Multi-Level Party Politics in Western Europe (Comparative Territorial Politics)

The vertical dimension of the multi-level organization of state-wide parties in Spain and the UK E Fabre Party Politics 17 3 , , Party organization in a multi-level system: Party rules, party resources and the politics of parliamentary democracies: Party Politics 22 6 , , How statewide parties cope with the regionalist issue: Decentralization and party organizational change: Party Organisation in a multi-level setting: Spain and the United Kingdom.

Statewide parties and regional party competition: Partis politiques nationaux en crise?

• Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe.
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Belgian federalism in a comparative perspective E Fabre. Verkiezingscycli in meerlagige politieke systemen: Palgrave Macmillan , RM Harden Medical teacher 30 5 , , Les partis politiques nationaux et non-nationaux au Royaume-Uni E Fabre. Political parties and territorial integration in Britain E Fabre. Published on-line first in Comparative European Politics Https: This article presents the main aim of the special issue, which is the systematic and empirically based investigation of the linkages between populism and ethno-territorial ideologies in Western European states.

By introducing a conceptual map, in which the defining characteristics of populism, regionalism, state- nationalism, and Euroscepticism are identified and conceptualized, the article proceeds with the possible linkage points between both concepts.

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By foreshadowing and discussing several of the key findings of the empirical case studies presented in this special issue, the introductory article highlights important emerging trends. Most crucially, only radical-right parties both regionalist and state-nationalist appear to be inherently and stably populist. The same parties are also clearly Eurosceptic. By contrast, several regionalist parties, positioned in the mainstream left or right, tend to adopt a populist discourse only incidentally and temporarily.

Centre- periphery dynamics have featured prominently both in Northern and Latin America. For long time, populism in Latin America was primarily conceived as a macroeconomic strategy—i. US and Western Europe. In addition, in more recent studies, a clear centre-periphery dynamic has been identified within and across individual states; for instance in the relationship between the Andean mountain areas and the plains Dunkerley, Centre-periphery dynamics have been given scant attention and have popped up in the literature only incidentally: Finally, while the scholarship has widely investigated the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism Taggart, ; Krouwel, ; Ruzza, ; Harmsen, ; Tournier-Sol, , the study of such relationship has only focused on two levels—national and EU—with extremely rare works analyzing the multi-level i.

This special issue aims to directly address these lacunae within the scholarship, by investigating center-periphery relationships, ethnic cleavages and multi-level dynamics that impact upon or are informed by populist politics in Western Europe. This article opens the special issue, providing a conceptual map and an explorative comparative analysis of the relationship and linkages between populism, regionalism or minority nationalism , majority ethno-nationalism and Euroscepticism. In the next section, we introduce, discuss, and define the concept of populism.

This is followed by a segment devoted to conceptualizing and defining specific ethno-territorial ideologies— regionalism, majority nationalism, and Euroscepticism—and highlighting the potential linkages between each of them and populism. We, then, present several ideological combinations that are reflected in the cases analyzed in the articles of this special issue. We further discuss these combinations in the final section of this introductory article.

Leaving aside the loose use of the term made by the media Bale at al. First, the predominance of single case-studies or region specific studies—e. Second, a certain tendency to shift the discussion from the essence of the concept of populism to the conceptual category to which populism belongs: Other important elements emphasized by several authors, such as a sense of crisis Taggart, ; Rooduijn, , can actually be considered contextual conditions under which a populist discourse may be more viable or successful Kriesi and Pappas, Indeed, populism can be linked with very different ideological orientations from radical left to radical right; from inclusionary to exclusionary; from socialist to neoliberal; from secular to religious; from fanaticism for charismatic leadership to fanaticism for grass- roots democracy Otjes and Louwerse, ; March, Populist claims are, by definition, ambivalent because the key concepts of populism are not sufficiently defined: Therefore, ambivalence may be considered as a key characteristic of populism, providing strategic flexibility and adaptability as well as a major source of diffusion of populist discourse among political actors.

This will allow distinguishing, for instance, between primarily populist parties engaging with regionalist claims and primarily regionalist parties using a populist discourse. It will also allow for the exploration of how the populist actors cope with the challenges arising from the ambivalence rooted in their often contradictory ideological patchwork, e.

We now turn to introducing the key ideological elements of regionalism, majority or state nationalism, and Euroscepticism, thus completing the conceptual map that we set out to provide. These specificities, which can be socio-cultural language, religion, prevailing ideological orientations, etc. The level of self-government claimed by regionalist parties can vary considerably.

However, the distinction seems to defy a persuasive definition and, in the end, the little value added by this distinction is attested by the fact that the very proponents consider both regionalist and stateless nationalist parties as belonging to one same party family Hepburn, Like populism, regionalism can and does also combine itself with all sorts of ideological orientations, from the radical- left to the radical-right Massetti, ; Massetti and Shakel, The linkages with populism can happen therefore within a broader ideological outlook.

The most basic and most evident connection between regionalism and populism resides in the potential correspondence between the two foundational dichotomies: Regionalist populists typically focus on the putative incapacity or unwillingness of national elites in the far away capital to recognize, understand, and even consider the specific needs of the region.

Indeed, the politics of resentment and victimization, so typical of populism, might resonate well with ethno-regional minorities that perceive a lack of recognition or fair treatment of their region by the state elites. Similarly, we can expect a regional populist party, or a particularly autonomous regional branch of a statewide populist party, to back-up their criticism of elites with a regionalist discourse.

It is worth pointing out that both regionalist and populist parties can antagonize not only the state political elites but, where a regional government is in place, also the regional political elites. Besides this basic connection, populism and regionalism can combine within the frame of a broader ideological orientation.

Wilfried Swenden

In addition, regionalist populists can target not only regional and state elites but also supra-national and international ones Mazzoleni, Special mention should be made of a particular category of regionalist parties—unionist regionalist parties—that operate in ethnically divided regions and often find themselves fighting on two fronts. In a way, like all regionalist parties, they are in a bargaining and sometimes confrontational relationship with the state for attaining a certain degree of self-government.

At the same time, they fully side with the state against secessionist threats involving their region and mobilize people based on alternative ethno- regional identities. It should be noted that highly autonomous regional branches of a statewide parties can also engage in this type of two-front battles. Indeed, some of these parties can enter into close agreements with majority nationalist statewide parties, thus becoming de-facto their regional branches — e.

State nationalism is the ideology at the basis of the putative nation-state: If the nation-state project is not internally contested, state nationalism remains an implicit or dormant ideology. If the nation-state project is internally contested, different scenarios open up, depending primarily on the level of democracy of the political system and on the mobilization strategies of ethno-regionalist forces.

Within the resulting democratic dialectic, some political forces can voice their resistance against this pluralist revision of the nation-state project. Therefore, in these cases, state nationalism remains a particularly potent force in the form of majority nationalism. In theory, majority nationalist parties can have different ideological orientations along the left-right continuum.

Therefore, the populist-nationalist synthesis tends to manifest itself as a form of right-wing populism Loch, It goes without saying that, beyond fighting against mobilized ethno-regional identities, majority nationalist parties also want to protect the national identity from the supposed threats posed by immigrant communities.

Euroscepticism can be seen, therefore, as a particular case of sovereignism and, in turn, a particular expression of state nationalism. Scholarship has identified different degrees and forms of Euroscepticism.

Multi-Level Party Politics in Western Europe - Klaus Detterbeck - Google Книги

In contrast, Kopecky and Mudde distinguish between political forces that oppose the very idea of European integration Eurorejects and those that, albeit supporting the principle of European integration, openly criticize the way in which it has been actualized Eurosceptic.

Like the other ethno-territorial ideologies, Euroscepticism can, in theory, combine itself with all types of leftist and rightist ideologies. In fact, empirical studies have found that Euroscepticism tends to connect itself primarily with radical-left and radical-right ideologies Hix, ; Hooghe et al. Although most regionalist parties have generally been supportive of European integration De Winter and Gomez-Reino, ; Jolly, , Eurosceptic positions have become more common in the last two decades Elias, As for the relationship between Euroscepticism and other ideological orientations, regionalist parties tend to follow the same pattern as statewide parties: Since the process of European integration follows a project devised by supranational elites, it is virtually self-evident why Euroscepticism can be easily expressed through a populist discourse: Case-studies of the special issue: Two articles analyze state nationalist parties: At first sight, there might seem a full overlap between the territorial organization of parties and their ethno-territorial ideology.

This because regionalist parties are also regional, in the sense that their party organization is present only in a specific territory and they compete in elections only in that territory or ethno-linguistic community in the case of Belgium within the state; while state nationalist parties operate statewide. However, looking more closely, this is not exactly the case. On the one hand, the regionalist Northern League since December only League has often tried to compete electorally also in regions where the party organization was absent and is currently trying to build up a statewide party organization Mazzoleni and Ruzza, in this issue.

On the other hand, the state-nationalist FN has clearly adapted its discourse to different French regions Ivaldi and Dutozia, in this issue. Interestingly, the five radical-right parties are the only ones adopting a marked form of Euroscepticism van Haute et al. One of them, the regionalist VB, attacks the EU primarily in the interest of the Flemish region and the Dutch-speaking community.

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Finally, two of them, the regionalist Italian League and the Swiss League of Ticino, voice their Euroscepticism alternating and trying to reconcile a defense of regional and national interests. From the following articles, it emerges that the parties analyzed and their relationship with populism varies considerably.

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By contrast, populism is virtually absent in the liberal regionalist DeFI van Haute et al. Summing up, this article intended to conceptualize the relationship between populism and ethno-territorial politics in Western Europe. Its aim is the systematic and empirical analysis of the linkages between the two key concepts as well as of the different formations and their operating logic that engage in both populism and ethno-territorial claims.

The systematic mapping introduced here is intended as a conceptual basis for further empirical research demonstrations of which are provided in the following case studies. Devolution and the Battle for Partisan Credibility. A Refutation and a New Perspective. Political Studies 64 1: