Le Dibbouk et autres textes (French Edition)

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He currently produces and mixes projects for a variety of artists in NYC and in addition to his independent work, Harry has also been a mix assistant on major label projects for artists including Shawn Mendes , Khalid , James TW , and others. While Egyptians may have had some sympathy for the injustices that their Tunisian brothers and sisters were facing, it had little or nothing to do with their own locally grown sense of injustice.

Similarly, it was not the injustice component of Israeli collective action frames where there was borrowing from Arab spring. Israel has undergone a sharp increase in economic inequality over the last two decades, much like the experience of the United States. What began as a protest against the high cost of housing quickly spread to other issues — transport, childcare, food and fuel, low salaries paid to many professionals, tax reform and welfare payments. And the new Israelis want only one simple thing: We are not here just to survive, we are here in order to live.

This demand embodies the fundamental right. While the injustice component is home grown, the agency component of collective action frames is very much subject to influence by example. In Tunisia, it took less than a month of protests and civil unrest to oust President Ben Ali who resigned and fled the country, ending 23 years in power.

The rapidity with which this happened in what was essentially a campaign of non-violent protest and civil disobedience must have emboldened Egyptian protesters and enhanced their sense of collective political efficacy. The Egyptian uprising began on January 25th as a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience, popular demonstrations, marches, and strikes directed against the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. The campaign spread from Cairo to other cities in Egypt and it took only until February 11th for Mubarak to resign from office.

A sense of agency is greatly increased by the failure of social control measures on the part of authorities. In this case, the government imposed a curfew but the protesters defied it and the police and military did not enforce it. The rapid success of the collective action in Tunisia and Egypt undoubtedly increased the sense of agency by demonstrators in other Arab countries including Yemen, Syria, and Libya. One would expect citizens of other Arab countries to take heart from the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions but it is more surprising that Israelis would also take the example to heart.

Harriet Sherwood Manchester Guardian, Sept. The major challenge in the Arab world is across the divide between the more radical elements of the Islamist movement and efforts by those who are experiencing poor living conditions, regardless of the intensity or nature of their religious convictions. I lack any systematic data on how this difficult challenge was negotiated in Tunisia and Egypt. It appears to have been met successfully but the mechanism and dynamics remains, for me, an untold story.

My impression is that the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt exercised deliberate restraint and made a conscious effort not to have the uprising defined as an Islamist movement. I would guess that the more secular elements also made a conscious effort not to exclude Islamist elements but to work with them in a broad coalition. But these are impressions without any solid empirical foundation. In Israel, I have some incomplete but suggestive evidence. I could find no evidence that haredim participated in the tent-city movement in any significant way. However, the movement did succeed in overcoming several other social cleavages in appealing to concerns about economic and social injustices in Israeli society.

Leef warns the crowd that there is not one decisive moment but a process. Did swinish capitalism make a particular moment of victory? Can we put our finger on that one privatization too many? There was no such moment. There was a process. This process of ours is just beginning now. We have demands of the government. To a limited degree, the tent-city demonstrations succeeded in cutting across the cleavage between Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians.

No more coexistence based on hummus and fava beans. What is happening here is true coexistence, when Arabs and Jews march together shoulder to shoulder calling for social justice and peace. The major issue is over how much to emphasize the connection between the issues of social justice inside the green line and the large amount of money spent on expanding settlements in the occupied territories and providing security for them.

While there is widespread recognition that this money could, instead, be spent on building housing and other infra-structure inside Israel, movement leaders have generally preferred to keep the connection implicit rather than using it to call for an end to the occupation. To understand the spread of the Arab spring among different Arab countries and to the movement for social justice in Israel in the following summer, the concept of collective action frames is much more useful than the flawed concept of cognitive liberation.

Unlike the latter which conflates analytically distinct processes and ignores the crucial process of negotiating a collective identity, the concept of collective action frames distinguishes the components and problematizes the connection among them. The injustice component is crucial for integrating all three into a coherent collective action frame. In accounting for the spread of collective action from one country to another, the agency component is crucial; the other components depend more on local conditions.

Even with the agency component, while a sense of collective efficacy may be inspired by events elsewhere, it is heavily influenced by the social control response of authorities. If some of the agents of the regime are equivocal or refuse to carry out the repressive orders of the authorities, this can greatly reinforce the sense that collective action can make a significant difference and even overthrow the existing regime.

The ultimate outcomes that will flow from the collective actions of the Arab spring and Israeli summer remain uncertain. It is a lot easier to unite groups with different grievances against a particular regime in oppositional action than it is to maintain solidarity in exercising power. Once the common enemy is gone, the solidarity maintained during collective action may vanish as well. Nor does the sense of collective efficacy that one could topple the regime lead to efficacy in solving the injustices that originally energized collective action.

Gates, Henry Louis , Jr.

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Black facts Web Page. All prejudices are not equal. Martin Luther King Jr. Kuby, wrote in a letter to the editor that appeared in the Times on the day of the march. That the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People endorsed the April 25th march made the insult all the deeper for those who disparage the gay-rights movement as the politics of imposture—Liberace in Rosa Parks drag. In short, they have content as well as form. Underplaying the differences blinds us to the signature traits of other forms of social hatred.

To take a quick and fairly obvious example, it has been observed that while anti-black racism charges its object with inferiority, anti-Semitism charges its object with iniquity. The racist believes that blacks are incapable of running anything by themselves. The anti-Semite believes in one popular bit of folklore that thirteen rabbis rule the world. How do gays fit into this scheme?

Take that hard-ridden analogy between blacks and gays. Most people think of racial identity as a matter of racial status, but they respond to it as behavior. Most people think of sexual identity as a matter of sexual behavior, but they respond to it as status. By contrast, the repugnance that many people feel toward gays concerns, in the first instance, the status ascribed to them. Disapproval of a sexual practice is transmuted into the demonization of a sexual species. In other respects, too, anti-gay propaganda sounds less like anti-black rhetoric than like classical anti-Jewish rhetoric: More broadly, attitudes toward homosexuals are bound up with sexism and the attitudes toward gender that feminism, with impressive, though only partial, success, asks us to re-examine.

Just as blacks have historically been represented as sexually uncontrollable beasts, ready to pounce on an unwilling victim with little provocation, a similar vision of the predatory homosexual has been insinuated, often quite subtly, into the defense of the ban on gays in the military. Granted, no one can legislate affection or approval. But the simple fact that people enjoy legal protection from religious discrimination neither confers nor requires victimization. Why is the case of sexual orientation any different?

Second, trying to establish a pecking order of oppression is generally a waste of time: People figured out that you could speak of the subordination of women without claiming, absurdly, that every woman Margaret Thatcher, say was subordinate to every man. Much of black suffering stems from historical racism; most gay suffering stems from contemporary hatred. Few people would be surprised to learn that secretiveness on this matter varies inversely with education and income level.

According to one monitoring group, one in four gay men has been physically assaulted as a result of his perceived sexual orientation; about fifty percent have been threatened with violence. For lesbians, the incidence is lower but still disturbing. A moral consensus now exists in this country that discriminating against blacks as teachers, priests, or tenants is simply wrong. For much of the country, however, the moral legitimacy of homosexuals,as homosexuals, remains much in question.

Yiddish - a Jewish National Language at "Jews and Slavs",vol | wolf moskovich - www.newyorkethnicfood.com

What makes the closet so crowded is that gays are, as a rule, still socialized—usually by their nearest and dearest—into shame. Similar access to mass media is not available to those who voice equivalent attitudes toward blacks. In short, measured by their position in society, gays on the average seem privileged relative to blacks; measured by the acceptance of hostile attitudes toward them, gays are worse off than blacks.

The question presupposes a measuring rod that does not and cannot exist. To complicate matters further, disapproval of homosexuality has been a characteristic of much of the black-nationalist ideology that has reappeared in the aftermath of the civil-rights era. In the end, the plaintive rhetoric of the Reverend Mr. Kuby and those civil-rights veterans who share his sense of unease is notable for a small but significant omission: And in this immediate context one particular black gay man comes to mind.

By a poignant historical irony, it was in no small part because of his homosexuality—and the fear that it would be used to discredit the mobilization —that Rustin was prevented from being named director of the march; the title went to A. Philip Randolph, and he accepted it only on the condition that he could then deputize Rustin to do the arduous work of co-ordinating the mass protest.

Rustin accepted the terms readily. In , it was necessary to choose which of two unreasoning prejudices to resist, and Rustin chose without bitterness or recrimination. Multiculturalism, the real thing? In Twenty Years of Multiculturalism: Successes and Failures, edited by S. By the way, Prof. Gautier was my Ph. Director and someone who never once questioned my methods and always supported me with great friendship!

Revue des deux Mondes Juin. Gardons-nous, cependant, de tout confondre! Le dynamisme de la francophonie a-t-il le pouvoir de nuancer ce constat? The use of words: How so-called foul words can have many meanings. Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change. On the Virtues of Loose Canon. Bourdieu, Propos sur le Champ Politique, Lyon: PU de Lyon, , p. La mort du Biafra P. I can still remember reading this as a very young student researching on a topic for my masters…good old days;- One of my sources of inspiration still guiding me 30 years later!

Individual Rights against Group Rights. We are all Multiculturalists Now. Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Beyond the Melting Pot: This book is probably the reason why I got hooked to the issue of multiculturalism…and still am! On sent celle-ci sans voir de cadavres. Quel avenir pour cette langue? The speech and writing of Jews. For over threee thousand years of recorded history, Jewish communities have had distinctive patterns of language use: Despite losses from assimilation, exogamy and conversion, the cohesiveness of Jewish communities has generally remained high.

The newly adopted langauge has been Jaized. Jewish communities have characteristically used more than one language, each for different communicative funtion. Thre is Hebrew, a lashon hakodesh, a vernacular plus the language of the country. Hebrew is a semitic language. The mothertongue of the Jewish people in ancient times and has been the vehicle of most sacred Jewish writings Dudezmo si superficially most like spanish. It was once the chief languae of Sefardic jews but is now habitually used by only a handful.

Yiddish is superficially most like German, but a very different kind in fact. It was the native tongue of all ashekenazic jews cenbtral and eastern europe. Aside from these separate Jewish languages, the varieties of English used by Jews aare in many instances sufficiently distinctive to be collectively called Jewish English. The story of Jewish speech and wiritng in the US is a history of waves of immigration from differnt parts of the Jewish world. The most recent period has been the eastern ashkenazi one, form the s till now. The breakdown into 3 period is a simplification, for at no time has Jewish immigration been homogenious.

Religiously, culturally, and linguistically, we find a multitude of Jewish groups in the US. They range, for example, for the least to the most americanized. Yiddish in the USA had a birghter history than other immigrant jewish languages, thanks tothe large numbers of native speakers who immigated and to the vibrancy of Yiddish culture in the old country. Efforts to stem the erosion of Yiddish language and cultrue in the US were weak before the Holocaust. The period of greates vigor for Yiddish language and culture in the US extended form the s to the s, peaking in the s or s.

The best cover term for varieties of English used by Jews is Jewish Englis. Speakers and wirters of Jewish English can usually cod-switch between this and a non-Jewish variety, such as In what sul does your zeydi daven on Shabes? Obama, in whose Cabinet Kerry serves faithfully, but with some exasperation, is himself given to vaulting oratory, but not usually of the martial sort associated with Churchill.

The president believes that Churchillian rhetoric and, more to the point, Churchillian habits of thought, helped bring his predecessor, George W. Bush, to ruinous war in Iraq. Obama entered the White House bent on getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan; he was not seeking new dragons to slay. And he was particularly mindful of promising victory in conflicts he believed to be unwinnable. Kerry, like Obama himself, was horrified by the sins committed by the Syrian regime in its attempt to put down a two-year-old rebellion.

The strong sentiment inside the Obama administration was that Assad had earned dire punishment. In Situation Room meetings that followed the attack on Ghouta, only the White House chief of staff, Denis McDonough, cautioned explicitly about the perils of intervention. John Kerry argued vociferously for action. Kerry counted President Obama among those leaders. A year earlier, when the administration suspected that the Assad regime was contemplating the use of chemical weapons, Obama had declared: That would change my calculus.

That would change my equation. Despite this threat, Obama seemed to many critics to be coldly detached from the suffering of innocent Syrians. He resisted demands to act in part because he assumed, based on the analysis of U. Power, who during this period served on the National Security Council staff, is the author of a celebrated book excoriating a succession of U.

Senate, though the two were not an obvious ideological match.

She lobbied him to endorse this doctrine in the speech he delivered when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in , but he declined. Obama generally does not believe a president should place American soldiers at great risk in order to prevent humanitarian disasters, unless those disasters pose a direct security threat to the United States. Power sometimes argued with Obama in front of other National Security Council officials, to the point where he could no longer conceal his frustration. Obama, unlike liberal interventionists, is an admirer of the foreign-policy realism of President George H.

As Obama was writing his campaign manifesto, The Audacity of Hope, in , Susan Rice, then an informal adviser, felt it necessary to remind him to include at least one line of praise for the foreign policy of President Bill Clinton, to partially balance the praise he showered on Bush and Scowcroft. Obama flipped this plea on its head. He would not end up like the second President Bush—a president who became tragically overextended in the Middle East, whose decisions filled the wards of Walter Reed with grievously wounded soldiers, who was helpless to stop the obliteration of his reputation, even when he recalibrated his policies in his second term.

Who is pro—stupid shit? Syria, for Obama, represented a slope potentially as slippery as Iraq. In his first term, he came to believe that only a handful of threats in the Middle East conceivably warranted direct U. The danger to the United States posed by the Assad regime did not rise to the level of these challenges. Even his own advisers were surprised. I was told that Vice President Joe Biden repeatedly warned Obama against drawing a red line on chemical weapons, fearing that it would one day have to be enforced. They are watching to see if Syria can get away with it, because then maybe they too can put the world at greater risk.

And that is a danger to our national security. It appeared as though Obama had drawn the conclusion that damage to American credibility in one region of the world would bleed into others, and that U. Assad, it seemed, had succeeded in pushing the president to a place he never thought he would have to go. The preservation of credibility, he says, led to Vietnam. The Saudi ambassador in Washington at the time, Adel al-Jubeir, told friends, and his superiors in Riyadh, that the president was finally ready to strike.

Obama had already ordered the Pentagon to develop target lists. Five Arleigh Burke—class destroyers were in the Mediterranean, ready to fire cruise missiles at regime targets. All week, White House officials had publicly built the case that Assad had committed a crime against humanity. But the president had grown queasy. In the days after the gassing of Ghouta, Obama would later tell me, he found himself recoiling from the idea of an attack unsanctioned by international law or by Congress.

The American people seemed unenthusiastic about a Syria intervention; so too did one of the few foreign leaders Obama respects, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor. She told him that her country would not participate in a Syria campaign. And in a stunning development, on Thursday, August 29, the British Parliament denied David Cameron its blessing for an attack. Clapper, the chief of an intelligence community traumatized by its failures in the run-up to the Iraq War, was not going to overpromise, in the manner of the onetime CIA director George Tenet, who famously guaranteed George W.

But his doubts were growing.

Late on Friday afternoon, Obama determined that he was simply not prepared to authorize a strike. Obama did not choose McDonough randomly: He is the Obama aide most averse to U. He and McDonough stayed outside for an hour. He also pointed out an underlying flaw in the proposed strike: A strike would target military units that had delivered these weapons, but not the weapons themselves.

Obama also shared with McDonough a long-standing resentment: He was tired of watching Washington unthinkingly drift toward war in Muslim countries. Now, on Syria, he was beginning to feel jammed again. When the two men came back to the Oval Office, the president told his national-security aides that he planned to stand down.

There would be no attack the next day; he wanted to refer the matter to Congress for a vote. Aides in the room were shocked. Others had difficulty fathoming how the president could reverse himself the day before a planned strike. Obama, however, was completely calm. Not long ago, I asked Obama to describe his thinking on that day.

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He listed the practical worries that had preoccupied him. A second major factor was the failure of Cameron to obtain the consent of his parliament. The fourth factor, he said, was of deeper philosophical importance. The prime minister of France, Manuel Valls, told me that his government was already worried about the consequences of earlier inaction in Syria when word came of the stand-down.

Working with the Americans, we had already seen the targets. It was a great surprise. If we had bombed as was planned, I think things would be different today. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, the two leading Republican hawks in the Senate, had met with Obama in the White House earlier in the week and had been promised an attack. They were angered by the about-face. Damage was done even inside the administration. Neither Chuck Hagel, then the secretary of defense, nor John Kerry was in the Oval Office when the president informed his team of his thinking.

Kerry would not learn about the change until later that evening. I figured the president had a reason to make a decision and, honestly, I understood his notion. The next few days were chaotic. The president asked Congress to authorize the use of force—the irrepressible Kerry served as chief lobbyist—and it quickly became apparent in the White House that Congress had little interest in a strike.

When I spoke with Biden recently about the red-line decision, he made special note of this fact. He had his doubts at that point, but he knew that if he was going to do anything, he better damn well have the public with him, or it would be a very short ride. Do we not go in and rescue? Amid the confusion, a deus ex machina appeared in the form of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. At the G20 summit in St. The arrangement won the president praise from, of all people, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, with whom he has had a consistently contentious relationship.

Obama understands that the decision he made to step back from air strikes, and to allow the violation of a red line he himself had drawn to go unpunished, will be interrogated mercilessly by historians. But today that decision is a source of deep satisfaction for him. And so for me to press the pause button at that moment, I knew, would cost me politically.

And the playbook prescribes responses to different events, and these responses tend to be militarized responses. Where America is directly threatened, the playbook works. But the playbook can also be a trap that can lead to bad decisions. He resented military leaders who believed they could fix any problem if the commander in chief would simply give them what they wanted, and he resented the foreign-policy think-tank complex.

A widely held sentiment inside the White House is that many of the most prominent foreign-policy think tanks in Washington are doing the bidding of their Arab and pro-Israel funders. History may record August 30, , as the day Obama prevented the U. I first spoke with obama about foreign policy when he was a U. At the time, I was familiar mainly with the text of a speech he had delivered four years earlier, at a Chicago antiwar rally.

It was an unusual speech for an antiwar rally in that it was not antiwar; Obama, who was then an Illinois state senator, argued only against one specific and, at the time, still theoretical, war. A ruthless man … But I also know that Saddam poses no imminent and direct threat to the United States or to his neighbors. This speech had made me curious about its author. I wanted to learn how an Illinois state senator, a part-time law professor who spent his days traveling between Chicago and Springfield, had come to a more prescient understanding of the coming quagmire than the most experienced foreign-policy thinkers of his party, including such figures as Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, and John Kerry, not to mention, of course, most Republicans and many foreign-policy analysts and writers, including me.

It involves every single country, and it is a comparatively slow-moving emergency, so there is always something seemingly more urgent on the agenda. Few presidents have faced such diverse tests on the international stage as Obama has, and the challenge for him, as for all presidents, has been to distinguish the merely urgent from the truly important, and to focus on the important. This article is informed by our recent series of conversations, which took place in the Oval Office; over lunch in his dining room; aboard Air Force One; and in Kuala Lumpur during his most recent visit to Asia, in November.

It is also informed by my previous interviews with him and by his speeches and prolific public ruminations, as well as by conversations with his top foreign-policy and national-security advisers, foreign leaders and their ambassadors in Washington, friends of the president and others who have spoken with him about his policies and decisions, and his adversaries and critics.

But he also has come to learn, he told me, that very little is accomplished in international affairs without U. Obama talked me through this apparent contradiction. One day, over lunch in the Oval Office dining room, I asked the president how he thought his foreign policy might be understood by historians. He started by describing for me a four-box grid representing the main schools of American foreign-policy thought.

One box he called isolationism, which he dismissed out of hand. I told him my impression was that the various traumas of the past seven years have, if anything, intensified his commitment to realist-driven restraint. Had nearly two full terms in the White House soured him on interventionism? If it is possible to do good at a bearable cost, to save lives, we will do it. Though he has so far ruled out the use of direct American power to depose Assad, he was not wrong, he argued, to call on Assad to go.

You did not invade. There are going to be times where our security interests conflict with our concerns about human rights. But he is the rare president who seems at times to resent indispensability, rather than embrace it. Part of his mission as president, Obama explained, is to spur other countries to take action for themselves, rather than wait for the U. The defense of the liberal international order against jihadist terror, Russian adventurism, and Chinese bullying depends in part, he believes, on the willingness of other nations to share the burden with the U.

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I asked Obama about retrenchment. But once he decides that a particular challenge represents a direct national-security threat, he has shown a willingness to act unilaterally. This is one of the larger ironies of the Obama presidency: He has relentlessly questioned the efficacy of force, but he has also become the most successful terrorist-hunter in the history of the presidency, one who will hand to his successor a set of tools an accomplished assassin would envy. One of them is that sometimes you have to take a life to save even more lives. We have a similar view of just-war theory. The president requires near-certainty of no collateral damage.

Those who speak with Obama about jihadist thought say that he possesses a no-illusions understanding of the forces that drive apocalyptic violence among radical Muslims, but he has been careful about articulating that publicly, out of concern that he will exacerbate anti-Muslim xenophobia. And yet he consistently, and with apparent sincerity, professes optimism that the world is bending toward justice.

He is, in a way, a Hobbesian optimist. The contradictions do not end there. Though he has a reputation for prudence, he has also been eager to question some of the long-standing assumptions undergirding traditional U. He overthrew half a century of bipartisan consensus in order to reestablish ties with Cuba. He questioned why the U. According to Leon Panetta, he has questioned why the U. He is clearly irritated that foreign-policy orthodoxy compels him to treat Saudi Arabia as an ally. The nuclear deal he struck with Iran proves, if nothing else, that Obama is not risk-averse.

But his desire for the nuclear agreement was born of pessimism as much as it was of optimism. The aim was very simply to make a dangerous country substantially less dangerous. No one had any expectation that Iran would be a more benign actor. I once mentioned to obama a scene from The Godfather: Part III, in which Michael Corleone complains angrily about his failure to escape the grasp of organized crime. In his first extended spree of fame, as a presidential candidate in , Obama often spoke with hope about the region. The next year, as president, he gave a speech in Cairo meant to reset U. What drew the most attention, though, was his promise to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was then thought to be the central animating concern of Arab Muslims.

His sympathy for the Palestinians moved the audience, but complicated his relations with Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister—especially because Obama had also decided to bypass Jerusalem on his first presidential visit to the Middle East. When I asked Obama recently what he had hoped to accomplish with his Cairo reset speech, he said that he had been trying—unsuccessfully, he acknowledged—to persuade Muslims to more closely examine the roots of their unhappiness. My thought was, I would communicate that the U. Bush, which was characterized in part by the belief that democratic values could be implanted in the Middle East.

Gershon Sirota

And these rights include free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women under the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders … Our support for these principles is not a secondary interest. But over the next three years, as the Arab Spring gave up its early promise, and brutality and dysfunction overwhelmed the Middle East, the president grew disillusioned.

Some of his deepest disappointments concern Middle Eastern leaders themselves. Benjamin Netanyahu is in his own category: Obama has also not had much patience for Netanyahu and other Middle Eastern leaders who question his understanding of the region. Finally, the president interrupted the prime minister: I live in the White House.

I managed to get elected president of the United States. Obama said he had heard that Abdullah had complained to friends in the U. Congress about his leadership, and told the king that if he had complaints, he should raise them directly. The king denied that he had spoken ill of him. Obama did not want to join the fight; he was counseled by Joe Biden and his first-term secretary of defense Robert Gates, among others, to steer clear.

Benghazi is a focal point for the opposition regime. The way I looked at it was that it would be our problem if, in fact, complete chaos and civil war broke out in Libya. But this is not so at the core of U. The name field is required. Please enter your name. The E-mail message field is required.

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