The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process

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The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process

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REVIEW: The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process – By Alex de Waal

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The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process, Young

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Project MUSE Mission Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide. When the African Union took over the Darfur mediation, it envisaged a Darfur peace agreement as a pillar to the CPA, a means of bringing the Darfurians into the national democratic process. Neither the NCP nor the Darfurians saw it that way: None of the political parties was committed: Only the southern civilian parties were serious about democratization, because they saw it as a means of restraining the militarism and authoritarianism of the SPLM.

Young is aware of all of this though Darfur is largely neglected in his account.

First, the Sudanese parties would, as soon as they sense that their mediator demands a commitment to democratic transformation, make that commitment, and then find a hundred ways to delay or derail it. In fact this is precisely what they did over the CPA and during the Darfur peace talks. Second, when the IGAD countries walked away from the mediation in , they did not walk away from engagement. On the contrary, three of the four governments Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda sent their troops into Sudan and actively supported the opposition, forcing the Sudanese government back to the table.

Unless any would-be mediator has comparable pressure to exert, walking away is not an option. There were no such options for anyone when Sudan and South Sudan fought in Heglig in April and stood at the brink of all-out war. Third, and related to this, what should a mediator do when walking away entails standing by while Sudan and South Sudan plunge into a crisis with potentially disastrous regional repercussions?

This is precisely what was threatened in But the AU also knew that if the conflict were not managed it risked a far worse outcome, including dragging in the entire region, from Egypt to Uganda. Mediators do not usually have the privilege of choosing their parties or their circumstances: Young is certainly right that the Sudanese peace processes of the last fifteen years have been riddled with mistakes. But Sudan belonged to the Sudanese and today the two Sudans belong to the Sudanese and South Sudanese , and the main crimes and blunders have been by the Sudanese leaderships.

The international mediators undoubtedly made their own mistakes, as well as achieving some unanticipated successes. As I mentioned above, I would like to believe that an inclusive peace process was possible. And I believe that, had the mediators and the Troika listened to the Darfurians in and , as Justice Africa demanded at that time, the chances of the disaster in Darfur would have been reduced.

But I am not confident that, even if IGAD and the Troika had insisted on bringing in the diverse northern and southern political parties, armed groups and civil society organizations, that the outcomes would necessarily have been better. Both parties had the option of fighting and were ready to carry on doing so.

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Would another decade of war have brought a better peace? This piece was originally published by the World Peace Foundation.