Christian Humanism: The Compassionate Theology of a Jew Called Jesus

I think I can also safely say that we reject all forms of fundamentalism including scientism and secularism, any humanism that is a closed anthropocentric system incapable of criticism and transformation, all forms of ecclesiastical and religious triumphalism, and denominational sectarianism, and rejoice whenever we experience the church as an inclusive and progressive community of concerned and compassionate fellow-believers.

In short, for us, being Christian means to be truly human rather than being religious in any narrow sense of that word; it also means striving to become more fully human in solidarity with the rest of humankind in the struggle for a more humane, just and peaceable world that respects human dignity and freedom, as well as the integrity of creation.

I am a humanist because I am a Christian, and as a Christian I seek to be the best humanist I can be, and I know that Martin would agree. But what about Martin's use of the terms 'post-credal', 'post-ecclesiastical', and 'transcendental humanism? Does this mean that we hold to no beliefs, that there is nothing of substance to which we can append our 'credo'? Put so crassly, that is surely not what Martin means. But if, as I think most likely, it means moving beyond the classical Christian creeds, does it mean a rejection of everything they generally affirm, not just their form and structure, but also their substance?

I don't actually know how Martin would respond to that, but I assume, once again, that he would be more nuanced than his words superficially suggest. However, instead of second-guessing him, I would like to clarify my own position in order to take our conversation further.

In my own ecclesial tradition Congregational creeds are not normally part of the liturgy, and forced subscription to them has always been strenuously resisted. We have not been called 'Nonconformists' for nothing! Maybe that means that already, since the seventeenth century, my own tradition was post-credal.

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This does not mean we were creedless, for we affirmed various Reformed confessions of faith, and continue to acknowledge the historical, theological and ecumenical importance of the historic creeds even though they do not normally feature in our liturgies. They are important because they keep us in conversation with historical Christianity. But we insist that their contextual character does not bind us to past understandings of Christian faith.

I am sure that many Christians in other traditions where the creeds are more central would agree with that position. There are, after all, faithful church members, ministers and priests who dutifully say the creeds, but who have serious reservations about some of their assertions taken literally even though they may appear to affirm them as though they do.

This means that a degree of dishonesty can intrude the liturgy undermining the doxological character of the creeds and the integrity of the worshippers.

Tom Drake-Brockman (Author of Christian Humanism)

I fear this often results from the ineptitude of priests and ministers in helping people understand the Bible hermeneutically, long before they get round to explaining the creeds and the reasons why they are embedded in the liturgy. Apart from any lack of training in this regard, this failure often arises from a fear of being censured, or by an unwillingness to upset those who do take the creeds literally.

But the fact that people in the pews who recite the creeds week by week assume that it is all meant to be understood literally, while many theologians and clergy understand them differently, seems to me a sad, dishonest and counterproductive state of affairs. The classical creeds emerged in the Patristic struggle against what was perceived to be heresy. Those who drafted them sought to draw boundaries between true and false belief in the contest between contending interpretations of the significance of Jesus as the Jewish Messiah and 'incarnate Son of God'.

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Irrespective of how they were understood then or the purposes to which they were sometimes put, they became doxological expressions that encapsulated the mysteries of Christian faith in the language of both history and myth. If myth is properly understood, I have no problem with the formulation 'the myth of God Incarnate' made infamous by John Hick, though the term is as James Dunn suggests, inappropriate in early Christology Dunn What is appropriate is C. Lewis' assertion that in the Jesus narrative myth became fact without losing its mythical character , something that Bonhoeffer also said 5.

Christianity expresses itself in the language of myth as much as it does in the language of history, and the two merge in the creeds which encapsulate the Christian mythos as understood in its early genesis. The original meaning of mythos as narrative or story is the product of human imagination.

So we can speak of the Christian mythos in the same way as we might talk about an historical novel, though the analogy is not perfect Jennings The Christian mythos is that in Jesus of Nazareth, God became truly human in order that we might become fully human in the image of God. This is the theological basis for Christian humanism, as Zimmermann has thoroughly articulated in his Incarnational Humanism. But as he tells us, something that I too affirm, we are not seeking 'to invent something new but rather to retrieve an ancient Christian humanism for our time in response to the general demand for a common humanity beyond religious, denominational, and secular divides'.

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Yet, both he and I also assert, that 'orthodox Christology provides the most promising source for a common vision of a truly human society' Zimmermann b: This does not mean that what is often taken for 'orthodoxy' has always got it right when it comes to a praxis that is faithful to its Christological source. But if not, what can it mean?

As someone who spoke and wrote about the theological justification of apartheid as a heresy, I obviously recognize that there come moments in history when the boundaries that define what it means to be Christian and the church of Jesus Christ have to be drawn. My understanding of the church as an inclusive community is contingent precisely on the rejection of false boundaries determined by ethnicity, gender, class or sexual orientation. I am not suggesting that this is the 'orthodox' way to understand the classical creeds, but I am saying that there are boundaries that determine the character of the church even if there is disagreement as to where and when those boundaries are to be drawn.

This was the problem which confronted Bonhoeffer in responding to the German Christians who supported Hitler and promoted the Nazification of the Protestant Church. Both sides in the Kirchenkampf recited the creeds and affirmed the Lutheran confessions, but Bonhoeffer understood them hermeneutically not literally, christologically and not ideologically. There may have been consensus on, for example, the 'two natures of Christ' but there was clearly disagreement on who Jesus Christ was for them at that historical juncture 6.

The Barmen Declaration was a confessional response to that question within that historical context and, as such, assumed credal significance if not status.

Although Bonhoeffer's own response to his question 'who is Jesus Christ for us today' was hermeneutically located within that context, it was undoubtedly in continuity with the ancient creeds, despite the influence of his great liberal teacher Adolf von Harnack, for whom they were highly problematic.

For Harnack, following Jesus rather than believing in the 'Christ of the creeds' was the essence of Christianity von Harnack In taking this position, Harnack rightly maintained that discipleship is not the same as believing in a doctrine about Jesus as the Christ. Yet contrasting discipleship and believing in a doctrine in this way is surely a category mistake.

Discipleship and faith as commitment to Jesus as Lord belong together, as Bonhoeffer expressed so powerfully in Discipleship Bonhoeffer Harnack's problem, as Rudolf Bultmann said, was that he did 'not clearly see the difference between the kerygmatic character of the Gospel and an 'Enlightenment doctrine or an ethical appeal' von Harnack Jesus became the timeless truth about God and eternity, about the human soul and the good life, rather than the witness to God's coming kingdom amidst the historical and political realities of his day. It is true that many seek to follow Jesus without accepting the claim that he is the Christ of Christian faith, but it seems to me that faith in Jesus as 'the Christ' is fundamental to being Christian.

I am not saying that there is no 'Jesus before Christianity', as Albert Nolan portrayed in his book of that title, nor am I saying that Jesus only has significance within Christianity, for Jesus was not a Christian; nor am I saying that you have to be a Christian to follow Jesus, or that many who follow Jesus do not do so much better than many Christians. What I am saying is that Christianity as it evolved already in the apostolic period was Christological not Jesu-logical, and that the doctrine of the Incarnation was already implicit.

To my mind, no one has explored this development more fully than Dunn whose conclusion is that while we 'cannot claim that Jesus believed himself to be the incarnate Son of God', we can say that this conviction was 'an appropriate reflection on and elaboration of Jesus' own sense of sonship and eschatological mission' Dunn In sum, we cannot delete the doctrine of the Incarnation from Christianity without destroying its integrity as Christian faith.

Having said that, I would equally say that to believe that 'God was in Christ' is not the same as believing in the doctrine as doctrine. It is, rather, as Bonhoeffer wrote in his Ethics in continuity with what he said in Discipleship but put differently , becoming 'conformed to the Incarnate One'.

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And this is fundamental to Christian humanism. In fact, nowhere to my knowledge have the humanist ethical implications of the Incarnation been so well expressed as in this section of the Ethics where, inter alia , Bonhoeffer writes: To stress the point, I am not talking about believing in a doctrine, but about life being shaped by the reality to which that doctrine points.

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For Bonhoeffer this was fundamental to following Jesus and therefore to the Christian mythos. And, of course, the same applied to being conformed to the 'crucified One' and the 'risen One', that is, living in solidarity with the suffering and struggles of the world, and living and acting in hope of new life and the just transformation of present reality. Christian humanism, as I understand it, then, is founded on a 'high Christology' shaped by a reading of the gospel mythos , but kenotic, not triumphalist in character.

By this I mean that when we confess Jesus Christ as 'truly God' we are saying that the God in whom we believe has been revealed in history as the one who, for us , is most truly human. Too often Christians turn this around so that their definitions of God all-powerful, all-knowing, etc. Of course, to say Jesus is the 'truly human One' is a confession of faith that arises out of a reading of the Christian tradition, even though it begs many questions. For example, in what sense is Jesus to be regarded as such? Is Jesus the only truly human One? Are the rest of us humans not truly human and, if not, are we less than human?

How then are we to define being human, and being more truly so? Discussion of these requires another lengthy conversation which is beyond the scope of this essay, but some hints as to how that may develop must be given here. What I have said thus far is about the basis for Christian humanism, something premised on a faith claim.

As such it is alien to people of other faiths and secular humanists even though there may be agreement on the importance of its outcomes and acceptance of the need for such a theological strategy. But it is precisely at this point that Schweiker focuses his critique and challenge to my approach. Without denying the importance of historical traditions or Christian confession, he rightly wants theological humanism to be 'tested in the unending work of interpretation and rumination aimed at understanding'.

This is necessary if we are to avoid a triumphalism - even in the name of humanity - that reduces 'the other' to the status of junior partner in the humanist endeavour. In fact it requires a theological humanism fashioned in dialogue and solidarity with those who come to similar conclusions yet from a different perspective. And that, in turn, may require of us a new, liberating language in which to express our faith in Christ, as Bonhoeffer anticipated.

This does not mean ditching the fundamental premise of Christianity, otherwise there is no specifically Christian contribution to the discussion. But if my confessional Christian humanism is, at one level, affirmed by Schweiker, at another he prompts me to go further for the sake of a broader theological humanism in which the integrity of life becomes the key affirmation. What, then, needs to be considered as we take the Christian humanist or theological neo-humanist project further?

A priority must surely be to engage with humanists of other traditions in clarifying both areas of agreement and disagreement and thus, together with them, set an agenda for further discussion and engagement as we did in the New Humanist project at STIAS Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies in which Schweiker participated de Gruchy c. This requires those of us who are Christians to explore in greater depth the theological foundations of our own faith claims and perspectives. But it will also help us understand better what resources we bring to the table as Christians who seek to be humanists, and as humanists who seek to be Christian.

So now, within the parameters of this essay, I want to explore further, with Zimmermann, the genealogy of a genuinely Christian humanism, and its potential for the renewal of culture and the common good, and in doing so reflect a little on the significance of the church. Apart from sharing in a common task, what do we bring to the dialogue table?

Zimmermann's premise is that Western secularism is exhausted, having lost its roots in the religious tradition that gave birth to secularity and modernity. The resultant vacuum has been filled by the resurgence of religion, chiefly in fundamentalist forms. The consequences are serious and potentially disastrous, especially given the fact that the West is increasingly culturally plural in character due to the influx of many immigrants for whom secularism is alien, humanism threatening and Christianity problematic. At the same time, for many secularists, religion has not only lost whatever significance it might have had and become the prime target of rebuttal, the enemy of humanism, and the cause of social conflict.

This is undoubtedly true of some forms of religion, but not true of all religion. On the contrary, religion, including Christianity, is historically and remains potentially a source of humanism. Examining the Christian humanist tradition is, therefore, an 'essential hermeneutical task' in making possible the renewal of Western culture and 'integrating other religiously formed cultures into Western societies' Zimmermann b: Zimmermann's agenda is focused specifically on the West; Prozesky and I are more global in interest and specifically concerned about South Africa.

But we all share the same concern for the recovery and building of humane values that enable the flourishing of life in building societies and nations, and the role of Christianity as one significant agent in doing so. A preliminary question which must be brought to the fore is whether and to what extent Zimmermann's analysis and prognosis relates meaningfully to our South African context.

This was part of the rationale for my initiation of and participation in the project at STIAS in which eventually led to the publication of The Humanist Imperative in South Africa to which I previously referred. Two factors suggest that there is a connection between this project and Zimmermann's. The first is that South African culture has been profoundly influenced by the West as a result of colonization, and by Christianity as a result of Christian missionary endeavour, not least the education of those cohorts of African leaders who established the African National Congress. In many respects they were Christian humanists in the sense described by Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and embodied in the likes of Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela.

Their imprint on the Freedom Charter and our present Constitution is part of that humanist legacy, as is our Constitution. The second has to do with the extent to which Christianity in our context has lost its humanist thrust implicit, if not necessarily explicit, in Christology. The reasons are not unlike those in other contemporary societies dominated by fundamentalism and more susceptible to secularism than previously. So Zimmermann's contribution to the debate, while centered on the West, resonates with the issues as I understand them in our own situation in important respects.

Heeding Heidegger's injunction to critically retrieve tradition in order to transform the world, Zimmermann's aim is neither to return to Christendom, within which Christianity attempts to reign supreme over culture, nor to resuscitate previous forms of Christian humanism. Instead, he goes behind modernity to explore the theological origins of humanism in the West with its foundations already laid in classical culture.

Western humanism, he reminds us, is deeply rooted in the biblical assertion that humanity bears the 'image of God'. The Patristic faith-claim that God becomes fully human in Christ in order that humans may become truly like God, and therefore truly human is foundational. So too, is the correlation of faith and reason, with faith being necessary for rationality and self-understanding. The result is 'a profound sense of human dignity, solidarity, and freedom based on a reasonable faith' Zimmermann a: Scholastic humanism in the Middle Ages, Zimmermann observes going further, was built on and developed Patristic humanism in a way that some regard as 'the most important kind of humanism Europe has ever produced' Zimmermann b: Unfortunately scholastic theology was incapable of keeping pace with these developments, and not only became rigid but also fractured.

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