Pacification: Burma

British officers would have to be posted to command them, and they must be relieved at short intervals. He showed me letters which had passed between him and Bernard about the military police force, to which, as an instrument in the pacification of the province, he attached the first importance. He spoke of the strength of the Commission, and told me to consider it carefully and ask for more men if I thought them necessary. Generally he considered that true economy dictated the expenditure of as much money as was necessary to fit out the new province with offices, roads, buildings, and river steamers, and it was folly, he said, not to give it.

Barracks and shelter for troops and police should be vigorously pushed on. The questions of the Shan States and our relations with China were discussed. As to the Shan States, I represented the manner in which our relations with the feudatory chiefs in the Central Provinces were managed and the saving in cost and responsibility to be gained by leaving them quasi- independent. Lord Dufferin approved of this policy and preferred it to annexation, even in the case of the Wuntho Sawbwa, who had shown an inclination to refuse submission to our Government. The Viceroy spoke at length and with emphasis regard- ing our relations with China, which he looked upon as most important.

We were face to face, he said, with a very powerful neighbour, who might greatly harass us if she or even her subordinate officials chose to worry us. Two officers of the Chinese Consular Service had been sent to Upper Burma to be at my disposal in dealing with the Chinese in Burma and in conducting relations with the Chinese Government.

In the matter of the frontiers of Upper Burma, where they touched China, great care should be exercised. He told me to think carefully whether there was anything I wanted done and to let him know before I left. I was to see him again. In a country where one man is as good as another, where there are no landlords, no hereditary aristocracy and no tribal chiefs, the Government, especially a foreign Govern- ment, is at a great disadvantage. It is impossible to deal with each individual. The first question is, who is the great man of this village: Having found the man, it becomes possible to enter into relations with the village and to treat with them as a whole.

In Upper Burma there was a recognized headman in each village who had duties, and powers corresponding to his duties ; and in many administrative matters, especially in taxation, the village was dealt with as a whole. The difficulty in Lower Burma was the absence of such a local authority or unit. The villagers were not held together by any obligation to each other or by subordination to any one on the spot. Each man had his own bit of land which he held directly from the Government.

He lived w r here he pleased, and if he put his house in the same place with other cultivators, it was for the sake of con- venience and protection. The villages were grouped for revenue purposes by the British administration under officials who collected the taxes and received a percentage on the amount. Each of these taik Thugyis headmen of circles , as they were designated, had many villages under him and could not be expected to have local knowledge or personal influence in all of them. He had no powers out- side his revenue work. It was open to any one to put up his hut in any village, wherever he could find room.

There was no one to say him nay, even if he was a gambler, an opium-eater, or a notorious evildoer living by theft and robbery. There were, it is true, village policemen appointed by law, who were intended to supply the wants of a local authority. But no power was given to them: Consequently they tended to become mere village drudges, although by no means useless and fre- quently showing both courage and sagacity in police matters.

I had observed that in nearly every case w r here a large gang of dacoits, to use the Indian term, was domin- ating a district or part of a district they were assisted by sympathisers, who sent them food, supplied them with information, and made it possible for them to live un- detected. The codes of Indian Criminal Procedure do not enable a magistrate to touch cases of this sort. If the people are against the Government and in they were certainly not minded to help it the difficulty of detecting and convicting such secret abettors is almost insuperable.

At any rate, it was a slow process, and meanwhile violence and disorder flourished and the peasantry became more and more enthralled to the brigands. It occurred to me that nothing would give the civil magistrate more assistance than the power of summarily removing persons who, while they themselves appeared to be living harmless lives without reproach, were enabling the insurgent or brigand gangs to keep the field. I explained my views on these matters to the Viceroy. He promised me his support and desired me to embody my ideas in a draft Regulation before I left Calcutta.

With the assistance of the Legislative Department the draft was quickly completed, and on my arrival in Burma it was cir- culated to district officers for their opinions. It was delayed by various formalities and inquiries, and was not finally made law until October, Founded so far as might be on the system indigenous to the country and in accord with the mind of the people, this law was a great aid to the administration. Writing in October, , I said: It would not have been possible to use this instrument if the village system had no vitality. If we are to rule the country cheaply and efficiently and to keep the people from being robbed and oppressed by the criminal classes, the village system must be maintained in vigour.

But the life of the system is the headman, his dignity and his position. This is what the author of " The Soul of a People " wrote in That within their little means they did it well no one can doubt. They taxed themselves without friction, they built their own monastery schools by voluntary effort, they maintained a very high, a very simple, code of morals entirely of their own initiative.

The King has gone to a banishment far across the sea, the Ministers are either banished or powerless for good or evil. It will never rise again, this government of the King which was so bad in all it did and only good in what it left alone. It w T ill never rise again.

The people are now part of the British Empire, subjects of the Queen. What may be in store for them in the far future no one can tell ; only we may be sure that the past can return no more. And the local government is passing away too. It cannot exist with a strong Govern- ment such as ours. For good or for evil, in a few years, it too, will be gone. But to return to the order of events. I was detained in Calcutta until the 24th of February.

Time by no means wasted. I had frequent opportunities of seeing the Members of Council and learning what was going on in each department. Lord Dufferin allowed me to discuss matters with him more than once. On the 19th I attended His Excellency in Council and explained my views, especially regarding the village system.

Hodgkinson, had been appointed to take immediate charge of the older province. I found that the Special Commissioner was in fact ruler of the Lower Province, and was so regarded by the public. Nothing which was not of a very extraordinary nature was referred to the Chief Commissioner, whose responsibility, however, remained un- impaired. For example, two or three days after my arrival the Viceroy telegraphed in cipher to the Chief Commis- sioner about some matters in Lower Burma which had given rise to questions in Parliament, and of which the responsible Chief Commissioner had no cognizance.

No more competent and trustworthy man than Mr. Hodgkinson could have been found for the work. Nevertheless the arrangement did not seem to me quite satisfactory. There were urgent matters requiring to be settled with Mr. Hodgkinson, more especially the Budget of the Province and the organization of the police in Lower Burma, which needed thorough reform. They had earned the reputation of being the worst and the most costly in the world, and during the last eighteen months they had not belied it.

It was necessary to form a body of military police for Lower Burma of suitable Indians, trained and disciplined. During the few days I was in Rangoon this and other urgent matters for example, the arrangements with the Bombay Burma Company about the Upper Burma Forests, the Ruby Mines, the condition of some of the Lower Burma districts, the postings of officers, the distribution of reinforcements of military police just disembarking from the transports, consultations with the General Com- manding in Lower Burma as to the measures necessary along and beyond the line of the old frontier within the limits of his command, all these things and much more would have given me plenty of work for many days.

I could only dispose of those matters which required my personal orders and leave the rest to Mr. I could not remain in Rangoon. Sir Charles Bernard had a powerful memory. Letters and telegrams received from Man- dalay were dealt with and returned with his orders, no copies for reference being kept. As the Rangoon Secre- tariat was ignorant of Upper Burma affairs, I found myself completely in the air.

I decided therefore to start as soon as possible for Mandalay. I left Kangoon by rail for Prome on the 9th of March. To a man sailing up the river there were few signs of trouble. The people appeared to be going about their business as usual, and no doubt along the river bank and in the neighbourhood of our posts there was little disorder. But this appearance was deceptive. Just beyond the old frontier the country from the right bank of the Irrawaddy up to the Arakan Yoma was in the hands of insurgents.

On the right bank of the river, forty miles above Thayetmyo, is the Burman fort and town of Minhla, where the first opposition was offered to the British expedition. I found here a small detachment of Indian troops, and in the town, about half a mile off, a police post. I learnt from the British officer commanding the detachment and from the Burman magistrate that for some fifty miles inland, up to the Chin hills on the west, the villages were deserted and the headmen had absconded.

This is an unhealthy tract, with much jungle, and broken up into small valleys by the spurs from the Arakan mountains. The noted leader Bo Swe made his lair here and had still to be reckoned with. His story illustrates the difficulties which had to be overcome. This district was known at first as Minhla, but afterwards as Minbu, to which the headquarters were moved. Phayre, a relative of that distinguished man, Colonel Sir Arthur Phayre, the first Chief Commissioner of British Burma, was the right man for the work.

He began by getting into touch with the native officials, and by the 15th of December all those on the right bank of the river had accepted service under the new Government. Outposts were established, and flying columns dispersed any gather- ings of malcontents that were reported. A small body of troops from Thayetmyo, moving about in the west under the Arakan hills, acted in support of Minhla.

Eevenue began to come in, and at Yenangyoung, the seat of the earth-oil industry, work was being resumed. There were two men, however, who had not been or would not be propitiated, Maung Swe and Oktama. Maung Swe was hereditary headman or Thugyi of Mindat, a village near the old frontier. He had for years been a trouble to the Thayetmyo district of British Burma, harbouring criminals and assisting dacoit gangs to attack our villages, if he did not lead them himself.

He had been ordered up to Mandalay by the Burmese Government owing to the strong remonstrances of the Chief Commissioner. So long as there was a force moving about in the west of the district he was unable to do much. When the troops were withdrawn the deadly climate under the hills compelled their recall , he began active operations. The second man was named Cktama, one of the most determined opponents of the British. He had inspired his followers with some of his spirit, whether fanatical or patriotic, and harassed the north of the district about and beyond Minbu.

His gang was more than once attacked and dispersed, but came together again. He and Maung Swe worked together and between them dominated the country. In May, , Maung Swe was attacked and driven back towards the hills. Early in June, , Mr. Phayre, with fifty sepoys of a Bengal infantry regiment and as many military police Indians , started from Minbu to attack Maung Swe, who was at a place called Padein.

The enemy were reinforced during the night by two or three hundred men from Ngape. The attack was delivered on the 9th of June, and Phayre, who was leading, was shot dead. His men fell back, leaving his body, which was carried off by the Burmans, but was afterwards recovered and buried at Minbu. Three days after this two parties of Oktama's gang who had taken up positions near Salin were attacked by Captain Dunsford. His force consisted of twenty rifles of the Liverpool Regiment and twenty rifles of the 2nd Bengal Infantry.

The Burmans were driven from their ground, but Captain Dunsford was killed and a few of our men wounded. Reinforcements were sent across the river from Pagan: The Burmans fought well, but were forced to retire. Unfortunately the want of mounted men prevented a pursuit. The enemy carried off their killed and wounded. Our loss was eight men killed and twenty-six wounded, including one officer.

We then occupied Ngape in strength, but in July the deadly climate obliged us to withdraw. Maung Swe returned at once to his lair. By the end of August the whole of the western part of the district was in the hands of the insurgents, rebels, or patriots, according to the side from which they are seen. Meanwhile Salin had been besieged by Oktama. He was driven off after three days by Captain Atkinson, who brought up reinforcements to aid the garrison of the post.

Captain Atkinson was killed in the action. Thus in a few weeks these two leaders had cost us the lives of three officers. In the course of the operations undertaken under Sir Frederick Roberts's command in the open season of , this country was well searched by parties of troops with mounted infantry. Bo Swe's power was broken, and in March, , he was near the end of his exploits. The peasantry, whether through sympathy or fear, were on his side. I have troubled the reader with this story because it will help to the understanding of the problem we had before us in every part of Upper Burma.

It will explain how districts reported at an early date to be " quite peaceful" or " comparatively settled" were often altogether in the hands of hostile bands. They were reported quiet because we could hear no noise. We were outsiders, as indeed we are, more or less, not only in Burma but in every part of the Indian Empire less perhaps in Burma than elsewhere.

On the way up the river I had the advantage of meeting Mr. No more capable or helpful men could have been found. The Commissioner of the Eastern Division was out of reach for the time. The only way of getting to that country was by road from Mandalay, which would have taken many days. I had to wait until I returned to Eangoon and could go by rail to Toungoo before I made acquaintance with Mr.

Upper Burma, inclusive of the Shan States, contains in round numbers one hundred and sixty thousand square miles, of which the Shan States cover sixty thousand miles and the Chin hills ten thousand. It may be divided, for the present purpose, into four parts. The first is the great valley of the Irrawaddy, from the mountain ranges north of Mogaung to the northern boundary of the Thayetmyo district ; the second is the valley of the Chindwin ; the third is the valley of the Sittang, in which lies the Eastern Division, down to the boundary of the Toungoo district ; and the fourth is the Shan States.

In the British administration had not yet touched the Chin hills or the Kachins in the mountains which divide Burma from China. Beginning with the Irrawaddy Valley, Mogaung, the most northerly post of importance, was held by a Burman Myook, or township officer, nominally for us. He collected the revenue and spent it much, no doubt, on his establish- ment, for which no regular provision had been made. South of Mogaung as far as Bhamo the country was quiet, and no organized gangs were in the field.

The Katha district, which comes next below Bhamo, was disturbed on the Wuntho border, and was not much under control. The Wuntho Sawbwa, a Shan chief exercising inde- pendent jurisdiction within his country, had refused our invitation to come in. A strong force under Brigadier- General Cox, with Mr. The districts south of Katha, namely Shwebo and Ye-u, were controlled by dacoit gangs under active leaders. The Ruby Mines district, with its capital, Mogok, was held in force and had remained submissive since its occupation.

South of the ruby mines lies the district of Mandalay, shut in on the north and east by the Shan hills. In spite of this force the district was dominated by three or four leaders, who had large follow- ings and acted in concert. They had divided the country between them into definite jurisdictions, which they mutually respected. They collected revenue from the villagers. Dis- obedience or any attempt to help the British Government met with swift and severe punishment. They professed to be acting under the authority of the Myingun Prince, who was at the time a refugee in Pondicherry, and they were encouraged and helped to combine by a relative of the Prince, known as the Bayingan or Viceroy, who went from one to the other and supplied them with information.

Catalog Record: The pacification of Burma | Hathi Trust Digital Library

The district of Ava, south of Mandalay, was in a similar state. The valleys of the Samon and Panlaung gave good shelter to the dacoit s. Unfortunately several district boundaries and divisions of military commands met in this country, and on that account action was not so prompt as it ought to have been. Following the river below Ava, the Myingyan and Pagan districts extended to both sides of the river, an inconvenient arrangement inherited from the Burmese Government. The headquarters of these districts, both on the left bank, were held by garrisons of some size, and within striking range the country was controlled.

It rises to a height of four thousand five hundred feet, a gigantic cone throwing out numerous spurs. It is wooded thickly almost to the top, and extending for a long distance round it is a tangle of scrub jungle and ravines, an ideal hunting- ground for robbers and the home of cattle- thieves. South of this was the Taungdwingyi district, extending down to the old border. It was in the hands of a leader named Min Yaung, who was well provided with ponies, and even elephants. The northern spurs of the Pegu Yoma divide this district from the Sittang Valley, and are densely wooded, offering a harbour of refuge to criminals.

To this, among other causes, it was due that this district gave more trouble than any other in Upper Burma. It was at that time separated from the river by the Magwe township, which belonged to the Minbu district, and enjoyed com- parative peace, owing mainly to the influence of the Burman governor, who had taken service under us and for a time was loyal. These parts of the Myingyan and Pagan districts, which were on the right bank of the Irrawaddy, were not really under our control or administered by us. Southward, still on the right bank, came the Minbu dis- trict, where Oktama and Bo Swe were still powerful, the former in full force.

The difficulties of country and climate which our men had to face in this district were very great. The west of the Minbu district lies up against the range of mountains known as the Arakan Yoma, which run parallel to the sea and shut off the Irrawaddy Valley from the Bay of Bengal.

The country below the Yoma is what is known in India as Terai, a waterlogged region reeking with malaria, deadly to those not acclimatized. Many a good soldier, British and Indian, found his grave in the posts occupied in this district, Taingda, Myothit, Ngape, and Sidoktaya. The dacoit leaders knew the advantage of being able to live where our men could not. Soldiers like Captain Golightly Colonel K. The two local potentates, the Sawbwa of Hsawnghsup and the Sawbwa of Kale, were not of much importance.

The former had made his submis- sion ; the latter was holding aloof, but had shown his good- will by arresting and delivering to the Deputy Commissioner a pretender who had attacked a British post and was gather- ing to his banner various leaders. Lower down, the country round Mingin, where Mr. Gleeson, Assistant Commissioner, was murdered in , was much disturbed.

In the Lower Chindwin there was trouble in Pagyi and Pakangyi. The former country, which is covered with forests and very unhealthy, had been placed under the management of Bur- mans of local influence a plan which answered for a time. The Kani township, which adjoins Mingin, had been governed from the first by the Burmese Wun well and loyally. He was murdered on that account by a dacoit leader. His younger brother was appointed in his room and followed in his steps.

On the left bank the country was not openly disturbed. The river trade was busy, but boats were obliged to take a guard or to be convoyed by a steam-launch. At this time the cause of order seemed nearer victory in the Eastern Division than elsewhere. The Sittang Valley includes the Kyaukse district, which at first was placed under the Commissioner of the Central Division, but was allied in dacoit politics to Meiktila. Myat Hmon, Maung Gyi, and Maung Lat, names well known to soldiers in , hunted this country, making the Hmawwaing jungles their rallying-ground.

When hard-pressed they took refuge in the hills of Baw and Lawksawk, coming back when the troops retired. Nevertheless, in March, , large bands were still active. But throughout the plateau dacoities were rife and petty wars were raging. Wide tracts were laid waste, and the peasantry, deserting their fields, had joined in the fights or gone across the Sal ween.

Great scarcity, perhaps in some cases actual famine, resulted, not from failure of rain, but from strife and anarchy. And this reacted on Burma proper, for some of the Shan States on the border gave the dacoits encouragement and shelter. The whole of Upper Burma at this time was in military occupation.

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There were one hundred and forty-one posts held by troops, and yet in wide stretches of country, in the greater part of the Chindwin Valley, in the Mogaung country and elsewhere, there was not a soldier. The tide, however, was on the turn. The officers in command of parties and posts were beginning to know the country and the game, while the dacoits and their leaders were losing heart. The soldiers had in fact completed their task, and they had done it well.

What remained to be done was work for the civil administrator. The first and essential step was to enable the civil officers to get a firm grip of their districts. For this purpose a civil police force, recruited from the natives of the country, was necessary. Without it, detection and intelligence were impossible. Commissioners and generals were alike unanimous on this point. The next thing was to provide an armed force at the disposal of the district officer, so that he should be able to get an escort immediately for there was no district where an Englishman could yet travel safely without an armed escort and should be able also to quell risings and disperse ordinary bands of insurgents or brigands without having to ask assistance from the army.

The military police had been designed and raised for these purposes, and the men were being distributed as fast as they arrived from India. The relations of the district officers to the commandants of military police and of the latter to the civil police officers, and the duties and spheres of each, had to UPPER BURMA 35 be defined. I had drafted regulations for these purposes, and was waiting for the appointment of an Inspector- General to carry them out.

It had been decided before I left Calcutta that a soldier should be selected for this post. The military police force was in fact an army of occupation sixteen thousand strong. Many of them were old soldiers who had volunteered from the Indian regiments, the rest were recruited mainly from the fighting races of Northern India. And they were commanded by young officers, some of whom had come with somewhat exalted ideas of their independence. It was imperative, therefore, to get an able soldier who could look at matters from all points of view, and who could manage men as well as command them.

For it required a delicate touch to avoid friction between the military and civil members of the district staff. Some of the civil officers were young, some were quite without experience, and some were inferior to the military com- mandants in force and ability. In April, , Colonel E. Stedman, commanding the 3rd Gurkhas, who had accompanied Mr. Among the many able officers of the Indian Army it would have been hard to find another man equally adapted to the work. On the 21st of March, , I wrote to Lord Dufferin regarding the relations of the district and police officers as follows: I have decided to keep the Commandant to his military work, and the District Superintendent of Police to the real civil police duty intelligence, detection, and investigation.

The Deputy Commissioner has by law supreme control and must exercise it. The Deputy Commissioners have no hold on their districts, and through the absence of a civil police they get no intelligence and no touch with the people. There must be a completely separate trained body of Burman Civil Police, trained not to arms but to their police duties. I have got orders under issue about the location of posts and everything connected with them and the constitution of the police in them. We must have some Burmans and some Civil Police Burmans in every police post, and I think in every military post also.

Meanwhile I must return to affairs at Mandalay. He is the head of the Buddhist monks, the religious order which in Bishop Bigandet's words is " The greatest in its extent and diffusion, the most extraordinary and perfect in its fabric and constituent parts, and the wisest in its rules and prescriptions that has ever existed either in ancient or modern times outside the pale of Christianity. His title means that he has power over all religious matters. It is misleading to speak of him as an archbishop or to apply any of the titles of the Christian Church to the Buddhist monks, who are not priests in any sense, but " are the strict followers of Buddha, who, like him, have renounced the world to devote them- selves to the twofold object of mastering their passions and acquiring the true wisdom which alone can lead to the deliverance.

In the King's time the Thathanabaing neither personally nor as representative of the order interfered in affairs of State.

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As a " religious " he would have, and was bound to have, no concern with mundane affairs. Could he bring any influence to bear on the people at large to induce them to submit peacefully to our rule?

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It does not appear that in Burma they have ever aimed at any share in the management or direction of the affairs of the country. Since the accession of the house of Alomphra to the throne, that is to say, during a period of above a hundred years, the history of Burma has been tolerably well known.

We do not recollect having ever met with one instance when the Pongyis, as a body, have interfered in the affairs of State. But in a religious point of view," continues Bishop Bigandet, "their influence is a mighty one. One of my first acts at Mandalay was to issue orders for the repair of monasteries occupied by our men and for making compensation in some form to the monks, and at least twice afterwards I reiterated and enlarged these orders.

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No doubt this matter of the monasteries was a grievance. But, as often happens, it was made more of by busybodies and correspondents interested in defaming the administration than by the sufferers. It was an un- fortunate necessity of war. The only remedy was to build barracks and reduce the garrison, both of which were done with all the speed possible. It is worth noting that the Thathanabaing did not make any complaint to me on this head.

In his conversations with me he dwelt mainly on the sufferings caused to the monks by the removal of the inhabitants from the walled city, which was being converted into a cantonment. I reminded him of the removal of the people by their own monarchs, first from Ava to Amarapura and then from Amarapura to Mandalay. He replied that the King removed the Jcyaungs with the people, and put them up on the new sites at the public cost, and also compelled his Ministers to build new monasteries.

He was amused by my suggesting that the Commissioner and the secretary who accompanied me should be ordered to erect some monasteries on the sites to which the people were being moved. He saw the humour of it. I found the Thathanabaing in my intercourse with him always courteous and good-humoured ; and in his bearing there was neither arrogance nor ill-will. Of the Pongyis generally in Upper Burma I saw something, as in riding about the districts there were no motors or tents for Chief Commissioners in those days we had generally to ask the Pongyis to give us shelter ; and their manner was courteous and hospitable.

Not a few, I thought, felt and deplored the misery which the disturbances caused, and would have been glad to work for peace. It must be remembered that from the experience of our rule in Lower Burma they knew the attitude of the British Government towards their religion.

They had no reason to fear oppression or persecution. They knew at the same time that in losing a Buddhist King their position and influence must be lowered. They could hardly be asked to rejoice with us. In common with others who know Burma better, I doubt if the religious orders as a body had much influence on the course of events, or took an active part in the resistance to us. When a monk became a noted leader, it was a patriot who had been a monk and not a monk who had become a patriot.

At the same time some of the most serious and deepest-laid plots were hatched in monasteries or initiated by Pongyis. I may give some instances of the conduct and feelings of Pongyis. In August, , a pretender calling himself the Pakan Prince joined a conspiracy to get up a rebellion in Mandalay. The prince told all that he knew. The originator of the scheme was a Sadaw or Abbot living in one of the Thathanabaing's monasteries. He made his escape. I sent for the Thathanabaing and he consented readily at my request to cite the Sadaw to appear before him and to pro- claim him as a man with whom Pongyis should not associate.

Whether he was sincere or not, I cannot say. But he issued the injunction and I took care it was widely published. Another case shows how the people as well as the Pongyis were coming to regard us. It was essential to catch the Boa,' or captains of the guerrilla bands, who gave life and spirit to the.

The mounted infantry man, British or Indian, a stone or two heavier, and weighted with rifle, ammunition, and Accoutre- ments, on an underbred twelve-hand pony, had no chance of riding down a ' Bo. Those who recall the Parliamentary debates in Great Britain after the annexation of Upper Burma will remember that there was much criticism of the use of some Buddhist monasteries by the troops, of the continuance of the opium trade, and of the seizure of the ruby mines. It is specially interesting to know what the author says on these points. As regards the use of the monasteries, he writes that it was a military necessity, and he remarks that the Thathanabaing a Buddhist clerical authority who bears much the same relation to Burmese Buddhists as the Sheikh-ul-Islam to Sunnite Moslems never made any complaint.

When the- barracks were built at Mandalay and some troops were ordered! In the case of the opium traffic Sir Charles Crosthwaite says that if the Burmese alone had been con- cerned opium might have been prohibited ; but prohibition would have enraged the Chinese, who were a useful and quiet. But the chief reason which weighed with Lim was that it would have been almost impossible to stop smuggling. Overland transport of opium from Yunnan and from the hilly country on the Salween would have been beyond control without enormous expenditure.

He goes on to a defence—in which we must not be understood to follow him—of a free opium market, quoting with approval the argument of Sir J. Scott that where opium is cheap the people are always healthy. It is dear opium, he says,. When they die of hunger they are said to have died. The Burmans will not become slaves of opium or drink so long as they practise Buddhism. The danger, as in India, is that Western education will undermine their ancient creed without replacing it with any other religious or moral motive.

As for the ruby mines the decision to let them on a temporary lease to a mining company—a short lease of three years in order to ascertain the value- of the mines—was taken by Sir Charles Crosthwaite's pre- decessor. The excited discussion in the House of Commons. The Secretary for India sent out an expert to report on them. Sir Charles Crosthwaite describes the sequel: A company was floated in London under the auspices of a big financier.

The success for the concessionnaires was un- exampled. Anaukwindawhmu U Paung would lead swordsmen and Shan and Burmese musketeers to attack the city directly and slaughter Burmese ministers and officials who had capitulated under the British. Mongnai Sawbwa would invade the eastern suburbs and capture Yankin Hill with swordsmen and Shan and Burmese musketeers. Lawksawk Sawbwa would invade Amarapura with swordsmen and Shan and Burmese musketeers. Myaukdawebo Maung Gale would then administer the oath of allegiance to all Sawbwas and Myosas. In the end, Myinzaing was forced to retreat into the Myelat State of Ywangan.

He contracted fever there in August and died soon after. This united front however did not materialize because of British retaliation. Bo Shwe Yan finally escaped into the jungles near Panlaung while the princes retreated back into Mandalay by A plot was hatched in in Mandalay to put Saw Yan Naing on the throne. Nevertheless, the plan was foiled once again by the British who arrested the ringleaders while Saw Yan Naing was dispatched to Rangoon.

On 23 December, after skirmishes with two companies of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers , they gave up Shwebo but continue to harass the British forces. After a major battle at Kadu Kunitywa, the princes were defeated. Hteiktin Thein died later in January but his brother Hteiktin continued the resistance. After continual harass and strong British retaliation, Hteiktin Hmat retreated to the north. He attacked and captured Taze with men recruited from Myedu , Wuntho and Indauktha. However, the tough jungle life was unbearable to him and like Myinzaing Prince, he died of fever in August The Shwegyobyu Prince, whose claim to royalty was probably questionable, rose up and mobilized his forces of resistance at Kanle in the southern part of the Chindwin district in the treacherous hills of the Pondaung range.

By , he had extended his resistance activities into the Yaw country and then the Chin Hills. U Tha Gyi, another local man of influence defected from the British and joined in the resistance. At the same time of the Shwegyobyu Prince attacks, the Bayingan Viceroy Prince also arose along with resistance movements that started in Mandalay and eventually moving north into Sagaing. The combined forces of both princes became a serious threat to the British. In early , the Kyimyindaing Prince started off his resistance movement in Ava district before establishing himself in the area around Mahlaing.

He then combined forces with leaders like Yamethin Lewun, Theingon Thugyi, Buddhayaza and Thihaya when he moved south. Their forces managed to disrupt the communications of the British in Pyinmana.



However, the British moved swiftly against the Prince and his forces, attacking his camp on 12 November The Kyimyindaing Prince was forced to withdraw but not without killing a British officer, Lieutenant Eckersley of the Somersetshire Regiment. British counter-attacks forced the Prince to retreat to Ywangan state where he and his men fought their last battle stoically till the last man standing.

Initially starting his resistance movement from his base in Mandalay District, he moved to Maw, the Myelat state on the southeast border of Kyaukse at the end of This was followed by attacks from the British with the support of the Maw Ngwegunhmu. The Setkya prince was forced to withdraw east in , establish a large following and making incursions into Kyauke district.

He did some damage to the Military Police but was eventually captured by the Sawbwa of Lawksawk who handed him over to the British to be executed. Although in his fifties by the time of annexation, Bo Swe , the hereditary Thugyi of Mindat continued to fight against the British. He established his power in the region west of Minbu, between the Irrawaddy and Arakan hills.

By December , Bo Swe and his forces attacked a police station on the west frontier and subsequently moving into Malun township in After which, Bo Swe retreated into the Arakan Yomas. He emerged once again in May to attack Kani with men. The British, at that time, set a bounty of Rs.

Nevertheless, Bo Swe was unfazed. The British commander Phayre was shot and killed in the skirmish and Bo Swe managed to hold his position at Padein. To salvage the loss of their commander, the British then sent reinforcements from Pagan led by Major Gordan with 95 rifles of the 2nd Bengal Infantry, 50 rifles of the Liverpool Regiment and 2 artillery pieces. Bo Swe eventually withdrew but not without inflicting losses of 8 killed and 26 wounded on the British side. Finding their strength rather deficient at Ngape , the British withdrew in July , allowing Bo Swe to once again regroup and reconsolidate his forces in the region.

After the Ngape incident, the British decoded to change tactics. They tried to win Bo Swe over to their side with the promise that he would be appointed Extra Assistant Commissioner 5th Grade at Ngape should he give himself up with his men and capture U Ottama. There was a further proviso that he would not be charged for the murder of Phayre.

Nevertheless, Bo Swe refused. Finally, Bo Swe made a last ditched effort at repelling the British forces in a ravine near Milangon in Thayetmyo district. He died a valiant death of fighting with only 10 of his men as compared to the more numerous mounted South Wales Borderers led by Major Harvey. Bo Ya Nyun was the chief horseman of Welaung in Myingyan district. This district was well known for the high caliber of its cavalry.

Due to his official position and his natural leadership ability, Bo Ya Nyun was able to gather a large following. Whenever the enemy forces were too great, he would retreat into the jungles around Popa. By Bo Ya Ngun had reconsolidated enough strength to establish himself formally at Welaung , launching attacks on the British from there.