Appendices of: To Escape Into Dreams, Volume III

If, however, it is intended tacitly to presuppose the conception " humanity," and accordingly to make it the principle of morality to strive after human perfection, this is only saying: In fact " perfect " is very nearly a mere synonym of " complete," for it signifies that in one given. Therefore the conception " perfection," if used absolutely and in the abstract, is a word void of significance, and this is also the case with the talk about the " most perfect being," and other similar expressions.

All this is a mere jingle of words. It was in every one s mouth, so that at last it became a simple nuisance. We see even the best writers of the time, for example Lessing, entangled in the most deplorable manner in perfections and imperfections, and struggling with them. At the same time, every thinking man must at least dimly have felt that this conception is void of all positive content, be cause, like an algebraical symbol, it denotes a mere relation in dbstracto. Kant, as we have already said, entirely separated the undeniably great ethical signiiicance of actions from the phenomenon and its laws, and showed that the former directly concerned the thing in itself, the inner nature of the world, while the latter, i.

The little I have said, which by no means exhausts the subject, may suffice as evidence of my recognition of the great merits of Kant, a recognition expressed here both for my own satisfaction, and because justice demands that those merits should be recalled to the memory of every one who desires to follow me in the unsparing exposure of his errors to which I now proceed. It may be inferred, upon purely historical grounds, that Kant s great achievements must have been accompanied by great errors.

For although he effected the greatest. For since he did not set up a completely new system, to which his dis ciples could only have adhered for a period, all indeed observed that something very great had happened, but yet no one rightly knew what. They certainly saw that all previous philosophy had been fruitless dreaming, from which the new age had now awakened, but what they ought to hold to now they did not know.

Induced by this, but not urged by inward inclination and sense of power which find utterance even at unfavourable times, as in the case of Spinoza , men without any exceptional talent made various weak, absurd, and indeed sometimes insane, attempts, to which, however, the now interested public gave its attention, and with great patience, such as is only found in Germany, long lent its ear.

The same thing must once have happened in Nature, when a great revolution had altered the whole surface of the earth, land and sea had changed places, and the scene was cleared for a new creation. It was then a long time before Nature could produce a new series of lasting forms all in harmony with themselves and with each other. Strange and monstrous organisations appeared which did not harmonise either with themselves or with each other, and therefore could not endure long, but whose still exist ing remains have brought down to us the tokens of that wavering and tentative procedure of Nature forming itself anew.

Since, now, in philosophy, a crisis precisely similar to this, and an age of fearful abortions, was, as we all know, introduced by Kant, it may be concluded that the ser-. First of all we shall present to ourselves clearly and examine the fundamental thought in which the aim of the whole " Critique of Pure Reason " lies. Kant placed himself at the standpoint of his predecessors, the dog matic philosophers, and accordingly he started with them from the following assumptions: Metaphysics is the science of that which lies beyond the possibility of all experience.

In our reason certain principles of this kind are actually to be found: So far Kant goes with his predecessors, but here he separates from them. A more care ful examination, then, of the reasoning given above will oblige one to confess that its first fundamental assumption is a petitio principii. In truth, however, the matter stands thus: The world and our own existence presents itself to us necessarily as a riddle. It is now assumed, without more. But for this it was first necessary to prove that the material for the solution of the riddle absolutely can-.

But so long as this is not proved, we have no grounds for shutting ourselves off, in the case of the most important and most difficult of all questions, from the richest of all sources of knowledge, inner and outer experience, in order to work only with empty forms. Yet this solution is only possible within cer tain limits which are inseparable from our finite nature, so that we attain to a right understanding of the world itself without reaching a final explanation of its existence abolishing all further problems. Therefore est guadam prodire tenus, and my path lies midway between the omniscience of the earlier dogmatists and the despair of the Kantian Critique.

The important truths, however, which Kant discovered, and through which the earlier metaphysical systems were overthrown, have supplied my system with data and materials. Compare what I have said concerning my method in chap. Kant s style bears throughout the stamp of a pre eminent mind, genuine strong individuality, and quite. Its characteristic quality may perhaps be aptly described as a brilliant dryness, by virtue of which he was able to grasp firmly and select the conceptions with great certainty, and then to turn them about with the greatest freedom, to the astonishment of the reader.

I find the same brilliant dryness in the style of Aristotle, though it is much simpler. Nevertheless Kant s language is often indistinct, indefinite, inadequate, and sometimes obscure. Moreover, a man who is himself quite clear will not be always explaining anew what has once been explained, as Kant does, for example, in the case of the understanding, the categories, experience, and other leading conceptions. In general, such a man will not incessantly repeat himself, and yet in every new ex position of the thought already expressed a hundred times leave it in just the same obscure condition, but he will express his meaning once distinctly, thoroughly, and ex haustively, and then let it alone.

But the height of audacity, in serving up pure nonsense, in string ing together senseless and extravagant mazes of words, such as had previously only been heard in madhouses, was finally reached in Hegel, and became the instrument of the most barefaced general mystification that has ever taken place, with a result which will appear fabulous to posterity, and will remain as a monument of German stu pidity.

But let us return to Kant. His philosophy has no analogy with Grecian architecture, which presents large simple propor tions revealing themselves at once to the glance; on the contrary, it reminds us strongly of the Gothic style of building. For a purely individual characteristic of Kant s mind is a remarkable love of symmetry, which delights in a varied multiplicity, so that it may reduce it to order, and repeat this order in subordinate orders, and so on indefinitely, just as happens in Gothic churches.

Indeed, lie sometimes carries this to the extent of trifling, and from love of this tendency he goes so far as to do open. I will support this with facts. After he has treated space and time isolated from every thing else, and has then dismissed this whole world of perception which fills space and time, and in which we live and are, with the meaningless words "the empirical content of perception is given us," he immediately arrives with one spring at the logical basis of his whole philosophy, the table of judgments.

From this table he deduces an exact dozen of categories, symmetrically arranged under four heads, which afterwards become the fearful pro- crustean bed into which he violently forces all things in the world and all that goes on in man, shrinking from no violence and disdaining no sophistry if only he is able to repeat everywhere the symmetry of that table. The first that is symmetrically deduced from it is the pure physio logical table of the general principles of natural science the axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, ana logies of experience, and postulates of empirical thought in general.

Of these fundamental principles, the first two are simple; but each of the last two sends out symme trically three shoots. Iii accordance with his highest guide to all wisdom, symmetry, the series must now prove itself fruit ful in the syllogisms, and this, indeed, is done symme trically and regularly. For, as by the application of the categories to sensibility, experience with all its a priori principles arose for the understanding, so by the applica tion of syllogisms to the categories, a task performed by the reason in accordance with its pretended principle of seeking the unconditioned, the Ideas of the reason arise.

Now this takes place in the following manner: The three categories of relation supply to syllogistic reasoning the. In the second of these, the Idea of the world, the symmetry of the table of the categories now repeats itself again, for its four heads produce four theses, each of which has its antithesis as a symmetrical pendant. We pay the tribute of our admiration to the really ex ceedingly acute combination which produced this elegant structure, but we shall none the less proceed to a thorough examination of its foundation and its parts.

But the fol lowing remarks must come first. It is astonishing how Kant, without further reflection, pursues his way, following his symmetry, ordering every thing in accordance with it, without ever taking one of the subjects so handled into consideration on its own account. I will explain myself more fully. After he has considered intuitive knowledge in a mathematical refer ence only, he neglects altogether the rest of knowledge of perception in which the world lies before us, and confines himself entirely to abstract thinking, although this receives the whole of its significance and value from the world of perception alone, which is infinitely more significant, gene rally present, and rich in content than the abstract part of our knowledge.

Indeed, and this is an important point, he has nowhere clearly distinguished perception from abstract knowledge, and just on this account, as we shall afterwards see, he becomes involved in irresolvable contradictions with himself. After he has disposed of the whole sensible world with the meaningless " it is given," he makes, as we have said, the logical table of judgments the foundation-stone of his building.

But here again he. These forms of judgment are indeed words and combinations of words; yet it ought first to have been asked what these directly denote: The next question would then have been as to the nature of conceptions. It would now have become necessarv to examine,. But then it would have become apparent what part the understanding has in this, and thus also in general what the understanding is, and, on the other hand, what the reason properly is, the critique of which is being written.

It is most remarkable that he does not once properly and adequately define the latter, but merely gives incidentally, and as the context in each case demands, incomplete and inaccurate explanations of it, in direct contradiction to the rule of Descartes given above.

One would now think that there must be a very wide difference between principles and rules, since it entitles us to assume a special faculty of knowledge for each of them. But this great distinction is made to lie merely in this, that what is known a priori through pure perception or through the forms of the understanding is a rule, and only what results from mere.

We shall return to this arbi trary and inadmissible distinction later, when we come to the Dialectic. Now, this really amounts to saying: Judging is the work of the understanding so long as the ground of the judgment is empirical, trans cendental, or metalogical Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Beason, 31, 32, 33 ; but if it is logical, as is the case with the syllogism, then we are here concerned with a quite special and much more important faculty of knowledge the reason.

Nay, what is more, on p. From the proposition, " All men are mortal," the inference, " Some mortals are men," may be drawn by the mere understanding. On the other hand, to draw the conclusion, "All the learned are mortal," demands an entirely different and far more important faculty the reason. How was it possible for a great thinker to write the like of this! The understanding also is constantly being explained anew. In seven passages of the " Critique of Pure Bea son " it is explained in the following terms. Against such really confused and groundless language on the subject even though it comes from Kant I shall have no need to defend the explanation which I have given of these two faculties of knowledge an explanation which is fixed, clearly defined, definite, simple, and in full agreement with the language of all nations and all ages.

I have only quoted this language as a proof of my charge that Kant follows his symmetrical, logical system without sufficiently reflecting upon the subject he is thus handling. Now, as I have said above, if Kant had seriously examined how far two such different faculties of know ledge, one of which is the specific difference of man, may be known, and what, in accordance with the language of all nations and all philosophers, reason and understand ing are, he would never, without further authority than the intcllectus theoreticus and practicus of the Schoolmen, which is used in an entirely different sense, have divided the reason into theoretical and practical, and made the latter the source of virtuous conduct.

But this very necessary investigation has unfortunately been also ne glected, and has contributed much to the irremediable confusion of intuitive and abstract knowledge which I shall soon refer to. The same want of adequate reflection with which he passed over the questions: But he follows his logical schema and his symmetry with out reflecting or looking about him. The table of judg ments ought to, and must, be the key to all wisdom. I have given it above as the chief merit of Kant that he distinguished the phenomenon from the thing in itself, explained the whole visible world as phenomenon, and therefore denied all validity to its laws beyond the phe nomenon.

It is certainly remarkable that he did not deduce this merely relative existence of the phenomenon from the simple undeniable truth which lay so near him, "No object without a subject," in order thus at the very root to show that the object, because it always exists merely in relation to a subject, is dependent upon it, conditioned by it, and therefore conditioned as mere phenomenon, which does not exist in itself nor uncon ditioned. Berkeley, to whose merits Kant did not do justice, had already made this important principle the foundation-stone of his philosophy, and thereby established an immortal reputation.

Yet he himself did not draw the proper conclusions from this principle, and so he was both misunderstood and insufficiently attended to. In my first edition I explained Kant s avoidance of this Berkeleian principle as arising from an evident shrink-. And this charge was well founded, if, as was then my case, one only knew the " Critique of Pure Eeason " in the second or any of the five subsequent editions printed from it.

But when later I read Kant s great work in the first edition, which is already so rare, I saw, to my great pleasure, all these contradic tions disappear, and found that although Kant does not use the formula, " No object without a subject," he yet ex plains, with just as much decision as Berkeley and I do, the outer world lying before us in space and time as the mere idea of the subject that knows it.

Therefore, for example, he says there without reserve p. In this way then the text of the " Critique of Pure Eeason," as it has circulated from the year to the year , was disfigured and spoilt, and it became a self-contradictory book, the sense of which could not therefore be thoroughly clear and comprehensible to any one. The particulars about this, and also my conjectures as to the reasons and the weaknesses which may have influenced Kant so to disfigure his immortal work, I have given in a letter to Professor Piosenkranz, and he has quoted the principal passage of it in his preface to the second volume of the edition of Kant s collected works edited by him, to which I therefore refer.

In consequence of my representations, Professor Eosenkranz was induced in the year to restore the "Critique of Pure Eeason" to its original form, for in the second volume referred to. But let no one imagine that he knows the " Critique of Pure Reason " and has a distinct conception of Kant s teaching if he has only read the second or one of the later editions. That is altogether impossible, for he has only read a mutilated, spoilt, and to a certain extent ungenuine text.

It is my duty to say this here decidedly and for every one s warning. Yet the way in which Kant introduces the thing in itself stands in undeniable contradiction with the dis tinctly idealistic point of view so clearly expressed in the first edition of the " Critique of Pure Pteason," and without doubt this is the chief reason why, in the second edition, he suppressed the principal idealistic passage we have referred to, and directly declared himself opposed to the Berkeleian idealism, though by doing so he only intro duced inconsistencies into his work, without being able to remedy its principal defect.

This defect, as is known, is the introduction of the thing in itself in the way chosen by him, the inadmissibleness of which was exposed at length by G. Schulze in " dSncsidemus" and was soon recognised as the untenable point of his system. The matter may be made clear in a very few words. Kant based the assumption of the thing in itself, though concealed under various modes of expression, upon an inference from the law of causality an inference that the empirical perception, or more accurately the sensation, in our organs of sense, from which it proceeds, must have an external cause.

Therefore the whole empirical perception remains always upon a subjective foundation, as a mere process in us, and nothing entirely different from it and independent of it can be brought in as a thing in itself, or shown to be a necessary assumption. The empirical perception actually is and remains merely our idea: An inner nature of this we can only arrive at on the entirely different path followed by me, by means of calling in the aid of self-consciousness, which proclaims the.

The great defect of the Kantian system in this point, which, as has been said, was soon pointed out, is an illus tration of the truth of the beautiful Indian proverb: But this last was Fichte s misunderstanding of it, which could only happen because he was not concerned with truth, but with making a sensation for the furtherance of his individual ends. Accordingly he was bold and thoughtless enough to deny the thing in itself altogether, and to set up a system in which, not, as with Kant, the mere form of the idea, but also the matter, its whole content, was professedly deduced a priori from the subject.

If he had sharply separated ideas of per ception from conceptions merely thought in abstracto, he would have held these two apart, and in every case would have known with which of the two he had to do. This, however, was unfortunately not the case, although this accusation has not yet been openly made, and may thus perhaps be unexpected.

For, incredible as it may seem, he lacked either the wisdom or the honesty to come to an understanding with himself about this, and to explain distinctly to himself and others whether his " object of experience, i. Strange as it is, there always runs in his mind something between the two, and hence arises the unfortunate confusion which I must now bring to light. For this end I must go through the whole theory of elements in a general w T ay. Its proofs carry such perfect conviction, that I number its propositions among incontestable truths, and without doubt they are also among those that are richest in results, and are, therefore, to be regarded as the rarest thing in the world, a real and great discovery in metaphysics.

The fact, strictly proved by him, that a part of our knowledge is known to us a priori, admits of no other explanation than that this. For a priori means nothing else than " not gained on the path of experience, thus not come into us from without. Now if what is thus present in the intellect itself consists of the general mode or manner in which it must present all its objects to itself, this is just saying that what is thus present is the intellect s forms of knowing, i.

Accordingly, " knowledge a priori " and " the intellect s own forms " are at bottom only two expressions for the same things thus to a certain extent synonyms. Kant did not carry out his thought to the end, especially in this respect, that he did not reject Euclid s whole method of demonstration, even after having said on p. It is most remark able that one of Kant s opponents, and indeed the acutest of them, G. Schulze Kritik der theorctischen Philo sophic, ii. Let me refer to 15 of the first book of this work. But the whole teaching of Kant contains really nothing more about this than the oft-repeated meaning less expression: But it is nothing more than a mere sensation in the organ of sense, and only by the application of the understanding i.

I have explained this point fully in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, With this, however, the work of the understanding and of the faculty of perception is completed, and no conceptions and no thinking are required in addition; therefore the brute also has these ideas. If conceptions are added, if thinking is added, to which spontaneity may certainly be attributed, then knowledge of perception is entirely aban doned, and a completely different class of ideas comes into consciousness, non-perceptible abstract conceptions.

This is the activity of the reason, which vet obtains the whole. But thus Kant brings thinking into the percep tion, and lays the foundation for the inextricable confusion of intuitive and abstract knowledge which I am now en gaged in condemning. He allows the perception, taken by itself, to be without understanding, purely sensuous, and thus quite passive, and only through thinking category of the understanding does he allow an object to be appre hended: From this springs the inextricable confusion referred to, and the consequences of this first false step extend over his whole theory of knowledge.

Through the whole of his theory the utter confusion of the idea of perception with the abstract idea tends towards a something between the two which he expounds as the object of knowledge through the understanding and its categories, and calls this know ledge experience. In the " Critique of Pure Reason," p. Finally, in the " Critique of Practical Eeason," fourth edition, p.

All this is in Kant s own words. Now all that has been quoted is contradicted in the most glaring manner by the whole of the rest of his doctrine of the understanding, of its categories, and of the possibility of experience as he explains it in the Trans cendental Logic. Thus Critique of Pure Eeason, p. At the same place the logical function of the judgment also brings the manifold of given perceptions under an apperception in general, and the manifold of a given perception stands necessarily under the categories. Further, here and at V. Yet it is certain that Nature, the course of events, and the coexistence.

I challenge every one who shares my respect towards Kant to reconcile these contradictions and to show that in his doctrine of the object of experience and the way it is determined by the activity of the understanding and its twelve functions, Kant thought something quite distinct and definite. I am convinced that the contra diction I have pointed out, which extends through the whole Transcendental Logic, is the real reason of the great obscurity of its language.

Kant himself, in fact, was dimly conscious of the contradiction, inwardly com bated it, but yet either would not or could not bring it to distinct consciousness, and therefore veiled it from himself and others, and avoided it by all kinds of subter fuges. And notwithstanding this great apparatus, not even an attempt is made to explain the perception of the external world, which is after all the principal fact in our knowledge; but this pressing claim is very meanly rejected, always through the same meaningless meta phorical expression: I believe that an old deeply-rooted prejudice in Kant, dead to all investigation, is the ultimate reason of the assumption of such an absolute object, which is an object in itself, i.

It is then the proper function of the categories to add on in thought to the perception this directly non-perceptible object. This is made specially clear by a passage on p. Here the source of the error and the con fusion in which it is involved shows itself distinctly. But Kant ascribes the objects themselves to thought, in order to make expe-. In this relation he certainly dis tinguishes perception from thought, but he makes par ticular things sometimes the object of perception and sometimes the object of thought.

In reality, however, they are only the object of the former; our empirical perception is at once objective, just because it proceeds from the causal nexus. Things, not ideas different from them, are directly its object. Particular things as such are perceived in the understanding and through the senses; the one-sided impression upon the latter is at once com pleted by the imagination.

But, on the contrary, as soon as we pass over to thought, we leave the particular things, and have to do with general conceptions, which cannot be presented in perception, although we afterwards apply the results of our thought to particular things. If we hold firmly to this, the inadmissibleness of the assumption becomes evident that the perception of things only obtains reality and becomes experience through the thought of these very things applying its twelve categories. Perception is accordingly in reality intellectual, which is just what Kant denies.

Besides in the passages quoted, the assumption of Kant here criticised will be found expressed with admirable clearness in the " Critique of Judgment," 36, just at the beginning; also in the "Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science," in the note to the first explanation of " Phenomenology. It there appears so clearly how those disciples who do not themselves think become a magnifying mirror of the errors of every thinker. Once having determined his doctrine of the categories, Kant was always cautious when expounding it, but his disciples on the contrary were quite bold, and thus exposed its falseness.

According to what has been said, the object of the cate gories is for Kant, not indeed the thing in itself, but yet most closely akin to it. Accordingly Kant really makes a triple division: The first belongs to the sensibility, which in its case, as in that of sensation, includes the pure forms of perception, space and time. The second belongs to the understand ing, which thinks it through its twelve categories. The third lies beyond the possibility of all knowledge. In support of this, cf. Critique of Pure Reason, first edition, p.

But if we should not wish to count the object of the idea as belonging to the idea and identify it with the idea, it would be neces sary to attribute it to the thing in itself: This, however, always remains certain, that, when we think clearly, nothing more can be found than idea and thing in itself. For every empirical perception is already experience; but every perception which proceeds from sensation is empirical: If we desire to go beyond this idea, then we arrive at the ques tion as to the thing in itself, the answer to which is the theme of my whole work, as of all metaphysics in general.

Kant s error here explained is connected with his mistake, which we condemned before, that he gives no theory of the origin of empirical perception, but, without saying more, treats it as given, identifying it with the mere sen sation, to which he only adds the forms of intuition or per ception, space and time, comprehending both under the name sensibility. But from these materials no objective idea arises: From the above it is clear that Kant s "object of the idea" 2 is made up of what he has stolen partly from the idea i , and partly from the thing in itself 3.

If, in reality, experience were only brought about by the understanding applying its twelve different functions in order to think through as many conceptions a priori, the objects which were pre viously merely perceived, then every real thing would necessarily as such have a number of determinations, which, as given a priori, absolutely could not be thought away, just like space and time, but would belong quite essentially to the existence of the thing, and yet could not be deduced from the properties of space and time. But only one such determination is to be found that of causality.

Upon this rests materiality, for the essence of matter consists in action, and it is through and through causality cf. But it is materiality alone that distinguishes the real thing from the picture of the imagination, which is then only idea. For matter, as per manent, gives to the thing permanence through all time, in respect of its matter, while the forms change in con formity with causality.

Everything else in the thing consists either of determinations of space or of time, or of its empirical properties, which are all referable to its activity, and are thus fuller determinations of causality. But causality enters already as a condition into the em pirical perception, and this is accordingly a thing of the understanding, which makes even perception possible, and yet apart from the law of causality contributes nothing to experience and its possibilty.

What fills the old ontolo gies is, with the exception of what is given here, nothing more than relations of things to each other, or to our re flection, and a farrago of nonsense. The language in which the doctrine of the categories is expressed affords an evidence of its baselessness. What a difference in this respect between the Transcenden tal Esthetic and the Transcendental Analytic! All is full of light, no dark lurking- places are left: Kant knows what he wants and knows that he is right.

In the latter, on the other hand, all is obscure, confused, indefinite, wavering, uncertain, the language anxious, full of excuses and appeals to what is coming, or indeed of suppression. Moreover, the whole second and third sections of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding are completely changed in the second edition, because they did not satisfy Kant himself, and they have become quite different from the first edition, though not clearer.

We actually see Kant in conflict with the truth in order to carry out his hypothe sis which he has once fixed upon. In the Transcenden tal. Here, then, as everywhere, the language bears the stamp of the thought from which it has proceeded, for style is the physiognomy of the mind. The deduction of the categories is simpler and less involved in the first edition than in the second. He labours to explain how, according to the perception given by sensibility, the understanding produces experi ence by means of thinking the categories. In doing so, the w r ords recognition, reproduction, association, appre hension, transcendental unity of apperception, are re peated to weariness, and yet no distinctness is attained.

It is well worth noticing, however, that in this explana-. Thus in this way he evades the point, and all the Kantians have in like manner evaded it. Besides this, he seems to have been afraid that if the causal nexus were allowed to hold good between sensation and object, the latter would at once become the thing in itself, and introduce the empiricism of Locke.

But Kant was hindered from confessing this by his fear of the Berkeleian idealism. Yet this is never adequately explained, nor is it shown what this manifold of perception is before it is combined by the understanding. But time and space, the latter in all its three dimensions, are contimia, i. Thus, then, every thing that exhibits itself in them is given appears origi nally as a continuum, i. If, however, some one should seek to interpret that combining of the manifold of perception by saying that I refer the different sense-impressions of one object to this one only thus, for example, perceiving a bell, I recognise that what affects my eye as yellow, my hand as.

In the beautiful recapitulation of his doctrine which Kant gives at p. In general, according to Kant, there are only conceptions of objects, no perceptions. I, on the contrary, say: Objects exist primarily only for perception, and conceptions are always abstractions from this perception. I therefore require that we should reject eleven of the categories, and only retain that of causality, and yet that we should see clearly that its activity is indeed the condition of empirical perception, which accordingly is not merely sensuous but intellectual, and that the object so per ceived, the object of experience, is one with the idea, from which there remains nothing to distinguish except the thing in itself.

After repeated study of the " Critique of Pure Eeason " at different periods of my life, a conviction has forced itself upon me with regard to the origin of the Transcen dental Logic, which I now impart as very helpful to an understanding of it. Gratified by this happy hit, he wished to pursue the same vein further, and his love of architectonic symmetry afforded him the clue.

As he had found that a pure intuition or perception a priori underlay the empirical perception as its condition, he thought that in the same way certain pure conceptions as presuppositions in our faculty of knowledge must lie at the foundation of the empirically obtained conceptions, and that real empirical thought must be only possible through a pure thought a priori, which, however, would have no objects in itself, but would be obliged to take them from perception.

Reward Yourself

From this point onwards Kant was no more free, no more in the position of purely,. Now for this purpose he hit upon the table of judgments, out of which he constructed, as well as he could, the table of categories, the doctrine of twelve pure a priori con ceptions, which are supposed to be the conditions of our thinking those very things the perception of which is con ditioned by the two a priori forms of sensibility: Then another consideration occurred to him, which offered a means of increasing the plausi bility of the thing, by the assumption of the schematism of the pure conceptions of the understanding.

But just through this the way in which his procedure had, uncon sciously indeed, originated betrayed itself most distinctly. We go back, then, to the perception only tentatively and for the moment, by calling up in imagination a perception corresponding to the conceptions which are occupying us at the time a perception which can yet never be quite adequate to the conception, but is merely a temporary. I have already adduced what is needful on this point in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, Kant calls a fleeting phantasy of this kind a schema, in opposition to the perfected picture of the imagination.

He says it is like a mono gram of the imagination, and asserts that just as such a schema stands midway between our abstract thinking of empirically obtained conceptions, and our clear percep tion which comes to us through the senses, so there are a priori schemata of the pure conceptions of the under standing between the faculty of perception a priori of pure sensibility and the faculty of thinking a priori of the pure understanding thus the categories.

These schemata, as monograms of the pure imagination a priori, he describes one by one, and assigns to each of them its corresponding category, in the wonderful " Chapter on the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Under standing," which is noted as exceedingly obscure, because no man has ever been able to make anything out of it. For when he assumes schemata of the pure empty a priori conceptions of the understanding categories analogous to the empirical schemata or re presentatives through the fancy of our actual conceptions , he overlooks the fact that the end of such schemata is here entirely wanting.

For the end of the schemata in the case of empirical real thinking is entirely connected with the material content of such conceptions. For since these conceptions are drawn from empirical perception, we assist and guide ourselves when engaged in abstract thinking by now and then casting a momentary glance back at. This, however, necessarily presupposes that the conceptions which occupy us are sprung from perception, and it is merely a glance back at their material content, indeed a mere aid to our weakness.

But in the case of a priori conceptions which as yet have no content at all, clearly this is necessarily omitted. For these conceptions are not sprung from perception, but come to it from within, in order to receive a content first from it. Thus they have as yet nothing on which they could look back. I speak fully upon this point, because it is just this that throws light upon the secret origin of the Kantian philo sophising, which accordingly consists in this, that Kant, after the happy discovery of the two forms of intuition or perception a priori, exerted himself, under the guidance of the analogy, to prove that for every determination of our empirical knowledge there is an a priori analogue, and this finally extended, in the schemata, even to a mere psychological fact.

Here the apparent depth and the difficulty of the exposition just serve to conceal from the reader that its content remains a wholly undemon- strable and merely arbitrary assumption. But he who has penetrated at last to the meaning of such an ex position is then easily induced to mistake this under standing so painfully attained for a conviction of the truth of the matter. If, on the contrary, Kant had kept himself here as unprejudiced and purely observant as in the discovery of a priori intuition or perception, he must have found that what is added to the pure intuition or perception of space and time, if an empirical perception arises from it, is on the one hand the sensation, and on the other hand the knowledge of causality, which changes the mere sensation into objective empirical perception, but just on this account is not first derived and learned from sensation, but exists a priori, and is indeed the form and function of the pure understanding.

It is also, however,. If, as has often been said, the refutation of an error is only complete when the way it originated has been psychologically demonstrated, I believe I have achieved this, with regard to Kant s doctrine of the categories and their schemata, in what I have said above. After Kant had thus introduced such great errors into the first simple outlines of a theory of the faculty of per ception, he adopted a variety of very complicated assump tions. To these belongs first of all the synthetic unity of apperception: And what is the meaning of this carefully balanced.

That all knowledge of ideas is thinking? That is not the case: And besides, the brutes would then either think also, or else they would not even have ideas. Or is the proposition perhaps intended to mean: That would be very badly expressed by it, and would come too late. If we collect Kant s utterances on the subject, we shall find that what he understands by the synthetic unity of apperception is, as it were, the exten- sionless centre of the sphere of all our ideas, whose radii converge to it.

It is what I call the subject of knowing, the correlative of all ideas, and it is also that which I have fully described and explained in the 22d chapter of the Supplements, as the focus in which the rays of the activity. Finally, it results from the explanations which I myself have given of these faculties of the mind in the first book and its Supplements, and more fully in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, 21, 26, and 34, explana tions which are very definite and distinct, which clearly follow from the consideration of the nature of our know ledge, and which completely agree with the conceptions of those two faculties of knowledge that appear in the language and writings of all ages and all nations, but were not brought to distinctness.

Their defence against the very different exposition of Kant has, for the most part, been given already along with the exposure of the errors of that exposition. In this discussion I shall always- attach to the concepts understanding and reason the sense given them in my explanation, which I therefore assume- the reader is familiar with. An essential difference between Kant s method and that which I follow lies in this, that he starts from indirect, reflected knowledge, while I start from direct or intuitive knowledge.

He may be compared to a man who measures the height of a tower by its shadow, while I am like him who applies the measuring-rule directly to the tower itself. Therefore, for him philosophy is a science of con ceptions, but for me it is a science in conceptions, drawn from knowledge of perception, the one source of all evi dence, and comprehended and made permanent in general conceptions. According to this, what is essential and conformable to law in abstract know ledge would, as it were, place in our hands all the threads by which the varied puppet-show of the world of per ception is set in motion before our eyes.

If Kant had only distinctly expressed this first principle of his method, and then followed it consistently, he would at least have been obliged to separate clearly the intuitive from the abstract, and we would not have had to contend with inextricable contradictions and confusions. But from the way in which he solves his problem we see that that fundamental principle of his method was only very in distinctly present to his mind, and thus we have still to arrive at it by conjecture even after a thorough study of his philosophy.

Now as concerns the specified method and fundamental maxim itself, there is much to be said for it, and it is a brilliant thought. The nature of all science indeed con sists in this, that we comprehend the endless manifold of.

Helene Andorre Hinson Staley (Author of Appendices Of)

The sciences, however, divide the wide sphere of phenomena among them according to the special and manifold classes of the latter. Here, however, before going further, the relation of reflection to knowledge of perception ought to have been investigated which certainly presupposes the clear separation of the two, which was neglected by Kant.

As the result of this investigation, however, it would have appeared that knowledge of perception suffers very nearly as much change when it is taken up into reflection as food when it is taken into the animal organism whose. The whole of reflective knowledge, or the reason, has only one chief form, and that is the abstract conception. It is proper to the reason itself, and has no direct necessary connection with the world of perception, which therefore exists for the brutes entirely without conceptions, and in deed, even if it were quite another world from what it is, that form of reflection would suit it just as well.

But the combination of conceptions for the purpose of judging has certain definite and normal forms, which have been found by induction, and constitute the table of judgments. These forms are for the most part deducible from the nature of reflective knowledge itself, thus directly from the reason, because they spring from the four laws of thought called by me metalogical truths and the dictum de omni et nullo. Lastly, still others of these forms have sprung from the concurrence and combination of the reflective and intuitive modes of knowledge, or more properly from the assumption of the latter into the.

The so-called Quantity of judgments springs from the nature of concepts as such. It thus has its ground in the reason alone, and has absolutely no direct connection with the understanding and with knowledge of perception. It is indeed, as is explained at length in the first book, essential to concepts, as such, that they should have an extent, a sphere, and the wider, less determined concept includes the narrower and more determined.

The latter can therefore be separated from the former, and this may happen in two ways, either the narrower concept may be indicated as an indefinite part of the wider concept in general, or it may be defined and completely separated by means of the addition of a special name. The judgment which carries out this operation is in the first case called a particular, and in the second case an universal judg ment. For example, one and the same part of the sphere of the concept tree may be isolated through a particular and through an universal judgment, thus " Some trees bear gall-nuts," or "All oaks bear gall-nuts.

Nevertheless, Kant has explained this difference as disclosing two fundamentally different actions, functions, categories of the pure understanding, which determines experience a priori through them. Finally, a concept may also be used in order to arrive by means of it at a definite particular idea of perception, from which, as well as from many others, this concept itself is drawn; this happens in the singular judgment.

Such a judgment merely indicates the boundary -line. In the same way the Quality of the judgment lies entirely within the province of reason, and is not an adumbration of any law of that understanding which makes perception possible, i. The nature of abstract concepts, which is just the nature of the reason itself objectively comprehended, carries with it the possibility of uniting and separating their spheres, as was already explained in the first book, and upon this possibility, as their presupposition, rest the universal laws of thought of identity and contradiction, to which I have given the name of mctalogical truths, because they spring purely from the reason, and cannot be further explained.

They determine that what is united must remain united, and what is separated must remain separate, thus that what is established cannot at the same time be also abolished, and thus they presuppose the possibility of the combination and separation of spheres, i. It is, therefore, pure reality; all negation is foreign to its nature, can only be added on through reflection, and just. To the affirmative and negative Kant adds the infinite judgment, making use of a crotchet of the old scholastics, an ingeniously invented stop-gap, which does not even require to be explained, a blind window, such as many others he made for the sake of his architectonic sym metry.

Under the very wide conception of Relation Kant has brought three entirely different properties of judgments, which we must, therefore, examine singly, in order to recognise their origin. The hypothetical judgment in general is the abstract expression of that most universal form of all our know ledge, the principle of sufficient reason. In my essay on this principle, I already showed in that it has four entirely different meanings, and in each of these originally originates in a different faculty of knowledge, and also concerns a different class of ideas. We see here, however, very dis tinctly how kinds of knowledge which are quite different in their origin and significance yet appear, if thought in abstracto by the reason, in one and the same form of com bination of concepts and judgments, and then in this form can no longer be distinguished, but, in order to distinguish them, we must go back to knowledge of perception, leaving abstract knowledge altogether.

Therefore the path which was followed by Kant, starting from the point of view of. The form of the categorical judgment is nothing but the form of judgment in general, in its strictest sense. Tor, strictly speaking, judging merely means thinking, the combination of, or the impossibility of combining, the spheres of the concepts. Therefore the hypothetical and the disjunctive combination are properly no special forms of the judgment; for they are only applied to already completed judgments, in which the combination of the concepts remains unchanged the categorical.

But they again connect these judgments, for the hypothetical form expresses their dependence upon each other, and the dis junctive their incompatibility. Mere concepts, however, have only one class of relations to each other, those which are expressed in the categorical judgment. The fuller determination, or the sub-species of this relation, are the intersection and the complete separateness of the concept-spheres, i.

Thus he separates what is very closely related, and even identical, the easily surveyed modifica tions of the one possible relation of mere concepts to each other, and, on the other hand, unites what is very different under this title of relation. Categorical judgments have as their metalogical prin ciple the laws of thought of identity and contradiction.

But the ground of the connection of the concept-spheres which gives truth to the judgment, which is nothing but this connection, may be of very different kinds; and, according to this, the truth of the judgment is either logical, or empirical, or metaphysical, or metalogical, as is explained in the introductory essay. But it is apparent from this how very various the direct cognitions may be, all of which exhibit themselves in the abstract, through the combination of the spheres of two concepts, as subject and predicate, and that we can by no means set up the sole function of the understanding as corresponding to them and producing them.

Now, after this, like much which is quite different from it for example, the subordination of very abstract concepts , has been expressed in the abstract through subject and predicate, these mere relations of concepts have been transferred back to knowledge of per ception, and it has been supposed that the subject and predicate of the judgment must have a peculiar and special correlative in perception, substance and accident. But I shall show clearly further on that the conception substance has no other true content than that of the conception matter.

But the special manner in which the idea of matter arises is explained partly in 4 of the first book, and still more clearly in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason at the end of 21, p. The deduction of the category of community or reciprocity from them is, however, a glaring example of the violence which Kant sometimes allowed to be done to truth, merely in order to satisfy his love of architectonic sym metry. The illegitimacy of that deduction has already often been justly condemned and proved upon various grounds, especially by G.

Schulze in his " Kritik der theoretischen Philosophic" and by Berg in his " Epikritik der Philosophic. Therefore, unquestionably, the real logical analogue of reciprocity is the vicious circle, for in it, as nominally in the case of reciprocity, what is proved is also the proof, and conversely. And just as logic rejects the vicious circle, so the conception of reciprocity ought to be ban ished from metaphysics.

My recommendation is that the government should do everything in its power to create employment. I stayed in the village of Mabeseneh.

The World as Will and Representation/Appendix of Volume I

One evening my husband joined others for the evening prayers in the mosque. After the beating, people alerted the officer and then soldiers entered the village. When the soldiers came they entered the mosque and started beating up the people. My husband and others fled, but my husband fell on the wayside. The soldiers found him and gave him severe beating thinking he was the madman. He narrated his ordeal. After a short while, my husband died as a result of the beating inflicted by him.

Now I am a widow and single parent and I have to bore all the family responsibilities. Did Osman enter the Mosque? Yes, he use to go to the mosque everyday Comm. When did he enter the Mosque? He entered the mosque when he was chased by the soldiers Comm. How many soldiers entered the mosque? How many people were in the mosque? They were in large numbers. Do you know where the soldiers came from?

I cannot tell where they came from. You mentioned that one of people in the congregation was beaten to death. Can you tell the name of that person? It was my husband Comm. Did you take him to the hospital? No, there was no hospital at that time Comm. I am happy that you are here to give your testimony. That was an unfortunate case of missing identity. We are sorry that you lost your husband. How many children do you have? You said you are responsible for their welfare, Is that correct.

How old are they? The eldest is a boy, the second is not going to school; the third is a girl she is at the verge of getting married Comm. The third is a girl, how old is she? Did you marry after the death of your husband Hawa: Do you know which fraction did the attackers belong to? Can you tell where they were staying? They were deployed at Lunsar; these groups of soldiers that entered were staying at Mabeseneh village Charm: Do you know the name of the wife of the soldier that was beaten Hawa: In your written statement, you mention about one Mr.

Tee can you tell me about him Hawa: Tee was a soldier he was deployed at Mabeseneh Charm: Was he one of them? Apart from your husband do you know of any other people beaten by the soldiers? Everybody in the mosque was beaten. Did you know of any other person who died has a result of this beaten? I only know of my husband. Do you have any question for the commission? The only recommendation is that government should assist me now that my husband is dead and the responsibility of the children is solely on me considering the fact that I am a widow and single parent. It is regrettable that the commission did not have the means but we have the mandate to forward these recommendations in our final report.

I thank you for coming. I am a Christian. On the 21st of June , the rebels eventually infiltrated into Lunsar after the ninth attempt. At about 4 pm, I heard sporadic firing. I ran into the bush with my family. I could not go with my car. We spent the night in the bush. The following day at about 9 am, I came out of my hiding place. To my utmost dismay, I found my compound grounded and it in flames, my car also was partly in flames. Before then, the SLA was living with us in the village, but on the day of the attack, they were nowhere to be fond until the following morning.

He replied that the rebels overwhelmed them. My houses were grounded, until now I could not rebuild them. I am presently a displaced. On 3rd December , the rebels attacked Mamusa at about 2 a. I was asleep when my driver alerted me that the rebels had attacked the village. I was having a car in Mamusa. Luckily, the rebels did not do any shooting. I stayed in the bush for sometime then the rebels began to shoot. Upon hearing the gunshots, I lifted my head and saw the village on fire.

In the morning, I did not leave my hiding place for fear that I was been targeted. I was a petrol dealer, farmer and a politician. When I came out of my hiding place, I found that my house was grounded, car vandalized and my petrol station burnt. Going around, I found 15 corpses, some of their faces burnt and used to mount roadblocks. I departed for Lunsar where my house had been burnt. Fortunately for me, the store and toilet building of the house were not burnt down and I had to use the store as a living room.

On the 4th December , two of the abductees at Mamusa showed up in Lunsar. I met with them and they asked me if I knew S. Musa and that he was one of their captors. They stated that I was very lucky to escape as I was their target and they were going to launch another attack in Lunsar. The following day, 5th December, Lunsar was again attacked. I again escaped and slept in the bush together with my family. I returned to Lunsar after normalcy because at that time, Lunsar was a no mans land. As I had given the opportunity to testify this afternoon, I do not have much to say.

The scripture tells us in Hebrews So all is vanity? Commissioner and all those concern I thank you very much. I am very impressed with the testimony you made, as you rightly said, you were reluctant at first, I am sure that as you have testified, your psychological burden will ease. I urge you to keep the faith as a Christian. Did you loose members of your family?

No, I only lost properties. You talked about your car which of the cars was burnt? I had two cars. What was your relationship with Yamahokati and his colleagues during the war? We regularly held meetings on security issues and the defense of the town. As I did say, the rebels made nine attempts before they eventually succeeded in attacking.

The rebels tried to attack Lunsar during the reign of Yamahokati but they did not to succeed. That was why we relied on him for security. Did he tell you where they were after talking to him? Yes, he said he spent the night at Foredugu and I did see him the following morning coming from Foredugu because I spent the night at a village called Makomb.

How would you classify the people that did these things to you, which faction did they belong to? We are grateful that you have come to help the TRC, we are sorry for all the material loss you had and for the anxiety. Once there is life, there is hope. It is good to realize that you have confidence in God. You told us that you were a politician, a businessman and a farmer. Can you point out any definite reason why you were targeted? As a petrol dealer, I was able to purchase a large amount of fuel and that means money.

I was in charge of Mobil station in Port Loko and Mamusa village. The petrol companies needed money as they had run short of cash. They suggested that we should pay in notes rather than bank drafts. I want to believe there were people monitoring our daily movements. They might have seen me offloading my products.

Did they succeed in getting the money? Yes they succeeded in getting my money and some of my petroleum products because at that time our oil company had wanted physical cash. We told them about the dangers involved. Even taking the cash to Freetown was not easy, but we had no alternative because the boss is always right. You mentioned about three different attacks, the first one was in , I would like to know if anybody was killed?

Yes, people were killed. How many people were killed? Two people were killed. How many people were abducted? I was told that many people were abducted, including boys and girls. Do you have any idea how many people were abducted and their present health status? When they showed up, some were not quite ok, they had to be taken to the hospital. Do you know what happened to them during their stay with the rebels?

Did they tell you or other people what happened to them? Yes, I saw a suckling mother; she told me her ordeal when she was with the rebels. Did they tell you whether they were raped? Some of them told me that they were forced to go to bed with them; some were forced to carry their arms. I want to take you back to the second attack on 5th December ; you mentioned that a teacher was killed in that attack.

I want to know whether other people were killed. They were overwhelmed by the rebels. You said, you are a politician, what is your political affiliation? Could that be a reason why you were targeted? The 2nd attack in , which group of rebels attacked you? Could you give us a rough estimate of the cash you loose in the hands of the rebels?

I cannot tell at the moment. Since we have asked you so many questions do you have any question to ask the Commission? What is the composition of the commission? I am sorry, you were not here yesterday, the Commission is composed of 7 members, 4 nationals, i. The panel was selected by the United Nations. Now that I have heard the composition of the Commission, I wish you the best of luck in your future endeavors. I do not doubt your integrity and credibility. I do not have any question to ask. Do you have any recommendation? Lunsar is an unfortunate town when it comes to rehabilitation.

The rebels vandalized a town like Masiaka and it has been rehabilitated, on the way to Mabora, villages were vandalized; they had been now rehabilitated. On to Rogbere Junction also on the same highway to Lunsar it was vandalized and it has now been rehabilitated. The big question is what Lunsar has done to be neglected in areas of rehabilitation. I am craving your indulgence so that you can recommend to Government for them to rehabilitate the houses in Lunsar.

We now have a young and dynamic Paramount Chief and if given the opportunity he will do well. The commission will take your recommendation to the government there are some NGOs who are responsible in assisting victims for rehabilitation. I just want to comment that Mr. Saccoh is a politician of the SLPP and he must have some connections in the government of the day, I believe he can advocate for the development of Lunsar.

My name is Sheka Kabia. I am a native of Lunsar in Marampa Chiefdom. I was a trader. On day I went to buy palm oil and groundnut at Konta in Masimera Chiefdom. At about 2 pm, I had collected my goods when I saw lots of men in military uniforms. When the people saw these men in military uniforms, most of them ran away. At that time I had no chance to run away. I was standing with my friend, called Unisa. The men in military fatigue asked me, what I was doing in the village. I told them that I was on business, the rest of the men in uniform shouted at me. By the time I could realize what was happening, two of the men in uniform placed me on the ground and the others turned their attention to the house where my goods were.

The others were beating me; they lay me on the ground and some kicked me on the head, some on the chest and some on the buttocks. The one I identified as the head asked the others what I have done to them. They told him that I have not done anything, just that they suspected that I was transacting business for the SLA.

He stopped them and ordered my release. The people in military fatigue were then approaching me then I had the opportunity to escape. I went into the bush and I traveled through the bush until I came to the highway between Masiaka and Mile There I boarded a vehicle and returned to Tombo where my sister was staying. Since that time, it was difficult for me to go back to the provinces.

This was the ordeal I went through. Until present, I am not doing well at all. I have my mother, wife and my two children to care for. During this attack, did they kill anybody? What group; did your perpetrators belong to? Can you remember their faces if you are to come face to face with them? I have few questions to ask, how do you know they were RUF? I suspected the group to be RUF because those who attacked us were very young boys; between the ages of 15 and The army does not recruit young boys Martien: Were there women among them? Who was in charge, was it one of these young boys?

He was a man Martien: In what year did it happen? Some spoke Krio, Mende, Temne and some spoke Liberian pidgin. Do you have any recommendation to make to the Commission for onward transmission to the government? My recommendation to government is; I suspect that one of the causes of this war was greed and the other was unemployment. I therefore recommend that government create employment opportunities, and they must ensure that everybody have a share of the national cake.

I have a point of observation, I am not defending the government, before the attack you were doing well, you were self- employed, and comparatively you were better than some employees. If one or two of your friends had follow suit, there would not be much problem of unemployment. However, your suggestion will be taken into good part and we sympathize with you for what you suffered. I thank you very much for coming. The session ended at 3: One day, I was in my village called Kamasondo, in the early hours of the morning we heard the sound of gunshots.

At that time my dependants were all with me. So I tried to escape with them to a nearby village, we spent the night in our hiding place. It took me the entire day to find a hiding place, we suffered a lot in the bush, we finally spent the night in the bush, unfortunately, it happened during the rainy season. The following morning, I told my family to stay where they were so that I can go back to the village to see what had happened. When I went to the village I discovered that the village was burnt down.

I personally inherited three houses from my late father; all those three houses were burnt down. I went round to inspect the other houses in the village I also discovered that they were all burnt. I discovered that one of our elders in the village was killed, I found his corpse. I discovered the corpse of my sister, one of my friends was also killed and a village sub chief was killed. When I saw these corpses, I was terrified, at that time the rebels were around.

I later went back to my hiding. I advised that we should move from there to another village. We finally get to Lunsar, the rest of my family were dispatched to Freetown. Few of us returned to find out whether the rebels were still occupying our village, fortunately for us they had gone back to their base. All our cattle and sheep were carted away by the rebels. Since we wanted to stay in the village we put up some temporary structure. The house was overcrowded, the following year I got some seed rice and brushed a farm.

The rebels came back when it was time to harvest, they harvested all my rice. I will not be able to recount all the problems I encountered during the rebel incursion. Marcus Jones - Thank you Foday for giving such a testimony. I am going to ask you few questions to clarify issues you made in your statement. Do you know any Kalilu Sesay? Marcus Jones - who is he? Ans — He is my brother. Marcus Jones - Did anything happen to him? Ans - Yes, his houses were burnt down. Marcus Jones — How old was your stepmother at that time? Marcus Jones — Is she with you?

Ans - She is dead. Marcus Jones — Is it because of the rebel attack? Ans - She was not killed by the rebels, she fell ill and die. Marcus Jones — Have you been able to improve on those shacks? Ans - I have actually improved on the shacks because I used the zinc that was burnt by the rebels but I still experience leakages. Marcus Jones — Did you know any of the rebels? Ans - It is difficult to identify them, because when they entered any village nobody was able to look at them. Marcus — the commission is mandated to work with religious leaders, you are a member of the Muslim Jamaat, have you made any effort to bring these people onboard so that they can continue to live normal lives again?

Ans - I have been doing that, each time we went to the mosque we preached about forgiveness to the people. Torto - Can you tell me who Osman Kamara was in Kamasondo? Ans - Osman Kamara is my son. Torto — Did he witness the attack? Ans - We were together. Torto - He does not seem to know anything that happened to you.

Ans - When we escaped to the bush, we were all scattered. Torto — You said that you were all scattered around, how did he know what happened to you? Ans - We were separated in the bush, but we met again later. Martien — In which year did the rebels attack you? Ans - It was in Martien — Was it before or after the election? Immediately after the election. Martien - You said you found dead bodies in the village? Martien — Can you give the names?

Marcus Jones — We have been asking you questions, do you have any question to ask the Commission? Ans - My question is - now that I am poor and cannot embark on profitable farming. What will the Commission do to assist me? Marcus Jones — You did tell us that when you returned to your village, you started farming.

Unfortunately, the rebels came and get away with all your harvest. Now that we have peace, you have a better climate to go ahead with your farming; I believe you should go farming. If you cultivate in your farm you will make a lot of profit for you to live a better life, the country should be able to create these facilities for you and to help you get medical facilities in your community.

That is why this Commission is formed, so that recommendations and suggestions made will be included in our report for you to benefit in future. Marcus Jones - Do you have any other question? My next question relate to shelter, like I told you in my testimony, all the houses in my village were burnt down. What assistant can we get so that we can have proper shelter?

Marcus Jones — It is important you look for some NGOs to assist in constructing a better structure for you, they might not be able to give you all the money you required, but they will be able to assist in giving you building materials. The TRC does not give money to people and also it would not be possible for government to go all over the country giving money to people to restructure their burnt houses. It would not be even advisable for TRC to give out money to people because some people will come out to give elaborate story or terrible lies. The Commission is interested in knowing the truth and made its recommendation to government.

That is the work of TRC. Ans - I want to comment on this last response you made to me. You told me that the Commission is mandated or have not got the resources to give to people but there are NGOs who are responsible for that. Marcus Jones — You can talk to our briefer they will advice you on what to do. Ans - During the war we have to send some of our children to Freetown at that time Freetown was safe, unfortunately, Freetown was also attacked by the rebels; our children were sent back to us, what we will do now that we are displaced.

Marcus Jones — In our report, the Commission will make recommendations to the government and these recommendations will be implemented in the future. Do you have recommendations to make to the Commission for onward transmission to Government? Ans - My recommendation is that Government should assist us get better accommodation so as to forestall overcrowding and the spread of disease.

I also recommend that government build a school for our community. Marcus Jones — I thank you for helping us. We urge you to be a little bit patient and we will be living in a better country in future. I say thanks to God. I was with my husband in Kono when the war started and we ran to Makeni. From there I came to a village called Komasendo. I went there to buy palm oil, I bought ten drums.

I later sent for my husband to join me in the village. We took the palm oil to Makeni, we spent two days there and on the third day, my husband asked me to go to Kono. When I arrived in Kono I found my relatives packing their belongings they asked me why I was there, I told them that I never knew what was happening. Then one of my customers bought a drum of palm oil from me. I left the others in the store. I was worried because of the information I got from my parents. I spent that night in Kono. At about 5 a. On my way to the store, I met people running helter-skelter.

There were firing all over the place, I went back to my brother and told him that I have lost all my commodities. I told him that I cannot return without my goods, he insisted that I must go back to the village, I refused and he left me behind and came to Makeni. On his return to Kono he persuaded me to return back to Makeni, on our way going we met so many corpses.

I met one man who asked me where I was going, I told him that I am going to Safroko, we then continue our journey. We walked on feet until we reached Masingbi and then finally board a vehicle to Makeni. At that time my feet were swollen and he took me to the hospital. After I recovered and I went back to the house. I finally decided to go back to Kamasando. The little money I had on me I used to buy bushel of rice, 27 bags of salt, 2 Cartoons of Cosmos Cigarette, 2 bags of soda. It was after I had collected all these goods that the rebels attacked Kamansondo again, I ran to the bush with my husband.

Whilst in the bush, we were hiding on top of a hill, he saw rebels entered our house and he told me that rebels had entered my house. They went out and there was no way we could go to our house. On the 3rd day they took a vehicle and looted all our belongings. On that day, they found me in the house. A small boy said that I should give him money. I told him I have no money and I asked him why.

I then saw many people coming with arms. The little boy took my shoes and he ordered me out to sit under the sun and looked as they went away with my properties. I also have 31 bags of garri in a nearby village, my husband told me to go that village, because the highway was blocked by the rebels. He advised that we follow a by-pass route to Gbinti en route to Port Loko. My husband then returned to the village.

After selling my garri, I then went to Freetown to stay with my relatives. I was worried about my children who I had left behind in the village. I boarded a vehicle for Port Loko. No sooner the people, who knew me saw me, they started making some gesticulations. Upon reaching, I met my house wide open, the windows and doors damaged. I saw my children and I asked them about their father, they started crying and told me that he had instructed them to go ahead.

As he was going, he met rebels; they beat him and asked him for money. The rebels then asked him about his wife and he told them that I am not around. They beat him until he was helpless. They gave him their luggage to carry and about 31 people were abducted. When they reached their base, they gave him a bag of husk rice to pound. Wherever he wanted to go, he was given a guard. Any time he wanted to drink they would not allow him and as they moved to their final destination they killed him.

After two days, I paid some people the sum of , Leones to help me find the corpse of my husband. I had wanted to give him a fitting burial rite. On the way, there were rebel road blocks, the rebels asked where I was going, I told them that my husband was killed in the next village, I told them that I wanted to find his corpse but they advised that I should not go. When I insisted to go, the rebels took my bag from me. Since it was impossible to get the corpse of my husband, I decided to go back to his village Rosint, in Sanda Chiefdom.

Some of his relatives said I should forget about him, some people told me that the rebels had eaten his body; others said that vulture had eaten his body and some also said that his body has decomposed. I decided to go to Freetown but I find life very difficult so I had to return back to my village. Up till now, things are not favorable with me. I have no capital to start business, and no shelter. I depend on my relatives for survival. I used to live well but now I am poor. Marcus -Jones — we are moved and sorry to hear your testimony, we sympathize with you for the loss of your husband. Ans - That is my greatest problem; if he was alive I would not have suffered this way.

Marcus —Jones - I know, but your husband would want to see you brave to take care of your children. You told us about your children, you said your husband sent them ahead, which was how they escaped the rebels. So your husband was very thoughtful about the children. It is now your duty to go on and take care of those children.

It is now for all survivors to go on and take care of their family and live in a better country where there will be no such violence any more. Will you be able to answer some questions now? Ans - Yes, I will be able to answer. Marcus Jones — I would ask some questions for clarification, who were your attackers? Marcus Jones - Do you know the fighting group they belonged to? Marcus Jones — Do you think you were targeted because of your influence? Ans - I think so, because people knew I was well to do, the other houses were not attacked by the rebels.

Marcus Jones — who gave you the details that your husband was manhandled by the rebels? Ans - The abductees who escaped from the rebels. In my testimony, I told you that about 31 people were abducted; some of them escaped and they gave me the information about the death of my husband. Marcus Jones — Where they able to tell you what happened to the corpse of your husband? Ans - Some of these abductees told me that the corpse of my husband was eaten by the rebels in a village called Makabo in Marampa Chiefdom. Marcus Jones - Was your brother abducted as well?

Ans - My brother was unable to tell me that my husband had been killed because it was heavy for him. He was abducted but he escaped. Marcus Jones - My question was whether your brother was abducted? Ans - He was abducted but he later escaped. Marcus Jones - Did your brother see what happened to the corpse of your husband? Ans - My brother found the corpse of my husband on the way, but they were not allowed to stay, he did see the corpse. Torto — We thank you for coming to relate your experience with us. I want to encourage you to make few clarifications.

Does the name Sheku Sesay, mean anything to you or what did it remind you of? Ans - Sheku Sesay was my brother, he was one of the abductees. Torto — In your statement you mentioned that your brother was forced to prepare food before he was released? Ans - I cannot remember making that statement, he was my brother, according to him, somebody helped him to escape when they were cooking, he did not do the cooking himself.

Martien - In what year did this happen? Martien — What is the condition of your family now? Ans - I am going through very difficult times with my family, since my husband was killed by rebels I am staying in my village but I am suffering I did not have any assistance from anybody unless my relatives. I also have a friend called Sarah Kobi who occasionally helped me. Now that you have answered all these questions do you have any question to ask the Commission? Ans - Now that the rebels had killed my husbands, looted all my properties, how do I stand now?

Marcus-Jones — That is a difficult question for the Commission to answer. It is for you to decide how brave you are going to be, the example you are going to take from others and how you hope to continue your life in future. It is for you to answer these questions. Do you have any recommendation to make that we can include in our report? Ans - Yes I have, out of five children, I buried four of them there is only one survivor.

I am appealing for assistance to educate the only one I have now. I would recommend that government assist in education, health and the general welfare of my community as a whole.

Marcus- Jones — Did these children die as a result of this war? Ans - No, they died naturally. Marcus-Jones - We thank you for sharing your testimony with us. We appreciate your courage. We know you will make it. When the war started, I was in Boajibu. We managed to get food for our survival. My wife advised that we leave another village Kendema which is bigger. When we went there at about 7pm we heard gunshots from across the river.

Everybody in the town at that time was confused; I had my kids with me. I told my wife that I will go ahead with some of our belongings and she will have to stay behind. She told me that I should not live her alone with the children; I realized later that we should all go together. Since the attack was about 7pm, we traveled all night to seek refuge. Finally, we slept in a village called Rogbanti and the following morning we managed to get food for the children at this stage the children were unable to walk on foot, they refused going any further, at this point in time there was no vehicle plying the road.

We spent the night in the village. Whilst we were there we heard the sound of gunshots and we saw people running away, in the process one of my children got missing from that time I had not been able to set eyes on my child. Since then I became helpless, I decided not to go anywhere, but there was no alternative, I had to move and finally I got to Masingbi and we boarded a vehicle that took us to Makeni.

On the next day, I managed to get to my village, Kamansondo. I was there together with my wife and children. I joined my relatives in the village to do some farming but I was very unhappy when I think of my son that got missing. The following year, the rebels attacked Kamansondo. On the first day of the attack they looted all my belongings. It was on a Sunday. At that time we were listening to the result of the general elections. During this time I saw someone carrying a gun. The first shot I heard, hit one of my brothers who was carrying a bundle of zinc. So all of us had to run away into the bush for quite sometime.

While we were in the bush we saw smoke coming from the town. We were informed that the whole village had been set on fire. We asked ourselves what we should do as the village had been burnt. We went to seek refuge and we met my step mother and my brothers. I decided to leave my people in hiding to find out what was happening in my village but I was advised not to go the village.

I therefore returned to my parents and told my people that the village had been burnt. The children were hungry as there was nothing for them to eat. I told my father that he has to manage to travel to the highway so that we can board a vehicle to take us back.

Upon that decision we resolved to leave our hiding place. Since the family was large we separated and my mother and father with my family, went to Freetown, whilst my brother and myself went to Makeni, we were advised there by our family to go to the camp. We registered in the camp and stayed there until the end of that year. During that time we were informed that the Lome Agreement had been signed. That all displaced persons must return to their homes.

At that time the Red Cross provided vehicles to take us back to our villages. The Red Cross together with our family helped with that process. We manage the burnt zincs to get shelter. We were there leaving happy. On a certain day the rebels attack Kosawai and as usual we escaped. We were in the bush at that time and the rebels were in the habit of hit and run.

They were just cajoling us; they wanted to keep us in the village for human shield. I was not satisfied, I had to escape, I was later told that the rebels had left the village; I was told that they abducted many people in the village. Some of them stay behind, the ones that were left behind, three men and one woman.

I went into my room got some salt, as soon as I was about to come out, a rebel pointed a gun at me. I fell on the ground and the rebel picked me up from the ground. The rebels asked me to show them the wealthy people in the village. They took me to their colleague, the one that held me did not beat me, one of his colleagues, slapped me.

I saw my nephew and one suckling mother with them. One of them told me to carry his gun. They found a sheep in the village and said I must carry the gun and at the same time carry the sheep but I was unable to move fast because the sheep was sluggish to walk. Unfortunately for them, they follow the wrong route and their colleagues were on there own.

In the next village, we met few people in the village but as they saw us they all started running away. The rebels asked the people in the village whether they have seen soldiers in the village they said no. They later removed the gun from me and handed it over the village head man; the suckling mother was later released. They continue to beat me on the way going.

Finally we got to another village where we found other rebels and they stopped beating me. The person in charge of that group was called Kosowai; he took the looted goods from us. My child was hungry I told them that I wanted to find something for her to eat. So we were released by those rebels.

We all went back to our village; some of the abductees were also released. Marcus Jones — Have you recovered from the beaten you got from the rebels? Ans — I must confess that I am impotent, I have lost my manhood. Marcus Jones — Did you not seek medical advice in your village after your release? Ans — I did not seek medical attention because I had no money at the time and it was unsafe to go back to the village.

Torto - I thank you for coming and sharing your experience with us. You were used as human shield for torture. I want you to make some clarification. Who actually abducted you and do you know which of the fighting groups they belonged to? Ans - The rebels. Tort — Which of the rebel groups? Ans - The SLA. Torto - Can you identify their faces? Ans - I can identify the one who beat me if I see him. Ans - The rebel that captured me and took me along with the gun and sheep told me that he is Alhaji. Torto — A tall, black man that came from Lunsar? Ans - The Alhaji that captured me was fair in complexion, very tall, speaks krio and he hailed from Lunsar.

Charm — You said that when the rebels attacked your village in one of your brothers was killed; can you tell me the name of your brother? Ans - It was not my brother but my sister, her name was Fatmata Kamara Mr. Charm — Can you tell whether they were small boys or adults? Ans - They were youths. There was a young woman with them. Charm — How many people were abducted? Ans - I cannot tell, I was told that they were large in number. Charm — How long were you with them? Ans - I did not spend the whole day with them.

Charm - Did they identify themselves as RUF? Ans - One of the women in their group had RUF inscribed on her back. Charm — Where you able to speak to this woman to know why RUF is written on her back? Ans - I was not able to talk to her because she was carrying a whip and she was flogging the suckling mother.

Charm - How are you coping with your family? It is these seed rice that we are using to farm, from the proceeds we take care of our family. Marcus Jones - Do you have any question to ask the Commission? Ans - I want to know the relationship between the Commission and victims? Marcus Jones — The relationship between the Commission and Victims is a very strong one.

The Commission is victim-oriented; we want them to share their testimony with us and we later addressed these issue so that there will not be a recurrence of such things in the future. There is a very strong relationship between the Commission and victims. Apart from relaying their experiences, we encourage the victims to give recommendations and suggestions that will be included in our report for onward transmission to the government. Our report will be dedicated to a large extent to the victims. Do you have any recommendations to make to this Commission that will be included in its report?

Ans - Yes, I have two recommendations; firstly, now that our community had become inaccessible, the bridges had been destroyed by the rebels it is very difficult for us to go to the market. We are recommending that government restructure our bridges. We have few primary schools but we do not have a secondary school, our children had to go to Freetown or Makeni for their secondary education.

The problem is that these children will go astray when they get to those big towns because the parents are not to there to take care of them. We need a secondary school in our Chiefdom. Marcus Jones — Thank you very much for coming to this Commission. Your recommendation will be included in our report and submitted to government.

I encourage you not to give up, but to continue and seek medical attention. I hope you are feeling better now. My name is Karayemu Sesay. My experience during the conflict. The SLA that retreated from Makeni and abducted me. They found me in my village Kamasondo and they captured me I was with them for 18 days, I was beaten, they beat me with their guns. I stayed with them throughout the 18 days. We were 43 in all that was abducted.

We came down to Mamusa. They also killed my brother Amadu Sankoh in the village; our children were beaten when they were asked to give them money. When it was night they put on their military uniform and raped us. We were taken as their wives for 18 days. The men who were abducted with us were able to escape; fortunately, I escaped from them when we reached Makeni.

They told us that when we were going back if we were interrogated by ECOMOG we should tell them that we were captured by the rebels. When we explained to the soldiers they provide vehicle for us. We walked for a long distance.