Future Leader Development of Army Noncommissioned Officers: Workshop Results (Conference Proceedings)

The third phase consists of systematic, structured data collection from a sample of military units during stressful graded training exercises, such as at the Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center. Data collection instruments will be tailored to reflect the nature and objectives of the training exercises and to obtain detailed descriptions of the social interactions that take place.

Technology is now available in the form of wearable data collection devices, such as smart watches and headsets, to minimize the intrusion of the data collection process. In addition, tools are under development Miller and Rye, that can be employed for automatically analyzing data collected from interactions to assess dimensions of unit social context.

Data collected will reflect, in detail along a timeline, the impact of specific interactions on the social context that existed within the unit during each exercise. Data collected on social interactions and social context will be related to measures and observations of unit performance. The final phase assumes that, in the near future, sufficient technical advances will be achieved in modeling and simulating small unit. For example, currently available agent-based modeling and adaptive-system simulation should be adaptable to conduct the required type of experiments.

Experiments conducted through highly realistic simulations of military environments would permit tightly controlled studies to test a number of hypotheses developed in Phase 3 about the relative influence of types of social interactions on social context, the most effective ways in which desired and effective social interactions can be influenced by leadership actions, characteristics especially social interactions that are most likely to lead to negative and positive individual behaviors and unit dynamics in a particular military context, and the relative impact of various individual behaviors on unit performance and effectiveness.

These results are expected to provide implications for leadership training, as well as possibly for leader selection and promotion. Current Research and Practice pp. Transformational Leadership , 2nd ed.

• ;
• Die Teerose: Roman (Rosen-Trilogie) (German Edition).
• .
• The Third Face?
• .
• Little Girl Blue.

Personality and transformational and transactional leadership: Journal of Applied Psychology, 89 5: What type of leadership behaviors are functional in teams? The Leadership Quarterly, 17 3: Framework for Research on Leadership, Cohesion, and Values. American Forces Press Service, August 6.

Its content and consequences. Journal of Applied Psychology, 79 5: Personal Leadership in Industry. The Nature of Leadership. Department of the Army. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Profile of the Military Community. Trait and behavioral theories of leadership: An integration and meta-analytic test of their relative validity.

Personnel Psychology, 64 1: Meta-analytic findings and implications for research and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87 4: Gender and leadership style: Psychological Bulletin, 2: Gender and the effectiveness of leaders: Psychological Bulletin, 1: Too much of a good thing: Leaders need to learn to beware of their strengths.

Expectations and experiences associated with rural GP placements. Rural and Remote Health, 9 4: A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness. Mismanagement in the Army. Meta-analytic review of leader-member exchange theory: Correlates and construct issues. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82 6: Smart badges track human behavior. Graduate nurse perceptions of the work experience. Nursing Economics, 24 3: A framework for examining leadership in extreme contexts. The Leadership Quarterly , 20 6: Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 42 Social identity and self-categorization processes in organizational contexts.

Academy of Management Review, 25 1: Research Methods for Studying Groups and Teams: A Guide to Approaches, Tools, and Technologies. A Theory of Charismatic Leadership. Southern Illinois University Press. The social scientific study of leadership: Journal of Management, 23 3: D Nahrgang, and F. Leader-member exchange and citizenship behaviors: Journal of Applied Psychology, 92 1: Transformational and transactional leadership: A meta-analytic test of their relative validity.

The validity of consideration and initiating structure in leadership research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89 1: A quantitative review and test of theoretical propositions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89 3: Leadership and the fate of organizations. Their meaning and measurement.

Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 22 3: Toward a contingency theory of leadership based upon the consideration and initiating structure literature. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 12 1: Center for American Progress, May An emerging competency for global leaders.

IN ADDITION TO READING ONLINE, THIS TITLE IS AVAILABLE IN THESE FORMATS:

Regent Global Business Review, 2 2: Harvard Business Press Books. Military Leadership Diversity Commission. From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military. Power and politeness in interactions: December , Washington, DC. A study of New Zealanders. Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 49 4: Human Behavior in Military Contexts. The National Academies Press. Threatening Communications and Behavior: Perspectives on the Pursuit of Public Figures. Hagel orders urgent push for military ethics crackdown. Effective leaders need contextual intelligence and intuition.

Women in the U.

Growing Share, Distinctive Profile. Pew Research Social and Demographic Trends. Leadership as related to the Bernreuter personality measures: Leadership among adult women in social activities. Journal of Social Psychology, 36 2: Hell in Hurtgen Forest: University Press of Kansas. Personal factors associated with leadership: A survey of the literature.

Journal of Psychology, Foundational Research in Behavioral and Social Sciences: Marching Towards the Future. US soldier goes on trial for civilian atrocities in Afghanistan. What we know and what questions need more attention. Academy of Management Perspectives, 26 4: The Leadership Quarterly, 12 4: The United States Army faces a variety of challenges to maintain a ready and capable force into the future.

Missions are increasingly diverse, ranging from combat and counterinsurgency to negotiation, reconstruction, and stability operations, and require a variety of personnel and skill sets to execute. Missions often demand rapid decision-making and coordination with others in novel ways, so that personnel are not simply following a specific set of tactical orders but rather need to understand broader strategic goals and choose among courses of action. Like any workforce, the Army is diverse in terms of demographic characteristics such as gender and race, with increasing pressure to ensure equal opportunities across all demographic parties.

With these challenges comes the urgent need to better understand how contextual factors influence soldier and small unit behavior and mission performance. Recognizing the need to develop a portfolio of research to better understand the influence of social and organizational factors on the behavior of individuals and small units, the U.

Army Research Institute ARI requested the National Research Council's Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences to outline a productive and innovative collection of future basic science research projects to improve Amy mission performance for immediate implementation and lasting over the next years. This report presents recommendations for a program of basic scientific research on the roles of social and organizational contextual factors, such as organizational institutions, culture, and norms, as determinants and moderators of the performance of individual soldiers and small units.

The Context of Military Environments: Basic Research Opportunities on Social and Organizational Factors synthesizes and assesses basic research opportunities in the behavioral and social sciences related to social and organizational factors that comprise the context of individual and small unit behavior in military environments. This report focuses on tactical operations of small units and their leaders, to include the full spectrum of unique military environments including: This report identifies key contextual factors that shape individual and small unit behavior and assesses the state of the science regarding these factors.

Army personnel policies and practices of selection, recruitment, and assignment as well as career development in training and leadership. The report also specifies the basic research funding level needed to implement the recommended agenda for future ARI research. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book. Switch between the Original Pages , where you can read the report as it appeared in print, and Text Pages for the web version, where you can highlight and search the text. To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter. Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available. Do you enjoy reading reports from the Academies online for free?

Sign up for email notifications and we'll let you know about new publications in your areas of interest when they're released. Looking for other ways to read this? Page 58 Share Cite. In this chapter, the committee develops a research agenda to answer three fundamental questions regarding contextual leadership: What knowledge and skills do leaders require to understand and address social interactions within a unit? What types of interactions exert the strongest influence, positively and negatively, on unit performance under differing environmental conditions?

How can leaders influence social interactions so as to have the most positive impact on unit performance? Page 59 Share Cite. Page 60 Share Cite. Page 61 Share Cite. Page 62 Share Cite. Conclusion 4 The committee concludes that leaders play a critical role in influencing the social context, which in turn shapes positive individual behavior and effective unit performance. Page 63 Share Cite. Recommendation 4 The U. Page 64 Share Cite.

Relevant and important research questions for these considerations included the following: What distinct leadership behaviors facilitate and encourage rapid and lasting assimilation of replacement individuals and units such that a desired social context is maintained or enhanced including, for example, desirable interactions, cohesion, and trust? How can replacement individuals, who change the dynamics of the small unit, be encouraged to strengthen the group invigorate with fresh ideas; rethink outdated practices, etc. What organizational structures may encourage new unit members to question and report unethical or illegal conduct, when it exists?

What organizational structures may encourage and facilitate leaders to resolve such behaviors or vice versa, discourage action from leaders? How does trust evolve in a unit with rotating individual members? In later years, Clarke would consider the NCO Academy to be one of the most successful activities he had been charged with in his illustrious career. Clarke created a staff partly from the officers who had worked under him as students and instructors at the Armored School.

Fourteen subjects were decided on to form the basic curriculum and included drill and command, military justice, physical fitness and basic tactics. As in the 88 th Division's school, Clarke's academy required rigid discipline. The three major departments, Leadership and Command, Tactics, and Personnel and Administration were charged with the conduct of the training.

The students' day began at 5 a. Soldiers in the first three grades who were not previously officers or graduates of similar training were considered for attendance at this NCO Academy. As with its predecessor in Sonthofen, the Munich NCO Academy was originally established for Constabulary troopers, but the graduates' success spilled over to the other units and soon expanded to the 7 th Army and the European and Trieste Commands. On October 15, the first class of students reported to the Constabulary Academy.

In later classes the Academy reached their full student load of and by had graduated almost students. As part of developing future noncommissioned officer replacements the Academy allowed enlisted soldiers from Grades 4 and 5 corporal and private first class to attend, providing they had the appropriate educational background and demonstrated potential to become a noncom. To serve as an inspiration to all on the campus, the 10 buildings on Jensen Barracks were all named after World War II Medal of Honor recepients who gave their lives in the European Theater.

Some 45, noncoms had graduated from the Munich school by then, with even several students from the newly formed West German Bundeswehr attending. Clarke would go on to establish other NCO Academies in Texas, Hawaii, and Korea, and other divisions began to develop their own versions. Though they were similar in nature and conduct, there were no established standards of instruction, and graduates of one course could later ultimately be required to attend another.

The Korean War brought an urgent need for better-trained small unit leaders. This June 25th directive stated that the "purpose of Noncommissioned Officer Academies is to broaden the professional knowledge of the noncommissioned officer and instill in him the self-confidence and sense of responsibility required to make him a capable leader of men. This regulation authorized, but did not require, division and installation commanders to establish NCO academies.

It set forth a standard pattern for training NCOs and fixed the minimum length of a course at four weeks. It did not call for a standardized course of instruction, but mandated seven subjects that were required as part of the curriculum and would emphasize the new concepts of atomic warfare. It required each command to support its academy from its available resources and did not provide additional funding.

Looking for other ways to read this?

For the first time, Army noncommissioned officers had an Army-sponsored program for institutional training. Though the Korean War would derail many programs, noncommissioned officer academies would continue to operate throughout the war. In the U. Army Leadership Human Research Unit with support from the George Washington University began to study the feasibility of identifying and training enlisted soldiers in the event of hostilities to perform in leadership roles.

Long-recognized that the NCO was important to the smooth operation of the Army, there had been relatively little research conducted on improving their training. Parallel research programs were begun, with the Human Resources Research Office HumRRO of George Washington University developing initial psychological predictors of leadership potential and the evaluation system for use in identifying competent leaders for senior NCO positions.

Army Personnel Research Office USAPRO had the mission of developing techniques to identify early in the careers of those enlisted men who were capable of becoming good noncommissioned officers in the combat branches. The Army Noncommissioned Officer's Academy system was selected to serve as the framework to measure leadership performance. Initially, the HumRRO project was to study the effects of academy training on noncommissioned officers job performance and to study the factors that modify effects of academy training. In the midst of these studies and field experiments, the Army and the Department of Defense was faced with a possible call for mobilization during the Berlin Crisis in The goals were to provide support to the training cadre at advanced training sites and centers, and provide these leader trainees with supervisory and human relations skills.

In a one-week Leader Orientation Course was provided to the Women's Army Corps, to be conducted one-week before basic training. As to be expected for a program of this type, there was resistance from the "old soldiers. Informal leadership training was conducted using different approaches and techniques, and by the completion of NCO III, three experimental training systems were developed. The conclusions drawn up in at the close of their year study on how to train NCOs and potential NCOs were as follows:. The experimental training methods led to better leadership indications on nearly all criteria, with the Leader Preparation Course system exhibiting greatest effectiveness and feasibility among various experimental and control conditions tested.

Relatively little criterion difference was found between results from specific training methods i. However, because the time involved in presentation of each different method varied, definitive comparisons could not be made. CONARC developed a new concept to transfer responsibility from training committees to the platoon sergeant. The Noncommissioned Officer's Candidate Course. By the early's, the United States Army was again engaged in conflict, now in Vietnam. As the war progressed, the attrition of combat, the month tour limit in Vietnam, separations of senior noncommissioned officers and the month stateside stabilization policy began to take its toll to the point of crisis.

Without a call up of the reserve forces, Vietnam became the Regular Army's war, fought by junior leaders. The Army was faced with sending career noncoms back into action sooner or filling the ranks with the most senior PFC or specialist. Field commanders were challenged with understaffed vacancies at base camps, filling various key leadership positions, and providing for replacements. Older and more experienced NCOs, some World War II veterans, were strained by the physical requirements of the methods of jungle fighting. The Army was quickly running out of noncommissioned officers in the combat specialties.

In order to meet these unprecedented requirements for NCO leaders the Army developed a solution. Based on the proven Officer Candidate Course where an enlisted man could attend basic and advanced training, and if recommended or applied for, filled out an application and attended OCS, the thought was the same could be done for noncoms. If a carefully selected soldier can be given 23 weeks of intensive training that would qualify him to lead a platoon, then others can be trained to lead squads and fire teams in the same amount of time.

From this seed the Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course was born. Potential candidates were selected from groups of initial entry soldiers who had a security clearance of confidential, an infantry score of or over, and demonstrated leadership potential. Based on recommendations, the unit commander would select potential NCOs, but all were not volunteers.

Those selected to attend NCOCC were immediately made corporals and later promoted to sergeant upon graduation from phase one. The select few who graduated with honors would be promoted to staff sergeant. The outstanding graduate of the first class, Staff Sgt. Leverick, recalled "I think that those who graduated [from the NCOCC] were much better prepared for some of the problems that would arise in Vietnam. The NCO candidate course was designed to maximize the two-year tour of the enlisted draftee.

The Army Chief of Staff Gen. By combining the amount of time it took to attend basic and advanced training, including leave and travel time, and then add a month tour in Vietnam, the developers settled on a week course.

History of NCO Education by Dan Elder

NCOCC was divided into two phases. Phase I was 12 weeks of intensive, hands-on training, broken down into three basic phases. For the Infantry noncom, the course included tasks such as physical training, hand-to-hand combat, weapons, first aid, map reading, communications, and indirect fire. Vietnam veterans or Rangers taught many of the classes, but the cadre of the first course were commissioned officers.

The second basic phase focused on instruction of fire team, squad and platoon tactics. Though over hours of instruction was given, percent was conducted in the field. The final basic phase was a "dress rehearsal for Vietnam," a full week of patrols, ambush, defensive perimeters, and navigation. Twice daily the Vietnam-schooled Rangers critiqued the candidates and all training was conducted tactically. Throughout the weeks of training, leadership was instilled in all that the students would do. A student chain of command was set up and "Tactical NCOs" supervised the daily performance of the candidates.

By the time the students successfully completed Phase I, they were promoted to sergeant or staff sergeant, and shipped off to conduct a week practical application of their leadership skills by serving as assistant leaders in a training center or unit. This gave the candidate the opportunity to gain more confidence in leading soldiers.

As with many programs of its time, NCOCC was originally developed to meet the needs of the combat arms. With the success of the course, it was extended to other career fields, and the program became known as the Skill Development Base Program. Some schools later offered a correspondence "preparatory course" for those who anticipated attending NCOCC or had not benefited from such formal military schooling.

As with the Leadership Preparation Course tested by HumRRO, the "regular" noncoms and soldiers had much resentment for the NCOCC graduates, as those who took years to earn their stripes the hard way, were immediately angered. Many complained by voice or in writing that it took years to build a noncommissioned officer and that the program was wrong. Many feared it would affect their promotion opportunities, and one senior NCO worried that "nobody had shown them [NCOCC graduates] how to keep floor buffers operational in garrison.

Wooldridge, serving as the recently established position of Sergeant Major of the Army stated that, "promotions given to men who complete the course will not directly affect the promotion possibilities of other deserving soldiers in Vietnam or other parts of the world. Besides being the first class, you are also the first group who has ever been trained this way. It has been a whole new idea in training.

After initial skepticism, former battalion commander Col. Skelton explained, "within a short time they [NCOCC graduates] proved themselves completely and we were crying for more. Because of their training, they repeatedly surpassed the soldier who had risen from the ranks in combat and provided the quality of leadership at the squad and platoon level which is essential in the type of fighting we are doing. The graduates recognized the value of their training. Young draftees attending initial training at the time knew they were destined for Vietnam. Many potential candidates were eligible for Officer Candidate School, but rejected it because they would incur an additional service obligation.

They realized that NCOCC was a method by which they could expand on their military training before entering the war. Many graduates would later say that the NCO Candidate Course, taught by Vietnam veterans who experienced the war first hand, was what kept them and their soldiers alive and its lessons would go on to serve them well later in life. Many were assigned as assistant fire team leaders upon arrival in Vietnam and then rapidly advanced to squad or platoon sergeants. Most would not see their fellow classmates again, and in many cases were the senior or only NCO in the platoon. Some would go on to make a career of the military or later attend OCS, and three were Medal of Honor winners.

The NCOCC graduate had a specific role in the Army-they were trained to do one thing in one branch in one place in the world, and that was to be a fire team leader in Vietnam. It was recognized that they were not taught how to teach drill and ceremonies, inspect a barracks, or how to conduct police call. Many rated the program by how the graduates performed in garrison, for which they had little skill.

But their performance in the rice paddies and jungles as combat leaders was where they took their final tests, of which many receiving the ultimate failing grade. The call was out in the Army to educate noncommissioned officers. The Army began to look at educating noncoms in earnest.

This study, which was completed in July , focused on how to establish and manage a quality-based enlisted force, and dedicated a portion for "improving the vital area of training. The Project recommended formal leadership training designed to prepare selected career-enlisted personnel for progressive levels of duty, and noted it would enhance career attractiveness and the quality of the noncommissioned officer.

This study recognized that "The present haphazard system of career development, as opposed to skill development, had two bad results. First, the image of the NCO as a professional, highly trained individual is difficult to foster; second, the Army's resource of intelligent enlisted men, anxious to develop as career soldiers, is inefficiently managed. The Army has extended great effort to ensure the selected development of its officers. Analagous [sic] effort should be spent in the development of the noncommissioned officers of the Army.

The report went on to recommend a three-level educational program, similar to officers, outlined in the February NCO Educational Development Concept. The Advanced Course was targeted to mid-grade NCOs, and the Senior Course was envisioned as a management course directed to qualifying men for senior enlisted staff positions. On the 23 rd of April , President Richard Nixon announced to Congress that a new national objective would be set to establish an all-volunteer force and from that the Modern Volunteer Army was born.

But by mid Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland was unhappy with the progress of the MVA and asked then retired Bruce Clarke to travel the Army and find out what could be changed to make it more attractive. On a visit to Fort Hood, Clarke arrived in time for its NCO Academy to close its doors, a repeat of the same story at other installations.

Clarke conducted a survey and discovered that there were only four NCO Academies remaining in which to train , noncommissioned officers. Some of the difficulties facing the Army of included Westmoreland's concern for leadership inadequacies. He directed the CONARC Commander to form a study on leadership, and noted "the evident need for immediate attention by the chain of command to improving our leadership techniques to meet the Army's current challenges.

While these studies were going on, the Army was continually under fire. The May release of Comptroller General's Report to Congress on the Improper Use of Enlisted Personnel noted that the Secretary of the Army should strengthen existing policies rather than introduce new programs or changes.

That same month Westmoreland urged all the commanders of the major commands to grant their noncommissioned officers broader authority. In his list of 14 points he asked them to "expand NCOs education through wise counseling and by affording them the opportunity to attend NCO Academies, NCO refresher courses, and off-duty educational programs. Planning for the development of an education system began in early Obviously, if the NCO could be school-trained for the jungle, then they ought to be school-trained for the garrison, too.

Woolnough was not enthusiastic about the plan. Woolnough believed that senior NCOs, like generals, needed no further military schooling. This was the same problem Gen. Freeman and his headquarters would not accept the idea. Westmoreland would also wait until Gen. The draft ended on December 31, and the Army entered prepared to rely on volunteers.

• ;
• Sei passi nella nebbia (Italian Edition).
• Overcome Fear of Rejection (Hypnosis and Guided Meditation).

The three-tiered later four, five, and now four noncommissioned officer education system was initially developed for career soldiers, specifically for those who had re-enlisted at least once. Students would attend the courses in a temporary duty status, with the sergeants major course being a permanent change of station. Reserve soldiers were authorized to attend active courses, and different branches developed correspondence courses. By mid forty-one basic courses were in operation. In January the first two advance courses started, consisting only of E-7s because the Department of the Army did not maintain the files of E-6s to screen.

Army Europe personnel were allowed to attend advance courses in the United States. Army Sergeants Major Academy. This capstone senior level course was designed to prepare selected E-8s for duty as sergeants major and command sergeants major throughout the Army. Unlike other NCOES courses it was branch immaterial and similar to courses provided to commissioned officers at senior service schools. To develop the initial curriculum a committee was formed consisting of ten command sergeants major from major commands and thirteen educational personnel from throughout the Army's schools systems.

Some of the subjects selected included the usual courses on leadership, military organization and military management. But the sergeants major course also included topics on world affairs and human relations. Some within the military were against NCOs studying world affairs. The subject was supported and encouraged by the first Commandant, Col. William Bainbridge who would later go on to become Sergeant Major of the Army. It took a decision by the Army Chief of Staff, Gen.

Abrams, to keep this topic in the course. In December of students began to arrive and on January 15, , the first Sergeants Major Course of students was convened. This first class was organized with student leaders who attended to administrative details and organizing committees. This first class also established a new tradition by conducting a dining-in and dining-out for students.

These formal functions were a tradition with the officer corps but not for noncommissioned officers, and the first was held March 22, The senior course was designated the "capstone" of the noncommissioned officer education system. It consisted of over hours of instruction, mostly classroom centered, using a "small group" process. This method centered on a participatory method of training in which 10 or 15 students were organized into groups and accomplished a majority of their learning by doing. This different approach let the students participate in the learning.

Typically, the first students were first or master sergeants with between fifteen and twenty-three years of service. As long as a soldier was not a serving sergeant major, he or she could attend. The Academy offered a comprehensive, professional educational environment in which each individual was offered an opportunity to broaden his knowledge and discover new fields outside his MOS. Besides the academic portion, students were offered a college electives program and received an opportunity to participate in a college degree program. The Enlisted Personnel Management System.

Lawrence Hickey became the first in January The purpose of noncommissioned officer academies was to train noncommissioned officers and specialists in fundamentals and techniques of leadership and to offer increased career educational opportunities. Academies also were to prepare them for leadership duty in all environments and to instill in them self-confidence and a sense of responsibility.

This Task Force was organized in January to design a career system that would challenge, develop, reward, and satisfy soldiers so well that more would want to stay for a career. It also would provide the right number of soldiers in the right grades and skills to carry out the Army's mission. It would serve to eliminate the dead-end military occupational specialties? NCOs were now allowed to merge to specialties at a higher grade in a similar career field without changing having to change jobs entirely.

This plan was to implement a new EPMS through a multi-year plan. EPMS was implemented on 1 October and was designed to provide clear patterns of career development and promotion potential. A goal of eliminating bottlenecks for promotion was established by grouping MOSs into career management fields. A separate group of courses was developed in for the combat support and combat service support NCOs that were technical in nature.