidity, and other prudential requirements. We call on our international accounting bodies to redouble their efforts to achieve a single set of high quality, global accounting standards within the context of their independent standard setting process, and complete their convergence project by June Our commitment to fight non-cooperative jurisdictions NCJs has produced impressive results.

We are committed to maintain the momentum in dealing with tax havens, money laundering, proceeds of corruption, terrorist financing, and prudential standards. We welcome the expansion of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information, including the participation of developing countries, and welcome the agreement to deliver an effective program of peer review. We stand ready to use countermeasures against tax havens from March We call on the FSB to report progress to address NCJs with regards to international cooperation and information exchange in November and to initiate a peer review process by February We task the IMF to prepare a report for our next meeting with regard to the range of options countries have adopted or are considering as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution toward paying for any burdens associated with government interventions to repair the banking system.

Modernizing the international financial institutions and global development architecture is essential to our efforts to promote global financial stability, foster sustainable development, and lift the lives of the poorest.