THIS IS NOT THE COUNTRY I CAME TO - An Immigrants Perspective on the Changes taking place in America

The Baby Boom, those Americans born from the late s to the mids, actually reversed the aging of the American population for several decades. The very large birth cohorts during this period rippled through the age structure of the American population over the past half-century. The most distinctive feature of the population in , at the peak of the Baby Boom, was the relative abundance of children and youth and the relative scarcity of the elderly.

With less than 1 in 10 Americans above age 65, the costs of Social Security and Medicare, which was implemented. The costs of youthful dependents, for schooling in particular, were substantial, but the benefits were broadly distributed to most households with children. The costs of child care were primarily borne by families and by women in particular. The population share of children and youth fell sharply by 10 percentage points from to and has continued to decline, but more gradually, in recent years.

The share of the elderly has increased very slowly over the same period, rising from 9 percent in to 12 percent in However, the rate of change in population aging has accelerated in recent years, and the share of elderly is predicted to reach 16 percent in and 20 percent in The population share in the prime working ages, , rose for several decades after and was about 54 percent of the total population from to As the large Baby Boom cohorts—those born from to —become senior citizens in the years following , the population share in the prime working ages will decline, dropping below 50 percent by the late s.

Changes in the age structure and the growth of the elderly population exert a fundamental constraint on public finances. In essence, the support of dependent-aged populations rests on the number of working-age Americans. What is most striking about Figure is that the senior ratio sometimes called the old-age dependency ratio remained relatively constant, with between 19 and 24 seniors per working-age population, from to , after which it is projected to rise sharply based on the Pew projection data.

The oldest Baby Boomers crossed the age 65 threshold in , and by , the ratio has already climbed to In the next 25 years, by , the ratio is projected to reach This increase of The current level of youthful immigration to the United States is not sufficient to completely reverse population aging or to rejuvenate low-. As noted earlier, 1 million new immigrants per year is less than one-third of 1 percent of million people that comprise the American population.

But the small effect of immigration on population aging is not inconsequential Lutz and Scherbov, To demonstrate the impact of immigration on population aging, one can compare old age ratios in projections that include or exclude immigration using the method developed by Myers If one hypothetically removes immigration after , including the future descendants of those immigrants, it is possible to compare the future changes in the senior ratio over several decades. These data have already been applied in Figure , but the calculation of how large a difference immigration makes requires more detail.

As demonstrated in Table , population projections can be compared for the key ages with and without immigration. Without any immigration after , the older population grows to a ratio of Even in the first 25 years, by , the ratio without immigration is projected to reach In effect, already by , the absence of immigration in the population projection would lead to growth of the senior ratio that is about one-quarter Pew Research Center a. Clearly, immigration cannot fully stop population aging, but it can partially slow its effects.

As can be seen in the table, immigrants and descendants add to the working-age population much more than to the elderly population. Not all grow old at once, and even after immigrants age, their children continue to pay a dividend toward old age support. Belonging to the working-age population does not directly translate into employment—this depends on labor force behavior. In general, foreign-born men are slightly more likely to be employed than their native-born peers, especially after the first few years of adjustment following immigration Duncan and Trejo, ; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, , Ch.

The gap is widest among men with a high school or less than high school education. Over a quarter of low-educated men in the third-plus generation are not employed, whereas the employment-to-population ratio of foreign-born men is very high across the education spectrum. The difference in employment ratios between foreign-born and native-born men is due mainly to differences in labor force participation and not to unemployment. Native-born men have some options—advanced education, early retirement, disability—that are not as readily available to foreign-born men, especially those who are unauthorized immigrants.

Among women, larger nativity differentials in labor force participation are common.

The Impact of Immigration on American Society: Looking Backward to the Future | IWM

Immigrant women are somewhat less likely about 5 to 10 percentage points to be employed than their third-plus generation peers in the same racial and ethnic group the pattern is reversed for those with less than a high school education. The main differences in employment here are due to the high percentage of immigrant women staying home with young children; their labor force participation rate now resembles that of native-born females during the s which was much higher than it had been, say, in the s, but still far from its peak around the year Second generation women are, however, just as likely to be working as their third-plus generation peers National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, , Ch.

As the Baby Boom cohorts age and exit from the labor force in the coming decades, immigrants and their children will play an even larger role in the American economy. To provide an historical perspective on future trends, Table and Figure report the net population change in thousands in the working-age population, ages , by immigration generation for each decade from to , with projections added for and Pew Research Center, a.

The net change in the working-age population is the balance between the numbers turning age 25 new entrants relative to those turning age 65 those exiting during the decade. Among the first generation, net change is the inflow of new.

Among the second and third-plus generations, net change is driven by the size of cohorts that were born 25 years earlier relative to those born 65 years ago those entering and leaving the working-age population. A large wave of new immigrants and their childbearing will trigger a subsequent large wave of births of second generation children, who will become workers approximately two decades later. From to , the working-age population grew by a little more than 6 million—a slow expansion driven by the relatively small birth cohorts that occurred in the late s and early s.

The figure of 6 million additional working-age people reflects the balance of a net increase of almost 9 million in the third-plus generation population and a net decrease of almost 2. These figures reflect the mortality experience and aging out of the workforce attaining age 65 of immigrants and children from early in the 20th century, before the long immigration pause.

In short, the foreign-born population in was composed mainly of the elderly survivors of the early 20th century immigration. The figure of 6 million persons added to the working-age population during the s is dwarfed by the population changes that follow over the next few decades. Between and , the working-age population expanded by about 20 million net workers each decade. From to , the growth was entirely due to Baby Boom cohorts in the third-plus generation reaching working age. Immigration added to the ranks of potential workers, but much of the increase was canceled out by aging of the second generation i.

Subsequently, in the last decade of the 20th century, the share of the increase in working-age population due to net immigration rose, not only because the inflow of immigrants increased but also because the additions to the third-plus generation of working age slowed to only 12 million. The to decade was a transitional period in terms of the share of growth in the working-age population contributed by immigrants. Overall growth held steady, with an increase of 17 million persons ages 25 to 64, but the increase from the third-plus generations slowed to 8 million, while the first and second generation working-age population increased by 9.

These trends have accelerated since and are projected to continue through the s. Growth of the third-plus generation is all but vanishing, with almost all of the 9 million net additions to the working-age population coming from the ranks of the first and second generations. The high relative growth of the second generation reflects the increases in immigration after ; the children of those immigrants are now coming of age, and new immigrants continue to make net additions to the working-age population.

The decade after marks a major turning point. The leading edge of the Baby Boom generation is aging into the retirement range turning 65 and older , and their numbers are approximately equal to entry of younger third-plus generation persons in the working ages. Overall, the net growth of potential workers ages among third-plus generation cohorts will shrink to less than half a million from to At the same time, the Pew Research Center projections suggest that the net increase in the number of working-age foreign-born will also slow, falling by half between the decades and However, the second generation—the children of the post wave of immigrants—are projected to add almost 4 million net entrants to the working-age population, a much greater number than in earlier decades.

After , the aging of the Baby Boom generation from to will begin to drain the potential workforce drawn from the ranks of the third-plus generation; a net departure from the working-age population of over 7 million is expected. From to , modest growth of the population ages 25 to 64—projected as a net gain of only 2 million persons—will result because of the growth of the first and second generation population segments. Based on the projections by the Pew Research Center a , the net gain of potential first generation workers will slow to 2 million in the s.

This number is less than half that of the decade and lower than any decade since , reflecting the fact that earlier immigration cohorts are reaching retirement ages. The projected changes in size of the working-age population from to are almost entirely due to the aging of persons already born and living in the United States. Assumptions about future mortality and emigration rates create a bit of uncertainty in the projections but not much. If the American economy grows and requires more workers both to replace those who retire and to create new firms and industries, the primary source of labor will be first and second generation immigrants.

This basic fact will hold at all levels, from low-skilled service jobs to professionals with postgraduate degrees. It bears repeating that the reason the third-plus generation cannot be a source of workforce growth is that so many of the older members from this population segment will be aging past Many young people who are third-plus generation Americans will be joining the working-age population, but they will simply be outnumbered by the flood of departing Baby Boomers.

These Baby Boom departures are expected to create employment opportunities that will benefit all ethnoracial groups. For instance, Richard Alba has argued that, similar to the World War II period, this coming period could create ideal conditions for reducing competitive frictions between groups and reducing inequality among minority groups and immigrants.

In addition to its impacts on employment and future economic growth, the volume and age composition of the immigrant population also has implications for public expenditures on education, old-age security, and health care. The working ages are also the primary ages of family formation.

Foreign-born women will bear an increasing share of future births in the United States. However, as discussed above, all groups in the United States appear to be converging to replacement-level fertility two children per woman or below by the second generation. Currently, first and second generation immigrants comprise about one of four children in schools.

Their schooling generates expenditures, but it is also an investment in their future productivity and the well-being of the rapidly growing elderly population of Baby Boomers Myers, The post immigrants also are beginning to retire and to become eligible for Social Security and Medicare. There is also some evidence that late-age immigration has been increasing somewhat Batalova, ; Carr and Tienda, ; Terrazas, Carr and Tienda used administrative data to examine changes in the age composition of immigrant inflows since ; they found that approximately two-thirds of all LPRs admitted between and were in their prime working ages.

Concurrently, immigration of persons above age 65 increased, rising from about 11 percent of new LPRs admitted between and to nearly 17 percent of new admissions between and This increase is consistent with claims by Jasso and Rosenzweig , who attribute this rise in older-age immigration primarily to sponsorship of parents by naturalized immigrants and to a lesser extent to the visa backlog for numerically capped relatives of naturalized immigrants. Other studies have found that numerically capped relatives from the top four sending nations contributed to late-age immigration because their family members aged while waiting in long queues for their visa priority number to be called Tienda, ; Wasem, The geographical distribution of immigrants across the United States has been a function of initial patterns of settlement and subsequent patterns of internal migration.

The initial pattern of settlement is sometimes affected by proximity, favoring seaports of first arrival and places near border crossings. The concentration of 19th century Irish immigrants in Boston and New York and of Cubans in south Florida in the s and s is illustrative of the importance of proximity. Locations of economic opportunity and of established co-ethnic communities are also important determinants of settlement patterns.

In the early 20th century, high labor. Even more important than arrival proximity is the presence of families and friends who can provide temporary housing, assistance in finding jobs, and the warmth of welcome based on ties of kinship and mutual obligation. These same factors affect the secondary, internal migration of immigrants after arrival. In the s and s, the federal government sought to settle Cuban and Vietnamese refugees in isolated small towns throughout the country in a misguided effort to spur assimilation Portes and Bach, Most of these families eventually moved to cities that had concentrations of their ethnicity, where they found family and relatives who could provide economic opportunity and also understand their cultural and spiritual needs.

The descendants of immigrants have less connection to the churches, institutions, and neighborhoods favored by their immigrant forebears, and they tend to move to suburban locations with more amenities and to other states and localities that offer attractive economic opportunities. Many cities and locations within cities retain an ethnic character across generations, but it usually takes a continuous flow of immigrants to maintain the social and economic vitality of an ethnic community.

The deconcentration and dispersal of immigrant communities, as with the general process of assimilation, is a multigenerational process that occurs unless discrimination or other institutional factors obstruct economic and social mobility. The initial settlement patterns of the post immigration wave follow the logic of earlier immigration flows, except that the origins of the immigrants shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia. Most new arrivals during the s and early s settled in five gateway states: Immigrants registered a visible presence in another five states—Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington—which, together with the traditional destination states, housed over 80 percent of the foreign-born population until Massey and Capoferro, With the exception of Texas and California, where proximity to the Mexican border facilitated recruitment of temporary workers into agricultural jobs throughout the 20th century, most of the initial post immigrants were concentrated in large urban centers Singer, New Jersey could certainly be considered among the major immigration destination states since in recent decades it at least matches Illinois in terms of the share of new settlers, number of foreign-born, and share of foreign-born.

Beginning in the late s and with greater momentum in the s and s, the foreign-born population witnessed a significant geographic dispersal. Buoyed by low unionization rates suppressed by state right-to-work laws U. Bureau of Labor Statistics, a , Table 5 , Southern states with histories of limited prior immigration and recent robust growth in labor demand were major beneficiaries of the dispersal toward nontraditional destinations. In addition, housing costs, school quality, public safety, and other amenities also attracted newcomers away from the traditional gateways and toward other destinations Lichter and Johnson, ; Singer, , ; Tienda and Fuentes, Among factors that pushed both settled immigrants and new arrivals away from the traditional gateways, Massey and Capoferra identified high unemployment rates, which coincided with growth in the availability of newly legalized workers, along with rising anti-immigrant sentiment and tighter border controls authorized by IRCA and selectively implemented at ports of entry along the U.

Despite widespread agreement in the research literature that the effects of immigration are strongest in areas where immigrants are spatially concentrated, relatively few empirical studies have examined the initial settlement patterns and subsequent internal migration of immigrants. Available empirical studies suggest that internal migration rates are higher for immigrants than for the native-born. However, internal migration rates vary according to skill levels, regional origins, and legal status Massey, Based on pubic use microdata from the U. Census Bureau, Bartel found large regional-origin differences in remigration following initial settlement, with Asians more likely than either Europeans or Latin Americans to engage in subsequent internal migration.

To illustrate the changing patterns of settlement of the post wave of immigrants, Table shows the population of immigrants who arrived in the United States during six periods—, , , , , and —by current state of residence in , , , , , and , respectively. The next three post Data from Flood et al. The data for these periods are based on a survey question about the year of arrival in the United States, which is included in both Decennial Censuses and the Annual Social and Economic Supplement March round of the CPS. The classic pattern of post immigrant concentration on the West Coast, East Coast, and a few other locations is evident in the column for , which reflects the character of immigration in the late s.

During this period, 31 percent of recent immigrants were in California and 44 percent were in just two states: California and New York. There were also significant numbers of new immigrants in a few other states: Florida, Illinois, and Texas. More than 60 percent of all recent immigrants resided in these top five destination states. A closer look reveals that most of these immigrants resided in the major cities in these states: A second tier of states, including Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 5 Virginia, and Washington, collectively housed 12 to 13 percent of immigrants, or about 2 to 3 percent each.

Although the post wave of immigration was in full swing in the late s—on average, more than a quarter million immigrants arrived annually during this period—the very concentrated patterns of settlement meant that the majority of the American population, especially in medium-size cities and small towns in the Midwest and South, had little contact with new immigrants.

The pace of immigration accelerated in the late s with more than , arrivals annually, almost tripling the average from 10 years earlier. The index varies from 0 all immigrants in one state to an equal number of immigrants in each state. Although many national political leaders thought the concentration of immigrants was a sign of slow assimilation, immigration researchers explained that the gravitation of immigrants to locations with dense social and business networks was not only the historical pattern but also the path most likely to lead to upward mobility Portes and Rumbaut, The s were a period of rapid economic growth and also increased immigration; the average annual number of arrivals in the late s rose to more than 1 million per year.

It was also the beginning of a dispersed immigrant settlement pattern that generated many new immigrant destinations Massey, ; Singer, , ; Tienda and Fuentes, ; Waters and Jimenez, As shown in Table , the Diversity Index rose from 66 to 77, indicating a very strong trend away from concentrated settlement. Although gateway cities and states continued to receive the largest numbers of new immigrants, there were very large relative shifts of new immigrants away from California and New York.

The diversion of immigrants away from California in the s and continuing to recent years has been stunning. The inflow corresponding to this 18 percentage point decline was distributed across many new places, each with a relatively small share of the total shift. The largest gains in foreign-born population share were 1. The demographic renewal of depopulated nonmetropolitan areas brought by new immigrants has visibly altered the ethnic composition of rural America in a short period of time and has also infused new economic life into dwindling communities Lichter and Johnson, ; Tienda and Fuentes, The geography of immigration.

The post patterns are even more complex, largely because of the Great Recession of to , which interrupted the dispersal to new destinations. In Table , the panel examines three periods— to , to , and to —that provide pre-recession, recession, and post-recession comparisons. The first period, from to , shows a continuation of immigrant flows to new destinations and away from California, New York, and Illinois. The Great Recession did not stop overall immigration. The CPS data in Table show that more than 1 million new international migrants arrived annually in the years before, during, and after the recession.

Since these data count only new arrivals and not departures, they are not necessarily in conflict with the evidence that net undocumented migration into the United States slowed or even reversed during these years. The reported inflows might have been counterbalanced by outflows. Moreover, new arrivals after the recession have been mainly authorized immigrants, most of whom are on family reunification immigrant visas or were admitted on temporary work or student visas.

During the Great Recession period , the pull to new destinations waned and there was a slight reversion back to traditional gateways. The diversity index that had risen from 66 to 80 from the late s to the early s indicating more geographic dispersion fell slightly to 78 during the recession years. California increased its share of immigrants, as did a couple of other traditional gateway states.

Many of the second- and third-tier states that had been gaining immigrants in the s and early s saw a decline in their share of new immigrant arrivals. One explanation, which the panel considers likely, is that many of the growth sectors that were pulling migrants to nontraditional locations, such as construction and manufacturing, had few jobs during the recession for anyone, including immigrants.

In the traditional gateways, the ethnic economy, immigrant institutions, and family networks were better situated to buffer the adverse effects of the recession. The new destinations were also in states with the highest concentration of undocumented persons among their immigrant populations Passel and Cohn, Thus, the slowdown in unauthorized immigration probably also slowed settlement in many new destinations. The most recent period, based on CPS data, shows a return to the dispersal of new migrants away from traditional gateway areas especially California and gains for the second tier states and other states.

In short, the Great Recession interrupted, but did not reverse, the posts trend toward increasing geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population. Economic recovery rekindled the trend away from traditional gateway locations to new destinations. Perhaps the most dramatic change is the declining primacy of California as the leading destination for new immigrants. Although California is still the leading destination, receiving 12 percent of new immigrants from to , this figure is about one-third its foreign-born share in the s and s.

Florida, by contrast, increased its share of new immigrants from 6 to almost 11 percent as other groups beyond Cubans Latin American and Caribbean have settled there. The increasing dispersal of immigrants around the county has made many more Americans aware that immigration is a national phenomenon. This brief survey of historical, current, and future immigration trends supports five specific conclusions drawn by the panel:.

The subsequent chapters of this report address economic issues of contemporary immigration with a focus on the labor market and fiscal system. Many of the controversies over these questions turn on issues of the availability of data and the precise measurement of key theoretical concepts. There is also debate over the interpretation of relatively small differences as well as the assessment of short-term versus long-term impacts, some of. For example, the initial political and social response to major waves of immigration has historically almost invariably been negative.

Many Americans in the early 21st century, just like their predecessors in the midth and early 20th centuries, fear that the numbers and characteristics of new immigrants will have adverse economic, demographic, and cultural impacts on the welfare of the native-born population. Although there may well be short-term costs of immigration, both for immigrants and the host society, study of the last two centuries suggests the long-term impact has been almost entirely positive. Not only did markets adjust but U. To understand the impacts of immigration on U.

Largely because of data limitations, authoritative answers to these seemingly basic questions are surprisingly difficult to obtain. In theory, immigration is measured as stocks—namely, counts of the resident foreign-born in censuses and surveys—and flows, which are the numbers of arrivals minus departures in a given period. Even with complete and accurate measurement, however, the stocks of the foreign-born are not simply the sum of the net flows of prior immigrants. Rather, in any given year, the foreign-born stock represents the survivors among prior migrants, those who neither emigrated nor died.

International migration adds not only to the foreign-born stock but also to the numbers of native-born Americans through the fertility of the immigrants after they arrive. An ambiguity is that children may have one foreign-born and one native-born parent. By general convention, if either parent is foreign-born, the children are considered second generation. Stock measures of the foreign-born population are affected by changes in both census enumeration methods and items in the questionnaire that.

Every Decennial Census from to included a question on birthplace and a question on country of birth for the foreign-born. Comparable data on the foreign-born are available from the ACS, which replaced the long-form census schedule after , and from the CPS, which is used to track labor market trends.

Decennial Census, CPS, and ACS data on the foreign-born population include permanent residents, persons on temporary work and student visas, and undocumented residents who either entered without inspection or have overstayed visas. Therefore, the official census definition of foreign-born—all residents who are not U. The major limitation of Decennial Census, ACS, and CPS data for the study of immigration is that the current visa status and visa status at time of arrival of foreign-born respondents is not recorded.

Current citizenship and year of arrival are measured in most data sources, although with some significant variations in the wording of the question and in measurement precision in the arrival dates. There is considerable mobility across these statuses, and current visa status does not always predict who stays permanently. Changes in the stock of immigrants over time e. Net changes in the immigrant stock are a result not only of in-migration but also of out-migration and deaths of immigrants that have occurred between rounds of the census or survey.

Although measurement can be improved by. Undocumented persons are likely to be underenumerated in all surveys and censuses. Prior to the Decennial Census, this group was identifiable in census data through the questions on country of birth of parents. This permits data users to identify the foreign-born population as well as to distinguish U.

Flows of immigrants are also difficult to measure because of changes in the criteria used to record new admissions and because return flows are poorly measured. In , the federal government began counting immigrants based on arrivals by ships at major seaports. However, persons crossing land borders were not counted until the early years of the 20th century. The historical fact that a considerable number of immigrants entered the United States by crossing land borders after arriving by ship at Canadian ports renders counts of immigrants for these periods incomplete.

1. How the Past 50 Years of Immigration Changed America.
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A second major problem with flow estimates is the lack of comprehensive data on departures, or emigration. Because of poor data quality, the U. Immigration and Naturalization Service ceased publishing emigration counts in Historians have estimated that perhaps up to one-third of the persons who arrived between and returned to Europe Wyman, , p.

Even higher figures were reported in a recent study based on detailed administrative records from Ellis Island Bandiera et al. That study found that out-migration rates may have been as high as 60 to 70 percent during the early 20th century, although they varied sharply by group, being quite low for those who faced persecution at home but comparatively high for groups dominated by labor migrants.

Recent research suggests that current emigration levels are not insignificant and also vary sharply by group Ahmed and Robinson, ; U. Census Bureau, ; Van Hook et al. Steamship companies also screened potential immigrants at embarkation because they were liable for the return transportation of persons denied entry to the United States. After the passage of the legislation, prospective immigrants were required to obtain an immigrant visa from an American consular office in their origin country Zolberg, , Ch.

The shift in measurement to those with immigrant visas probably had little impact during the s and s. Not only were immigrant flows fairly modest but the numbers of nonimmigrant foreigners who were in the United States for tourism, study, or temporary work also was much smaller than the inflow of permanent immigrants. This is no longer the case. Based on DHS administrative records, there were 61 million nonimmigrant border crossings in Foreman and Monger, Very few of these nonimmigrant entrants become residents of the United States, as the vast majority are only in the country for short periods.

There is no official count of persons who are in the United States without a visa—the undocumented population—but the expert consensus is that the undocumented population peaked at approximately 12 million in , then fell to about 11 million in the wake of the Great Recession Baker and Rytina, ; Passel et al.

Both side-door nonimmigrant visa entrants and back-door undocumented entrants arrivals have complicated the assumption that the number of persons receiving LPR status reliably tracks new arrivals to the United States. Simply put, there are many more persons entering and leaving on temporary visas or without a current visa than the number of new LPRs.

Most but not all persons on temporary work and student visas are counted as part of the foreign-born population in censuses and surveys, which inflates immigrant stock measures. However, people on temporary visas who are included in the count of the foreign-born population very likely represent less than 5 percent of the foreign-born population National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, , p.

Temporary visa holders can achieve LPR status via sponsorship by an employer or family member. In recent years, large pluralities of new LPRs are persons who adjust their temporary visa status to LPR after many years of residence with or without a visa Kandel, ; U. Department of Homeland Security, Notwithstanding these difficulties in measuring immigration flows and statuses, about 70 percent of the foreign-born population in census and survey data are LPRs or naturalized U. The estimated number of nonimmigrant border crossings is even larger million: The official estimate includes persons with border crossing cards and other frequent travelers for whom electronic I forms are not automatically generated.

The conversion from paper to electronic I forms has increased the reported number of nonimmigrant admissions Foreman and Monger, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration finds that the long-term impact of immigration on the wages and employment of native-born workers overall is very small, and that any negative impacts are most likely to be found for prior immigrants or native-born high school dropouts. First-generation immigrants are more costly to governments than are the native-born, but the second generation are among the strongest fiscal and economic contributors in the U.

This report concludes that immigration has an overall positive impact on long-run economic growth in the U. More than 40 million people living in the United States were born in other countries, and almost an equal number have at least one foreign-born parent. Together, the first generation foreign-born and second generation children of the foreign-born comprise almost one in four Americans. It comes as little surprise, then, that many U. Not only does immigration affect the environment in which everyone lives, learns, and works, but it also interacts with nearly every policy area of concern, from jobs and the economy, education, and health care, to federal, state, and local government budgets.

The changing patterns of immigration and the evolving consequences for American society, institutions, and the economy continue to fuel public policy debate that plays out at the national, state, and local levels. The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration assesses the impact of dynamic immigration processes on economic and fiscal outcomes for the United States, a major destination of world population movements.

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Current Trends in Historical Perspective. Looking for other ways to read this? The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration. The National Academies Press. Current Trends in Historical Perspective 2. Page 34 Share Cite. In this brief survey, the panel addresses four major contemporary issues that have historical roots: Are current levels of immigration higher than those experienced in the past?

How is immigration changing the racial and ethnic makeup of the U. What will be the impact of immigrant workers on the U. How have the geographic settlement patterns of new immigrants changed in recent decades? Page 35 Share Cite. Page 36 Share Cite. This figure replicates Martin , Fig. These data can be downloaded from https: Page 37 Share Cite.

Page 38 Share Cite. Page 39 Share Cite. Page 40 Share Cite. Page 41 Share Cite. The American Industrial Revolution and Immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, to The second historical period of immigration includes the last two decades of the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th Table approximates this period with data from to Page 42 Share Cite. Page 43 Share Cite. The Immigration Pause from to During the long hiatus in immigration, only 7 million LPRs were admitted Table approximates this period with data from to Page 44 Share Cite.

The Post Immigration Wave from Latin America and Asia The 35 million legal immigrants from to represent a new chapter in American immigration history, with more than 40 percent coming from Latin America and 34 percent from Asia Table Page 45 Share Cite. Page 46 Share Cite. Page 47 Share Cite. Page 48 Share Cite. Page 49 Share Cite. Page 50 Share Cite. Page 51 Share Cite. Page 52 Share Cite. Page 53 Share Cite. Page 54 Share Cite. Page 55 Share Cite. Page 56 Share Cite. Page 57 Share Cite. Page 58 Share Cite. Page 59 Share Cite. Page 60 Share Cite.

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Page 61 Share Cite. Page 62 Share Cite. Page 63 Share Cite. Page 64 Share Cite. Page 65 Share Cite. Myers and unpublished estimates by Pew Research Center a. Page 66 Share Cite. Page 67 Share Cite. Page 68 Share Cite. Working-age Population, Ages , by Immigrant Generation, from to , Based on Population Estimates and Projections Time Period Net Change in Resident Working-age Population thousands Total Immigrant Generation First Second Third-plus to 6, — —1, 8, to 17, 2, —3, 17, to 22, 5, —2, 19, to 19, 8, — 11, to 19, 9, 1, 8, to 8, 4, 3, to 2, 2, 6, —7, SOURCE: FIGURE Net change in working-age population each decade, by immigrant generation in millions from to Table data, Pew Research Center a.

Page 69 Share Cite. Page 70 Share Cite. Page 71 Share Cite. Page 72 Share Cite. Page 73 Share Cite. Page 74 Share Cite. Page 75 Share Cite. Page 76 Share Cite. Page 77 Share Cite. Page 78 Share Cite. Many of these efforts lead to capture and humiliating treatment as criminals. In other instances, many migrants die when they are locked into shipping containers or attempt to traverse the deserts without sufficient water and other provisions.

Yet they continue to come. The simple reason is that the economies of the North and South are increasingly integrated through flows of goods, capital, and labour. International migration is a functional component of modern societies, rich and poor, that resolves the uneven distribution of people and opportunities. Most migrants come, not to settle, but to support their families at home. Most industrial economies do not have sufficient domestic supplies of low-cost labour.

If this pattern were found in only one country or in only a few sectors, then it might be possible to consider a fairly narrow explanation in terms of political cultures or market rigidities. The demand for immigrant labour is not restricted to unskilled manual labour. The United States and other industrial countries have encountered a shortage of scientific and engineering workers, particularly in the high-tech sector.

This demand has been met, in part, by allowing many talented foreign students in American universities to convert their student visas to immigrant status. Standard economic theory posits that domestic migration is a functional response to wage differentials between areas. Migration allows for workers to benefit from higher wages in growing areas and stimulates the economy to operate more efficiently by creating larger and more porous labour and consumer markets.

Indeed the logic for lessening barriers to migration is similar to that of international free trade. Economic theory suggests that all countries benefit from the free flow of capital, goods, and technology across international borders. International migration is often excluded from discussions about expanding international trade such as in the NAFTA debate , largely because of political considerations rather than economic theory. My reading of current trends and history suggests that the major policy issue for international migration is not immigration control, but the creation of opportunities for the socioeconomic advancement and social integration of immigrants and their descendants.

Immigrants will continue to come in large numbers for the foreseeable future. If the borders are closed, they are likely to find clandestine ways of entry — the economic incentives of both the sending and receiving societies are overwhelming. However, it is an open question whether the immigrants will be accepted as full members of the receiving society. American society, even with all of its failings, may offer a model of how immigrants and their children have prospered and also contributed to society. Even the idea of what it means to be an American has evolved as each immigrant wave has broadened the outlook of all Americans.

An awareness of this history can help to inform the contemporary debate over the significance of current and future immigration in other societies. A Portrait , Berkeley Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society , , , Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America , New York Patterns of American Nativism, , Second edition, New Brunswick original publication Population Division Working Paper Nr.

Bureau of the Census, Washington, D. William and Mary Quarterly , 37 , ; Thomas L. William and Mary Quarterly , 41 , An Ethnic History , New York , Demography , 9 , Reimers, Still the Golden Door: A Policy Analysis , New York Journal of Latin American Studies , 37 , Population Division Workpaper Nr. Clubb and Howard W. Bureau of the Census , Subject Reports. PC 2 -1A , Washington, D. Jews and the Broadway Musical , Cambridge Mass. Phillips, Exiles in Hollywood: Demography , 42 Nov. Nancy Foner and George Frederickson eds. Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration , Cambridge Blacks and White Immigrants Since , Berkeley Smelser and Paul B.

Population and Development Review , 25 , This work may be used, with this header included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed electronically, in whole or in part, without written permission from Transit. The fall of Aleppo makes us examine who we are. Despite generally honest media coverage, an international mobilization for the besieged city never materialized. Despite losing the popular vote, Trump has secured as much power as any American leader in recent history.

The Republican Party controls both houses of Congress. There is a vacancy on the Supreme Court. The country is at war abroad and has been in a state of mobilization for fifteen years. This means not only that Trump will be able to move fast but also that he will become accustomed to an unusually high level of political support. He will want to maintain and increase it—his ideal is the totalitarian-level popularity numbers of Vladimir Putin—and the way to achieve that is through mobilization.

There will be more wars, abroad and at home. As soon as the U. The Syrian government prevents humanitarian aid from getting to Aleppo, saying that this is how the rebels get arms and ammunition. The result is a bloody stalemate in which neither side is prepared to compromise and no force on the ground is overwhelming enough to claim victory and thus end the carnage. Eastern Aleppo is facing defeat by slow attrition if no political agreement is reached.

It viewed itself as immune to the pathologies of democracy: Crowds can go crazy in any other place in the world, but not in America, the land of common sense. But after the last years of extreme polarization and dysfunctional governance, are Americans still convinced that their democracy cannot be upended? Contemporary populism is not just anti-elitist, but also necessarily anti-pluralist, and in this exclusive claim to representation lies its profoundly undemocratic character.

As Michele Bachmann contends for the Republican nomination, we might ask what her Tea Party means for her native midwest. In southwestern Ohio, where I was born and raised, mantras of low taxation and small government have become the way to avoid discussing the challenges of globalization. The rise of populist, xenophobic and nationalist parties has been attributed to tensions arising from the financial crisis in Europe. While these tensions have erupted in some regions of the United States as well, ironically at the national level, the steep downturn delivered a democratic victory with the election of Barack Obama.

This is not … Read more. Tr nsit Online Authors Bradley F. Abrams History, Stanford University Read more. Seit wirkt er freischaffend als Sozialwissenschaftler und Publizist. Seine Arbeitsschwerpunkte sind Diskurs- und Kulturgeschichte der deutschen Zweistaatlichkeit und der ostdeutschen Transformation sowie die Generationengeschichte der DDR und Ostdeutschlands. History, Oxford Read more. In he was awarded the Latsis Prize of the European Science Foundation for his work on immigration and social cohesion in modern societies.

Among his many publications are Immigration and Boundaries of Citizenship , Transnational Citizenship: Membership and … Read more. Geschichte, Cambridge Read more. Freelance journalist, Wien Read more. Soziologie, Seattle Read more. He is the author of Putin kaputt!? Suhrkamp, , a study of the Russian protests for fair elections, and maintains protestrussia. Warsaw correspondent for Die Welt Read more. Jahrhundert und die Geschichte des Konsums in Europa. Haraszti studied philosophy and … Read more. Freelance journalist, Berlin Read more.

Hochschild is Professor of Government at the John F. Jackson is the founder and President of the Project on Transitional Democracies. The Project is a multi-year endeavour aimed at accelerating the pace of reform in post democracies and advancing the date for the integration of these democracies into the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic. Jackson has written extensively about the engagement of Russia … Read more.

He has served as President of … Read more. Professor of Sociology, University of Belgrade Read more.

Coming to America: An Immigrant’s Perspective

He worked as a consultant for several nongovernmental and international organizations, icnluding UNHCR. Social Networks … Read more. Newman is the James B. She is a widely published expert on poverty and the working poor who led major interdisciplinary initiatives at Princeton and Harvard universities. Political Science, Boston University Read more.

Politics, University of Essex Read more. Zuletzt erschien von ihm … Read more. He is the author of the books Plastic Money: Demise of Communism and … Read more. Lew Rubinstein lebt als Poet und Essayist in Moskau. Seit Ende der er-Jahre verfasst er poetische Arbeiten, seit serielle Textzyklen als so genannte Kartotheken. Zusammen mit Andrej Monastyrskij, Dimitrij A. Geschichte und Politikwissenschaft, Paris Read more. Paul Sanders is a historian and management scholar. He has published across the disciplines of history, international relations and leadership. He worked for various newspapers, among them as editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung.

From to he was Editor-in-Chief of Die Welt. PhD in Political Science Read more. Political Science, Paris Read more. George Soros is a pioneer of the hedge-fund industry, investor and philanthropist, he is the author of many books, including Financial Turmoil in Europe and the United States: