American History, 1897-1909. The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations

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Sign In or Create an Account. Close mobile search navigation Article navigation. Article PDF first page preview. So it came to pass in The feeling in Congress was intense and all the more so because it had been so long suppressed, awaiting the President's action.

A large majority of Congress was in favor of war to expel the Spaniards from Cuba, and most of the Democrats, assisted by some Republicans, desired, as a stage in the pro- ceedings, to recognize the republic of the Cuban insur- gents. Two days after the President's Message was sent to Congress, the members of the House met in "a state of frenzied excitement" with "partisan passion running high. The missile fell short ; the two members rushed for one another, and the House, so a reporter wrote, "was in an uproar. Shouts of anger and indignation were beard on every hand.

Members in the crush espoused the cause of the two original com- batants, and there were several exciting collisions but no blows struck. Congress formally declared that war with Spain had existed since April Excitement had given way to alarm in the public mind lest the Navy might not prove equal to the job when the country learned that the first successful blow had been struck in the Orient on May 1 by the Asiatic squadron, under the command of George Dewey.

Theo- dore Roosevelt, in his position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had made up his mind that Dewey was the man for the place, but political influence was pushing another officer who was his senior. Do you know any sen- ators? He is an old friend of the family and my father was of service to him when he was a young man. These first May 2 announcements were from Spanish sources and gave no adequate idea of the completeness of the victory; the reading between the lines made it possible to arrive at a conclusion that made the headlines of victory justifiable.

In his accurate and modest account of his work, written soon after his return to Washington in , 2 he told of the care- ful preparation that he made for an attack on the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. Before he heard of the disaster to the Maine, the news of which reached him on February 17, he had decided to take the squadron to Hong Kong. An evidence of the common working of two minds bent on war is Roosevelt's despatch to Dewey of February 25, Keep full of coal.

In the event of dec- laration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. This accouut was not published until What does your country want? Having served under Farragut, Dewey looked upon him as a master. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Com- mence operations at once, particularly against Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use ut- , most endeavors.

The Hong Kong newspapers stated that Manila was impregnable, and in the Hong Kong club which was British, whose members were in thorough sympathy with the United States, it was not thought that Dewey would be successful in his attack. Arriving off Manila, he signalled for all the com- manding officers to come on board his flag-ship and said to them, "We shall enter Manila Bay to-night, and you will follow the motions and movements of the flag-ship which will lead. After half of the squadron had passed, a battery opened fire but none of the shots took effect.

Still Dewey went forward to the attack, leading the column with his flag-ship Olympia; the rest of his command followed with a distance of yards between ships. Two submarine mines exploded, but they were two miles ahead, "too far to be effective. Firing without cessation as they moved, three inns were made from the eastward ami two from the westward ; the length of each run was aboul two miles. Saportj I Srowninahialdi All but one of the Spanish fleet, however, had been destroyed, and as Dewey naively remarked, " Vic- tory was already ours, though we did not know it.

Their casualties were men. This disconcerted the Span- iards whose valor was remarkable but whose fire was hasty and inaccurate. Dewey told the secret of his suc- 1 Autobiography, B The War with Spain, But in truth the Spanish admiral would not have attacked, nor would any American of "the respectable common- place type. The President made him a rear-admiral. Congress thanked him, his officers and men.

In writing to him, his "old friend" John Hay spoke of his "mingled wisdom and daring. The Archbishop of Manila who, it was said, had written the Captain-General's proclamation, visited the Olympia some months afterwards and Dewey had the ship's company paraded in his honor. I have seen the men-of-war of all the nations but never have I seen anything like this," as he pointed to the Olympia' s crew. Dewey paid tribute to his officers as well as to his men. It gave the country confidence in her navy. As a formidable fleet would certainly be sent across the ocean, imagina- tion ran riot as to the destruction it might cause to the seaboard cities and to the summer resorts on the coast.

Many Boston men took their securities inland to Worces- ter and Springfield. Roosevelt spoke of it as a "fairly comic panic" and wrote truly, "The state of nervousness along much of the seacoast was funny in view of the lack of foundation for it. Now Dewey's victory showed the stuff in the officers and men of the American Navy and imparted a confidence to the general public that was sorely needed at the commencement of hostilities.

Sympathy in the large powers of Europe on the con- tinent was with Spain, and especial manifestations were in Paris and Berlin. If there was any design to interfere in the conflict, it was checked by the attitude of England, who favored decidedly the United States. Dewey's vic- tory strengthened the position of England by rendering any intervention on the part of the continental powers impossible.

Sentiment on the continent was that, in the first encounters, Spain would be victorious, such was the confidence felt in her navy and distrust in the American sea power. White, our Ambassador to Ger- many, gave a vivid account of the sentiment, as shown in the German newspapers and in an interview granted by Momxnaen, on the conduct of the United States toward Autobiography, This, White wrote, "was even more acrid than his previous utterances and exhibited sharply and at great length our alleged sins and shortcomings.

A general expressed the opinion that "in declaring war on Spain the Americans were imprudent and it may cost them dear. Having neither an Army nor a Navy it will be difficult for them to maintain a conflict with a trained army and experi- enced sailors. The Americans are not prepared for war, and war requires long preparation. In short the victory of the United States would constitute a practical criti- cism of principles adopted in the whole of Europe by the most competent military authorities.

Such a result is neither to be expected nor desired. White saw the proof sheets of the in- terview but it was never published. They expect any day to see Spanish warships appear on their Atlantic coast. Inhabitants of Boston, New York and Philadelphia are fleeing in great numbers toward the in- terior of the country. It is a general panic. Amid an intense silence, he read aloud: The Americans did not lose a single man. In a day my name was on everyone's lips. The dash of our squad- ron into an Oriental bay seven thousand miles from home had the glamour of romance to the national imagina- tion.

There is no better man in discretion and safe judgment. After the battle, Dewey established a blockade of Manila which he aimed to maintain thoroughly and impartially. The English, who 1 Autobiography, Not so the Germans, who were a law unto themselves and chafed against the exercise of any author- ity not their own. After Dewey's return to Washington, at a dinner at the White House given him by the President, the Presi- dent desired to know the truth of the statements fre- quently made in the newspapers regarding the friction between him and the German Vice- Admiral.

President," Dewey answered, "as I was on the spot and familiar with the situation from day to day, it seemed best that I look after it myself, at a time when you had worries enough of your own. On June 12, he came in on his flag-ship, the Kaiserin Augusta making the third German cruiser in the harbor ; another was expected and a transport had already arrived. In accordance with naval etiquette, Dewey made the first call upon Diedrichs and referred to the large German force and the limited German interest in the Philip- pines.

The British, with a much larger commercial interest, with a greater number of resident subjects, with the largest naval force of any power in far Eastern waters, never had at any one time during the blockade more than three warships in Manila harbor. To Dewey's gentle Dewey, Autobiography, They were on the most cordial social terms with the Spaniards in Manila, and the talk of the town was that the Germans would intervene in favor of Spain.

Dewey addressed a formal letter to Vice-Admiral von Diedrichs in which he said: I claim the right to communi- cate with all vessels entering this port, now blockaded with the forces under my command. Never- theless it took further and peremptory action on the pari of Dewey to convince the German that his orders in Manila Bay must be obeyed.

On April 22, President McKinley pro- claimed a limited blockade of Cuban ports, and four days later he declared "that the policy of this government will be not to resort to privateering but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris. Sampson commander of the North Atlantic squadron. Advanced over seven- teen other officers, he was made rear-admiral at the out- break of the war and placed in supreme command of all operations on the Atlantic coast.

Appointed rear- admiral sixteen days before Dewey, the appointment came to him as a surprise, causing him to feel deep responsibil- ity rather than any elation. The Spanish War, Chadwick, i. Chadwick was Captain of the flag-ship New York and also Sampson's chief of staff. This valuable and useful work is in two volumes published in and will be referred to as Chadwick, The Spanish American War i. Two hundred million of an authorized loan of double that amount was offered to popular subscription and eagerly- grasped at.

Although paying but three per cent, it was oversubscribed seven and one half times, was entirely taken at home and went to a premium of six per cent within three months. The public was uncertain as to its destination, but the Navy Department felt sure that it was either Puerto Rico or Cuba.

As it proceeded much more slowly than was estimated, it was a source of mysti- fication and alarm ; it arrived at Martinique, a French island, on May 12, and one week later in Santiago harbor, Cuba. Cervera's choice of Santiago and decision to remain there made the battle, which finally took place, the decisive one of the war. In due time, his fleet was blockaded so that he could not make a sortie without a fight.

The President appreciated that to gain a decided re- sult the Army must cooperate with the Navy, and Cer- vera's entrance into Santiago fixed that place as the Army's objective point. Consequently an expedition was prepared to proceed thither. With the charitable and in- telligent view of men and affairs, which was a real dis- tinction in a man of active life, he wrote, "Secretary Al- ger happened to be Secretary when war broke out, and all the responsibility for the shortcomings of the Depart- ment were visited upon his devoted head.

He was made the scapegoat for our National shortcomings. The fault was not his; the fault and responsibility lay with us, the people, who for thirty-three years had permitted our representatives in Congress and in National executive office to bear themselves so that it was absolutely im- possible to avoid the great bulk of all the trouble that occurred, and of all the shortcomings of which our people complained during the Spanish War. The admirals, captains and lieutenants were continually practicing their profession in almost precisely the way that it has to be practiced in time of war.

Except actually shooting at a foe, most of the men on board ship went through in time of peace practically all that they would have to go through in time of war. Then the fleet got under way, and we steamed slowly down to Santiago. Here we disembarked, higgledy-piggledy, just as we had embarked. Different parts of different outfits were jum- bled together, and it was no light labor afterwards to as- semble the various batteries. For instance, one trans- port had guns, and another the locks for the guns; the two not getting together for several days after one of them had been landed.

Soldiers went here, provisions there ; and who got ashore first largely depended upon individual activity. Roosevelt went to Cuba as Lieut. Colonel of the Rough Riders of which Dr. Leonard Wood was the Colonel. In a private letter to Dr. Sturgis Bigelow of March 29, , Roosevelt wrote: But if I am able to go I certainly shall.

I like life very much. I have always led a joyous life. Roosevelt wrote in his diary which was given in by Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt to the Roosevelt Memorial Associa- tion: Each officer finds out for himself and takes his chances. No allotment of transports; no plans ; utter confusion.

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Roosevelt wrote to Ins sister, Mrs. Robinson, on June Sixty- three years of age, weighing over , with a tendency to the gout, mounting a horse with difficulty, 3 his physi- cal disabilities weighed upon him to an extent to unfit him entirely for his dangerous and responsible job.

Cap- tain John Bigelow, who was a captain in the regular cav- alry with the expedition, wrote: I have seen the famous stone wall at Fredericksburg backed by Marye's Heights. It is hardly a circumstance to this position. San Juan was more suggestive of Gettysburg than of Fredericksburg. Our attack seemed hardly less desperate than that of Pickett's division. At Gettys- burg a cannonade of several hours' duration designed to shake the morale of the defence, preceded the advance of the attacking infantry which, during this period of preparation, was kept out of fire.

At San Juan there was 1 "The Army was in a region with a character wholly unlike that of any in its experience. Nearly the whole of the regular force of which it was composed had been accustomed to harrying Indians over treeless plains or arid mountains. In this case however it found itself in a country cov- ered with brush so heavy that, almost impassable to the individual man, it was altogether so to troops in formation. The Cuban insurgents helped the Americans by doing their part in cutting off the sup- plies from Santiago, but were not as valuable support as had been expected.

Passar bra ihop

San Juan Heights was taken on this July first. They fought on empty stomachs, as the commissariat was badly managed ; they were also short of tobacco so highly prized by soldiers in the field. It was the product of long years of war against tin- wiliest and moei capable of savage races.

Schooled in every trick of Savage warfare, inured to every privation of lent and cold, individualized as no other soldier ever has been, these men of the plains were accustomed to fighting their own battles, and took with them to San Juan 1 bll the qualities and character which made this u force, which it is not too much to say, has never been equalled in general effi- ciency.

Nevertheless, the events justified the charge on the fortified position, as Spanish firing was less deadly than the climate. But the loss at El Caney and San Juan Hill was over ten per cent of the men engaged; the casualties among the officers were unusually heavy. Roosevelt, who always disliked the word retreat, cordially agreed with them "that it would be far worse than a blunder to abandon our posi- tion.

Senator Lodge gave a graphic account of the feeling in Washington on July 3. For Santiago was reaching the point of capitulation ; while the fleet had food for about a month longer, the army and the city had been reduced to rice. He wrote on June 25, eight days before the dark day in Washington, to the Spanish general in command at Santiago ; "I have considered the squadron lost ever since it left Cape Verde. To-day I con- sider the squadron lost as much as ever, and the dilemma is whether to lose it by destroying it, if Santiago is not able to resist, after having contributed to its defence, or whether to lose it by sacrificing to vanity the majority of its crews and depriving Santiago of their cooperation, thereby precipitating its fall.

It is therefore for the Captain-General to decide whether I am to go out to suicide, dragging along with me those sens of Spain. Cervera had lent his "landing forces" to the army for the defence of Santiago, and to make a proper sortie he must have them reembarked. He re- ceived an order from Blanco on July 1 to reembark "the crews" and to hasten the sortie from the harbor. This was followed up by a despatch next day to go out immedi- ately.

A telegram to the general in command showed plainly the thought that dwelt in Blanco's mind: A city lost can be recovered ; the loss of the squadron under these cir- cumstances is final and cannot be recovered. The historian is able to look into both camps — a look of course impossible to either Sampson or Cervera.

There was friction between Sampson and Shafter as well iChadwick, ii. When the Naval Board announced — an announce- ment which was endorsed by the Secretary — that it was better to sacrifice a number of soldiers rather than to lose one battleship, such an opinion was regarded as in- human although probably based on good naval strategy. Shafter, appalled at the losses of July 1, did not want to sacrifice further his men, and desired Sampson to force an entrance into the harbor on the Farragut plan, which, on his part, Sampson did not want to do on account of the risk of losing a battleship.

Shafter was ill and tele- graphed to Washington on July 3: I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor and will have consultation with him this morning. The port at which he proposed to land was eight miles from his posi- tion in the blockading squadron. No fortune could have been worse for Sampson. Since June 1 he had main- tained a perfect blockade of Santiago Harbor.

Not only was the commander-in-chief and his cruiser New York absent, but the Massachusetts had gone away forty miles in order to coal. The Spanish vessels came out of the harbor of Santiago on this Sunday morning, July 3, "a superb day," 2 between 9. The men on the American ships were at Sunday "quarters for inspection," which was to be followed by divine service. But their officers were on the alert and, at the first sight of the Spaniards, the American ships, carrying out Sampson's standing orders, closed in and began the work of destruc- tion which their careful labor of preparation and accurate firing enabled them to do.

The Spaniards advanced with coolness and courage. The Maria Teresa "presented a magnificent appearance," wrote Robley Evans, Cap- tain of the Iowa, and the fleet "came at us like mad 1 Long, ii. At quar- ter past eleven the Vizcaya, when fifteen miles from San- tiago, "turned in shore and was beached"; she "was burning fiercely and her reserves of ammunition were already beginning to explode. Remained "the sleek foxy Coldn," 5 the "best and fastest vessel" 6 of the Span- ish fleet, which was overhauled by the Brooklyn and Oregon; at twenty minutes past one, forty-eight miles from Santiago, she hauled down her colors and sur- rendered.

Wilson, an English au- thority, "that most Englishmen, with their knowledge of and the feats of the Civil War, confidently ex- pected the Americans to win. It is equally safe to say that no one anticipated that two important victories would be secured at the cost of but one American life. After less than five hours' fighting a modern squadron was completely annihilated with infinitesimal loss and infinitesimal damage to the victors.

It is the low cost at which victory was purchased that renders this great battle so honorable to the American Navy. President Roosevelt wrote, Feb. According to Spanish authority the Spaniards had killed and wounded. Our work toward the elevation of humanity, toward the greater diffusion of education, are counted as naught in contrast with these naval victories.

Noteworthy as was the victory of Santiago it was sup- plemented by humane action. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were explod- ing, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers ami men until their work of hu- manity was complete. They clothed the naked," he wrote, "giving them everything they needed ; they suppressed the shouts of joy in order not to increase the suffering of the defeated, and all vied in making their captivity as easy as possible.

Louis when "at sea" on his way home, "I thank you for the delicate and mani- fold acts of kindness through which you have endeavored to alleviate the sore burden of our great misfortune. Exactly the same may be said of the American soldiers who contended before Santi- ago. Blanco thought that the squadron must make a fight to save Spanish honor but he recognized that its destruction meant that the game was up.

The annihilation of the fleet, wrote Cap- tain Concas, the acting chief-of-staff of Cervera, deprived "Spain of the only power still of value to her, without which a million soldiers could do nothing to serve her; of the only power which could have weight in a treaty of peace ; a power which, once destroyed, would leave Spain, the old Spain of Europe, not Cuba as so many ignorant persons believed, completely at the mercy of the enemy.

Puerto Rico was also captured. See also Cervera to Blanco and Sampson. This was publicly announced. The reserve Spanish fleet went through the Suez Canal, but the public announcement of the desti- nation of the American fleet, together with the news of the destruction of Cervera's squadron, compelled its re- turn to Spain. A glance must now be had at the Orient.

Troops were sent at different times until on August 6 there were about men ashore in the Philippines. General Merritt commanded the land forces and, in conjunction with Dewey, demanded the surrender of Manila and the Span- ish forces in occupation. On August 13, an attack was begun which soon terminated, as arranged through "the good offices of the Belgian consul," by the surrender.

President McKinley in reply directed that there "must be no joint occupation with the insurgents. The absence of immediate cable connection had allowed no interruption to the fateful progress of events which was to establish our authority in the Philippines. They had made resistance to save their honor but recog- nized that, when the fortunes of war decided against them, it was useless to prolong the conflict.

Frankly on the Spanish side, he saw clearly the American position, appreciated the magnitude of the naval vic- tories and the helplessness of Spain. He found McKin- ley inflexible and disposed to drive a hard bargain. Be- lieving that the "Conqueror resolved to procure all the profit possible from the advantages it has obtained," 8 he advised Spain to give him authority to sign the Pro- tocol. This was done and the Protocol was signed by him and Secretary of State Day. This cession was in lieu of a pecuniary in- 1 Autobiography, Miscellaneous Addresses, , Furthermore, "The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and har- bor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and gov- ernment of the Philippines.

This Protocol was signed on August 12 and involved a total suspension of hostilities.

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First, and foremost, the two volumes of Admiral French E. Chadwick has used the Spanish as well as the American documents with the result that he has enabled us to see both camps at the same time. He has written an impartial account. His action on the New York before and during the naval battle of Santiago made him an excellent interpreter of the docu- ments, showing no animosity whatever to Spain. At the end of Vol. For Hobson's exploit, see Chadwick, i. This rich island might fall to the United States. It was a ripe plum l that needed only the plucking. But there stood in the way the sentiment of a majority of the American people embodied in the so-called Teller Amend- ment to the resolutions adopted by Congress when the United States went to war with Spain.

Although long a favorite policy that Cuba ought to belong to the Uni- ted States, she now disclaimed any intention of taking the island, but proposed to leave it to the Cubans them- selves. Any other large country would not probably in the first place have adopted the Teller Amendment but, even had it done so, its occupancy would have been made the prelude on one pretext or another to an eventual ab- sorption. Undoubtedly a powerful minority would have supported McKinley in such a policy, but he deserves credit that, believing in the terms of the Teller Amend- ment when adopted, he held to them firmly, after the quick result of the war, and wrote a glorious page in his country's history as the pledge was faithfully carried out.

In lieu of a pecuniary indemnity for the cost of the war and because it was desirable that Spain should quit the Western Hemisphere, Puerto Rico and other islands under the Spanish dominion in the West Indies were taken. Also on the ground of pecuniary indemnity an island in the Ladrones was required ; this article resulted in the 1 Substantially the same remark was made in chap. Remained the Philippines, which caused much discussion in the Cabinet, country and with the Spanish Peace Commissioners, who by the terms of the Protocol, met in Paris those sent from the United States to negotiate a treaty of peace.

When the letter of the Spanish Minister of State was received [July 26] l the President on a hot afternoon took the members of the Cabinet on a lighthouse tender for a trip down the Potomac, when were thoroughly discussed the terms of peace. This resulted later in the submission by Secretary Day of an article which proposed to "re- linquish all of the Philippine Islands to Spain except suf- ficient ground for a naval station. It is easy to see that had the President then decided not to take the Philippines he would have had a powerful backing.

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Dur- ing the war he had displayed a shrewd trading instinct thus expressed, "While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get ; when the war is over we must keep what we want. The President said to Jules Cambon: The Madrid government may be assured that up to this time there is nothing determined d priori 1 This is printed by Oloott, ii. The Protocol provided for the appointment of five Commissioners to meet in Paris an equal number from Spain. The President named William R. The discussion between the Peace Commissioners and the different despatches of the Americans to Washing- ton make interesting reading, but it is apparent that the decision of the main points rested with the President, who used the communications from the Commissioners as materials on which to base his own judgment.

He decided at once that neither the United States nor any government which she might set up in Cuba would as- sume any portion of the so-called Cuban debt which had been largely incurred in fighting two insurrections. The greatest contention, however, was in regard to the Philippines. These consisted of a number of islands with a combined area of , square miles, nearly as large as England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales.

The largest is Luzon with nearly 41, square miles, substantially the size of Ohio. The total population was more than seven and one half millions; the population of Luzon was 1 Despatch of Cambon to Spain, Aug. In his instruction to the Commission of Sep- tember 16, 3 he wrote that we must have the island of Luzon and on October 26 he had his Secretary of State, John Hay, 4 telegraph as follows to Commissioner Day: The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required. The Presi- dent reaches this conclusion after most thorough consid- eration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility.

Of these G,,6S6 were classed as civilized and , as wild. The civilized na- tive inhabitants are practically all adherents of the Roman Catholic Church. Wiih the exception of the aboriginal Negritos, who are widely dispersed through the mountain regions, all the natives are believed to be Malays. L Hay to Day, Foreign Relations, , While he was careful not to express himself positively in response to certain questions, a fair inference from his testimony is that it was desirable to take the whole group.

General Greene said in his Memorandum of August 27 which represented his opinion when he had the "long talk" with McKinley on September The insurgents were furnished arms and the moral support of the Navy prior to our arrival, and we can- not ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish Government is com- pletely demoralized and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of res- urrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surren- dered them. The opinions of the three imperialists, Davis, Frye and Reid, tallied with his own ; that of Day was a compromise, 1 but Senator Gray's opinion deserves consideration.

To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of country, declared and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity gov- erns case of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entangling alliances, against which Washington and all American statesmen have protested. Attacked Manila as part of legitimate war against Spain. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not owe duty to stay by them at conclusion of war.

On contrary interest and duty would require us to abandon both Manila and Cadiz.

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But even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful and Christian nation ; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in hour of victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for doubtful materia] advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boa bfully assumed.

Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our word. To demand the Philippines was undoubtedly to alter the moral po- sition of the United States and change its attitude from one of altruism to one of self-interest. This much is self-evident and scarcely requires statement. In this sen- timent the President fully concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them.

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