A 2007 view from Europe on NATO providing peace in our time on our continent.

In such a matter we can only go step by step, but we must begin now. I propose that each of the Powers and States should be invited to delegate a certain number of air squadrons to the service of the world organization. These squadrons would be trained and prepared in their own countries, but would move around in rotation from one country to another. They would wear the uniform of their own countries but with different badges. They would not be required to act against their own nation, but in other respects they would be directed by the world organization.

This might be started on a modest scale and would grow as confidence grew. I wished to see this done after the First World War, and I devoutly trust it may be done forthwith. It would nevertheless be wrong and imprudent to entrust the secret knowledge or experience of the atomic bomb, which the United States, Great Britain, and Canada now share, to the world organization, while it is still in its infancy. It would be criminal madness to cast it adrift in this still agitated and un-united world. No one in any country has slept less well in their beds because this knowledge and the method and the raw materials to apply it, are at present largely retained in American hands.

I do not believe we should all have slept so soundly had the positions been reversed and if some Communist or neo-Fascist State monopolized for the time being these dread agencies. The fear of them alone might easily have been used to enforce totalitarian systems upon the free democratic world, with consequences appalling to human imagination.

God has willed that this shall not be and we have at least a breathing space to set our house in order before this peril has to be encountered: Ultimately, when the essential brotherhood of man is truly embodied and expressed in a world organization with all the necessary practical safeguards to make it effective, these powers would naturally be confided to that world organization. Now I come to the second danger of these two marauders which threatens the cottage, the home, and the ordinary people - namely, tyranny.

We cannot be blind to the fact that the liberties enjoyed by individual citizens throughout the British Empire are not valid in a considerable number of countries, some of which are very powerful. In these States control is enforced upon the common people by various kinds of all-embracing police governments.

The power of the State is exercised without restraint, either by dictators or by compact oligarchies operating through a privileged party and a political police. It is not our duty at this time when difficulties are so numerous to interfere forcibly in the internal affairs of countries which we have not conquered in war. But we must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence.

All this means that the people of any country have the right, and should have the power by constitutional action, by free unfettered elections, with secret ballot, to choose or change the character or form of government under which they dwell; that freedom of speech and thought should reign; that courts of justice, independent of the executive, unbiased by any party, should administer laws which have received the broad assent of large majorities or are consecrated by time and custom. Here are the title deeds of freedom which should lie in every cottage home. Here is the message of the British and American peoples to mankind.

NATO today and tomorrow

Let us preach what we practice - let us practice - what we preach. I have now stated the two great dangers which menace the homes of the people: I have not yet spoken of poverty and privation which are in many cases the prevailing anxiety. But if the dangers of war and tyranny are removed, there is no doubt that science and co-operation can bring in the next few years to the world, certainly in the next few decades newly taught in the sharpening school of war, an expansion of material well-being beyond anything that has yet occurred in human experience.

Now, at this sad and breathless moment, we are plunged in the hunger and distress which are the aftermath of our stupendous struggle; but this will pass and may pass quickly, and there is no reason except human folly or sub-human crime which should deny to all the nations the inauguration and enjoyment of an age of plenty. I have often used words which I learned fifty years ago from a great Irish-American orator, a friend of mine, Mr. The earth is a generous mother; she will provide in plentiful abundance food for all her children if they will but cultivate her soil in justice and in peace.

Now, while still pursuing the method of realizing our overall strategic concept, I come to the crux of what I have traveled here to say. Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This is no time for generalities, and I will venture to be precise.

Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges. It should carry with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all Naval and Air Force bases in the possession of either country all over the world.

This would perhaps double the mobility of the American Navy and Air Force. It would greatly expand that of the British Empire Forces and it might well lead, if and as the world calms down, to important financial savings. Already we use together a large number of islands; more may well be entrusted to our joint care in the near future.

This Agreement is more effective than many of those which have often been made under formal alliances. This principle should be extended to all British Commonwealths with full reciprocity. Thus, whatever happens, and thus only, shall we be secure ourselves and able to work together for the high and simple causes that are dear to us and bode no ill to any. Eventually there may come - I feel eventually there will come - the principle of common citizenship, but that we may be content to leave to destiny, whose outstretched arm many of us can already clearly see. There is however an important question we must ask ourselves.

Would a special relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth be inconsistent with our over-riding loyalties to the World Organization? I reply that, on the contrary, it is probably the only means by which that organization will achieve its full stature and strength. There are already the special United States relations with Canada which I have just mentioned, and there are the special relations between the United States and the South American Republics.

I agree with Mr. Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, that it might well be a fifty years Treaty so far as we are concerned. We aim at nothing but mutual assistance and collaboration. The British have an alliance with Portugal unbroken since , and which produced fruitful results at critical moments in the late war. None of these clash with the general interest of a world agreement, or a world organization; on the contrary they help it. I spoke earlier of the Temple of Peace. Workmen from all countries must build that temple.

1. NATO Speech : NATO - Defence of security and shared values- 1 March .
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4. Una gran oportunidad (Jazmín) (Spanish Edition)!

If two of the workmen know each other particularly well and are old friends, if their families are inter-mingled, and if they have "faith in each other's purpose, hope in each other's future and charity towards each other's shortcomings" - to quote some good words I read here the other day - why cannot they work together at the common task as friends and partners? Why cannot they share their tools and thus increase each other's working powers?

Indeed they must do so or else the temple may not be built, or, being built, it may collapse, and we shall all be proved again unteachable and have to go and try to learn again for a third time in a school of war, incomparably more rigorous than that from which we have just been released. The dark ages may return, the Stone Age may return on the gleaming wings of science, and what might now shower immeasurable material blessings upon mankind, may even bring about its total destruction. Beware, I say; time may be short.

NATO Speech: NATO today and tomorrow - Speech by NATO Secretary General - 8 Nov

Do not let us take the course of allowing events to drift along until it is too late. If there is to be a fraternal association of the kind I have described, with all the extra strength and security which both our countries can derive from it, let us make sure that that great fact is known to the world, and that it plays its part in steadying and stabilizing the foundations of peace.

There is the path of wisdom. Prevention is better than cure. A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain - and I doubt not here also - towards the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships.

We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all, we welcome constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic.

It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.

Athens alone - Greece with its immortal glories - is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control.

Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy. Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government. An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build up a quasi-Communist party in their zone of Occupied Germany by showing special favors to groups of left-wing German leaders. At the end of the fighting last June, the American and British Armies withdrew westwards, in accordance with an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of miles upon a front of nearly four hundred miles, in order to allow our Russian allies to occupy this vast expanse of territory which the Western Democracies had conquered.

If now the Soviet Government tries, by separate action, to build up a pro-Communist Germany in their areas, this will cause new serious difficulties in the British and American zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting themselves up to auction between the Soviets and the Western Democracies. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts - and facts they are - this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up.

Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace. The safety of the world requires a new unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. It is from the quarrels of the strong parent races in Europe that the world wars we have witnessed, or which occurred in former times, have sprung. Twice in our own lifetime we have seen the United States, against their wishes and their traditions, against arguments, the force of which it is impossible not to comprehend, drawn by irresistible forces, into these wars in time to secure the victory of the good cause, but only after frightful slaughter and devastation had occurred.

Twice the United States has had to send several millions of its young men across the Atlantic to find the war; but now war can find any nation, wherever it may dwell between dusk and dawn. Some point to Russia for reacting to the fall of its ally Yanukovich in Ukraine by sparking a civil war in eastern Ukraine, designed to weaken the new Western-leaning government of Petro Poroshenko below, left and pull Ukraine back firmly into the Russian orbit.

As Russia has emerged from the chaos and economic troubles that characterized the initial years after the fall of the Soviet Union , it has become more assertive on its borders and less willing to cooperate with other European states. Under Putin , the Russian state has become more centralized and autocratic.

They have moved their sphere of influence east in spite of Russian objections, raising long-standing Russian fears of encroachment on its traditional sphere of influence. NATO itself has become more willing to take an active role in areas outside its normal scope, moving from a deterrent protecting Western Europe to operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

Yet looking at the history of NATO shows that since its origins in the alliance has often changed its mission, its strategy, and even its geographic scope of membership and activity. The most dramatic shift came at the end of the Cold War, when the alliance found it needed to justify its existence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Starting with the formation of NATO itself, changes were often driven by political rather than military or strategic factors. The alliance has always needed to keep an eye on its internal political cohesion, to ensure that it speaks with one voice to the extent possible.

Disagreements over the future of Germany, the growing division of Europe, and increasing ideological competition created an adversarial relationship between the Soviets and the Western allies. As the Soviets gained control over the countries of Eastern Europe that they occupied during the war, the Western allies reacted by tying Western Europe more closely together, including the western portion of Germany.

But the political and economic situations in Western Europe were still unstable and some feared communist-led governments could take power in countries like Italy and France. These fears prompted leaders in Western countries, including the United States, to seek new ways to strengthen anti-communist governments. Much of this support was economic, through the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction.

Some of the support was military, as promised by the so-called Truman Doctrine. President Harry Truman articulated this position to the nation as he announced American military assistance to the Greek and Turkish governments fighting communist-supported guerillas. But the threat remained. In February , when communists in Czechoslovakia staged a coup and evicted non-communists from the government, it appeared that the continuing instability in Europe might facilitate the further spread of Soviet communism.

In the wake of the Czechoslovakian coup, leaders in Western Europe began to look for ways to solidify the region against this communist threat. These countries all recognized that they were too weak properly to defend one another against outside threats, particularly the Soviet Union, and realized that the only country capable of providing such defense was the United States.

However, despite the extension of American involvement through the Marshall Plan and the military assistance promised by the Truman Doctrine, it was still unclear what role Americans wanted to play in postwar Europe. American leaders recognized that, while the economic and military assistance was vital to the reconstruction and stabilization of postwar Europe, the overall political situation was still uncertain, and Europeans needed more than military aid to ensure security.

As the sense of crisis heightened after the Czechoslovakian coup and the subsequent Berlin Blockade in , the U. The implications of such a treaty were significant. It would be the first peacetime American alliance with European states since the immediate years after the American Revolution , and would commit American military, economic, and political power to Europe. This assurance would send a strong signal to the European public that the United States was committed to ensuring the stability of Western Europe, thus preventing other governments from potentially appeasing the Soviets and falling under their influence.

The Treaty recognized the political role of this new alliance. The former called for close military coordination between the treaty signatories, and the latter stated that an attack against one ally was an attack against all of them. Pushed by the Canadian delegation, Article II was designed to demonstrate that NATO was to be more than a strictly military alliance, and sought broader political goals for its members.

In its initial months, this political role seemed to be more important than the military side of the new alliance. Limited defense budgets on both sides of the Atlantic, a reduced sense of urgency after the end of the Berlin Blockade, and uncertainty regarding the larger role of the alliance created a sense of stasis. It was only after the outbreak of the Korean War in June , and the resulting fear that Soviet communism was becoming more aggressive, that the allies began organizing their militaries under a new defense organization, with a command structure and permanently assigned units.

These included American forces stationed in West Germany. Significantly, NATO matched these military developments with political ones. Most notably, the Soviet Union gathered its Eastern European allies into a rival organization, the Warsaw Pact, in Throughout the remainder of the Cold War, until the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in , the two blocs faced off against each other in a nuclear standoff.

The main changes that NATO underwent during these decades were the times it expanded its membership, adding Greece and Turkey to its southeastern flank in , West Germany in , and Spain in While both the West German and Spanish expansions were militarily useful, they also served important political purposes.

Throughout the s, plans put forward about removing Germany as a threat to peace by making it a neutral, largely disarmed country raised the worries of instability in central Europe that might once again drag the continent into war. Bringing West Germany into NATO forestalled that possibility, legitimized the new Federal Republic, and gave West Germans assurance that their new allies would not desert them in case of Soviet aggression. Similarly, the accession of Spain following the end of the Franco dictatorship in the late s legitimized the nascent Spanish democracy. Despite changed geopolitical circumstances, most nations in Europe, both those inside and outside of NATO and including many former Warsaw Pact countries, continued to see the alliance as the preeminent source of stability and security on the continent.

While post-Soviet Russia appeared weak, none of its former allies wished to return to the position of client to their eastern neighbor, should Russian power and aggression revive. As a result, NATO not only remained in place, but also grew to include new members. As East Germany collapsed into disorganization, it became increasingly clear that the only way to stabilize the state was for West Germany to absorb the former communist territory. The Soviet Union objected. In the initial meetings after the fall of the Berlin Wall, American leaders sought to appease Soviet concerns, offering to assure them that NATO forces would not expand eastward in Germany.

These early offerings helped smooth the negotiations towards the reunification of Germany a year later. Without NATO being able to operate in the east, that territory would be difficult to defend, and East German citizens would not accept less protection than their new German compatriots in the west received.

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Thus, the American position in the negotiation changed at a very early point, from assurances that NATO forces would not expand eastward in Germany, to requiring that East Germany be allowed to join NATO with few, if any, limitations. Even though they were at first opposed to these terms, Soviet and East German officials did accept them. Thus, the final agreements, both bilateral between East and West Germany and multilateral between the other actors, recognized that the territory of East Germany would become a part of NATO.

In return, the West agreed to a lenient timeline for the removal of Soviet forces and provided billions of dollars in aid to help redeploy and resettle these troops in Russia. Perhaps more importantly, the final agreements also recognized that all of the states of Europe were free to choose which alliance, if any, to join. These states were struggling with the transition from communism to democracy, and saw NATO as a means to strengthen themselves politically and militarily, allowing room for economic development that would provide new prosperity and the possibility to join the burgeoning European Union.

They also saw NATO as a means to provide themselves with additional security from possible Russian aggression. It bears repeating that as NATO was trying to redefine itself in the post-Cold War environment, it was not looking to expand. Many of the original allies, including Britain and France, did not think expansion provided any advantage , views echoed by the American military.

But many American and Western officials, including President Bill Clinton below, left , came to see NATO enlargement as a useful means for ensuring political stability in an increasingly unstable Europe. In the words of senior State Department official Strobe Talbott above, right in For supporters of expansion, a larger NATO would provide security to democratizing countries, solidifying their transitions from communism and opening new economic prosperity through greater connections with the European Union, including potentially membership there.

Critics of enlargement argued that the new members would not offer NATO much military or strategic benefit, and that those countries would be better served through other organizations, including the OSCE and EU. NATO began evaluating candidates for military and political readiness. In , NATO judged that Poland , Hungary, and the Czech Republic met these criteria, but found that other countries like Slovakia needed more time to adjust their domestic politics to more liberal democratic norms. There were also claims that NATO expansion was directed against Russia, intended to surround the country with adversaries and reduce its ability to act independently in its former sphere of influence.

American and Western leaders were not blind to Russian concerns. Even though prospective members initiated the call for membership, despite whatever reluctance within NATO, there was a recognition that such enlargement could not happen without taking into account Russian concerns.

It would threaten no one and would enhance stability and security for all of Europe.

This program was open to all of the former Warsaw Pact countries and the rest of Europe, and was designed to open larger collaborations toward overall peace and stability in Europe. Russia gained special consideration within PfP, given its unique geopolitical circumstances.

PfP was not a formal arrangement, and did not provide non-members much access to the alliance or its decisions.