La CIA en Chile (1970-1973) (Spanish Edition)
Almost immediately after the assassination, rumors began circulating that the Chilean government was responsible. By the end of , contacts with Contreras were very infrequent. During , CIA met with Contreras about half a dozen times; three of those contacts were to request information on the Letelier assassination.
On 3 November , Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence so CIA severed all contact with him. After a short struggle to retain power, Contreras resigned from the Army in While some of this material has been released, some remains classified and another portion has been withheld at the request of the Department of Justice, which continues to pursue the investigation.
Intelligence Reporting Throughout the post-coup period, the CIA collected and disseminated to the intelligence and policy communities extensive reporting concerning human rights issues in Chile. Some of this information came from contacts with mixed reputations.
The intelligence included a wide variety of information, including:. In the days and months immediately following the coup, the CIA provided extensive reporting on what the government characterized as activities necessary to restore order.
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There were widely varying reports on the numbers of persons killed and arrested. CIA reporting confirmed that the military was deliberately not disclosing accurate figures and detailed the differing opinions within the military Junta regarding whether to summarily execute extremists and subversives or allow them trials and sentencing. There was also extensive reporting on:. CIA reported that the Chilean security interrogation units were dealing with suspected opponents in an extremely rigorous manner.
On 3 November, the CIA reported that, despite a government decree to end summary executions, 20 bodies were found shot in the San Carlos Canal. CIA reporting indicated that the Chilean security forces did not, and probably would not, observe the stated policy. Over the next 17 years, the CIA reported information available from its contacts concerning human rights abuses in Chile. As the left later regained strength, intelligence reporting included the plans, intentions, capabilities and terrorist acts of the left.
During the transition from military to civilian rule, intelligence reporting followed the political issue of how human rights investigations and prosecutions would be handled. Nevertheless, some clandestine contacts of the CIA were involved in human rights abuses. The CIA, at the direction of and with the full concurrence of senior US policymakers, maintained official contacts with various security services. At the same time, the CIA maintained clandestine contacts with selected members of the Chilean military, intelligence and security forces, both to collect intelligence and carry out the covert actions described above.
There is no doubt that some CIA contacts were actively engaged in committing and covering up serious human rights abuses. As a result of lessons learned in Chile, Central America and elsewhere, the CIA now carefully reviews all contacts for potential involvement in human rights abuses and makes a deliberate decision balancing the nature and severity of the human rights abuse against the potential intelligence value of continuing the relationship. These standards, established in the mids, would likely have altered the amount of contact we had with perpetrators of human rights violators in Chile had they been in effect at that time.
We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us. Submit questions or comments online. Contact the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. Contact the Office of Inspector General.
La Vía Chilena: Revolution and Counterrevolution in Chile, 1970-1973
Contact the Employment Verification Office. The United States and its partners continue to face a growing number of global threats and challenges. These challenges are international in scope and are priorities for the Central Intelligence Agency. If you have information about these or other national security challenges, please provide it through our secure online form. The information you provide will be protected and confidential. The CIA is particularly interested in information about imminent or planned terrorist attacks.
In cases where an imminent threat exists, immediately contact your local law enforcement agencies and provide them with the threat information. To contact the Central Intelligence Agency click here. Javascript must be enabled for the correct page display Library. He is believed to have committed suicide as the coup leaders closed in on him.
The major CIA effort against Allende came earlier in in the failed attempt to block his election and accession to the Presidency. All activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements of the Intelligence Community with respect to the accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency of the Republic of Chile. CIA actively supported the military Junta after the overthrow of Allende but did not assist Pinochet to assume the Presidency.
All activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements of the Intelligence Community with respect to violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of former President Pinochet. The IC followed then-current guidance for reporting such abuses and admonished its Chilean agents against such behavior. In April , the Group approved a propaganda and political action program for the upcoming September Presidential election. In February , the Committee approved a proposal to give covert assistance to selected candidates in upcoming Congressional elections.
In July , the Committee approved a political action program to support individual moderate candidates running in the Congressional elections. CIA also provided assistance to militant right-wing groups to undermine the President and create a tense environment. Historical Context The historical backdrop sheds important light on the policies, practices, and perceived urgency prevalent at that time.
Before the coup, the issue of human rights was not addressed in liaison contacts and intelligence reporting. In October , the CIA had credible information that a high-level contact was involved in specific human rights abuses; contact was severed. Although the CIA had information indicating that a high-level contact was a hard-liner and therefore more likely to commit abuses, contact with him was allowed to continue in the absence of concrete information about human rights abuses. CIA maintained indirect contact with a source in close contact with human rights violators.
There was no evidence that the source engaged in abuses, but he almost certainly knew about the practice. The intelligence value of the contact was sufficiently important that the contact was not dropped. In the case of an individual about whom the CIA had information concerning a corruption issue that may have been related to human rights issues, a decision was made to seek contact given his position and potential intelligence value. However, because such contacts allowed the CIA to accomplish its intelligence reporting mission and maintain a channel through which to voice concerns about human rights abuses, contact was continued.
In a few cases, although the CIA had knowledge that the contact represented a service with a known history of human rights abuses, contact was continued because refusing such contact would have had a negative impact on the CIA intelligence collection mission. In such cases, if a contact was deemed to have intelligence value, continuing contact was authorized. Information concerning human rights abuses of then current and former CIA contacts was disseminated to the intelligence and policy communities. Debates in within the Chilean military and security services about the appropriate level of force to be used in confronting what they viewed as the subversive threat posed by leftist political groups and splinter terrorist organizations;.
The identities and activities of sub-units within the Chilean security forces charged with conducting special political activities or activities against the left, and whose association with extremist groups with violent tendencies made them most prone to systemic abuses;. Debates within leftist political groups and splinter terrorist organizations concerning the use of violence in confronting the government; and. Write a review Rate this item: Preview this item Preview this item.
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La CIA en Chile, 1970-1973
Central Intelligence Agency " ;. There was suspicion that the Soviets had designs on this harbor as a new submarine base in the Western Hemisphere. At a more global level, Washington was struggling to maintain momentum in the negotiations for the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. It was in this framework of global power plays between the Soviet Union and the United States that the White House had to deal with the election of a Marxist-oriented government in Chile.
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The message he delivered at the meeting reflected his anger. The handwritten minutes taken by DCI Helms are revealing:. One in 10 chance, perhaps, but save Chile: This approach—Track I—primarily involved efforts by the US Ambassador and his diplomatic staff to hinder Allende through the manipulation of Chilean congressmen and senators within the framework of the Chilean constitution.
La CIA en Chile, (Book, ) [www.newyorkethnicfood.com]
The CIA, for its part, thought that the State Department did not have a clear understanding of Chilean politics and the nature of the Eastern Bloc threat posed by a Marxist state in the Americas. Such disagreements between the CIA and the State Department would be a hallmark of American operations in Chile, and would continue until Allende was overthrown in As time went on, Track I expanded to encompass a wide range of political, diplomatic, psychological, and economic policies, as well as covert operations designed to bring about the conditions that would encourage Chileans to stage a coup.
The parallel secret approach of Track II involved more direct efforts to prompt Chileans to stage an immediate coup. Both paths aimed at the same policy objective—the removal of Allende—but they differed in their approach, means, and timing.
On the day following the Oval Office meeting, William V. The Presidential Directive had made it clear that the CIA was to do what it needed to do to prevent an Allende administration. The precise parameters of such action are not yet in the public domain. Finding Chilean officers in favor of a coup was not an easy task. The officers of the Chilean armed forces were largely drawn from the middle class and, as such, were conservative and anti-Allende.
To thwart such violence and secure a post-coup government, incipient plotters assessed that the military would need to act as a whole to rally behind the new leaders. Potential plotters who were contacted by US operatives reported that their commander-in-chief, Gen. If he persisted in his constitutionalist stance, he would have to be removed from his position, in order to allow the military to intervene against the installation of an Allende government. The US Ambassador, Edward Korry, was aware of a long history of mini-plotting in the Chilean military and did not put much stock in the chances for effective action against Allende.
The outgoing Chilean president, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, had tried the patience of many conservative army officers, and plotting had been rife within the military during his tenure. Roberto Viaux, the alleged leader, who was forced into retirement. A CIA report of 26 September noted that a number of former Chilean army officers were attempting to infiltrate leftist groups in the hopes of conducting terrorist acts that would compel an anti-communist crackdown by Frei and the Army.
Others were working in primarily civilian rightist groups that had the same aim. Was everyone plotting against Allende? The Ambassador concurred that the Chilean military would need to act as a whole if military intervention were to succeed; simultaneously, however, he doubted that such coordinated action was possible. He reported to Washington, a full month before the beginning of Track II: He outlined one particular plan unwittingly related by a young Chilean officer to a CIA co-optee, and concluded by saying:. This report must be considered in the same vein. I would prefer that we ceased to check out all such reports and to be totally surprised by whatever might develop in the armed forces.
In the present circumstances, it is a waste activity for all concerned. Hence I am instructing [CIA station] to desist from the normal efforts to learn of possible military moves. Ignorant of the Track II initiative, Korry warned both the in-country CIA team and the State Department that to promote a coup with the climate and personnel at hand was to court a failure as massive and damaging to American interests as the Bay of Pigs.
Pressure for success came from Kissinger and the President. With time short, CIA officers in Santiago went against their better judgment and opened communications with retired Gen. Viaux, as well as two serving officers, Gen. Camilo Valenzuela, who commanded the Santiago Garrison, and Gen. Vicente Huerta, a senior officer in the Carabinero. Viaux took the spotlight. The answer came back within a few days: Viaux, and as a consequence is convinced that Viaux has no military support.
They decided to stop working with Viaux for the time being: Since a mini-coup which is what Viaux is most likely to produce would be counterproductive to our objective [name deleted] has been advised to do everything possible to prevent a Viaux move, at least for the time being. While his plans were not solid, as a serving officer he was at least in a position to command troops in a coordinated action, and he was deemed psychologically stable. CIA agent] will see Genl Camilo Valenzuela, if possible, on [date deleted] Oct and brief him along these lines [CIA agent] will take opportunity to caution Valenzuela about precipitate moves by Genl Viaux of which Valenzuela possibly cognizant.
Urge you do not convey impression that STA has sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering coup attempts. The fourth paragraph of this message makes a point repeated often by the CIA agents on the ground: They were not puppet masters, capable of fully controlling the Chilean officers they contacted.
The message had already been passed that the United States favored military intervention, but the Santiago CIA operatives did not want to bear responsibility for unfortunate results should a coup be led by a man such as Viaux:. Accordingly, Viaux should still be considered only as an opportunity of last resort. A Viaux Government, though preferable to Allende, would be a tragedy for Chile and for the free world. A Viaux coup would only produce a massive bloodbath. A bloodbath led by an uncontrollable and mentally unstable officer was not the aim of the mission, as the CIA understood it.
In short, a rightwing government was not attractive to the CIA or to the US government, for it would ultimately be counter-productive. Associating themselves with dictatorial and bloodthirsty regimes would do little to forward American efforts for increased influence in the region. The US personnel writing cables at the time did not assume that thwarting Allende had to be violent. In the case of Chile, however, what the CIA officers were looking for was, in the first instance, not actually a coup.
Rather, they sought some type of parliamentary subterfuge, where the military would declare a state of emergency and seize power temporarily, justifying the dissolution of the government in order to call new elections. Moreover, the United States was not going to run a coup for the Chileans. Another problem with Viaux was his high profile as an anti-communist agitator. Having already led one military revolt, he was under constant scrutiny by the state security apparatus, which made clandestine contact by the Americans dangerous.
It would be foolish of Washington to offer Viaux continued support if the PCCh would later be able to disclose American activities.
Viaux, clearly, was compulsive and uncontrollable, probably even anti-American. It is worth quoting at length:. What can Viaux accomplish under optimum conditions? He can split armed forces. Carnage would be considerable and prolonged, i. Under best of circumstances, armed forces will break up and create unpredictable situation. Above not intended to be exhaustive enumeration of some of key factors that ought to have hearing on your final determination.
You have asked us to provoke chaos in Chile. Thru Viaux solution we provide you with formula for chaos which unlikely to be bloodless. To dissimulate US involvement will clearly be impossible. Station [CIA] team, as you know, has given most serious consideration to all plans suggested by HQs counterparts. We conclude that none of them stand even a remote chance of achieving [USG] objective.