Jewish Identities in Postcommunist Russia and Ukraine

The substantial Chechen communities are much more visible in Russian population centers, like Moscow or Ukraine and are a more convenient, immediate adversary for expressing xenophobic sentiment. An overwhelming number of the blue collar work in Moscow is done by migrants from Soviet republics of the former Soviet Union. Jews became much less attractive as an address for this xenophobia. To this, one can add that the current political situation is much more imperative for Russian society than looking for an internal enemy. At the moment, there are quite a number of so-called external enemies—that is, the West.

Russia is attempting to return to the status of superpower under the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Propaganda, public discourse and public opinion have a noted anti-western, especially anti-American accent. With this external enemy, there is no need for an internal enemy.

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Official government policy— if not pro-semitic, is not antisemitic. Public opinion has seen quite a number of representable Jews, or court Jews, in his inner circle. The government does not appear interested in making Jews the enemy when real enemies exist outside the country. Ukraine has its own external enemy— imperial Russia.

Ukrainians believe that the current situation in Ukraine is inspired by renewed Russian imperialism.

Jewish Identities in Postcommunist Russia and Ukraine : Zvi Gitelman :

Society needs all ethnic and religious groups in this war against imperialist aspirations and interests of Moscow, including Jews. Thus, Ukrainians do not perceive the Jews to be an enemy. The third reason for the lack of official antisemitism stems from the fact that Russia is not afflicted with left wing European intellectual antisemitism, despite intellectual influence from the West.

• La colonie du diable (French Edition).
• Jewish Identities in Postcommunist Russia and Ukraine : An Uncertain Ethnicity?
• Die Dinge (German Edition).
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• An Uncertain Ethnicity!
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Contrary to the European left wing or radical left, Russian intelligentsia is generally not antisemitic. These Muslims are much more ethnic than religious. For this group, antisemitism is not as important as one would expect especially in comparison to what one sees in Central and Western Europe. Many of these groups have not adopted the anti-Zionist, anti-Israel sentiment apparent within the Muslim communities in Europe and in the Middle East. Indeed, last year a Muslim cleric was convicted of antisemitic propaganda for the first time.

Though this never occurred in the s, it is more of a trend today. The government was not interested in this issue until it crossed the red line. In some autonomous Muslim areas, such as in the Volga region, this is a more pronounced, imported antisemitism from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. The government considers this a challenge and threat to stability. Media antisemitism today is especially apparent in the new forms of the social media where antisemitic propaganda and incitement towards Jews is quite substantial.

These incorporate the promotion of negative public Jewish stereotypes, such as dual loyalty and Holocaust revisionism which is a new phenomenon given that the former Soviet government rejected a specifically Jewish character to this tragedy. Although the Kremlin is not antisemitic the local government and authorities are quite ready to play this card. Indeed, there exist antisemitic radical left movements trying to play this Jewish card in order to blackmail political enemies. There are widespread identified antisemitic stereotypes which still exist.

Many still believe, for example, that Jews rule the world. In conclusion, a decrease of state antisemitism and antisemitic violence does not mean that societal antisemitism has disappeared.

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Jewish Identities in Postcommunist Russia and Ukraine

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Many think Jews can believe in Christianity and do not condemn marrying non-Jews. This complicates their connections with other Jews, resettlement in Israel, the United States and Germany, and the rebuilding of public Jewish life in Russia and Ukraine. Post-Communist Jews, especially the young, are transforming religious-based practices into ethnic traditions and increasingly manifesting their Jewishness in public.

Ethnicity and identity 2. The evolution of Jewish identities 3. Soviet policies and the Jewish nationality 4. Constructing Jewishness in Russia and Ukraine 5. Anti-Semitism and Jewish identity 9.

Identity, Israel, and immigration Ethnicity and marriage Polities, affect, affiliation, and alienation Gitelman is a summa cum laude graduate of Columbia University where he also received his doctorate. He is the author or editor of 14 books and more than articles in scholarly journals. His book A Century of Ambivalence: His most recent edited volume is Ethnicity or Religion?