Desert and Virtue: A Theory of Intrinsic Value

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Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

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How to write a great review. This approach to value constitutes an endorsement of the principle of organic unities that is even more subversive of the computation of intrinsic value than Moore's; for Moore holds that the intrinsic value of something is and must be constant, even if its contribution to the value of wholes of which it forms a part is not, whereas Dancy holds that variation can occur at both levels.

Not everyone has accepted the principle of organic unities; some have held out hope for a more systematic approach to the computation of intrinsic value. However, even someone who is inclined to measure intrinsic value in terms of summation must acknowledge that there is a sense in which the principle of organic unities is obviously true. Consider some complex whole, W , that is composed of three goods, X , Y , and Z , which are wholly independent of one another. Suppose that we had a ratio scale on which to measure these goods, and that their values on this scale were 10, 20, and 30, respectively.

But notice that, if X , Y , and Z are parts of W , then so too, presumably, are the combinations X -and- Y , X -and- Z , and Y -and- Z ; the values of these combinations, computed in terms of summation, will be 30, 40, and 50, respectively. If the values of these parts of W were also taken into consideration when evaluating W , the value of W would balloon to Clearly, this would be a distortion. Someone who wishes to maintain that intrinsic value is summative must thus show not only how the various alleged examples of organic unities provided by Moore and others are to be reinterpreted, but also how, in the sort of case just sketched, it is only the values of X , Y , and Z , and not the values either of any combinations of these components or of any parts of these components, that are to be taken into account when evaluating W itself.

The general idea is this. In the sort of example just given, each of X , Y , and Z is to be construed as having basic intrinsic value; if any combinations or parts of X , Y , and Z have intrinsic value, this value is not basic; and the value of W is to be computed by appealing only to those parts of W that have basic intrinsic value. Gilbert Harman was one of the first explicitly to discuss basic intrinsic value when he pointed out the apparent need to invoke such value if we are to avoid distortions in our evaluations Harman However, he offers no precise account of the concept of basic intrinsic value and ends his paper by saying that he can think of no way to show that nonbasic intrinsic value is to be computed in terms of the summation of basic intrinsic value.

Several philosophers have since tried to do better. Many have argued that nonbasic intrinsic value cannot always be computed by summing basic intrinsic value. Suppose that states of affairs can bear intrinsic value. How are their intrinsic values to be computed? Summation seems to be a nonstarter in these cases. Nonetheless, attempts have been made even in such cases to show how the intrinsic value of a complex whole is to be computed in a nonsummative way in terms of the basic intrinsic values of simpler states, thus preserving the idea that basic intrinsic value is the key to the computation of all intrinsic value Quinn , Chisholm , Oldfield , Carlson These attempts have generally been based on the assumption that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value.

Matters would be considerably more complicated if it turned out that entities of several different ontological categories could all have intrinsic value.

Desert (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Suggestions as to how to compute nonbasic intrinsic value in terms of basic intrinsic value of course presuppose that there is such a thing as basic intrinsic value, but few have attempted to provide an account of what basic intrinsic value itself consists in. Fred Feldman is one of the few Feldman ; cf. Subscribing to the view that only states of affairs bear intrinsic value, Feldman identifies several features that any state of affairs that has basic intrinsic value in particular must possess.

In this way, Feldman seeks to preserve the idea that intrinsic value is summative after all. He does not claim that all intrinsic value is to be computed by summing basic intrinsic value, but he does insist that the value of entire worlds is to be computed in this way. Despite the detail in which Feldman characterizes the concept of basic intrinsic value, he offers no strict analysis of it.

Others have tried to supply such an analysis. For example, by noting that, even if it is true that only states have intrinsic value, it may yet be that not all states have intrinsic value, Zimmerman suggests to put matters somewhat roughly that basic intrinsic value is the intrinsic value had by states none of whose proper parts have intrinsic value Zimmerman , ch.

On this basis he argues that disjunctive and negative states in fact have no intrinsic value at all, and thereby seeks to show how all intrinsic value is to be computed in terms of summation after all. First, we are now in a position to see why it was said above in Section 2 that perhaps not all intrinsic value is nonderivative. If it is correct to distinguish between basic and nonbasic intrinsic value and also to compute the latter in terms of the former, then there is clearly a respectable sense in which nonbasic intrinsic value is derivative. Second, if states with basic intrinsic value account for all the value that there is in the world, support is found for Chisholm's view reported in Section 2 that some ontological version of Moore's isolation test is acceptable.

At the beginning of this article, extrinsic value was said simply—too simply—to be value that is not intrinsic. Later, once intrinsic value had been characterized as nonderivative value of a certain, perhaps moral kind, extrinsic value was said more particularly to be derivative value of that same kind. That which is extrinsically good is good, not insofar as its extrinsic value is concerned for its own sake, but for the sake of something else to which it is related in some way.

For example, the goodness of helping others in time of need is plausibly thought to be extrinsic at least in part , being derivative at least in part from the goodness of something else, such as these people's needs being satisfied, or their experiencing pleasure, to which helping them is related in some causal way. The first is whether so-called extrinsic value is really a type of value at all. There would seem to be a sense in which it is not, for it does not add to or detract from the value in the world.

Consider some long chain of derivation. In this sort of case, the values of A , B , …, Y are all parasitic on the value of Z. It is Z 's value that contributes to the value there is in the world; A , B , …, Y contribute no value of their own. As long as the value of Z is the only intrinsic value at stake, no change of value would be effected in or imparted to the world if a shorter route from A to Z were discovered, one that bypassed some letters in the middle of the alphabet.

The answer can only be that we just do say that certain things are good, and others bad, not for their own sake but for the sake of something else to which they are related in some way. To say that these things are good and bad only in a derivative sense, that their value is merely parasitic on or reflective of the value of something else, is one thing; to deny that they are good or bad in any respectable sense is quite another.

The former claim is accurate; hence the latter would appear unwarranted. It is not clear just what the answer to this question is. Philosophers have tended to focus on just one particular causal relation, the means-end relation. This is the relation at issue in the example given earlier: Suppose that A is a means to Z , and that Z is intrinsically good. Should we therefore say that A is instrumentally good? What if A has another consequence, Y , and this consequence is intrinsically bad? What, especially, if the intrinsic badness of Y is greater than the intrinsic goodness of Z?

Some would say that in such a case A is both instrumentally good because of Z and instrumentally bad because of Y. Others would say that it is correct to say that A is instrumentally good only if all of A 's causal consequences that have intrinsic value are, taken as a whole, intrinsically good. Still others would say that whether something is instrumentally good depends not only on what it causes to happen but also on what it prevents from happening cf. For example, if pain is intrinsically bad, and taking an aspirin puts a stop to your pain but causes nothing of any positive intrinsic value, some would say that taking the aspirin is instrumentally good despite its having no intrinsically good consequences.

Many philosophers write as if instrumental value is the only type of extrinsic value, but that is a mistake. Suppose, for instance, that the results of a certain medical test indicate that the patient is in good health, and suppose that this patient's having good health is intrinsically good. Then we may well want to say that the results are themselves extrinsically good.

But notice that the results are of course not a means to good health; they are simply indicative of it. Or suppose that making your home available to a struggling artist while you spend a year abroad provides him with an opportunity he would otherwise not have to create some masterpieces, and suppose that either the process or the product of this creation would be intrinsically good.

Then we may well want to say that your making your home available to him is extrinsically good because of the opportunity it provides him, even if he goes on to squander the opportunity and nothing good comes of it. Or suppose that someone's appreciating the beauty of the Mona Lisa would be intrinsically good.

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The value attributed to the painting is one that it is said to have in virtue of its relation to something else that would supposedly be intrinsically good if it occurred, namely, the appreciation of its beauty. Many other instances could be given of cases in which we are inclined to call something good in virtue of its relation to something else that is or would be intrinsically good, even though the relation in question is not a means-end relation. It is sometimes said that there can be no extrinsic value without intrinsic value.

This thesis admits of several interpretations. First, it might mean that nothing can occur that is extrinsically good unless something else occurs that is intrinsically good, and that nothing can occur that is extrinsically bad unless something else occurs that is intrinsically bad. Second, it might mean that nothing can occur that is either extrinsically good or extrinsically bad unless something else occurs that is either intrinsically good or intrinsically bad. On both these interpretations, the thesis is dubious.

Suppose that no one ever appreciates the beauty of Leonardo's masterpiece, and that nothing else that is intrinsically either good or bad ever occurs; still his painting may be said to be inherently good. Or suppose that the aspirin prevents your pain from even starting, and hence inhibits the occurrence of something intrinsically bad, but nothing else that is intrinsically either good or bad ever occurs; still your taking the aspirin may be said to be instrumentally good. On a third interpretation, however, the thesis might be true.

That interpretation is this: This would be trivially true if, as some maintain, the nonoccurrence of something intrinsically either good or bad entails the occurrence of something intrinsically neutral. But even if the thesis should turn out to be false on this third interpretation, too, it would nonetheless seem to be true on a fourth interpretation, according to which the concept of extrinsic value, in all its varieties, is to be understood in terms of the concept of intrinsic value.

Numbers in square brackets indicate to which of the above sections the following works are especially relevant. What Has Intrinsic Value? What Is Intrinsic Value? What Is Extrinsic Value? Bibliography Cited works Note: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt. The Extant Remains , Oxford: Thomas, Summa Theologiae several editions. University of Georgia Press. Baron, Marcia, et al. Harcourt, Brace, and World. Broome, John, , Weighing Goods , Oxford: Carlson, Erik, , Consequentialism Reconsidered , Dordrecht: University of Notre Dame Press.

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Dancy, Jonathan, , Moral Reasons , Oxford: Dewey, John, , Theory of Valuation , Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Some Comments on the Work of G. Egonsson, Dan, , Dimensions of Dignity , Dordrecht: George Allen and Unwin. Finnis, John, , Fundamentals of Ethics , Oxford: University of California Press. Frondizi, Risieri, , What Is Value?

Is Pleasure an Unconditional Good? Griffin, James, , Well-Being , Oxford: Haji, Ishtiyaque, , Freedom and Value , Dordrecht: Hall, Everett, , What Is Value? University of North Carolina Press. Harman, Gilbert, , Explaining Value , Oxford: Hartmann, Nicolai, , Ethics , London: Hirose, Iwao, and Olson, Jonas ed.

McDaniel, Kris, et al. Nagel, Thomas, , Mortal Questions , Cambridge: University of Pittsburgh Press. Slote, Michael, , Goods and Virtues , Oxford: Williams, Bernard, , Morality , New York: Academic Tools How to cite this entry. Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources [Please contact the author with suggestions. Related Entries abstract objects character, moral cognitivism vs. Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Those who endorse the notion that virtuous people deserve happiness in heaven will presumably say that the distributor in that case is God. In social and political contexts we often find philosophers assuming that citizens deserve certain rights from the government of their country. It may seem that we could relocate this reference to the distributor.

We could build reference to the distributor into the description of the desert. Thus, instead of saying that the desert in the example involving the elderly professor is respect , we could say that the desert is respect from his students. But there are some important facts here: Sometimes you deserve something, but only to a very slight degree and this desert could easily be overridden by some other consideration.

In many cases a desert statement if fully spelled out would also indicate some times. One of these is the time of the deserving; the other is the time when the receipt of the desert is supposed to take place. Suppose in fact the government has withheld more than the person owes in taxes. Then he deserves a refund. Suppose refunds are all given out on April 1. We might want to say this: In this example, the time of the deserving is every moment in March.

The time at which the deserver deserves to receive the desert is April 1. If we understand the question in this way, we may want to know how — if at all — a person can be epistemically justified in believing that for example hard work is a desert base for reward. Others take the question about justification in a different way.

They take it to be a question about explanation. Consider again the question about the justification of the claim that hard work makes us deserve reward. On this second interpretation, the question is: They seem to be concerned with a question about what explains the fact that when someone deserves something, it is obligatory for others to provide it, or good that it be provided.

Still others may phrase the question by appeal to concepts of grounding or foundation. They may ask what grounds the fact that those who work hard deserve rewards. Still others write a bit more vaguely about the analysis of desert claims see, for example, Feinberg There is a further distinction to be noted. Some who write about the justification of desert claims seem to think that it is specific desert claims about particular individuals that call for justification.

Others apparently think that what calls for justification is a more general claim about desert bases and deserts. They might ask for a justification of the claim that hard work is a desert base for financial reward. We will formulate the discussion in the admittedly vague idiom of justification of claims about desert bases and deserts. But as we understand the question, it can be explicated in this way: If challenged, how could the maker of such a claim support his claim?

How could he argue for his assertion? What facts about DB and D could he cite in order to show that he was right — the possession of DB does make someone deserve D? We first consider some monist views. Some popular views about the justification of desert claims are based on the idea that such claims can be justified by appeal to considerations about the values of consequences. It is not clear that Sidgwick means to defend this view about desert; he seems to be offering it as an account of what a determinist would have to say. According to a natural extension of the view that Sidgwick mentioned, a claim to the effect that someone deserves something, D, in virtue of his possession of some feature, DB, is justified by pointing out that giving the person D in virtue of his possession of DB would have high utility.

While there surely are some cases in which giving someone what he deserves would have high utility, this link between desert and utility is just as frequently absent. To see this, consider a case in which a very popular person has engaged in some bad behavior for which he deserves punishment — but suppose in addition that no one believes he is guilty.

If our interest were in producing an outcome with high utility, we would have to refrain from punishing him. But in spite of that, since in fact he did do the nasty deed, he does deserve the punishment. In other cases, giving a person some benefit might have good results even though the person does not deserve to receive those benefits.

To see this, imagine that a crazed maniac threatens to murder a dozen hostages unless he is given a half-hour of prime time TV to air his grievances. Giving him this airtime might have high utility — it might be the best thing for those in charge to do in the circumstances — surely the maniac does not deserve it. Here is the passage from Carritt:. In this example, punishing an innocent person has high utility because it would have great deterrent effect. But the victim of the punishment does not deserve punishment — after all, he is innocent.

This highlights an important fact about desert and utility: It appears then that the consequentialist approach confronts overwhelming objections.

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Sometimes deserved treatment is expedient; sometimes it is not. Sometimes undeserved treatment is expedient; sometimes it is not. As a result, appeals to the utility of giving someone some benefit or burden cannot justify the claim that the person deserves that sort of treatment. A second approach to the justification of desert claims is based on some ideas concerning institutions. Our discussion in this section has benefitted enormously from McLeod b. In some cases the rules of an institution are carefully written down and perhaps made a matter of legislation.

The system of taxation in some country might be a good example. In other cases the rules of an institution are not explicitly formalized. That is a puzzle best left to the sociologists. We may also need to assume that when people set up institutions, they do so with some intention. They are trying to achieve something; or more likely, they are trying to achieve several different things. Maybe different people have different aims. We can say — somewhat vaguely — that the point of an institution is the main goal or aim that people have in establishing or maintaining that institution.

A person may be governed by some institution even if he does not like it, or does not endorse it. Thus, for example, suppose a criminal justice system exists in a certain society. Suppose some miscreant lives in that society and has been charged with some crime. Suppose he is found guilty in a duly established court of law and is sentenced to ten years in prison. He is governed by the rules of the judicial system whether he likes it or not.

Again, this is a tricky sociological notion, not easily spelled out. Some philosophers have said things that suggest that it is possible to justify a desert claim by identifying an institution according to which the deserver is entitled to the desert. We can state this idea a bit more clearly:. Most of these emerge from the requirement that a desert claim is justifiable always and only when there is an appropriate actual social institution.

This produces a number of devastating objections. Suppose a thoroughly decent person has suffered a number of serious misfortunes. He deserves a change of luck; he deserves some good luck for a change. Suppose he lives in a country where there is no social institution that supplies compensatory benefits to those who have had bad luck. If AID were true, it would be impossible to justify the claim that he deserves it.

An equally serious objection arises from the fact that some of the institutions that actually exist are morally indefensible. Let us imagine a thoroughly horrible social institution — slavery. Suppose some unfortunate individual is governed by that institution. Suppose the institution contains rules that say that slaves who are strong and healthy shall be required to work without pay in the cotton fields. Suppose this individual is strong and healthy. Consider the claim that he deserves to be required to work in the fields without pay in virtue of the fact that he is strong and healthy.

AID implies that this desert claim is justified. That is as preposterous as it is offensive. AID seems to confuse these. It seems to say that you deserve something if and only if you are entitled to it by the rules of an actual institution. Since there are bad institutions, and cases in which desert arises in the absence of institutions, this is clearly a mistake.

We can deal with all of these objections by altering the institutional account of justification. Instead of making the justification of a desert claim depend upon the existence of an actual social institution, we can make it depend upon the rules that would be contained in some ideal social institution. The main change is that we no longer require that the social institution exists. We require instead that it be an ideal institution — an institution that would be in some way preferable to the actual one. Then we can attempt to justify desert claims by saying that the deservers would be entitled to those deserts by the rules of an ideal social institution.

We might try to define ideality by saying that an ideal institution is one that would distribute benefits and burdens to people precisely in accord with their deserts. With this account of ideality in place, IID generates quite a few correct results. Unfortunately, it would be unhelpful in the present context. After all, the aim here is to explain how desert claims can be justified. This account would explain desert by appeal to ideal institutions, and then explain ideal institutions by appeal to desert.

This yields a form of the institutional approach that seems importantly similar to the consequentialist approach already discussed. Unfortunately, with this conception of ideality in place, the proposal seems to inherit some of the defects of the simpler consequentialist approach. It implies, for example, that if it is possible for there to be a seriously unfair but nevertheless utility maximizing institution, then people would deserve the burdens allocated to them by the rules of that institution, even if it were not in place.

A further difficulty arises in connection with actual but not optimific institutions. Suppose, for example, the utility maximizing ice-skating institution would have rules specifying that in order to win the gold medal, a competitor must perform a 7 minute free program; a 6 minute program of required figures; and that all contestants must wear regulation team uniforms consisting of full length trousers and matching long-sleeved team shirts. Suppose instead that the de facto institution contains some slightly different but still fairly reasonable rules for ice-skating competitions.

Suppose Nancy abides by all the relevant extant rules and is declared the winner in a competition. She is entitled to the gold medal by the actual rules. It may seem, in such a case, that her claim to deserve the medal would be justified. But since she would not be entitled to it by the rules of the ideal institution, IID implies that it is impossible to justify her claim that she deserves the medal by virtue of her performance here tonight. It appears, then, that difficulties confront the attempt to justify desert claims by appeal to claims about the entitlements created by institutions, actual or ideal.

Commentators have understood these philosophers to have been defending the idea that desert claims can be justified by appeal to facts about appraising attitudes. Some have said, for example, that David Miller defended a view of this sort in his Social Justice While there may be debate about whether Miller actually intended to be defending such a view, it is worthwhile to consider it. In the discussion that follows we are indebted to McLeod and McLeod In each case, if a person has such an attitude toward someone, he has that attitude in virtue of some feature that he takes the person to have.

Suppose, for example, that you admire someone; then you must admire her for something she is or something she did. Maybe she worked hard; or wrote a good paper; or can run very fast; or is able to play the violin beautifully. Similarly for the other positive appraising attitudes. They are similar to the positive attitudes in this respect, if you disapprove of someone, then you must disapprove of him for something he is or something he did.

Maybe he plagiarized a paper; maybe he is totally out of shape; maybe he is utterly talentless. He also says that the range of possible desert bases coincides with the range of bases for appraising attitudes. You cannot deserve something on the basis of your possession of a property, DB, unless we could have an appraising attitude toward you on the basis of your possession of DB. Some have understood Miller to be claiming that something about these appraising attitudes provides the answer to our question about the justification of desert claims.

A certain appraising attitude may seem appropriate to a desert claim.

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For example, suppose a person feels strong approval a positive appraising attitude of a subject in virtue of his heroic action. The attitude would be appropriate to the claim that the hero deserves a reward for his heroism. On the other hand, if someone feels contempt a negative appraising attitude for a person in virtue of his cowardice, then this attitude would be appropriate to the claim that the coward deserves some sort of penalty.

On one possible view, whether a desert judgment is justifiable depends upon whether the person who makes that judgment has an appraising attitude that is appropriate to the desert claim. Suppose the leader of a terrorist gang claims that a member of his gang deserves respect for having set off a suicide bomb in an elementary school. Suppose the leader has great admiration for this the gang member precisely because he set off the bomb.

On the current proposal, since the leader in fact has a positive appraising attitude toward the member, his desert claim is justified. That cannot be right. The difficulty cannot be resolved by appealing to the reactions of the community. Surely, however, no matter how many of his compatriots admire him for doing this deed, the claim that he deserves admiration for having done it is still not justified.

Instead of appealing to facts about the appraising attitudes that others in fact have, we might consider a different question: If it would be fitting for others to admire him for bombing the school, then he deserves admiration. If it would be fitting for others to hold him in contempt for bombing the school, then he deserves contempt. In general, then, we might say that the claim that S deserves a certain benefit burden in virtue of having done X is justified if and only if it would be fitting for observers to have a positive negative appraising attitude toward S in virtue of his having done X.

This proposal seems misguided for several reasons. First, it seems to be circular. In this form the proposal seems circular. Furthermore, it appears that there are cases in which a person deserves something but in which no appraising attitude seems to be fitting. Suppose, for example, that an abandoned child is in need of medical care and nurturance. The fact that the child is sick does not make it appropriate for onlookers to admire her or to condemn her. Nevertheless, the claim that the child deserves medical care and nurturance in virtue of her need might be justified.

In his Feinberg hints at a different way in which appraising attitudes might figure in the justification of desert claims. Going further, we can say that various forms of treatment — punishments, rewards, prizes, etc. When such forms of treatment are in this way the customary and natural ways of expressing the attitudes, then those who engage in the action or manifest the quality deserve, in a derived way, to receive the treatment. The suggestion, then, is that in such cases the claim that someone deserves D on the basis of his possession of DB can be justified by pointing out that giving D is the conventional way of expressing the responsive attitude that reasonable men entertain toward those with DB.

In any case where only some reasonable men entertain the attitudes, it would be impossible to justify the associated desert claims. On the other hand, if we required merely that some reasonable men entertain the attitudes in question, then it would become far too easy to justify dubious desert claims. Furthermore, it would make it possible for there to be cases in which someone both deserves a certain treatment and also deserves not to get that treatment.

The details of the appraising attitudes approach remain unclear. It is also not clear that anyone ever seriously defended this view as an answer to the question about how desert claims can be justified. A few philosophers — including George Sher and Julian Lamont — said things that suggest a pluralistic approach to the question about the justification of desert claims.

Thus, for example, consider the claim that you deserve a reward for having saved a life. The external value in this case might be some combination of the value of courage and the alleged value of human life. Consider a different case in which someone claims that you deserve a high grade for having done outstanding work in a course.

In this case, the external value might be the value of academic achievement.

Desert and Virtue

In every case, a desert claim — if it can be justified at all — can be justified by pointing out that giving the deserver the desert would properly respect the associated external value. Here is a natural and appealing idea: If I am distributing raises, and only Jones deserves a raise, then it would be better for me to give the raise to Jones than to anyone else.

Common forms of consequentialism go on to say that whether an action A is permissible or impermissible is determined by how the intrinsic value of the world that would be actual if A is performed compares to the intrinsic values of the worlds that would be actual if the alternatives to A are performed instead. One standard form of consequentialism says that an act A is permissible iff none of the worlds that would be actual were the agent to perform one of the alternatives to A has a greater intrinsic value than the world that would be actual were he to perform A.

Thus, in a consequentialist framework, if one holds that facts about desert make a difference to intrinsic value, one may also hold that facts about desert make a difference to whether an act is permissible or impermissible.