Die EU nach der Erweiterung: Was ist mit Kerneuropa? (German Edition)

European Union countries -- Foreign relations. Contents Machine derived contents note: Ist de Gaulles Vision noch zeitgemiB? Interesse Europas oder der USA? Wie definiert sich Europa gegentiber den USA? Konkurrierende Szenarien fir die Entwicklung der EU 3. Trojanische Pferde fir die transatlantische Herde? Notes Includes bibliographical references.

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This programme included a common approach to relations between the European Union and the mediterranean states which was mainly of concern to France and the EU's policy vis-a-vis eastern Europe primarily of interest to Germany. None of this, however, is new. Indeed, many experts on German-French relations have repeatedly pointed out that there is an 'astonishing continuity of problems'. As indicated above in the context of discussing realist predictions, this is most surprising with regard to the German government.

If the German government had wanted to expand its autonomy vis-a-vis France it had plenty of opportunities. It did not choose to do so. Germany and the United States Relations between united Germany and the United States were also bound to deteriorate after unification according to realist scenarios. After having reached a climax in the course of the 'Two-plus-Four' talks in , relations between Germany and the United States quickly and unexpectedly deteriorated during and after the Gulf War. The Kohl government's hesitant support of the allied war effort caused as much irritation in Washington as did Germany's recognition of Croatia in late None of it, however, had a lasting negative effect on German-American relations.

When George Bush lost the presidential elections in , some observers anticipated conflict between the young American President of an inward looking Democratic administration on the one hand and the seasoned Chancellor of united Germany on the other. Yet it quickly emerged that they got on very well. This is not to say that their interests were always identical. Yet the important point is that emerging differences on critical issues such as whether or not to extend NATO eastward were often transformed into innovative initiatives which helped to stabilise both transatlantic relations and the Washington-Bonn axis.

KERNEUROPA - Definition and synonyms of Kerneuropa in the German dictionary

Germany and Russia Similar to Bonn's relations with Washington, balance-of-power theorists would also have expected major changes in Germany's relations with Russia. In particular, they would have expected Germany to pursue what Timothy Garton Ash called 'the classic eastern option of German foreign policy',61 that is, to line up with Russia against a more powerful United Downloaded by [Institutional Subscription Access] at As a result of this and a subsequent meeting in Moscow, the two governments signed a series of bilateral agreements which were intended to symbolise 'the new quality' of their relations.

It is certainly correct to say that the German government has undertaken major efforts to expand relations with Russia. However, this cannot be taken as an expression of an emerging German-Russian alliance, but rather as an indication of Germany's exposed position and its interest - nourished by its experience with binding strategies - in devising institutional mechanisms which allow the West both to tie Russia to Western institutions and to keep it at bay.

With regard to the European Union, for instance, the German government has been at the forefront of those who pushed for the 'association agreements' between the EU and those eastern European states which did not belong to the Soviet Union. Most of these agreements included a clear commitment for both sides to work towards eventual full membership of the associated states. It was only at the Korfu summit meeting of the heads of state that a 'partnership agreement' could be signed.

This, however, does not include an option to join the EU eventually. As Sir Leon Brittan stressed in his assessment of what had been achieved, the European Union and Russia had merely agreed that there is 'the perspective of developing a free trade area in the coming century, if reforms in Russia make sufficient progress until '.

Although the German government has always been among the most forceful proponents of transforming NATO into a 'more political' alliance in order to render it more acceptable to the Soviet Union or Russia , they never left any doubt that this did not mean moving from an alliance for collective defence to a collective security system.

Rather, NATO's core functions had to be preserved and its membership extended. The German Defence Minister, for instance, was among the first to call for an inclusion of Germany's eastern neighbours. Quite the opposite is the case: Germany and Poland The extent to which an ascending great power makes use of the traditional means of power politics can be measured both with regard to how it behaves vis-a-vis other great powers and how it treats lesser ones.

Germany's evolving relationships with the US, Russia and France were crucuial tests with regard to the first category, Poland appeared to present the best test of German intentions vis-a-vis the second one. Many felt boxed in, once again, between an unrestrained economic and political giant to the west and an increasingly restless nuclear power to the east. Downloaded by [Institutional Subscription Access] at Indeed, the legalistic approach towards the border issue which the Kohl government chose to take during the 'Two-plus-Four' negotiations very much upset and angered them.

To be sure, both sides formally settled the border issue for good within a month after the signing of the 'Two-plus-Four' treaty in Moscow. In addition to a 'stormy expansion' of trade relations between the two countries,83 bilateral military relations have also developed remarkably.

It is not only that the Defence Ministers of Germany and Poland have signed several agreements to co-operate including the regular organisation of joint military exercises ,84 but also that an exchange of officers has been arranged with a retired German general now serving free of charge as an adviser to the Polish Defence Ministry.

And indeed this is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the developing relationship between the two states: This has been most evident with regard to France, which has joined Poland and Germany in several initiatives during the past three years. As Adenauer, de Gaulle and others have tried to embed German-French relations in a wider European context, so the Kohl government is now trying to apply similar strategies of 'Einbindung' with regard to Poland - a strategy quite different from what balance-of- power theorists would have expected.

Rationales for action have to be articulated and policies have to be explained and justified. It is thus surprising that foreign policy discourse is a rather understudied field. This is even more so since an analysis of foreign policy disourse can help to structure the spectrum of foreign policy opinion within a country, thereby helping to provide a sense of both when changes are approaching and what options are most likely and which are extremely unlikely.

Five rather distinct 'schools of thought' can be distinguished in the current debate about German foreign policy: In brief, the first three schools share two fundamental assumptions. They argue, first, that it is very much in Germany's interest to stick to its basic commitment to multilateralism in general and Germany's membership in Western institutions in particular and, secondly, that Germany's 'power' or, rather, its 'responsibility' has increased as a result of the upheavals in the aftermath of , which makes it necessary for Germany to shed any restrictions to participating fully in the activities of international institutions.

The conclusions they draw from this analysis differ, however. Whereas Europeanists and Eeurosceptics hold strong views on European integration - perceiving its acceleration as either very beneficial or highly detrimental to German interests - pragmatic multilateralists refuse to advocate a strong position either way, arguing that the European Union is only one institution among many.

For internationalists, today's foreign policy has to be conducted against the background of an ever more complex and interdependent world - indeed, a world that has changed so much during the past decades that there simply is no 'foreign' policy any more. While they share the basic emphasis on multilateralism of the first three schools, they complain that the substance of multilateral action is often defined primarily by Germany's major Western allies, whose thinking is still considered to be heavily militarised. Rather than uncritically accepting the roles attributed to Germany by its allies, therefore, Downloaded by [Institutional Subscription Access] at In contrast to all of the previously named schools, the foreign policy views of normalisation nationalists are heavily shaped by what they consider to be a pressing need for a revised 'image of [German] history'.

Germany's Western orientation is viewed as having 'outlived itself as an ideological blinder [Versatzstiick] which has nurtured a false conscience in Germany'. Obviously, not all of these views are equally important or influential. Broadly speaking, the views of the pragmatic multilateralists and the Europeanists are the most widely shared by the mainstream foreign policy establishment: Similarly, the views of the internationalists are shared by many members of the opposition parties, including some Social Democrats especially the so-called 'left wing' , the Greens and the PDS.

In contrast, the Eurosceptics so far have more limited if growing support within the rather small national-conservative circles of the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP, whereas the normalisation nationalists, after having aroused some interest among the broader public in and , have been increasingly sidelined. They can be summarised under the following headings: Instead, it would assume a role in international politics similar to the ones ascribed to traditional great powers by realists.

The strategy of 'Wider West' entails working toward the gradual, possibly parallel and Downloaded by [Institutional Subscription Access] at Germany would remain fully embedded within these institutions, and, in addition, the reach of these institutions would be expanded, thereby gaining some protection from the potential trouble spots on Germany's eastern borders. According to a third grand strategy, 'Carolingian Europe', the organising concept for German foreign policy should be continued concentration on creating an ever 'deeper' political and economic union with all its willing neighbours in the European Union.

This 'hard core' of the European Union would probably consist of Germany, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Belgium and, possibly, Austria, thereby encompassing almost all of the old Carolingian Empire. Moreover, in adopting such a strategy the core states would push for treaty provisions or treaty interpretations that would allow them to proceed with integration even if the others were either not ready or not willing to go along. Most importantly, it would include Russia as a full member with equal rights. Finally, Germany could opt for 'Mitteleuropa' by trying to extend its influence eastward unilaterally, that is, mostly without, and possibly even against, its Western allies.

As a result, Germany would try to create separate institutions with the neighbouring states in central Europe.

If one relates these five grand strategies to the five schools of thought discussed previously one can draw a clearer picture of both the current spectrum of foreign policy opinion in Germany and the broad options that are considered to be a desirable or undesirable and b more or less likely in terms of mere feasibility see Table I. To be sure, there are differences of opinion among the schools on how the strategy should be spelled out in detail.

Among internationalists, for instance, this option would have to go hand-in-hand with a radical transformation of NATO from a military alliance to a system of collective security, which would have to include Russia eventually. For normalisation nationalists, on the other hand, it would be acceptable only if it allowed for a certain 'de-Westernisation' of German identity. These differences notwithstanding, there is agreement even among these two extremes in German foreign policy discourse that the key challenge for Germany is to come to better terms with its eastern neighbours while at the same time staying on good terms with its neighbours to the west.

Second, with the possible exception of the normalisation nationalists, there is a widespread consensus stretching from Eurosceptics to internationalists that 'Mitteleuropa' and, even more, 'World Power' are both highly unlikely and highly undesirable. This leaves the strategies 'Wider West', 'Carolingian Europe' and 'Gesamteuropa' as the more realistic spectrum of options to choose from - which is another way of saying that, based on the country's current discourse, German foreign policy will indeed continue the multilateralist orientation of the old Federal Republic, given that these strategies vary only with regard to two dimensions, the geographical area in which Germany should concentrate its integrationist ambitions and the extent of these ambitions.

While on current evidence this does not foreshadow any fundamental shift in Germany foreign policy, it may signal that some adjustments in the more ambitious integrationist designs of Germany's European policy may loom ahead. In the past few years Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly pointed out that Downloaded by [Institutional Subscription Access] at We have very good, cordial and friendly relations with the United States, France, Britain and Russia'. Unsurprisingly, his European policy is accordingly geared at binding Germany still faster. In a way, his is a declaration of 'total peace'.

One of his likely rivals in the next elections, the SPD's Gerhard Schroder, explicitly rejects the reference to 'war and peace': We must not have a bad conscience about Europe. To say we want it because we don't trust ourselves unsettles people. In both words and deeds Germany continues to steer the course of multilateralism and integration. After he had passed the Sirens, Ulysses, in Homer's Odyssey, was advised that 'two ways will lie before you, and you must choose between them as you think fit, though I will tell you both'. One would lead him to the 'Moving Rocks', from where no ship had escaped before.

The other course would lead between the two cliffs of Scylla and Charybdis. Although Germany's menu of choices looks more benevolent than that, only fools would say that the choice is an easy one. HarperCollins, , p. The earliest reference to the image of Gulliver as unification approached was made by the German correspondent of the Economist, see J. Carr, 'When the Wall Comes Down. An early list of seven 'cardinal sins' of German foreign policy behaviour after unification is provided by W.

Paterson had already alluded to a 'semi- Downloaded by [Institutional Subscription Access] at Paterson has, however, subsequently 'bid goodbye' to this image W. The image of Ulysses in the context of Germany's European policy was first used by R. Structure, Strategy, and Institutional Roles', in R. Harvard University Press, , p. A close reading of foreign policy speeches by German foreign policy makers, especially those of Chancellor Kohl's generation, would show that it is particularly widespread here, although any decision maker would be cautious in explicitly using the image of Germany being bound to a mast.

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, , esp. See also the statement of T. Garton Ash that Germany 'would be behaving differently from most large states in history' if it were not to seek an upgrading of its military power. He was not, however, predicting that Germany would actually do so; T. For a French persepctive along similar lines see A.

Freely available

Hoffmann und Campe, On the trade-off between autonomy and security see K. Grieco, 'Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Contemporary Debate New York: Columbia University Press, , p. Altfeld, 'The Decision to Ally: The general expectation that Germany would stick to the multilateral orientation of the old FRG was and continues to be widespread among German academics, whether or not they subscribe to realist arguments in general. For an early sample see R. Wolf, 'Das neue Deutschland - eine 'Weltmacht'?

Beck, , pp. Haftendom, 'Im Anfang waren die Alliierten. Leske und Budrich, , pp. Nationale Interessen in internationalen Beziehungen Opladen: Senghaas, 'Was sind der Deutschen Interessen? Suhrkamp Verlag, , pp.

Meaning of "Kerneuropa" in the German dictionary

For more recent examples see K. Senghaas, 'Deutschland ist ein "Handelsstaat". Goodman, 'Mars or Minerva? Westdeutscher Verlag, , pp. For the underlying liberal argument, see A. Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: Columbia University Press , pp. Reich, The German Predicament Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Although the empirical analysis is limited to the period to the arguments made can easily be extended in all areas covered to subsequent developments. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, , pp.

Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, No. This statement was also incorporated in the 'Two-plus-Four' treaty. Innenansichten der Einigung Berlin: Siedler Verlag, , pp. Elbe, Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Kanten. Der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, , pp.

Translation of «Kerneuropa» into 25 languages

On the US's interest in keeping a strong Bundeswehr, see P. Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed. Harvard University Press, , pp. According to the German newspaper Die Welt, defence planners in Bonn thought that a reduction to , troops would be acceptable, see 'Nur noch , Soldaten', Die Welt, 10 Feb.

For a glimpse at the decision-making process preceding this agreement see K. Stock, 'Wie geht es weiter mit der Bundeswehr? Defence experts of the opposition Social Democrats have long been arguing that even lower numbers are acceptable based on a calculation on 'money and risk', see '"Deutschland hat alle Voraussetzungen erwachsen zu werden". While stressing that he was not speaking as a NATO official, he emphasised that he was glad to be able to say 'what I could not say as general secretary'; see K.

On the historical roots and present significance of the high degree of integration of the Bundeswehr see A. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft , pp. For an extended and controversial discussion of these and other issues relating to the debate about German 'renationalisation' see also J.

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Frankreich und das vereinte Deutschland', Europa Archiv, Vol. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France. Princeton University Press, , ch. Wickert, Und Gott schuf Paris Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, , p.

Mitterrand had hinted at his intention to remove French troops as early as February , for an inside account see Teltschik, op.