Nelli’s Journey: From the Depths of Evil to Reconciliation and Beyond

They are required to counteract the destabilizing effects of false beliefs on society. In the ideal city there are provisions to minimize possible corruption, even among the good-loving philosophers. They can neither enjoy private property nor family life. Although they are the rulers, they receive only a modest remuneration from the state, dine in common dining halls, and have wives and children in common. These provisions are necessary, Plato believes, because if the philosopher-rulers were to acquire private land, luxurious homes, and money themselves, they would soon become hostile masters of other citizens rather than their leaders and allies a-b.

The ideal city becomes a bad one, described as timocracy , precisely when the philosophers neglect music and physical exercise, and begin to gather wealth b. Initially chosen from among the brightest, most stable, and most courageous children, they go through a sophisticated and prolonged educational training which begins with gymnastics, music and mathematics, and ends with dialectic, military service and practical city management.

They have superior theoretical knowledge, including the knowledge of the just, noble, good and advantageous, but are not inferior to others in practical matters as well d, e. Being in the final stage of their education illuminated by the idea of the good, they are those who can see beyond changing empirical phenomena and reflect on such timeless values as justice, beauty, truth, and moderation b, b. Goodness is not merely a theoretical idea for them, but the ultimate state of their mind. If the life of the philosopher-rulers is not of private property, family or wealth, nor even of honor, and if the intellectual life itself seems so attractive, why should they then agree to rule?

Philosophical life, based on contemplative leisure and the pleasure of learning, is indeed better and happier than that of ruling the state d. Plato assumes that a city in which the rulers do not govern out of desire for private gain, but are least motivated by personal ambition, is governed in the way which is the finest and freest from civil strife d. Philosophers will rule not only because they will be best prepared for this, but also because if they do not, the city will no longer be well governed and may fall prey to economic decline, factionalism, and civil war.

They will approach ruling not as something really enjoyable, but as something necessary c-d. Objections against the government of philosopher-rulers can be made. Firstly, because of the restrictions concerning family and private property, Plato is often accused of totalitarianism. Especially in the Laws he makes clear that freedom is one of the main values of society d. Other values for which Plato stands include justice, friendship, wisdom, courage, and moderation, and not factionalism or terror that can be associated with a totalitarian state. The restrictions which he proposes are placed on the governors, rather than on the governed.

Secondly, one can argue that there may obviously be a danger in the self-professed claim to rule of the philosophers. Individuals may imagine themselves to be best qualified to govern a country, but in fact they may lose contact with political realities and not be good leaders at all. If philosopher-rulers did not have real knowledge of their city, they would be deprived of the essential credential that is required to make their rule legitimate, namely, that they alone know how best to govern.

As in a few other places in the dialogue, Plato throws his political innovation open to doubt. Their political authority is not only rational but also substantially moral, based on the consent of the governed. They regard justice as the most important and most essential thing e. A political order based on fairness leads to friendship and cooperation among different parts of the city.

For Plato, as for Solon, government exists for the benefit of all citizens and all social classes, and must mediate between potentially conflicting interests. Such a mediating force is exercised in the ideal city of the Republic by the philosopher-rulers. They are the guarantors of the political order that is encapsulated in the norm that regulates just relations of persons and classes within the city and is expressed by the phrase: In the ideal city all persons and social groups are given equal opportunities to be happy, that is, to pursue happiness, but not at the expense of others.

Their particular individual, group or class happiness is limited by the need of the happiness for all. The happiness of the whole city is not for Plato the happiness of an abstract unity called the polis, or the happiness of the greatest number, but rather the happiness of all citizens derived from a peaceful, harmonious, and cooperative union of different social classes.

The philosopher-rulers enjoy respect and contemplative leisure, but not wealth or honors; the guardian class, the second class in the city, military honors, but not leisure or wealth; and the producer class, family life, wealth, and freedom of enterprise, but not honors or rule. Then, the producers supply the city with goods; the guardians, defend it; and the philosophers, attuned to virtue and illuminated by goodness, rule it impartially for the common benefit of all citizens. The three different social classes engage in mutually beneficial enterprise, by which the interests of all are best served.

Social and economic differences, i. In the Platonic vision of the Republic , all social classes get to perform what they are best fit to do and are unified into a single community by mutual interests. In this sense, although each are different, they are all friends. In the Laws a similar statement is made again c , and it is interpreted as the right of the strong, the winner in a political battle a. The answer to the question of what is right and what is wrong can entirely determine our way of life, as individuals and communities. They, the wise and virtuous, free from faction and guided by the idea of the common good, should rule for the common benefit of the whole community, so that the city will not be internally divided by strife, but one in friendship Republic , a-b.

Then, in the Laws , the reign of the best individuals is replaced by the reign of the finest laws instituted by a judicious legislator c-d. The skeptic may believe that every adult is capable of exercising the power of self-direction, and should be given the opportunity to do so. He will be prepared to pay the costs of eventual mistakes and to endure an occasional civil unrest or even a limited war rather than be directed by anyone who may claim superior wisdom.

In the short dialogue Alcibiades I , little studied today and thought by some scholars as not genuine, though held in great esteem by the Platonists of antiquity, Socrates speaks with Alcibiades. The subject of their conversation is politics. Frequently referred to by Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War , Alcibiades, the future leader of Athens, highly intelligent and ambitious, largely responsible for the Athenian invasion of Sicily, is at the time of conversation barely twenty years old. The young, handsome, and well-born Alcibiades of the dialogue is about to begin his political career and to address the Assembly for the first time a-b.

He plans to advise the Athenians on the subject of peace and war, or some other important affair d. His ambitions are indeed extraordinary. He does not want just to display his worth before the people of Athens and become their leader, but to rule over Europe and Asia as well c.

His dreams resemble that of the future Alexander the Great. His claim to rule is that he is the best. His world-view is based on unexamined opinions. He appears to be the worst type of ignorant person who pretends that he knows something but does not. Such ignorance in politics is the cause of mistakes and evils a.

What is implied in the dialogue is that noble birth, beautiful looks, and even intelligence and power, without knowledge, do not give the title to rule. Ignorance, the condition of Alcibiades, is also the condition of the great majority of the people b-c. Nevertheless, Socrates promises to guide Alcibiades, so that he becomes excellent and renowned among the Greeks b-c. He or she is perfect in virtue. The best government can be founded only on beautiful and well-ordered souls. In a few dialogues, such as Phaedo , the Republic , Phaedrus , Timaeus , and the Laws , Plato introduces his doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

Expert political knowledge for him should include not only knowledge of things out there, but also knowledge of oneself. This is because whoever is ignorant of himself will also be ignorant of others and of political things, and, therefore, will never be an expert politician e. Those who are ignorant will go wrong, moving from one misery to another a. For them history will be a tough teacher, but as long they do not recognize themselves and practice virtue, they will learn nothing.

It is also impossible without an ongoing philosophical reflection on whom we truly are. Therefore, democracy would not be a good form of government for him unless, as it is proposed in the Laws , the element of freedom is mixed with the element of wisdom, which includes ultimate knowledge of the self.

Unmixed and unchecked democracy, marked by the general permissiveness that spurs vices, makes people impious, and lets them forget about their true self, is only be the second worst in the rank of flawed regimes after tyranny headed by a vicious individual. This does not mean that Plato would support a theocratic government based on shallow religiosity and religious hypocrisy. There is no evidence for this. Freedom of speech, forming opinions and expressing them, which may be denied in theocracy, is a true value for Plato, along with wisdom.

It is the basic requirement for philosophy. In shallow religiosity, like in atheism , there is ignorance and no knowledge of the self either. In Book II of the Republic , Plato criticizes the popular religious beliefs of the Athenians, who under the influence of Homer and Hesiod attribute vices to the gods and heroes dc.

He tries to show that God is the perfect being, the purest and brightest, always the same, immortal and true, to whom we should look in order to know ourselves and become pure and virtuous b-e. God, and not human beings, is the measure of political order Laws , c. The three other virtues describe qualities of different social groups. Wisdom, which can be understood as the knowledge of the whole, including both knowledge of the self and political prudence, is the quality of the leadership ea. Courage is not merely military courage but primarily civic courage: It is the primary quality of the guardians b.

Finally, moderation, a sense of the limits that bring peace and happiness to all, is the quality of all social classes. It expresses the mutual consent of both the governed and the rulers as to who should rule da. The four virtues of the good society describe also the soul of a well-ordered individual. Its rational part, whose quality is wisdom, nurtured by fine words and learning, should together with the emotional or spirited part, cultivated by music and rhythm, rule over the volitional or appetitive part a.

Under the leadership of the intellect, the soul must free itself from greed, lust, and other degrading vices, and direct itself to the divine. The liberation of the soul from vice is for Plato the ultimate task of humans on earth. Nobody can be wicked and happy a-c. Only a spiritually liberated individual, whose soul is beautiful and well ordered, can experience true happiness. Only a country ordered according to the principles of virtue can claim to have the best system of government. Liberal democracies are not only founded on considerations of freedom and equality, but also include other elements, such as the rule of law, multiparty systems, periodic elections, and a professional civil service.

He believes that virtue is the lifeblood of any good society. They were losing their virtuous souls, their virtue by which they could prove themselves to be worthy of preservation as a great nation. Racked by the selfish passions of greed and envy, they forfeited their conception of the right order. Their benevolence, the desire to do good, ceased. Humans without souls are hollow. Cities without virtue are rotten.

To those who cannot see clearly they may look glorious but what appears bright is only exterior. To see clearly what is visible, the political world out there, Plato argues, one has first to perceive what is invisible but intelligible, the soul. One has to know oneself. Humans are immortal souls, he claims, and not just independent variables. They are often egoistic, but the divine element in them makes them more than mere animals. Friendship, freedom, justice, wisdom, courage, and moderation are the key values that define a good society based on virtue, which must be guarded against vice, war, and factionalism.

To enjoy true happiness, humans must remain virtuous and remember God, the perfect being. The doctrine of the harmony of interests, fairness as the basis of the best political order, the mixed constitution, the rule of law, the distinction between good and deviated forms of government, practical wisdom as the quality of good leadership, and the importance of virtue and transcendence for politics are the political ideas that can rightly be associated with Plato.

They have profoundly influenced subsequent political thinkers. When Hebrew mythical thought met Greek philosophical thought in the first century B. Thus Philo produced a synthesis of both traditions developing concepts for future Hellenistic interpretation of messianic Hebrew thought, especially by Clement of Alexandria, Christian Apologists like Athenagoras, Theophilus, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and by Origen.

He may have influenced Paul, his contemporary, and perhaps the authors of the Gospel of John C. Dodd and the Epistle to the Hebrews R. In the process, he laid the foundations for the development of Christianity in the West and in the East, as we know it today. Philo's primary importance is in the development of the philosophical and theological foundations of Christianity.

The church preserved the Philonic writings because Eusebius of Caesarea labeled the monastic ascetic group of Therapeutae and Therapeutrides, described in Philo's The Contemplative Life , as Christians, which is highly unlikely. Eusebius also promoted the legend that Philo met Peter in Rome. Jewish tradition was uninterested in philosophical speculation and did not preserve Philo's thought. Wolfson, Philo was a founder of religious philosophy, a new habit of practicing philosophy. Philo was thoroughly educated in Greek philosophy and culture as can be seen from his superb knowledge of classical Greek literature.

He had a deep reverence for Plato and referred to him as "the most holy Plato" Prob. Philo's philosophy represented contemporary Platonism which was its revised version incorporating Stoic doctrine and terminology via Antiochus of Ascalon ca 90 B. Clement of Alexandria even called Philo "the Pythagorean. For Philo, Greek philosophy was a natural development of the revelatory teachings of Moses. He was no innovator in this matter because already before him Jewish scholars attempted the same. Artapanus in the second century B.

E identified Moses with Musaeus and with Orpheus. According to Aristobulus of Paneas first half of the second century B. Very little is known about the life of Philo. He lived in Alexandria, which at that time counted, according to some estimates, about one million people and included largest Jewish community outside of Palestine.

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He came from a wealthy and the prominent family and appears to be a leader in his community. Once he visited Jerusalem and the temple, as he himself stated in Prov. Philo's brother, Alexander, was a wealthy, prominent Roman government official, a custom agent responsible for collecting dues on all goods imported into Egypt from the East. He donated money to plate the gates of the temple in Jerusalem with gold and silver. The other son, Tiberius Julius Alexander, described by Josephus as "not remaining true to his ancestral practices" became procurator of the province of Judea C.

Philo was involved in the affairs of his community which interrupted his contemplative life Spec. He was elected to head the Jewish delegation, which apparently included his brother Alexander and nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander, and was sent to Rome in B. The major part of Philo's writings consists of philosophical essays dealing with the main themes of biblical thought that present a systematic and precise exposition of his views.

One has the impression that he attempted to show that the philosophical Platonic or Stoic ideas were nothing but the deductions made from the biblical verses of Moses. Philo was not an original thinker, but he was well acquainted with the entire range of Greek philosophical traditions through the original texts. If there are gaps in his knowledge, they are rather in his Jewish tradition as evidenced by his relying on the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible.

In his attempt to reconcile the Greek way of thinking with his Hebrew tradition he had antecedents such as Pseudo-Aristeas and Aristobulus. The first group comprises writings that paraphrase the biblical texts of Moses: A series of works include allegorical explanations of Genesis A series of works classified as philosophical treatises: The third group includes historical-apologetic writings: The first extract is a rationalistic version of Exodus giving a eulogic account of Moses and a summary of Mosaic constitution contrasting its severity with the laxity of the gentile laws; the second extract describes the Essenes.

But all these works are related to Philo's explanations of the texts of Moses. Philo uses an allegorical technique for interpretation of the Hebrew myth and in this he follows the Greek tradition of Theagenes of Rhegium second half of the sixth century B. Theagenes used this approach in defense of Homer's theology against the detractors. He said that the myths of gods struggling with each other referred to the opposition between the elements; the names of gods were made to refer to various dispositions of the soul, e.

Anaxagoras , too, explained the Homeric poems as discussions of virtue and justice. The Sophist Prodicus of Ceos b. He also employed ethical allegory. The allegory was used by the cynic Antisthenes contemporary of Plato and Diogenes the Cynic. Stoics expanded the Cynics' use of Homeric allegory in the interest of their philosophical system. Using this allegorical method, Philo seeks out the hidden message beneath the surface of any particular text and tries to read back a new doctrine into the work of the past.

In a similar way Plutarch allegorized the ancient Egyptian mythology giving it a new meaning. But in some aspects of Jewish life Philo defends the literal interpretation of his tradition as in the debate on circumcision or the Sabbath Mig. Though he acknowledges the symbolic meaning of these rituals, he insists on their literal interpretation.

The key emphasis in Philo's philosophy is contrasting the spiritual life, understood as intellectual contemplation, with the mundane preoccupation with earthly concerns, either as an active life or as a search for pleasure. Philo disdained the material world and physical body Spec. But it was a necessary evil, hence Philo does not advocate a complete abnegation from life. On the contrary he advocates fulfilling first the practical obligations toward men and the use of mundane possessions for the accomplishment of praiseworthy works Fug. Similarly he considers pleasure indispensable and wealth useful, but for a virtuous man they are not a perfect good LA 3.

He believed that men should steer themselves away from the physical aspect of things gradually. Some people, like philosophers, may succeed in focusing their minds on the eternal realities. Philo believed that man's final goal and ultimate bliss is in the "knowledge of the true and living God" Decal. To him, mystic vision allows our soul to see the Divine Logos Ebr. In a desire to validate the scripture as an inspired writing, he often compares it to prophetic ecstasy Her. His praise of the contemplative life of the monastic Therapeutae in Alexandria attests to his preference of bios theoreticos over bios practicos.

He adheres to the Platonic picture of the souls descending into the material realm and that only the souls of philosophers are able to come to the surface and return to their realm in heaven Gig. Philo adopted the Platonic concept of the soul with its tripartite division. The rational part of the soul, however, is breathed into man as a part of God's substance. But if it were to die, then our soul would live according to its proper life being released from the evil and dead body to which it is bound" Op. Philo differentiated between philosophy and wisdom. To him philosophy is "the greatest good thing to men" Op.

It is a devotion to wisdom, and a way to acquire the highest knowledge, "an attentive study of wisdom. Hence it follows that Moses, as the author of the Torah, "had reached the very summit of philosophy" and "had learnt from the oracles of God the most numerous and important of the principles of nature" Op. Moses was also the interpreter of nature Her.

By saying this Philo wanted to indicate that human wisdom has two origins: Moreover, that Mosaic Law is not inconsistent with nature. A single law, the Logos of nature governs the entire world Jos. Because of this we have a conscience that affects even wicked persons QG 4. Wisdom is a consummated philosophy and as such has to be in agreement with the principles of nature Mos. The study of philosophy has as its end "life in accordance with nature" and following the "path of right reason" Mig.

Philosophy prepares us to a moral life, i. From this follows that life in accordance with nature hastens us towards virtues Mos. Thus Philo does not discount human reason, but contrasts only the true doctrine which is trust in God with uncertain, plausible, and unreliable reasoning LA 3. Philo's ethical doctrine is Stoic in its essence and includes the active effort to achieve virtue, the model of a sage to be followed, and practical advice concerning the achievement of the proper right reason and a proper emotional state of rational emotions eupatheia.

To Philo man is basically passive and it is God who sows noble qualities in the soul, thus we are instruments of God LA 2. Still man is the only creature endowed with freedom to act though his freedom is limited by the constitution of his mind. As such he is responsible for his action and "very properly receives blame for the offences which he designedly commits.

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Philo advocates the practice of virtue in both the divine and the human spheres. Lovers only of God and lovers only of men are both incomplete in virtue. Philo advocates a middle harmonious way Decal. He differentiates four virtues: Human dispositions Philo divides into three groups — the best is given the vision of God, the next has a vision on the right i. Felicity is achieved in the culmination of three values: Philo adopts the Stoic wise man as a model for human behavior. Such a wise man should imitate God who was impassible apathes hence the sage should achieve a state of apatheia, i.

In such a state of eupatheia, the sage achieves a serene, stable, and joyful disposition in which he is directed by reason in his decisions QG 2. But at the same time Philo claims that the needs of the body should not be neglected and rejects the other extreme, i. Everything should be governed by reason, self-control, and moderation. Joy and pleasure do not have intrinsic values, but are by-products of virtue and characterize the sage Fug.

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Mysticism is a doctrine that maintains that one can gain knowledge of reality that is not accessible to sense perception or to reason. It is usually associated with some mental and physical training and in the theistic version it involves a sensation of closeness to or unity with God experienced as temporal and spatial transcendence.

According to Philo, man's highest union with God is limited to God's manifestation as the Logos. It is similar to a later doctrine of intellectual contact of our human intellect with the transcendent intellect developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Ibn Rushd and different from the Plotinian doctrine of the absorption into the ineffable one. Philo's biblical tradition in which one could not name or describe God was the major factor in accepting the Greek Platonic concepts and emphasis on God's transcendence. But this position is rather alien to biblical and rabbinical understanding.

In the Bible, God is represented in a "material" and "physical" way. Philosophically, however, Philo differentiated between the existence of God , which could be demonstrated, and the nature of God which humans are not able to cognize. God's essence is beyond any human experience or cognition, therefore it can be described only by stating what God is not via negativa or by depriving him of any attribute of sensible objects and putting God beyond any attribute applicable to a sensible world via eminentiae because God alone is a being whose existence is his essence Det.

Philo states in many places that God's essence is one and single, that he does not belong to any class or that there is in God any distinction of genus and species. Therefore, we cannot say anything about his qualities "For God is not only devoid of peculiar qualities, but he is likewise not of the form of man" LA 1. Strictly speaking, we cannot make any positive or negative statements about God: But he alone can utter a positive assertion respecting himself, since he alone has an accurate knowledge of his own nature" LA 3.

Moreover, since the essence of God is single, therefore its property must be one which Philo denotes as acting "Now it is an especial attribute of God to create, and this faculty it is impious to ascribe to any created being" Cher. The expression of this act of God, which is at the same time his thinking, is his Logos Prov. Though God is hidden, his reality is made manifest by the Logos that is God's image Somn. Because of this we can perceive God's existence, though we cannot fathom his essence. But there are degrees and levels to our cognizance of God.

Those at the summit and the highest level may grasp the unity of the powers of God, at the lower level people recognize the Logos as the Regent Power, and those still at the lowest level, immersed in the sensible world are unable to perceive the intelligible reality Fug. Steps in mystic experience involve a realization of human nothingness, a realization that the one who acts is God alone, and abandonment of our sense of perception Her. A mystic state will produce a sensation of tranquility, and stability; it appears suddenly and is described as a sober intoxication Gig. According to Philo the highest knowledge man may have is the knowledge of infinite reality which is not accessible by the normal senses, but by unmediated intuition of divinity.

Humans were endowed with the mind, i. We received the first in order that we might consider the things that are discernable only by the intellect, the end of which is truth, and the second for the perception of visible things the end of which is opinion. Opinions are unstable, based on probability, and untrustworthy. Thus by this divine gift men are able to come to a conclusion about the existence of the divinity.

They can do it in two ways: And in the process the soul may climb the ladder to perfection by using natural means i. The other is a direct apprehension by being instructed by God himself when the mind elevates itself above the physical world and perceives the uncreated One through a clear vision Praem. This vision is accessible to the "purified mind" to which God appears as One. To the mind uninitiated in the mysteries, unable to apprehend God alone by himself, but only through his actions, God appears as a triad constituted by him and his two powers, Creative and Royal Abr.

Such a direct vision of God is not dependent on revelation but is possible because we have an impression of God in our mind, which is nothing but a tiny fragment of the Logos pervading the whole universe, not separated from its source, but only extended Det. And we receive this portion of the Divine Mind at birth being endowed with a mind which makes us resemble God Op.

At birth two powers enter every soul, the salutary Beneficent and the destructive Unbounded. The world is created through these same powers. The creation is accomplished when " the salutary and beneficent power brings to an end the unbounded and destructive nature. Thus both the world and humans are a mixture of these powers and the prevailing one has the moral determination: But the prudent and noble [soul] receives the powerful and salutary [power] and, on the contrary, possesses in itself good fortune and happiness" QE 1.

Philo evidently analyzes these two powers on two levels. One is the divine level in which the Unlimited or the Unbounded is a representation of God's infinite and immeasurable goodness and creativity. The Logos keeps it in balance through the Limit. The other level is the human one where the Unlimited or the Unbounded represents destruction and everything morally abhorrent. Human reason is able, however, to maintain in it some kind of balance.

This mind, divine and immortal, is an additional and differentiating part of the human soul which animates man just like the souls of animals which are devoid of mind. The notion of God's existence is thus imprinted in our mind that needs only some illumination to have a direct vision of God Abr. Thus we can arrive at it through the dialectical reasoning as apprehension of the First Principle. Philo differentiates two modes for perceiving God, an inferential mode and a direct mode without mediation: Thus this direct mode is not in any way a type of inspiration or inspired prophecy; it is unlike "inspiration" when a "trance" or a "heaven-inflicted madness" seizes us and divine light sets as it happens "to the race of prophets" Her.

Philo attempts to bridge the Greek "scientific" or rational philosophy with the strictly mythical ideology of the Hebrew scriptures. As a basis for the "scientific" approach he uses the worldview presented by Plato in Timaeus which remained influential in Hellenistic times. The characteristic feature of the Greek scientific approach is the biological interpretation of the physical world in anthropocentric terms, in terms of purpose and function that may apply to biological and psychological realities but may not be applied to the physical world.

Moreover, Philo operates often on two levels: Nevertheless, Philo attempts to harmonize the Mosaic and Platonic accounts of the generation of the world by interpreting the biblical story using Greek scientific categories and concepts. He elaborates a religious-philosophical worldview that became the foundation for the future Christian doctrine. Philo's doctrine of creation is intertwined with his doctrine of God and it answers two crucial questions: Was the world created ex nihilo or from primordial matter? Was creation a temporal act or is it an eternal process?

Though Philo's model of creation comes from Plato's Timaeus , the direct agent of creation is not God himself described in Plato as Demiurge, Maker, Artificer , but the Logos. Philo believes that the Logos is "the man of God" Conf. The Logos converted unqualified, unshaped preexistent matter, which Philo describes as "destitute of arrangement, of quality, of animation, of distinctive character and full of disorder and confusion," Op. For it is out of that essence that God created everything, without indeed touching it himself, for it was not lawful for the all-wise and all-blessed God to touch materials which were all misshapen and confused, but he created them by the agency of his incorporeal powers, of which the proper name is Ideas, which he so exerted that every genus received its proper form LA 1.

According to Philo, Moses anticipated Plato by teaching that water, darkness, and chaos existed before the world came into being Op. Moses, having reached the philosophy summit, recognized that there are two fundamental principles of being, one, "an active cause, the intellect of the universe. But Philo is ambiguous in such statements as these: These facts show that for his energy, perseverance, eloquence, invective, sagacity, and wide sympathy, he is indebted to his Negro blood. The very marvel of his style would seem to be a development of that other marvel--how his mother learned to read.

The versatility of talent which he wields, in common with Dumas, Ira Aldridge, and Miss Greenfield, would seem to be the result of the grafting of the Anglo-Saxon on good, original, Negro stock. If the friends of "Caucasus" choose to claim, for that region, what remains after this analysis--to wit: They will forgive me for reminding them that the term "Caucasian" is dropped by recent writers on Ethnology; for the people about Mount Caucasus, are, and have ever been, Mongols.

The great "white race" now seek paternity, according to Dr. Keep on, gentlemen; you will find yourselves in Africa, by-and-by. This is the proper place to remark of our author, that the same strong self-hood, which led him to measure strength with Mr. Covey, and to wrench himself from the embrace of the Garrisonians, and which has borne him through many resistances to the personal indignities offered him as a colored man, sometimes becomes a hyper-sensitiveness to such assaults as men of his mark will meet with, on paper.

Keen and unscrupulous opponents have sought, and not unsuccessfully, to pierce him in this direction; for well they know, that if assailed, he will smite back. It is not without a feeling of pride, dear reader, that I present you with this book. The son of a self-emancipated bond-woman, I feel joy in introducing to you my brother, who has rent his own bonds, and who, in his every relation--as a public man, as a husband and as a father--is such as does honor to the land which gave him birth.

I shall place this book in the hands of the only child spared me, bidding him to strive and emulate its noble example. You may do likewise. It is an American book, for Americans, in the fullest sense of the idea. It shows that the worst of our institutions, in its worst aspect, cannot keep down energy, truthfulness, and earnest struggle for the right. In Talbot county, Eastern Shore, Maryland, near Easton, the county town of that county, there is a small district of country, thinly populated, and remarkable for nothing that I know of more than for the worn-out, sandy, desert-like appearance of its soil, the general dilapidation of its farms and fences, the indigent and spiritless character of its inhabitants, and the prevalence of ague and fever.

The name of this singularly unpromising and truly famine stricken district is Tuckahoe, a name well known to all Marylanders, black and white. It was given to this section of country probably, at the first, merely in derision; or it may possibly have been applied to it, as I have heard, because some one of its earlier inhabitants had been guilty of the petty meanness of stealing a hoe--or taking a hoe that did not belong to him.

But, whatever may have been its origin--and about this I will not be. Decay and ruin are everywhere visible, and the thin population of the place would have quitted it long ago, but for the Choptank river, which runs through it, from which they take abundance of shad and herring, and plenty of ague and fever. The reader will pardon so much about the place of my birth, on the score that it is always a fact of some importance to know where a man is born, if, indeed, it be important to know anything about him. Nor, indeed, can I impart much knowledge concerning my parents.

Genealogical trees do not flourish among slaves. It is only once in a while that an exception is found to this statement. I never met with a slave who could tell me how old he was. Few slave-mothers know anything of the months of the year, nor of the days of the month. They keep no family records, with marriages, births, and deaths. They measure the ages of their children by spring time, winter time, harvest time, planting time, and the like; but these soon become undistinguishable and forgotten.

Like other slaves, I cannot tell how old I am. This destitution was among my earliest troubles. I learned when I grew up, that my master--and this is the case with masters generally--allowed no questions to be put to him, by which a slave might learn his. Such questions deemed evidence of impatience, and even of impudent curiosity. From certain events, however, the dates of which I have since learned, I suppose myself to have been born about the year The first experience of life with me that I now remember--and I remember it but hazily--began in the family of my grandmother and grandfather.

Betsey and Isaac Baily. They were quite advanced in life, and had long lived on the spot where they then resided. They were considered old settlers in the neighborhood, and, from certain circumstances, I infer that my grandmother, especially, was held in high esteem, far higher than is the lot of most colored persons in the slave states.

She was a good nurse, and a capital hand at making nets for catching shad and herring; and these nets were in great demand, not only in Tuckahoe, but at Denton and Hillsboro, neighboring villages. She was not only good at making the nets, but was also somewhat famous for her good fortune in taking the fishes referred to.

I have known her to be in the water half the day. Grandmother was likewise more provident than most of her neighbors in the preservation of seedling sweet potatoes, and it happened to her--as it will happen to any careful and thrifty person residing in an ignorant and improvident community--to enjoy the reputation of having been born to "good luck. In the time of planting sweet potatoes, "Grandmother Betty," as she was familiarly called, was sent for in all directions, simply to place the seedling potatoes in the hills; for superstition had it, that if "Grandmamma Betty but touches them at planting, they will be sure to grow and flourish.

Though Tuckahoe had but few of the good things of. If good potato crops came after her planting, she was not forgotten by those for whom she planted; and as she was remembered by others, so she remembered the hungry little ones around her. The dwelling of my grandmother and grandfather had few pretensions.

It was a log hut, or cabin, built of clay, wood, and straw. At a distance it resembled--though it was smaller, less commodious and less substantial--the cabins erected in the western states by the first settlers. To my child's eye, however, it was a noble structure, admirably adapted to promote the comforts and conveniences of its inmates. A few rough, Virginia fence-rails, flung loosely over the rafters above, answered the triple purpose of floors, ceilings, and bedsteads.

To be sure, this upper apartment was reached only by a ladder-- but what in the world for climbing could be better than a ladder? To me, this ladder was really a high invention, and possessed a sort of charm as I played with delight upon the rounds of it. In this little hut there was a large family of children: I dare not say how many.

My grandmother--whether because too old for field service, or because she had so faithfully discharged the duties of her station in early life, I know not--enjoyed the high privilege of living in a cabin, separate from the quarter, with no other burden than her own support, and the necessary care of the little children, imposed. She evidently esteemed it a great fortune to live so. The children were not her own, but her grandchildren--the children of her daughters.

She took delight in having them around her, and in attending to their few wants. The practice of separating children from their mother, and hiring the latter out at distances too great to admit of their meeting, except at long intervals, is a marked feature of the cruelty and barbarity of the slave system. But it is in harmony with the grand aim of slavery, which, always and everywhere, is to reduce man to a level with the brute.

It is a successful method of obliterating. Most of the children, however, in this instance, being the children of my grandmother's daughters, the notions of family, and the reciprocal duties and benefits of the relation, had a better chance of being understood than where children are placed--as they often are in the hands of strangers, who have no care for them, apart from the wishes of their masters.

The daughters of my grandmother were five in number. The daughter last named was my mother, of whom the reader shall learn more by- and-by. I knew many other things before I knew that. Grandmother and grandfather were the greatest people in the world to me; and being with them so snugly in their own little cabin--I supposed it be their own-- knowing no higher authority over me or the other children than the authority of grandmamma, for a time there was nothing to disturb me; but, as I grew larger and older, I learned by degrees the sad fact, that the "little hut," and the lot on which it stood, belonged not to my dear old grandparents, but to some person who lived a great distance off, and who was called, by grandmother, "OLD MASTER.

Once on the track--troubles never come singly--I was not long in finding out another fact, still more grievous to my childish heart. I was told that this "old master," whose name seemed ever to be mentioned with fear and shuddering, only allowed the children to live with grandmother for a limited time, and that in fact as soon.

The absolute power of this distant "old master" had touched my young spirit with but the point of its cold, cruel iron, and left me something to brood over after the play and in moments of repose. Grandmammy was, indeed, at that time, all the world to me; and the thought of being separated from her, in any considerable time, was more than an unwelcome intruder. Children have their sorrows as well as men and women; and it would be well to remember this in our dealings with them.

The liability to be separated from my grandmother, seldom or never to see her again, haunted me. I dreaded the thought of going to live with that mysterious "old master," whose name I never heard mentioned with affection, but always with fear. I look back to this as among the heaviest of my childhood's sorrows. But the sorrows of childhood, like the pleasures of after life, are transient. There is, after all, but little difference in the measure of contentment felt by the slave-child neglected and the slaveholder's.

The spirit of the All Just mercifully holds the balance for the young. The slave-boy escapes many troubles which befall and vex his white brother. He seldom has to listen to lectures on propriety of behavior, or on anything else. He is never chided for handling his little knife and fork improperly or awkwardly, for he uses none.

He is never reprimanded for soiling the table-cloth, for he takes his meals on the clay floor. He never has the misfortune, in his games or sports, of soiling or tearing his clothes, for he has almost none to soil or tear. He is never expected to act like a nice little gentleman, for he is only a rude little slave. Thus, freed from all restraint, the slave-boy can be, in his life and conduct, a genuine boy, doing whatever his boyish nature suggests; enacting, by turns, all the strange antics and freaks of horses, dogs, pigs, and barn-door fowls, without in any manner compromising his dignity, or incurring reproach of any sort.

He literally runs wild; has no pretty little verses to learn in the nursery; no nice little speeches to make for aunts, uncles, or cousins, to show how smart he is; and, if he can only manage to keep out of the way of the heavy feet and fists of the older slave boys, he may trot on, in his joyous and roguish tricks, as happy as any little heathen under the palm trees of Africa. The threat is soon forgotten; the shadow soon passes, and our sable boy continues to roll in the dust, or play in the mud, as bests suits him, and in the veriest freedom. If he feels uncomfortable, from mud or from dust, the coast is clear; he can plunge into.

His food is of the coarsest kind, consisting for the most part of cornmeal mush, which often finds it way from the wooden tray to his mouth in an oyster shell. His days, when the weather is warm, are spent in the pure, open air, and in the bright sunshine. He always sleeps in airy apartments; he seldom has to take powders, or to be paid to swallow pretty little sugar-coated pills, to cleanse his blood, or to quicken his appetite. He eats no candies; gets no lumps of loaf sugar; always relishes his food; cries but little, for nobody cares for his crying; learns to esteem his bruises but slight, because others so esteem them.

In a word, he is, for the most part of the first eight years of his life, a spirited, joyous, uproarious, and happy boy, upon whom troubles fall only like water on a duck's back. And such a boy, so far as I can now remember, was the boy whose life in slavery I am now narrating. That mysterious individual referred to in the first chapter as an object of terror among the inhabitants of our little cabin, under the ominous title of "old master," was really a man of some consequence. He owned several farms in Tuckahoe; was the chief clerk and butler on the home plantation of Col.

Edward Lloyd; had overseers on his own farms; and gave directions to overseers on the farms belonging to Col. This plantation is situated on Wye river--the river receiving its name, doubtless, from Wales, where the Lloyds originated. They the Lloyds are an old and honored family in Maryland, exceedingly wealthy. The home plantation, where they have resided, perhaps for a century or more, is one of the largest, most fertile, and best appointed, in the state. About this plantation, and about that queer old master--who must be something more than a man, and something worse than an angel-- the reader will easily imagine that I was not only curious, but eager, to know all that could be known.

Unhappily for me, however, all the information I could get concerning him increased my great dread of being carried thither--of being. It was, evidently, a great thing to go to Col. Lloyd's; and I was not without a little curiosity to see the place; but no amount of coaxing could induce in me the wish to remain there.

The fact is, such was my dread of leaving the little cabin, that I wished to remain little forever, for I knew the taller I grew the shorter my stay. The old cabin, with its rail floor and rail bedsteads upstairs, and its clay floor downstairs, and its dirt chimney, and windowless sides, and that most curious piece of workmanship dug in front of the fireplace, beneath which grandmammy placed the sweet potatoes to keep them from the frost, was MY HOME--the only home I ever had; and I loved it, and all connected with it.

The old fences around it, and the stumps in the edge of the woods near it, and the squirrels that ran, skipped, and played upon them, were objects of interest and affection. There, too, right at the side of the hut, stood the old well, with its stately and skyward-pointing beam, so aptly placed between the limbs of what had once been a tree, and so nicely balanced that I could move it up and down with only one hand, and could get a drink myself without calling for help.

Where else in the world could such a well be found, and where could such another home be met with? Nor were these all the attractions of the place. Down in a little valley, not far from grandmammy's cabin, stood Mr. Lee's mill, where the people came often in large numbers to get their corn ground. It was a watermill; and I never shall be able to tell the many things thought and felt, while I sat on the bank and watched that mill, and the turning of that ponderous wheel.

But, in all my sports and plays, and in spite of them, there would, occasionally, come the painful foreboding that I was not long to remain there, and that I must soon be called away to the home of old master. When the time of my departure was decided upon, my grandmother, knowing my fears, and in pity for them, kindly kept me ignorant of the dreaded event about to transpire.

Up to the morning a beautiful summer morning when we were to start, and, indeed, during the whole journey--a journey which, child as I was, I remember as well as if it were yesterday--she kept the sad fact hidden from me. This reserve was necessary; for, could I have known all, I should have given grandmother some trouble in getting me started. As it was, I was helpless, and she--dear woman! The distance from Tuckahoe to Wye river--where my old master lived--was full twelve miles, and the walk was quite a severe test of the endurance of my young legs. The journey would have proved too severe for me, but that my dear old grandmother-- blessings on her memory!

My grandmother, though advanced in years--as was evident from more than one gray hair, which peeped from between the ample and graceful folds of her newly-ironed bandana turban--was yet a woman of power and spirit. She was marvelously straight in figure, elastic, and muscular. I seemed hardly to be a burden to her. She would have "toted" me farther, but that I felt myself too much of a man to allow it, and insisted on walking.

Releasing dear grandmamma from carrying me, did not make me altogether independent of her, when we happened to pass through portions of the somber woods which lay between Tuckahoe and. She often found me increasing the energy of my grip, and holding her clothing, lest something should come out of the woods and eat me up. Several old logs and stumps imposed upon me, and got themselves taken for wild beasts. I could see their legs, eyes, and ears, or I could see something like eyes, legs, and ears, till I got close enough to them to see that the eyes were knots, washed white with rain, and the legs were broken limbs, and the ears, only ears owing to the point from which they were seen.

Thus early I learned that the point from which a thing is viewed is of some importance. As the day advanced the heat increased; and it was not until the afternoon that we reached the much dreaded end of the journey. I found myself in the midst of a group of children of many colors; black, brown, copper colored, and nearly white.

I had not seen so many children before. Great houses loomed up in different directions, and a great many men and women were at work in the fields. All this hurry, noise, and singing was very different from the stillness of Tuckahoe. As a new comer, I was an object of special interest; and, after laughing and yelling around me, and playing all sorts of wild tricks, they the children asked me to go out and play with them.

This I refused to do, preferring to stay with grandmamma. I could not help feeling that our being there boded no good to me. She was soon to lose another object of affection, as she had lost many before. I knew she was unhappy, and the shadow fell from her brow on me, though I knew not the cause. All suspense, however, must have an end; and the end of mine, in this instance, was at hand. Affectionately patting me on the head, and exhorting me to be a good boy, grandmamma told me to go and play with the little children.

I had never seen. We were brothers and sisters, but what of that? Why should they be attached to me, or I to them? I heard the words brother and sisters, and knew they must mean something; but slavery had robbed these terms of their true meaning. The experience through which I was passing, they had passed through before.

They had already been initiated into the mysteries of old master's domicile, and they seemed to look upon me with a certain degree of compassion; but my heart clave to my grandmother. Think it not strange, dear reader, that so little sympathy of feeling existed between us. The conditions of brotherly and sisterly feeling were wanting--we had never nestled and played together.

The domestic hearth, with its holy lessons and precious endearments, is abolished in the case of a slave-mother and her children. I really wanted to play with my brother and sisters, but they were strangers to me, and I was full of fear that grandmother might leave without taking me with her. Entreated to do so, however, and that, too, by my dear grandmother, I went to the back part of the house, to play with them and the other children.

At last, while standing there, one of the children, who had been in the kitchen, ran up to me, in a sort of roguish glee, exclaiming, "Fed, Fed! Grandmammy had indeed gone, and was now far away, "clean" out of sight. I need not tell all that happened now. Almost heart-broken at the discovery, I fell upon the ground, and. My brother and sisters came around me, and said, "Don't cry," and gave me peaches and pears, but I flung them away, and refused all their kindly advances.

I had never been deceived before; and I felt not only grieved at parting--as I supposed forever--with my grandmother, but indignant that a trick had been played upon me in a matter so serious. It was now late in the afternoon. The day had been an exciting and wearisome one, and I knew not how or where, but I suppose I sobbed myself to sleep. There is a healing in the angel wing of sleep, even for the slave-boy; and its balm was never more welcome to any wounded soul than it was to mine, the first night I spent at the domicile of old master.

The reader may be surprised that I narrate so minutely an incident apparently so trivial, and which must have occurred when I was not more than seven years old; but as I wish to give a faithful history of my experience in slavery, I cannot withhold a circumstance which, at the time, affected me so deeply. Besides, this was, in fact, my first introduction to the realities of slavery. If the reader will now be kind enough to allow me time to grow bigger, and afford me an opportunity for my experience to become greater, I will tell him something, by-and-by, of slave life, as I saw, felt, and heard it, on Col.

Edward Lloyd's plantation, and at the house of old master, where I had now, despite of myself, most suddenly, but not unexpectedly, been dropped. Meanwhile, I will redeem my promise to say something more of my dear mother. Slavery does away with fathers, as it does away with families.

Slavery has no use for either fathers or families, and its laws do not recognize their existence in the social arrangements of the plantation. The order of civilization is reversed here. The name of the child is not expected to be that of its father, and his condition does not necessarily affect that of the child. He may be the slave of Mr. Tilgman; and his child, when born, may be the slave of Mr.

He may be white, glorying in the purity of his Anglo-. Saxon blood; and his child may be ranked with the blackest slaves. He can be father without being a husband, and may sell his child without incurring reproach, if the child be by a woman in whose veins courses one thirty-second part of African blood.

My father was a white man, or nearly white. It was sometimes whispered that my master was my father. But to return, or rather, to begin. My knowledge of my mother is very scanty, but very distinct. Her personal appearance and bearing are ineffaceably stamped upon my memory. She was tall, and finely proportioned; of deep black, glossy complexion; had regular features, and, among the other slaves, was remarkably sedate in her manners.

Yet I cannot say that I was very deeply attached to my mother; certainly not so deeply as I should have been had our relations in childhood been different. We were separated, according to the common custom, when I was but an infant, and, of course, before I knew my mother from any one else. The germs of affection with which the Almighty, in his wisdom and mercy, arms the hopeless infant against the ills and vicissitudes of his lot, had been directed in their growth toward that loving old grandmother, whose gentle hand and kind deportment it was in the first effort of my infantile understanding to comprehend and appreciate.

Accordingly, the tenderest affection which a beneficent Father allows, as a partial compensation to the mother for the pains and lacerations of her heart, incident to the maternal relation, was, in my case, diverted from its true and natural object, by the envious, greedy, and treacherous hand of slavery. The slave-mother can be spared long enough from. I never think of this terrible interference of slavery with my infantile affections, and its diverting them from their natural course, without feelings to which I can give no adequate expression.

I do not remember to have seen my mother at my grandmother's at any time. I remember her only in her visits to me at Col. Lloyd's plantation, and in the kitchen of my old master. Her visits to me there were few in number, brief in duration, and mostly made in the night. The pains she took, and the toil she endured, to see me, tells me that a true mother's heart was hers, and that slavery had difficulty in paralyzing it with unmotherly indifference. My mother was hired out to a Mr.

Stewart, who lived about twelve miles from old master's, and, being a field hand, she seldom had leisure, by day, for the performance of the journey. The nights and the distance were both obstacles to her visits. She was obliged to walk, unless chance flung into her way an opportunity to ride; and the latter was sometimes her good luck. But she always had to walk one way or the other.

It was a greater luxury than slavery could afford, to allow a black slave-mother a horse or a mule, upon which to travel twenty-four miles, when she could walk the distance. Besides, it is deemed a foolish whim for a slave-mother to manifest concern to see her children, and, in one point of view, the case is made out--she can do nothing for them. She has no control over them; the master is even more than the mother, in all matters touching the fate of her child. Why, then, should she give herself any concern?

She has no responsibility. Such is the reasoning, and such the practice. The iron rule of the plantation, always passionately and violently enforced in that neighborhood, makes flogging the penalty of. One of the visits of my mother to me, while at Col. Lloyd's, I remember very vividly, as affording a bright gleam of a mother's love, and the earnestness of a mother's care. I do not now remember the nature of my offense in this instance, for my offenses were numerous in that quarter, greatly depending, however, upon the mood of Aunt Katy, as to their heinousness; but she had adopted, that day, her favorite mode of punishing me, namely, making me go without food all day--that is, from after breakfast.

The first hour or two after dinner, I succeeded pretty well in keeping up my spirits; but though I made an excellent stand against the foe, and fought bravely during the afternoon, I knew I must be conquered at last, unless I got the accustomed reenforcement of a slice of corn bread, at sundown. Against this disappointment, for I was expecting that her heart would relent at last, I made an extra effort to maintain my dignity; but when I saw all the other children around me with merry and satisfied faces, I could stand it no longer.

I went out behind the house, and cried like a fine fellow! When tired of this, I returned to the kitchen, sat by the fire, and brooded over my hard lot. I was too hungry to sleep. While I sat in the corner, I caught sight of an ear of Indian corn on an upper shelf of the kitchen. I watched my chance, and got it, and, shelling off a few grains, I put it back again. The grains in my hand, I quickly put in some ashes, and covered them with embers, to roast them.

My corn was not long in roasting, and, with my keen appetite, it did not matter even if the grains were not exactly done. I eagerly pulled them out, and placed them on my stool, in a clever little pile. Just as I began to help myself to my very dry meal, in came my dear mother. And now, dear reader, a scene occurred which was altogether worth beholding, and to me it was instructive as well as interesting. The friendless and hungry boy, in his extremest need--and when he did not dare to look for succor--found himself in the strong, protecting arms of a mother; a mother who was, at the moment being endowed with high powers of manner as well as matter more than a match for all his enemies.

I shall never forget the indescribable expression of her countenance, when I told her that I had had no food since morning; and that Aunt Katy said she "meant to starve the life out of me. My mother threatened her with complaining to old master in my behalf; for the latter, though harsh and cruel himself, at times, did not sanction the meanness, injustice, partiality and oppressions enacted by Aunt Katy in the kitchen.

The "sweet cake" my mother gave me was in the shape of a heart, with a rich, dark ring glazed upon the edge of it. I was victorious, and well off for the moment; prouder, on my mother's knee, than a king upon his throne. But my triumph was short. I dropped off to sleep, and waked in the morning only to find my mother gone, and myself left at the mercy of the sable virago, dominant in my old master's kitchen, whose fiery wrath was my constant dread.

I do not remember to have seen my mother after this occurrence. Death soon ended the little communication that had. I was not allowed to visit her during any part of her long illness; nor did I see her for a long time before she was taken ill and died. The mother, at the verge of the grave, may not gather her children, to impart to them her holy admonitions, and invoke for them her dying benediction. The bond-woman lives as a slave, and is left to die as a beast; often with fewer attentions than are paid to a favorite horse. Scenes of sacred tenderness, around the death-bed, never forgotten, and which often arrest the vicious and confirm the virtuous during life, must be looked for among the free, though they sometimes occur among the slaves.

It has been a life-long, standing grief to me, that I knew so little of my mother; and that I was so early separated from her. The side view of her face is imaged on my memory, and I take few steps in life, without feeling her presence; but the image is mute, and I have no striking words of her's treasured up. I can, therefore, fondly and proudly ascribe to her an earnest love of knowledge. There was a whisper, that my master was my father; yet it was only a whisper, and I cannot say that I ever gave it credence. Indeed, I now have reason to think he was not; nevertheless, the fact remains, in all its glaring odiousness, that, by the laws of slavery, children, in all cases, are reduced to the condition of their mothers.

This arrangement admits of the greatest license to brutal slaveholders, and their profligate sons, brothers, relations and friends, and gives to the pleasure of sin, the additional attraction of profit. A whole volume might be written on this single feature of slavery, as I have observed it. One might imagine, that the children of such connections, would fare better, in the hands of their masters, than other slaves.

The rule is quite the other way; and a very little reflection will satisfy the reader that such is the case. A man who will enslave his own blood, may not be safely relied on for magnanimity. Men do not love those who remind them of their sins unless they have a mind to repent--and the mulatto child's face is a standing accusation against him who is master and father to the child. What is still worse, perhaps, such a child is a constant offense to the wife. She hates its very presence, and when a slaveholding woman hates, she wants not means to give that hate telling effect.

Masters are frequently compelled to sell this class of their slaves, out of deference to the feelings of their white wives; and shocking and scandalous as it may seem for a man to sell his own blood to the traffickers in human flesh, it is often an act of humanity. It is not within the scope of the design of my simple story, to comment upon every phase of slavery not within my experience as a slave. But, I may remark, that, if the lineal descendants of Ham are only to be enslaved, according to the scriptures, slavery in this country will soon become an unscriptural institution; for thousands are ushered into the world, annually, who--like myself--owe their existence to white fathers, and, most frequently, to their masters, and master's sons.

The slave-woman is at the mercy of the fathers, sons or brothers of her master. The thoughtful know the rest. After what I have now said of the circumstances of my mother, and my relations to her, the reader will not be surprised, nor be disposed to censure me, when I tell but the simple truth, viz: I had to learn the value of my mother long after her death, and by witnessing the devotion of other mothers to their children.

There is not, beneath the sky, an enemy to filial affection so destructive as slavery.

Ideally, her attitude affects other participants of the dialogue too. As a consequence, non-Anglo European philosophers do not feel compelled to view things in terms of the dominant paradigms of the Anglo-European tradition as though this were the sole philosophical lens available. Due to a change in attitude of philosophers from the dominant tradi- tion, however, their counterparts from non-Anglo European traditions can now begin to explore their own traditions as genuine philosophical treasures.

How can alternative concep- tual structures and ways of grasping different facets of human exis- tence be laid bare in this situation, given the internalization of domi- nant paradigms? Different techniques are suggested, all of which, in different ways, aim for emancipation from dominant paradigms. According to this method, a comparative non-Anglo European philosopher should widen her philosophical perspective and not blindly toe the line set by the dominant Anglo-European tradition.

She should not use the latter as her sole guide in identifying pertinent philosophical problems. The theory-practice divide is commonly taken to be a crucial aspect of the Anglo-European philosophical tradition. This technique pro- poses that, especially in non-European contexts, philosophical theories need to be developed which do not merely ape dominant understand- ings of mainstream philosophy, but which are instead more congruent with local philosophical resources.

The palpable tension between these delinking and disobedience strategies has to be mentioned in this context. Maffie A second technique used in this second phase attends to linguistic concerns which can aid the emancipation mentioned above. Writing about the African context, Wiredu, for example, warns about hasty translations from one conceptual framework into another, where mar- ginal attention is paid to the intricacies of the latter.

Emancipation from dominant paradigms can be achieved according to this technique also by learning to philosophize in local languages. According to a third, related technique, this emancipation can be achieved by radically severing ties with the dominant language and by philosophizing in local idioms. The third technique presumes that the threads of philosophizing abandoned in the throes of colonialism can be easily resumed despite the epistemic rupture caused by the philosophical activities of the colo- nial culture. Nevertheless, this claim could well be contested within comparative philosophy itself insofar as it fails to take into account the historical context in which philosophizing takes place.

Why does this understanding continue to exercise a kind of moral authority over me? For a critique from a Bolivian perspective, see Rivera Cusicanqui A Thematic Introduction and Garfield It is indeed questionable whether a reappropriation of tradition can completely circumvent this colonial past. In contemporary times, it seems that philosophy is not necessarily condi- tioned by limitations of language, as the different linguistic styles highlight.

If we assume that ideas are embedded and understood only in specific linguistic-cultural settings, neither interpretation nor trans- lation can ever be fruitful. To summarize tentatively, colonial encounters forced indigenous intellectuals and in some cases continue to do so to introspect inten- sively on their own traditions. Such encounters, which were commonly played out as a clash of civilizational values by the colonial powers, compelled some of these intellectuals to rethink indigenous customs, reinterpret texts, and justify them to members and non-members of their community.

In the process, the bounds of their traditional com- munity were themselves contested and refashioned in certain contexts. The experience of colonization created a stronger need to bring out indigenous, but neglected, perspectives to the fore with new tools. In general, philosophers in this second phase underscore how cul- turally ingrained philosophical activity is. Universal claims advanced by any philosophy, are, according to this understanding, simply that: This common space somehow enables the comparative phi- losopher to shed, or momentarily forget, her cultural garb.

As Wimmer states, dialogues or polylogues do not take place between cultures, po- litical units, or religions, but between human beings trying to argue either for or against propositions, theories, etc. And yet, methodological concerns take cen- ter stage. If there is reason not to dismiss this claim categori- cally, does it make sense to think through how social life impacts the standards, rules, precepts, and principles?

If philosophers in the second stage endeavor to bring down philosophizing from the transcendental realm of reason or divine revelation and anchor it in the positionality of the philosopher, what consequences, if any, does this change entail for a justification of her moral standards, principles, etc.? Moreover, should she implement her phi- losophical tools and expertise to take a stand on socio-political pro- blems? Philosophers in the third stage take up some of these chal- lenges. This philosophical pro- blem-solving is, however, more than a theoretical exercise.

Like in the second stage, a deeper transformation of the actors involved is sought by inducing relevant changes in the self-understanding of mainstream philosophy. Authors following the first path attempt to ascertain the conditions under which certain global epistemological and moral values can be meaningfully postulated. Authors following the second path direct their attention towards the way comparative thought relates, and resonates with, daily life. But should such a culture or mindset be undergirded by global values?

What makes a value a global value? Moreover, is the presumption that certain values are common to cultures which inter- mingle and overlap even tenable? Furthermore, how does one draw up a list of such values? In this regard, one may glean at least two different techniques from the relevant literature, although both agree that global values, indubitably, need to be found. One faction concentrates on the plausibility of certain values in the global context. Especially since the beginnings of colonialism, the standard philosophical under- standing had explicitly downplayed the occurrence of certain global values.

Contextual studies today, how- ever, showcase the faultiness of this assumption. This list can be supplemented with epistemological values like truth, reasonable belief, rational consensus, and knowledge. Taking a further step, one then comparatively reconstructs individual contexts in which these values can be said to be instantiated. As Amartya Sen warns: This technique, thus, presumes that people situated in different cultur- al contexts have their own conceptual resources to back up global va- lues; in some cases these values, in fact, even predate contact with An- glo-European traditions.

It assumes that comparative philosophers can facilitate the search for global values by digging out and presenting the global roots of values found across cultures. Furthermore, these philosophers should attend to the impact of individual traditions on this global intellectual culture. Going by his own work on the Chinese intellectual tradition, Ro- semont perceives civility, courtesy, reciprocity, respect, affection, hon- esty, etc. The values mentioned above come to play in all these roles, be it of a child, a parent, a sibling, a spouse, a friend, a colleague, etc.

Maffie besetting American social life Rosemont If authors like Sen and Ganeri attempt to demonstrate that values closely associated with the liberal tradition are also found in other non- Anglo European contexts, authors such as Rosemont, David Hall, and Roger Ames explicitly search for common global values in an attempt to realign the narrow framework of the liberal tradition. By reflecting on common values which could, irrespective of cultural boundaries, undergird human interaction, both of these techniques underscore the need for a viable theoretical engagement with, and exploration of, other philosophical traditions or alternatives.

Both presume that cross-cul- tural expertise and intercultural attitude qualify a comparative philo- sopher to take on a crucial role in this exercise. Admittedly, these techniques could lead to a different list of global values. More importantly for our purposes, however, is the following: Cultures are perceived as evolving entities, which adapt to situations and possess at least some powerful beliefs that are capable of convincing people, regardless of where the latter are located. Both capture, says Wong, diverse, evolving, changing processes between human beings, not all of whom at a given time possess unanimous views.

Like simultaneous and com- plex conversations between several people, cultures too are dynamic processes hosting a gamut of conflicting beliefs, norms, values, and practices. Neither do they form a coherent body, nor are they all neces- sarily accepted by all of their members Wong Boundaries between cultures simply become human constructs that can be sur- passed by those willing to engage in a conversation with hitherto new or changing partners. After further examination these values could possibly turn out to be viable alternatives for us, for example, although we may be located in other cultural traditions.

What then hinders us from adapting these alternatives to our own philosophical situation and testing their feasibility for us? Global values may serve as a foundation from which a philosophi- cal net may be cast to draw in other traditions along with their notions, concepts, ideas, etc.

Building a Better Bensalem

But why should the net be cast in this way? One argument would propound that global theories on justice, for exam- ple have far-reaching repercussions on the lives of third-parties in re- mote parts of the world. We do not live in secluded cocoons of our own. And if the institutions and policies of one country influence lives elsewhere, should not the voices of affected people elsewhere count in some way in determining what is just or unjust in the way a society is organized, typically with profound effects — direct or indirect — on people in other societies?

In other words, plural grounding would go a long way in enabling the agency of the hitherto marginalized. It would allow them to implement conceptual resources which, from their own perspective, are more appropriate in making sense of their subjective experience and in dealing with the world. A more solid grounding for these principles could, poten- tially, be found in traditions unfamiliar to us.

Only a cross-cultural engagement with another tradition can reveal whether the tradition under investigation is able to serve as an alternative resource for grounding these values and thus for enriching and transforming our lives. The values unearthed in this process, it is believed, need not necessarily lead to cultural homogeneity, but rather to a much-needed diversification, both in the values we consider to be global and in their grounding.

Remarkably, the search for a single overarching value is not pursued. Equally, this search is not considered to be the exclusive prerogative of the philoso- 32 Referring to indigenous populations, Rivera Cusicanqui writes They are given a resi- dual status that, in fact, converts them into minorities, ensnaring them in indigenist stereotypes of the noble savage and as guardians of nature. Lin, Rosemont and Ames Positions propounding global values seem to widen the confines of an intercultural space.

If members of different traditions not all of them being philosophers are said to pro- pound them too, it seems to be possible to work out an intercultural space globally, with these non-philosophers too. A Thematic Introduction pher. Given the complexity and ambivalence of human beings, the chances of finding an overriding single value on the global scale are relatively slim. It makes more sense to focus on overlapping values rather than collapsing all of them into one. With cross-cultural re- search, a comparative philosopher can help to reorder and reweigh the values found in a culture.

The search for global values, thus, can con- tribute to the debate on local values. The Responsibilities of a Comparative Philosopher Some philosophers in the third phase, however, strive for a stronger emphasis on the political dimension of comparative philosophizing. On account of cross-cultural expertise and intercultural orientation, the comparative philosopher is perceived as having a special commitment to adopting a critical and creative stand on socio-political problems which afflict modern societies.

Granting the plau- sibility of this position, how, one is tempted to ask, does she even begin to address the problems alluded to above? Is there one, or are there different, way s , different technique s , in which this responsibility can be met? Several techniques may be gleaned from the relevant literature.

This decolonizing is a multi-faceted process, beginning with a re-examination and rewriting of the history of philosophy and ending for the moment with an inclusion of marginalized traditions such as those of India and China as well as those which have previously been completely dismissed as non-philosophical those of Africa as well as of the indigenous peoples of the Americas, Australia, etc.

Maffie Robert Bernasconi makes extensive use of this technique in order to unmask social structures which continue to cast their long shadows on philosophizing, both in the local and in the global context. These strategies, both in their overt and covert forms, must be abandoned immediately: Bernasconi also pleads for a critical and contextual engagement with enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. As long as they last, further- more, a more just society free from racist institutions cannot be established.

In an attempt to forestall such tendencies, Bernasconi sets himself and other comparative philosophers three important tasks: By contextua- lizing key thinkers and their work, Bernasconi not only presents his case for a more critical view of the trite self-representation of Anglo- European philosophy, but he also demonstrates why intellectual des- cendants of these thinkers must adequately address and abandon the racial frameworks they once adopted.

These philosophers cannot be of philosophy, it is included in this third stage. A Thematic Introduction exonerated in any plausible way: Bernasconi advocates a critical en- gagement with the history of Anglo-European philosophy that creates the possibility of modifying the content and self-image of academic philosophy.

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This grunt work must be done so that Anglo-European academic philosophy is able to address a broader, more global audience than is the case today. This deafness considered the identity of the speak- er or writer to be completely irrelevant to philosophizing. Mainstream academic philosophy will have to openly admit and critically re-exam- ine how all hitherto philosophizing exploits the notion of the prephilo- sophical before seriously engaging with contemporary African philo- sophy.

Anglo-European philosophy must become aware of its own prephilosophical roots and acknowledge how this experience shapes philosophizing. This admission would go a long way in engaging with current African philosophy, which is grounded in the prephilosophical experience of racism and colonialism. A second, closely related technique concentrates on uncovering the locality of philosophical practices. Legacies and practices of self- understanding take place, it argues, within a highly complex socio-cul- tural matrix. Knowledge is produced within this framework by mediat- ing the results of such processes.

Thinkers involved in these knowl- edge-production processes, are, importantly, also actors in this matrix. They attribute certain understandings to others and assign them cer- 36 Cf. Maffie tain roles; the same happens to them in turn. The locality of philosophical knowledge-production processes also directs attention to the rupture between mainstream philosophy and societal practices. Currently, mainstream philosophy ascribes to its own activities a transcendental space above and beyond concrete social and cultural life.

In the words of Lucius Outlaw, Jr. But this self-description is not well- grounded. Philosophers have never been external, detached observers, but active participants involved in every step of the knowledge-produ- cing process, be it in producing, certifying or mediating knowledge. Enlightenment figures like Kant, Thomas Jefferson, Locke, and Benja- min Franklin, for example, abstracted from and idealized their own experiences, which were then generalized to other men and universa- lized as ideal characteristics of all human beings.

These particular char- acteristics were then simply, and thoroughly, expounded upon as cap- turing universal and essential features of all human beings. The Anglo-European philoso- phical tradition rests, as we see, on the experiences of a privileged few, who used their own particular experiences as a universal standard for humanity.

One paradoxical element of our peculiar form of ethnocentricity is the rejection of ethnocentrism. But we do not escape provincialism simply because we make naive claims to objectivity and universality. A Thematic Introduction inclusive and can yet critically recognize and appreciate the cultural practices and legacies of its members ibid.: Philosophical activity should be able to generate norms informing, and relating to, the life-worlds and agendas of the people whose life this activity seeks to capture.

A third technique can be said to build upon the other two. Today, this paralysis continues in new guises like prostration, in- visibility, a supposed lack of fertility and philosophical creativity, etc. This agenda would enable 38In his work, Outlaw focuses on one upshot of his analysis, namely the need to inte- grate Africana philosophy in American academia. These thoughts can be extended to other contexts too. Maffie them, from their own particular standpoints, to affirm their exploita- tion at the hands of global capitalism.

They are not taken seriously as thinkers about their own social reality; the existence thereof is, as mentioned above, simply denied by mainstream philoso- phy. Within the third phase, thus, at least two different paths can be discerned, which endeavor to transform the discipline of philosophy and the self-understanding of those involved. Proponents of the second path underscore the political dimension of comparative philosophizing. For them, philosophizing cannot be wholly truncated from the societies in which it takes place. The history of philosophy demonstrates the deep involvement of this field in other socio-political phenomena like colonialism and racism.

The need to grapple with the socio-political dimension of philosophy is evident, both in culturally pluralistic socie- ties and in a globally interconnected world. Today, the moral commit- ment which comparative philosophers avow also entails that they take a stand on acute socio-political problems. In both contexts, the inter- cultural attitude of a comparative philosopher and her awareness of the historicity, particularity, and culturality of the dominant mode of phi- losophizing, demand that her activity not be restricted to an explication of purely theoretical categories and principles.

In general, it can be stated that voices in the third phase of com- parative philosophy advance a contextual approach, which locates phi- losophical activity in a broader socio-cultural context. A Thematic Introduction blems. Moreover, armed with this approach, a comparative philosopher can relate these problems to those faced by members of her local, but also those of the global, community.

They must closely attend to the socio-cultural dimension of their own posi- tionality. If our observations are plausible, philosophers in the first stage optimistically believed that the philosophical ethos could by itself ensure fair procedural conditions; as a result, a comparative phi- losopher simply needed to attend to the techniques of comparison. Phi- losophers in the second stage have been more cautious. Holding fair procedural conditions as to be crucial to viable comparisons, they pro- pose that these conditions be explicated and strictly observed.

They endeavor to develop a morally bounded space, within which genuine philosophical explorations in comparative thought might be carried out. Their counterparts in the third stage share this cautiousness. Likewise, one delves into how the schemes of representation can be reclaimed by the marginalized. They seek to supplement the theoretical debate on comparative philosophy by demonstrating the necessity of its existential dimension. Building upon the locality of comparative philosophizing accentuated in the second phase, one now sets to examine how the global dimension works in philosophizing within a particular context.

More importantly, the power of this dominant tradition must be checked, because certain notions of humanity, human development, progress, etc. Maffie underlined in the second phase. It is imperative in their view that the discipline of philosophy be transformed. Such a transformation of phi- losophy is, however, a gargantuan task which needs to be tackled at various levels: Its self-representation must be modified, its history re- written and reinterpreted, its conceptual framework contextualized, its ideological power remedied.

In addition to a deconstruction of main- stream philosophy, the discipline has to be constructed anew. For this purpose, a more pluralistic understanding of philosophy is needed now, indeed one which has true global applicability. In this regard, tradition- ally excluded people — socially marginalized and colonized peoples, wo- men, ethnic minorities, etc.

When philosophy as a discipline is able to reflect upon its moorings in several cultural traditions, it will be more easily comprehended and related to by decent and informed human beings regardless of where they are located. Such a widening of perspective has at least one added benefit for philosophers within the dominant Anglo-European tradi- tion. A dialogue with other cultural traditions can increase the range of possibilities for any philosophical problem. In the process, feasible alternatives to philosophical problems about truth, knowledge, global justice, etc.

Nevertheless, comparative philosophers must attend more closely to the political dimension of their philosophizing than is currently the case. Today, comparative philosophy continues to be the privilege of better-situated males, often coming from traditions with relatively de- veloped traditions of comparative philosophy. The terrain occupied by comparative philosophy is apparently unequal, with some traditions taking up a higher ground than others.

In this respect, the field seems to parallel, and repeat, the pernicious developments of mainstream philosophy — which it seeks to counter and off-set in the first place. Butnor and McWeeney If our reconstruction is plausible, this demand can only be reiterated. A worthwhile compara- tive philosophy must lead to an opening up, a relating to, and an in- cluding of other social and cultural minorities, whose existence goes by and large unacknowledged up into the present day in a field that expli- citly tries to fight off its own marginalization.

As this ideational reconstruction of developments showcases, an evaluative critique of the agendas, modes, and practices of philosophiz- ing has been steadily developed since the beginning of the journal Phi- losophy East and West. Today, comparative philosophers endeavor to invoke and rejuvenate a wide variety of voices and standpoints from near and far, all of which focus on issues closely related to human ex- istence.

Their project, one could say, draws on recent developments and conceptual frameworks in academic philosophy. As our reconstruction indicates, these philosophers are found in diverse philosophical sub- disciplines. Despite their analytical, hermeneutic, phenomenological, transcendental, deconstructive, etc. Given their moral commitment and their awareness of the posi- tionality and embeddedness of all philosophizing, comparativists, how- ever, cannot by their own standards coherently take up a meta-perspec- tive on mainstream philosophizing.

As our thematic introduction indicates, ever since the inception of Philosophy East and West, philo- sophizing has been conceived of as an activity rooted in a particular socio-cultural context. If their own philosophizing is first and foremost to be understood as a critique of these activities, comparativists cannot be satisfied in carving out a niche for themselves and their like-minded colleagues, a niche which is walled off from mainstream thought.

But given the current state of affairs, it has to be stated that the bites of these gadflies go, by and large, unnoticed. Generally speaking, mainstream philosophers have not, as yet, seemed to fully comprehend the relevance of comparative philosophy to philosophy as a discipline. Maffie phy is neither encouraged nor rewarded; one result is that comparative philosophy continues to be sidelined in philosophical syllabi and pro- fessional publications.

This is where Confluence steps in. It will endeavor to take on philosophical issues in proper depth, so that cross-cultural philoso- phizing can be enabled. Simultaneously, it will seek to move out of the comfort zone of specialization and demonstrate the interdisciplinary relevance that comparative philosophizing can have. Due to the specific focus of these journals, however, broader concerns and issues pertaining to comparative research do not tend to get the space and attention that they deserve.

This state of affairs is not parti- cularly conducive to the development of comparative philosophy. Moreover, a philosopher, who is genuinely interested in keeping abreast of new developments in the field, first needs to invest time and energy in locating and excavating relevant work scattered in di- verse journals before engaging with it. Furthermore, unless comparati- vists are fortunate enough to find themselves in a country in which comparative research has been steadily on the rise, their opportunities to engage in a dialogue with like-minded colleagues is severely re- stricted.

Confluence aims to rectify such problems by providing such a space. We aim to bring together scholars working on concerns and issues pertinent to comparative philosophy and thus aid a dialogue across the geographical divide, and perhaps across those of culture, gender, and class.

We seek to initiate, assist, and nurture further methodic and methodological work. Journals like Journal of Comparative Philoso- phy, Philosophy East and West, Polylog, and Sophia have contributed substantially to improving the quality of comparative philosophizing in recent years. While supplementing this important work, Confluence aims to provide a forum for doing philosophy together.

A Thematic Introduction steadfast in its commitment to a broadly ecumenical approach to the nature and practice of philosophy itself as well as to the aims and meth- ods of doing philosophy.

We, the editors of this journal, will strive to place all philosophical traditions on an equal footing, without assigning a singular priority to the philosophical traditions with which we our- selves are familiar. We acknowledge the existence of alternative conceptions of the philosophical enterprise itself. Several philosophers engaged in com- parative philosophy, for example, have defended the existence of two alternative philosophical orientations: They argue that these two alternative ways of doing philosophy involve two clearly distinct constellations of notions of knowledge, thinking, belief, language, morality, philosophy, and in the end, how to live.

Philosophy is thus on this score pri- marily a theoretical endeavor aimed at truth. Path-oriented philoso- phies understand these notions in terms of finding, following, and creatively extending the path. Knowledge, reason, language, morality, etc. Philosophy, so understood, is creative and practical. Fully aware of our situatedness in concrete cultural and historical traditions, we will seek to provide a forum for previously under-explored or unexplored comparative perspectives on philosophi- cal thought and for lively debates on controversial issues.

A confluence must enable a steady moving back and forth between positions before philosophical streams of various bearings can emerge. In this regard, Confluence will provide space for research in which the moral commit- ment of the researcher alluded to above is clear. Our journal empha- sizes the spirit of philosophical inquiry which we deem vital to com- parative thought: Only such an attitude can guarantee the critical research we seek to develop and nurture. Maffie sentation — if not complete absence — of minorities, be they women, non-Anglo European ethnicities, disadvantaged classes, indigenous peoples who remain under the yoke of internal colonialism , people from the global South as well as their descendants in diaspora, and displaced peoples.

It is incumbent upon supporters of comparative phi- losophy to broaden the demographic scope of our conversation, so as to replace silence here with the voices of the aforementioned. As we see matters, the aims of comparative philosophy are as var- ied as its practitioners. And yet, comparative philosophy performs both negative and po- sitive functions with regard to mainstream philosophizing.

A Thematic Introduction a niche completely isolated from the debates prevalent in mainstream philosophy. We will need to pursue philosophy in such a manner that constructive ways of initiating changes in the prevalent ways of doing philosophy emerge. Confrontations, however effective they may seem from a short-term perspective, will be unable to initiate long-term modifications in philosophical self- understandings. In this regard, however, our journal does not restrict itself to car- ving out and establishing an intercultural space with fellow philoso- pher-colleagues alone.

It also seeks to bring in voices beyond the boundaries of our discipline that could be pertinent to the development of comparative philosophy. Epistemai of the world also include local and alternative ways of classifying the world, as the systems of tradi- tional medicine testify. These ways, which are reflected in diverse reli- gious and cultural practices, are commonly not acknowledged as legit- imate forms of knowledge — unless they are restructured scientifically, as well as philosophically.

Confluence seeks to make these voices heard too, thus helping retain and sustain the link from the past to the future. These practices are philosophically significant, as they compel one to ask: And if so, how? Does a meaningful comparison necessitate a methodological constraint on reason and rationality? Our journal would like to create a liberal atmosphere unhindered by disci- plinary constraints. We realize that cultural and philosophical explora- tions, like disciplines, have their own boundaries; and yet one needs to transcend them through mutual conversation in order to make pro- gress.

Like a confluence of two rivers, whose actual territory is often hard to pinpoint with the bare eye, we would like to intensify, complexify, and transform the ideas and perspectives prevalent in philosophy today. Confluence endeavors to serve as a juncture where specific philo- sophical issues of global interest may be explored in an imaginative, 40 Solomon and Higgins Maffie thought-provoking, and pioneering way.

Instead of privileging a single philosophical approach to comparative philosophical thought, it expli- citly tries to provide a platform for diverse philosophical perspectives. This approach, we believe, will open up room to highlight both the similarities of the philosophical enterprise in different philosophical traditions and the differences be- tween them.

Philosophical reflection and analysis could overcome lim- itations that different cultures impose from within. In the past, area studies have initiated many crucial developments in comparative thought. However, many pressing phi- losophical problems some of which were touched upon in the first section call for a geographically broader scope of inquiry. They also indicate the need for comparative inquiry which does not fear to tread new pathways. For this reason, Confluence will encourage hitherto un- tried or relatively uncommon comparisons between traditions, such as between non-Anglo European traditions.

In light of current research, we tend to be skeptical about the de- velopment of a single coherent body called global philosophy, which seeks to develop one coherent and systematic conceptual apparatus to be implemented on the global scale. Such a philosophy can only operate with high-flying, abstract observations.

In all probability, the proto- types constructed on the basis of these observations will be out-of-sync with developments on the ground. Attempts to weave together a seam- less body of thought, which can integrate the important insights of all relevant world-views, are bound to face at least some of the problems described in these pages. For example, what feasible standpoint exists that might enable a philosopher to sift through insights, isolating and universalizing those most relevant?

How does she ascertain that the voices of the other are not simply assimilated into her own position? The project of comparative philosophy can be best nurtured by creating room for, and actively maintaining, a plurality of theoretical perspectives. A Thematic Introduction gruent and incompatible ways of dealing with philosophical problems. Nevertheless, like some authors mentioned above, we too believe that philosophy must be made more comprehensive globally. A critical re- view of the history of philosophy indicates that a single, monolithic, and uniform conceptual framework fails to capture the plurality of phi- losophical traditions we find today.

The development of diverse concep- tual frameworks, in turn, is a task which merits adequate attention, care, and a moral commitment that can guarantee judicious research. We hope that the contributions featured in Confluence will, like the epigram of this introduction, be fruitful and rich in this regard. Cambridge University Press, State Univer- sity of New York Press, b, pp. Allen, The Sacred Hoop: New Essays in Compara- tive Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, , pp.

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