Der Einfluss unbeobachteter Einflussfaktoren (German Edition)

People who are leftist here tend to support diversity with regard to sexual orientation, religion, ethnic background, language and other defining markers, and believe that the state should provide regulations to allow such diversity. These two dimensions are not fully independent from another. Those people who are more conservative economically tend to be more conservative culturally, the relationship between the two dimensions is, however, not very strong. This is the reason why it makes sense for parties to explore the full two-dimensional room on these dimensions.

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For instance, the Dutch left-liberal party D66 Democraten 66 and the right-liberal party VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid and Democraties are both economically conservative, but they differ on the cultural dimension with the D66 being more progressive culturally than VVD. We can analyse these dimensions of political values by looking at some public opinion data from to from the European Social Survey. To measure the economic dimension, we will use support for the idea that the government should redistribute from the rich to the poor.

Table 1 shows the two demographically oldest European societies and the two youngest alongside support for the above statement as expressed in the European Social Survey. Again, if the ratio stands at one, there is no difference in support levels between the two age groups. So, in Germany, younger people are actually more likely to be economically conservative than older people, but only very slightly. Older people are 1. The same pattern prevails in Italy, which is demographically the most similar society to Germany in Europe.

It also holds in Ireland and Slovakia, the two youngest societies in our sample. Support for income redistribution by age group. Let us now look at the cultural dimension. Table 2 shows similar evidence about whether individuals support the idea that homosexuals should be able to live as they want.

The numbers are levels of support for the culturally progressive position. All four countries show the same inter-age group pattern, namely that older people tend to be culturally more conservative than young people. The only striking difference in Table 2 is between Slovakia and the other three countries, since Slovakia has a strongly culturally conservative populace with stark age group differences and an age ratio of 0. Support for free expression of homosexual life styles in two oldest and youngest democracies. Figure 2 gives us an overview of all European countries in terms of the differences between older and young people with respect to the economic and cultural views described above.

The picture is divided by the two parity lines at the value 1. The biggest quadrant is to the top left: Four countries deviate from this pattern: Austria, Switzerland, Great Britain i. In the first three, older people are on average both economically and culturally more conservative than young people. In the Netherlands, however, older people are less conservative than young people on both dimensions, although only slightly so in the cultural dimension. The countries are also marked by different symbols depending on their time of democratisation.

Those countries that have been democratised before or slightly after World War II tend to show a smaller age ratio in the cultural dimension than the other countries. This means that the difference between older people and the young in terms of the cultural dimension is much smaller in more established democracies. In a nutshell based on our measures, older people are on average and in most European countries economically less conservative than young people. They are also culturally more conservative, broadly, than their young country peers. Are there any explanations for these patterns?

First of all, the distribution of certain social characteristics is different among the elderly than it is among younger people. For instance, the group of older people is more female than younger groups due to gender-specific mortality rates and less well educated due to recent expansions of educational possibilities.

Being female and lower educated are both associated with less economic conservatism than being male or higher-educated. At the same time, women and lower educated people are also less likely to be economically conservative, supporting the notion that the differences observed may be due to the composition of the groups. Age ratios of support for redistribution economic progressivism and support for diversity of sexual orientation cultural progressivism. For country acronyms, see appendix. There are further explanations for age-related differences with regard to political values.

Most importantly, older people are members of a different cohort than younger people. This means that individuals who grew up during the same time, given the same historical context, share similar experiences that shapes them in late adolescence and early adulthood. These common experiences are tremendously shaped by national circumstances and political history. Being a member of a birth cohort in one country can shape an individual rather differently than being the member of the same birth cohort in another country. If these experiences were all idiosyncratic to a national context, we would not see such a common pattern across countries.

Instead, there are some cohort experiences that have a similar political effect across European countries. World War II and its aftermath is one such common experience. We know that the experience of death and violence in World War II shaped the collective experience in Eastern Europe and the longing for safety in the European Union. More importantly in the context of our discussion about conservatism, there have been broad developments in Europe that shaped the ways in which members of different cohorts relate to politics.

One of these broad developments is socio-economic modernisation and democratisation Inglehart This is a broad development at the social, economic and political level through which individuals grow more individualistic, more cosmopolitan and more accepting of diversity. This development catches cohorts differently, such that it is mostly those cohorts whose members are still young and can still be shaped by this change. When we look at a snap shot of younger and older people as we did with our data, this can explain the varying degrees of cultural conservatism among older people.

Their cohorts have been less impacted by this development than cohorts of younger people. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the richer and, according to this theory, socio-economically more developed countries in Europe Western Europe tend to be more on the right of the x-axis in Figure 1.

The further along societies are in the process of socio-economic development, the smaller the gap in cultural conservatism between younger and older people is. Lithuania, Greece, Estonia and Slovakia show culturally much more conservative older people relative to younger people in their countries because they are, according to this theory, less developed with GDP per capita being a simple indicator of that. Iceland, the Netherlands and Belgium, in contrast, show a rather low level of difference. This co-evolution with socio-economic development is remarkable because the social status of older people tends to decline with increasing modernisation.

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In pre-modern society, the social status of older men not women! This status declined with increasing industrialisation and was finally removed altogether with the introduction of the modern welfare state, which allowed all individuals to seek their own material fortunes without the family having to be the main safety net. In other words, if older people are more conservative than younger people, this is much more likely due to their cohort membership than to where they are in the life cycle.

But these differences are not stable across time. For instance, analyses of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom demonstrate that older people in were much more likely to vote for the Leave option than for the Remain option, most likely because older people belonged to cohorts that were more fond of the traditional nation-state than the supranational structure of EU governance Goodwin and Heath ; Hobolt So, is there anything left to say about older people and conservatism?

There is some evidence about voters being more open to newer parties in the first elections of their lives. Later, if these parties do not make it into the establishment, they tend to shift to more established parties. As voters have had more opportunities to cast a vote, they grow increasingly disenchanted with wasting their votes on new parties. However, this effect, which one might call status-quo conservatism, is small and can only be demonstrated for countries with proportional representation systems Goerres Support for free expression of homosexual life styles.

The Greying of Our Democracies. Goodwin, Matthew J, and Oliver Heath. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Current voting-age population estimates for Iceland, Japan and Turkey unavailable.

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In addition, one Swiss canton has compulsory voting. House of Representatives and various national election authorities. Das Handbuch Wahlforschung Hrsg. November , von http: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. November , von https: Voter turnout trends around the World. At the onset of many liberal democracies, participation in democratic elections was the only political action that citizens would engage in. All other forms of political participation were extremely rare. This has changed dramatically since the s in Europe. In mainstream political science, political participation is an individual action intended to affect political outcomes.

These outcomes can be policies, political institutions or the selection of political personnel. Purely expressive actions, such as waving a flag, do not fall under this definition. Within this definition, there are a wide variety of different political actions. Here, we will only look at four that are among the most common forms of low-intensity political participation: They are low-intensity forms of participation because they require relatively low levels of cognitive and physical abilities.

The first two are often called institutionalised political participation, since they involve the use of formalised institutions of representative democracy. The second two are often called non-institutionalised participation, since they do not require formalised forms of participation. Political participation is changing across Europe in manifold ways that vary from country to country. Broadly, individuals are becoming less willing to subscribe to whole manifestoes of political goals, such as those offered by political parties.

Instead, they are increasingly interested in single political issues, such as the protection of the environment. There is also less willingness to attach oneself to a specific type of political participation in the long run. This makes non-institutionalised forms of political participation increasingly popular. Voting and some forms of institutionalised participation, like party activism, are on the decline. This is not true for all countries and all parties, but the tendency is clearly there. Across European countries, the levels of non-institutionalised participation seem to depend on the length of democratic epoch in a country.

As I will show below, the longer ago the transition to democracy was, the more common non-institutionalised forms of participation are. How we participate in politics is linked to the patterns we observe today and what we first learned when we were more impressionable young adults. This is a typical cohort phenomenon, wherein older people are different because they belong to a certain birth cohort who shared different social and political experiences at a young age.

This is not a deterministic relationship, however. There are certainly very active older people in non-institutionalised forms of participation. Nonetheless, this particular participation gap between older and young people is closing. As I will show below, there are even some European countries, such as Switzerland or Sweden, where the gap has reversed and older people are now more likely to use forms of non-institutionalised participation than young people. That the manner of the overall participation process is changing is not only remarkable as such, but it carries an inherent message about social inequalities.

High-frequency forms of political participation, such as voting, are less unequal than low-frequency forms of participation in terms of the social profile of those who resort to them. Moreover, non-institutionalised forms of participation are also higher education forms of political participation. So even though these forms are becoming more popular, they have a strong bias against people with a lower educational level than voting does. Thus, if older people are more likely to use institutionalised forms of participation such as voting, the social representation of older people is less biased than that of young people, who are more likely to use high-bias forms of participation.

The effects of these differences on representation bias are fairly unexplored. Let us examine age differences in political participation in more detail. We start by identifying four groups: For those groups, we use four different political actions that will also form the basis of the more nuanced analysis to follow: Types of political participation across age groups in Europe. Table 1 shows the four activity groups across 27 European countries weighed by their population size. If you want to know just four numbers for the political participation of older Europeans in free European democracies, they can be found in the first row.

Thirteen percent of older people in Europe are not politically active at all. The young are clearly the least active of the three age groups. Distribution of activity types across European countries and Europe. Figure 1 reveals the distribution of these four political activity groups across all 27 European countries. Lithuania has the least politically active older people whereas Iceland has the most active older people on the right. Those who only vote are the dominant activity is most European countries. Those who are active but outside of electoral politics constitute a small fraction in all European countries.

Let us now turn to some detailed cross-country comparisons.

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This statistical analysis is based on all European countries that were in the European Social Survey between and and considered free democracies, a total of 27 countries. For some countries we have data from three different surveys and for others just from one. So while older people have high voter participation rates across Europe, there are strong differences between older people in different countries. When we look at the ratio of elderly voting participation and young ages voting participation , we see that the ratio stands almost exactly at 1. This makes sense because both countries have mandatory voting with either weak enforcement Italy or strong enforcement Belgium.

However, for all other countries, the ratio is above 1 with an average of 1. This means that older people in Lithuania are 2. Overall in Europe, older people are more likely to vote than young people. The reasons for this are well-known. First, as voters have had more opportunities to vote, they get used to voting Goerres The occasional non-voter tends to become a regular voter.

This is an age effect that is likely to linger for some time to come. This is a historical trend that can reverse. It could be that, in the future, members of older cohorts will have a lower likelihood of voting than younger cohorts. Voting participation by age groups.

In Figure 2, we can see that the relationship between the ratio of voting levels is strongly correlated with the overall level of reported voting participation. The more common voting is in a country, the smaller the difference is. This is in parts a mechanical effect. If an activity is almost carried out by everyone, sizeable groups in that country cannot differ much in their activity levels. In other words, if the voting differential in participation between young and old is seen as a problem, increasing the overall turnout will tend to narrow the gap here.

Scatter plot overall level of reported voting and ratio of the levels of older people and young people. For country acronyms, see Table 2. Figure 2 also shows the timing of democratisation in each of these countries. Countries that democratised after tend to have lower levels of voter turnout overall and a stronger distortion of voting in favour of older people. In other words, more recent democracies are characterised by a voting process in which older people play a disproportionally stronger role compared to young people.

Let us turn to the second type of institutionalised political participation Table 3, with more detailed results in the appendix. Whether people contacted a politician or public official varies a lot between countries.

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When we look at the ratio between the participation level of older people divided by that of young people, we see much more dramatic cross-country differences than we did for voting participation. Six countries show a pattern in which older people are less likely to use this channel of participation.

Croatia, for instance, has a ratio of only 0. Meanwhile, in Belgium there is absolutely no difference.

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In contrast, older people were more likely to use this channel in 20 countries. The maximum is in Lithuania, where older people are 2. Scatter plot of the overall reported level of contacting a public official or politician and the age ratio. Figure 3 shows that there is almost no relationship between the overall level of contacting public officials and politicians and the ratio level of elderly to young people.

The fitted line is almost flat. However, we do see that older democracies i. This means that they have higher levels of contacting public officials and are less heterogeneous in terms of the ratio of elderly to young people using this form of participation. In more recently democratised countries, the level of contacting tends to be lower and the distortion of usage varies dramatically. Signing a petition is the most common form of political participation outside of the established formal channels Table 4. Here, the range of country averages is very large. The ratio is on average tilted below 1 with a mean of 0.

Of the 27 countries in our sample, 25 reveal a ratio below 1, meaning that older people in Europe are less likely to use this form of political participation. Signing a petition by age group. Scatter plot of the overall level of signing a petition and the age ratio. In Figure 4 we see that, in contrast, to voting there is a distinct positive relationship between the overall level of this form of political participation and the ratio.

This means that the more common signing a petition is in a country, the less difference there is between whether young and older people participate in this way. At the bottom-left of the figure, we can see a cluster of six countries Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia that are all characterised by low levels of this form of participation and a low ratio of older to young participation. Here, signing a petition is predominantly carried out by young people and not at all by older people. Demonstrating in the streets is another form of non-institutionalised participation that is much less used and more demanding in terms of time and energy than just signing a petition.

In previous studies of the s, demonstrating was considered a youth thing. This finding has now been partially revised. Demonstrating in the streets is far more common in countries such as Spain or Iceland, especially compared to places like Finland or the Netherlands. In most countries 26 of the 27 in our sample , demonstrating in the streets is predominantly carried out by young people and not by older people.

In Iceland, older people are resorting to street demonstrations as much as young people with the ratio at exactly one. The gap between young and older people, however, varies quite substantially across countries. Taking part in a demonstration by age group. Figure 5 displays the overall level of demonstrating in a country and the participation ratio of older to young people. There is a positive association between the two, but not a very strong one.

The more common demonstrating is, the less difference there is between older and young people.

The less popular this form of participation is, the more it is carried forward by young people. There is no discernible relationship between the timing of democracy here: Two interesting countries stand out, Iceland and Spain. But in Iceland, older people and young people have the same level of participation, thus showing an age gap of zero. In contrast, Spain shows a significant age gap, with the ratio standing at 0. Even though both countries show high levels of demonstration, in Spain this is carried out much more by young people than it is in Iceland where this kind of political action is equally popular among young and older people.

Scatter plot overall level of demonstrating and the age ratio. Figure 6 puts our evidence together. Here we see the mean age ratios for institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation in one graph.

Where the two lines meet, a hypothetical country would show no difference in participation levels between older and young people in any of the two dimensions. Iceland comes closest to this point. In institutionalised participation, Icelandic older people are a little bit more active than Icelandic young people. After Iceland, Sweden comes closest to this two-dimensional parity.

In non-institutionalised participation, it is the other way around. There are four countries where institutionalised participation is almost the same across age groups, but there are also sizeable differences in non-institutionalised participation in favour of young people. These are Belgium, Estonia, Finland and Spain. Britain shows a pattern of relatively small differences in non-institutionalised participation but very strong differences in institutionalised participation.

Older British people are not very far from young British people in non-institutionalised participation. However, they are much more active in institutionalised forms of participation. Lithuania is the most unequal in terms of both measures. Older people in Lithuania are much more active than young people in institutionalised forms of participation and much more inactive in non-institutionalised participation.

In other words, older and young people in Lithuania differ completely in their patterns of political participation. Most importantly, institutionalised participation through formalised routines of representative democracies is used more by older people than young people in many, but not all democracies.

Exceptions include Belgium, Poland and Spain. Non-institutionalised forms of participation are characterised by a loose commitment outside of the formal channels of representative democracies. These are favoured more by young people, but in some countries like Iceland, the age gap is practically negligible. Across all modes of participation, there are a lot of differences between countries.

Sometimes, there is a relationship between the levels of participation in a country and the size of the age gap. For example, in countries with higher turnout, the age gap in favour of older people is weaker. The data are mostly taken from the Eurostat database and were provided by the team of the European Social Survey. Estimates of participation rates and support for certain political stances are my own, based on waves 5 to 7 of the European Survey.

They apply to the years The estimates are weighted by design weight to reflect differences in sampling techniques.

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Note that the estimates are based on reported behaviour. Since citizens know that democratic participation is socially desirable, some respondents indicate their having complied with this expectation while actually not having done so in reality. This is due to conscious lying and more importantly to our inner subconscious urge to be consistent with our own image of ourselves and our behaviour.

Full table of estimates on contacting a public official. Full table of estimates on signing a petition. Full table of estimates on taking part in a demonstration. R atio old by young. Da diese Antwort zwar korrekt aber unbefriedigend ist, wollen wir die Frage etwas umformulieren: Darunter sind 6,3 Millionen Deutsche, die selbst nach Deutschland migriert sind oder mindestens einen Elternteil haben, der nach Deutschland migriert ist.

Das Problem ist nur: Sie werden 61,0 bzw.

Es gibt etwa Von diesen gibt es etwa 2,0 Millionen Wahlberechtigte. Suchaufkommen der letzten 30 Tage. Menschen am Fernseher verfolgten [2]. Interessanterweise steigen hierbei nicht nur die Suchanfragen nach den Parteien der Duellanten, sondern auch die nach allen anderen Parteien. Suchaufkommen der letzten 7 Tage. What is new is that we talk about it. In the Bundestag election, for the first time in the history of Germany, the majority of those voters If older people are a uniform bloc of voters with like-minded interests, then Germany has since a grey majority.

In other words, the majority of actual voters as opposed to eligible voters are less than 20 years away from their retirement. In democracies, majorities matter. They decide the allocation of public resources. However, two things are important here. First, despite the size of the elderly population, their political interests vary widely.

Thus, the political importance attributed to this majority-approaching stage of population development seems exaggerated. Second, the discussion about population ageing often seems to suggest that it is a new phenomenon. But this is hardly the case. Europe has by and large been ageing for most of the last century and beyond.

Figure 1 shows the greatest European success story of the 20th century. It displays the life expectancy at birth for all European countries for which data is available. The indicator we are using describes the average expected life span for a child born in that country in that year. This is one of the central indicators of population ageing. The figure begins in , just before World War I.

The differences between countries at that time are remarkable. Menschen einen Migrationshintergrund [1]. Mit zunehmender Aufenthaltsdauer der Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland wurden aber auch gesundheitliche Nachteile sichtbar [6]: Zudem nehmen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund manche Gesundheitsleistungen seltener in Anspruch [12—15].

Dennoch bleibt das Bild uneinheitlich: Zum anderen zeichnen sich Menschen mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund durch unterschiedliche Altersund Sozialstrukturen aus [4]. Beispielsweise sind im Generationenwechsel zwischen Einwanderern und deren Nachkommen Lebensbedingungen und Verhaltensweisen einem kontinuierlichen Wandel unterworfen. Zudem enthalten diese Daten keine validen Informationen zur sozialen Lage der erfassten Personen. Dies kann durch das angewandte Gewichtungsverfahren nur teilweise ausgeglichen werden [23].

Personen, die vor eingewandert sind, sowie deren Kinder sog. Vertriebene gelten nicht als Personen mit Migrationshintergrund. Menschen mit Mig- Bundesgesundheitsblatt - Gesundheitsforschung - Gesundheitsschutz rationshintergrund, die selbst zugewandert sind, gelten als Migrantinnen und Migranten der ersten Zuwanderergeneration. In Deutschland Geborene werden der zweiten Generation zugerechnet. Als Gesundheitsoutcomes werden je drei Indikatoren zum Gesundheitszustand, zum gesundheitsbezogenen Risikoverhalten sowie zur Leistungsinanspruchnahme betrachtet.

Alle Outcomes wurden dichotomisiert. Analysiert wird hier der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Migrationshintergrund und der gesundheitlichen Lage. Die Ergebnisse zeigen klare geschlechtsspezifische Muster. The analysis focuses on the relationship between migrant background and health and health-related behavior.

The population for cross-sectional analyses contains PMB weighted The research question is addressed on the basis of nine exemplary health outcomes. Zum Rauchverhalten kam die Frage: Logistic regression is calculated adjusting for age and SES. The results reveal clear gender-specific patterns: For women, differences are statistically significant mainly for first generation PMB. Compared to the NMP their self-assessed health status is lower, they are less physically active, consume less alcohol, feel less informed about cancer screening programs and make less use of preventive health services.

However, daily smoking is more prevalent in second generation women. For men, differences are statistically significant for first and second generation PMB. Wie oft treiben Sie Sport? After adjusting for SES the impact of migrant background on health status and health-related behavior largely remains stable. The study shows that the DEGS1 data offers valuable results and new insights into the health status of people with a migrant background. The use of this data for further research requires a differentiated approach to the concept of migrant background and a careful interpretation of results.

Die Vergleichsgruppe bilden Personen ohne Risikokonsum moderater Konsum oder abstinent. Die Auswertungen erfolgen geschlechtsspezifisch und differenzieren nach Personen mit Migrationshintergrund der ersten und der zweiten Generation. Das Alter geht als stetige Variable in die multivariaten Analysen ein. Auf eine Anpassung wegen multiplen Testens wurde daher verzichtet [37, 38].

Insgesamt haben Befragte einen Migrationshintergrund. Von diesen sind der ersten und der zweiten Generation zuzurechnen. Die angewandte Gewichtung hat mittelbar auch Auswirkungen auf den Anteil an Personen mit Migrationshintergrund. Die deskriptiven Auswertungen ergeben in Bezug auf den Gesundheitszustand ein uneinheitliches Bild.

Generation 8,5 MMH 2. Gen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund 1. Gen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund 2. Gleichzeitig tendieren sie seltener als Frauen ohne Migrationshintergrund zu einem riskanten Alkoholkonsum. Modell 1 OR 1,76 1,27 0,84 1,36 1,72 1,60 0,89 1,52 2,24 1,35 0,56 0,74 3,42 1,72 1,66 1,39 1.

Belastbare epidemiologische Studien zu depressiven Symptomen oder Erkrankungen haben bislang kaum geschlechtsspezifische Betrachtungen vorgenommen. Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund weisen dabei durchgehend einen geringeren Alkoholkonsum auf als Personen ohne Migrationshintergrund [16, 17, 40, 46]. Diese Bundesgesundheitsblatt - Gesundheitsforschung - Gesundheitsschutz finden aber keinen Ausdruck in einer geringeren Inanspruchnahme. So konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Inanspruchnahme einzelner Gesundheitsleistungen stark mit diesen Merkmalen variiert [14, 15, 50].

Vielmehr ist der Blick auf spezifische Muster zu richten: In der zweiten Generation treten bei ihnen neue Risiken, aber auch Ressourcen hervor. Dennoch sind bei der Interpretation einige Limitierungen zu beachten. Generell ist deutlich geworden, dass Analysen zur Gesundheit von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund geschlechtsspezifisch erfolgen sollten. Einhaltung ethischer Richtlinien Interessenkonflikt.

Ellert geben an, dass kein Interessenkonflikt besteht. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus Robert Koch-Institut Migration und Gesundheit. Schwerpunktbericht der Gesundheitsberichterstattung des Bundes. Int J Public Health 52 2: Int J Equity Health 3 1: Psychiatr Prax 39 3: Eur Psychiatry 25 8: Rommel A Migration und Rehabilitation psychischer Erkrankungen. Perspektiven und Grenzen einer Gesundheitsberichterstattung mit Routinedaten. Brzoska P, Voigtlander S, Spallek J et al Utilization and effectiveness of medical rehabilitation in foreign nationals residing in Germany.

Eur J Epidemiol 25 9: Kinder und Jugendliche mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland. Robert Koch-Institut, Berlin Int J Equity Health 8: BMC Public Health 14 1: