Descriptive Psychology (International Library of Philosophy)

It used to be this later interval which proved to be so vital within the paintings of his pupil Husserl. Muller has additional a concise advent which locations Brentano's paintings in the old context of philosophy and psychology. Muller additionally locates Brentano's impression on modern thinkers corresponding to Husserl, Meinoning, Bertrand Russel and the complete Polish tuition of philosophy.

Till lately, philosophers tended to be suspicious of the concept that of want. David Wiggins, Gillian Brock and John O'Neill suggest treatments for a few blunders made in ignoring or marginalising desire, for instance in need-free theories of rationality or justice. Download PDF by E. Concerns coated during this quantity comprise: The Very proposal of association provides a philosophical account of the phenomenon of association.

Simons , p. See, for example, J. Boring , p. Wollheim, Sigmund Freud, New York: Viking Press , pp. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 3rd ed. Three different lecture manuscripts have been preserved. The first of these was given in —8 and was entitled Deskriptive Psychologie. The third, entitled simply Psychognosie, was given in —1. The main text of the present book is taken from the lecture of —1.

The following material is added in the appendices: But the lectures of —1, which constitute our main text, are concerned with the nature of descriptive psychology as such and with the formulation of a doctrine of psychological categories.

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In , Brentano published the following statement about the nature of descriptive psychology: Meiner unaltered reprint Hamburg: Meiner , [Engl. Meiner , 2nd ed. Meiner unaltered reprint with new introduction by F. Sensory and Noetic Consciousness, L. Meiner ; Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie, 2nd ed.

Chisholm and Reinhard Fabian eds , Hamburg: The one shows all the final psychical constituents from the combination of which arises the totality of psychical phenomena, in the same way as the totality of words arises from letters.

Its implementation could serve as basis for a characteristica universalis as envisaged by Leibniz and, before him, Descartes. The other one teaches us about the laws according to which phenomena come and disappear. Given that, due to the undeniable dependency of the psychical functions on the processes in the nervous system, the conditions are to a large extent physiological, one can see here how psychological investigations must intertwine with physiological ones.

It might more likely be suspected that psychognosy could completely disregard anything physiological and thus dispense with all instrumental auxiliary means. Yet already the mentioned analysis of experiences, be it in the domain of hearing, be it in the domain of vision or even in the one of the primitive sensory phenomena a domain where it has thus far been carried out with extreme imperfection , can only achieve its most essential successes by means of cleverly conceived instrumental auxiliary means; and this [sort of] work is psychognostic.

For he does not hesitate to say that psychical acts are parts of human consciousness. But the second statement would seem to relate two things — a rose and a red-thing. What, then, is the relation between the two things? Brentano explicates it by reference to part and whole. He says that, if we can correctly say of a rose that it is a red thing, then a rose and a red-thing are both parts of the same thing.

In this case, too, we are relating concrete things. And once again, according to Brentano, we are dealing with the part-whole relation. The person — or the self — is an ultimate unified substance [eine letzte einheitliche Substanz] which may be a part of that accident which is a seeing-thing. But the self has no parts. Hence the parts of consciousness must not be identified with the parts of the self or the soul. Normally, we think of parts as exemplifying actual separability or detachability [Abtrennbarkeit].

Actual separability is illustrated by the parts of a physical thing. One may distinguish, say, the left and right halves of a table-top: Separable parts are exemplified in consciousness by seeing and hearing, or by remembering and desiring: Brentano puts this fact by saying that the thinking-thing [der Denkende] may continue to exist after any of these parts is separated from it. Brentano also distinguishes between mutual [gegenseitige] and one-sided separability.

This distinction is of fundamental importance to his theory of the self and his theory of substance. Consider a person who is both seeing and hearing. The seeing and the hearing are related by mutual separability: In this respect the seeing and the hearing — the seeing-thing and the hearing-thing — are like the two halves of the table-top: One-sided separability is illustrated by the relation of the thinker to the see-er.

It is also illustrated by the relation between experiencing [Empfinden] and noticing [Bemerken], and by the relation between presenting [Vorstellen] and desiring [Begehren]. The first member of each pair can exist without the second, but the second cannot exist without the first. Brentano says that psychical acts may be identified with the separable parts of consciousness.

Such parts, one could say, are distinguishable in thought but not in reality. The objects of sensation provide us with examples of such parts. The pervading parts of this act of judgment are its affirmative quality, its being directed [Gerichtetsein] at the object truth, its evidence, and its apodeictic modality. Let us now consider the general conception of consciousness that Brentano had accepted in —1. The Intentional Relation Every psychical act is intentional in that it is directed upon an object.

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The doctrine of intentionality that is set forth in the present lectures is essentially that of the first edition of the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint It is a non-real correlate of the thinking that has it as its object. A person who is being thought [ein gedachter Mensch] is as little something real as a person who has ceased to be [gewesener Mensch].

The person who is being thought hence has no proper cause and cannot properly have an effect. But when the act of consciousness the thinking of the person 31 p. According to this final view, there are no insubstantial entities; everything is an ens reale. Every psychical act involves the presentation of an object. The objects of presentations are normally restricted to individual things or entia realia e.

But in the present lectures, Brentano holds that certain non-things [Undinge] for example, truth as well as certain immanent objects may be objects of presenting. Judgment is a matter of accepting or rejecting an object of a presentation. Since every judgment is either an acceptance or a rejection, judgments are always either affirmative or negative.

And since the object of a judgment is the same as the object of the presentation that underlies the judgment, the object of judgment may be an individual thing or ens reale. For example, if a person believes that there are horses, then horse constitutes the object of an affirmative judgment; the object is not a non-thing designated by some 33 34 35 36 p.

See, for example, p. See Wahrheit und Evident, Hamburg: Meiner ; and Die Ahkehr vom Nichtrealen, Hamburg: There are different modes of judgment. In particular, one may distinguish judgments that are assertoric from judgments that are apodeictic. For example, if a person can be said to judge that round squares are impossible, then he apodeictically rejects round squares.

Emotive phenomena are thus like judgment in being either positive or negative. And they are like judgment in presupposing presentations: Loving and hating are therefore like judgment in being superposed acts, for they are necessarily such that they presuppose another act. And every object of inner perception can be an object of an evident judgment. If I am thinking about a mountain, then I can judge with evidence — and therefore with truth — that I am thinking about a mountain.

And it is often emotive — involving a love or hate of the object. The objects of sensation are individual things. They exist as insubstantial correlates of experience. Experiencing is something real; the object of experiencing is something non-real. The object of his fears is a certain individual. But this individual does not exist. Hence, given his final view about the existence of sensory content, he can say that, from the fact that I see a patch of colour or hear a certain note, it does not follow that the patch of colour or the note exists. Every sense-object has both spatial and qualitative determinations.

Brentano also puts this point by saying that every sense-object involves 39 40 41 p. Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie, 2nd ed. Marty in his The True and the Evident, R. He discussed the issues between nativism and empiricism in much greater detail in his —9 lectures on Descriptive Psychology.

There are, according to Brentano, three simple or elementary chromatic colours red, blue and yellow and two simple or elementary non-chromatic colours black and white. All other colours are compounds of elementary colours.

Brentano describes the nature of the relevant compounding in terms of the nature of sensible space. Analogous considerations hold of the other senses. Thus, in the case of hearing, colouredness is exhibited in pitch. And in the case of the other senses, it is exhibited in flavour and odour. The second component [Moment] of quality is the distinction between lightness [Helligkeit] and darkness [Dunkelheit]. Unlike other psychologists of sensation, Brentano does not restrict this distinction to the visual sense.

It has an analogue for the sense of hearing compare the distinction between high and low. Proteraesthesis Are temporal dimensions presented in a way that is analogous to the presentation of spatial dimensions?

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In his —8 lectures, he introduced his discussion of this doctrine with the following remarks: When I spoke of the content of experience, you presumably all understood, more or less, what I meant: Indeed, the expression does not appear in any manual or textbook of psychology. And, it seems to me that the fact to which it refers is itself not apprehended and interpreted in anything 42 His views are very similar to those of C. I myself have never published anything about it, which is why the doctrine is [only] taught orally from certain chairs held by students of mine.

The source of our concept of time, according to Brentano, is this experience of proteraesthesis or original association. But it is a phenomenon that accompanies every sensation. Examples are the hearing of a melody, the seeing of something in motion and the seeing of something at rest. In each case, we experience a succession [ein Nacheinander]: The experience of any such succession involves what might be called, somewhat misleadingly, an experience of the past [Verg angenheitsempfindung].

The duration of such a proteraesthesis is very brief. Yet, brief as such experiences are, they enable us to acquire the concepts of past, present and future, the concepts of before and after, and the concept of a temporal continuum extending indefinitely in two directions. Thus Brentano writes in the present lectures: Everything else, including the future, arises from this in an unintuitive manner. Some have said that the field of consciousness is temporally extended in the way in which, say, the visual field may be said to be spatially extended. According to this view, just as a red spot can be at the left side of the visual field and a blue spot at the right, so, too, the note c can be in the present part of the sensory field while b is in 43 44 45 Concerning the relationship of the concepts of proterosis and proteraesthesis see pp.

But does it make sense to say of the note b that it is past? If b is no longer in the present, we cannot say that it is in a part that is past. If we take tense seriously, as Brentano does, we cannot say of the field of consciousness or of the objects of sensation that they now have a temporal extension. Yet nothing has the attribute of being past.

If anything has a given attribute, then that thing exists now and cannot be said merely to exist in the past. Brentano speaks of that peculiar modification through which what presented itself earlier as being present is seen and judged to be past. What, then, is a modifying attribute? Brentano puts this point by saying that everything exists as a temporal boundary. Croom Helm, , p. Appendix XIV and pp. Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewusstsein, p.

Reisland ; this work originally appeared in English Studies 62 and 63 Tone is contained in past tone not properly but modifyingly […]. Thus, where the secondary object of the sensation is a present sensation, the primary object of the proteraesthesis is a past sensation. This means that the primary object of the proteraesthesis is a modified intentional relation — an intentional relation that is past.

The modifying attribute of pastness was thought to be quantitative and capable of degrees. Brentano was subsequently to reject this view, according to which proteraesthesis always involves a modifying attribute, and to replace it by a conception of temporal modes of consciousness. Kirchberg am Wechsel 1 September Roderick M. IX , pp. Husserl, Gesammelte Werke — Husserliana, Vol. The first is the subject matter of psychognosy, the second that of genetic psychology.

The difference between the two disciplines is fundamental. It manifests itself, in particular, in two essential relationships: Both [of these points] can be set forth in a few words. I am saying that only psychognosy is to be called pure psychology. The meaning and the correctness of this [statement] may be shown by the following brief reflection. The occurrence of both human consciousness and its different phenomena is, according to experience, tied to certain physiological events, which we have learnt to understand as physico-chemical processes.

It teaches nothing about the causes that give rise to human consciousness and which are responsible for the fact that a specific phenomenon does occur now, or does not occur now or disappears. Its aim is nothing other than to provide us with a general conception of the entire realm of human consciousness. It does this by listing fully the basic components out of which everything internally perceived by humans is composed, and by enumerating the ways in which these components can be connected.

Psychognosy will therefore, even in its highest state of perfection, never mention a physico-chemical process in any of its doctrines [Lehrsatz]. For, correct as it is to say that such processes are preconditions for consciousness, one must resolutely contradict the person who, out of a confusion of thought, claims that our consciousness in itself is to be seen as a physico-chemical event, that it itself is composed out of chemical elements.

Chemical elements are substances [Stoffe] which, by themselves, are unintuitive [unanschaulich], and which can only be characterized in relative terms by considering manifold direct and indirect effects on our consciousness. The elements of inner life, i.

In enumerating them, psychognosy can therefore leave out any reference to the physiological, the physico-chemical realm. And the same evidently applies to the ways of connecting the elements of consciousness. These connections are as alien to those mentioned in chemistry, as the elements of consciousness are to chemical items. Psychognosy is in this sense pure psychology and as such essentially different from genetic psychology. I have emphasized yet another important difference.

What do I mean by this? What is to be understood by an exact science, as opposed to an inexact one? There has sometimes been talk of exact science as opposed to a socalled speculative science. The latter name was used, in particular, to honour the bold constructs of certain men, who admired a recent past as a marvel of philosophical genius. I would be gravely misunderstood if, in our case, one were to think of this distinction.

My distinction is completely different. There are sciences which can formulate their doctrines sharply and precisely. Others are forced to content themselves with undetermined and vague formulae. But he says that this is always and without exception the case. Likewise, in mechanics, the law of inertia and so many other postulates and doctrines are formulated in a sharp and exact manner.

In contrast, we have, e. Meteorology is not capable of determining fully and taking into account the factors influencing meteorological events. Meteorological results thus often vary within wide margins. They might still show some gaps here and there — after all, the same holds in the case of mathematics. Nevertheless, psychognostic doctrines do allow and [indeed] do demand a precise formulation: Genetic psychology is different. The laws of Becoming [Gesetze des Werdens] which it postulates are not strictly valid.

They are subject to a more or less frequent occurrence of exceptions. The same character can also quite clearly be attributed to the laws of psychical Becoming which have been formulated without giving the physiological preconditions, like, e. Some have talked, in this context, of a law of similarity and again of a law of continuity, according to which one thought revives [wieder erwecken] another. The reason for this is that the most immediate preconditions for the return of thoughts are not, or, in any case, not exhaustively, identified in these laws.

More hopeful, with respect to full exactness, are those claims of genetic psychology in which physiological preconditions are given. The lack of exactness will thus inevitably continue to exist. Stimulation of a retinal part by a light-ray of a certain frequency induces the phenomenon of blue. And who could claim that there are no other disturbances which bring about exceptions by creating an anomaly in the most immediate physiological preconditions, given that our examples make use only of the more distant of these preconditions.

The necessary inexactness of genetic psychology could likewise be demonstrated by using any other doctrines which it puts forward. To conclude, you now understand sufficiently the two differences, which — as I said — give an essentially different character to the doctrines of psychognosy and to those of genetic psychology, a insofar as the one is pure psychology, and the other psychophysical, b insofar as the claims of the one are exact, while those of the other [are not, and] presumably never will acquire the character of exactness.

We have thus divided psychology into psychognosy and genetic psychology. And we have clarified the meaning of this separation by pointing at two essential differences between these disciplines: The division of the two disciplines will also be beneficial to the progress of psychological research, particularly if their natural order becomes clear.

In this, four fundamental rules for research are put forward. Two of them have no other purpose than to recommend [on the one hand] the necessary division of difficulties and [on the other] that the individual difficulties are to be dealt with in an order which is fixed and, as far as possible, outlined by nature. Instead of dividing psychognostic questions from questions pertaining to genetic psychology, psychologists, up to the present day, usually mix these questions in manifold ways. And this grave contravention of the Method presumably contributed decisively to slowing down, or indeed completely frustrating, progress in psychology.

Having divided the disciplines, it will be clear without much reflection what their natural order is. Psychognosy is prior in the natural order. All the same, this is not to say that psychogenetic knowledge could not become useful at some point in psychognostic research. On the contrary, one will very often be able to draw support from such knowledge. Let us look, e. What an impediment to the psychognosy of the senses it would be, if the psychognost did not use them [the laws of genetic psychology] to call up the sensation to be analysed.

In order to notice certain peculiar characteristics of a phenomenon, it is very important to compare it to other phenomena that are in certain ways similar, in other ways dissimilar to it. Hence one must try to present to oneself such phenomena together with each other or in rapid succession. One must let these phenomena vary by experimenting psychognostically.

It is evident that in doing so, knowledge of genetic psychology is used to a greater or lesser extent. Namely the use of resonators, tuned to specific tones: In following this experiment, one could admittedly still doubt whether the tone-phenomenon in question really contained the overtones, or whether it is to be regarded only as the effect of the simultaneous influence of different soundwaves, each of which would separately have brought about one of those tones.

The genetic experiment gave rise to the right hypothesis, and this was in this case, as so often, essential in facilitating the discovery of the truth. If there is hope for such a classification, then it is only by using genetic laws. The more the analogy is grounded in related points, the more plausibly can we trust its guidance. Any knowledge of a related factor [Moment], even if it does not belong to the domain of psychology, will be of value in this context.

I mention this only briefly, for it would be premature, at this stage, to conduct a thorough investigation of whether and how genetic psychology can help in overcoming the very awkward problems arising in this context. The assistance in other domains might be less extensive, but certainly not negligible. For example, the arousal or the retaining of a sensory phenomenon not only serves in its observation, but also in observing other phenomena, which occur in regular correlation with this phenomenon.

And furthermore, it will be of extremely wide-ranging importance for psychognostic investigations to take into account those genetic laws concerning the conditions under which we are tempted to deceive ourselves about our inner phenomena. We take what is equal [Gleiches] for unequal, what is unequal for equal, plurality for unity e. Even though much more ought still to be added, let these remarks be sufficient to substantiate our claim that in many cases psychognosy uses the knowledge of genetic psychology advantageously.

All the same, no matter how high one values these services, the services which psychognosy provides to genetic psychology are incomparably more valuable. As mentioned before, a genetic psychologist without psychognostic knowledge is like a physiologist without anatomical knowledge. Even so, one often finds researchers who dare to approach genetic psychological investigations in a pitiful ignorance of psychognosy, which, in turn, has the effect that all their efforts are in vain.

Others occupy themselves with the genesis of error and delusion [Wahn]. But they are in no way clear about what a judgment, what the evidence for a judgment and what a conclusion and its plausibility [einleuchtende Folgerichtigkeit] are. And, in misjudging the essential peculiarities of the normal states of affairs, they can delude themselves into thinking that these normal states, and the deviations from them, are sufficiently understood in their genetic laws, even though they have not touched the most basic differences between the normal and the deviant states of affairs at all.

The perfection of psychognosy will hence be one of the most essential steps in preparation for a genuinely scientific genetic psychology. We divided psychology into psychognosy and genetic psychology, and briefly analysed both terms. On the basis of this analysis we were able to determine the natural order between the two disciplines. It came to light that, in this natural order, psychognosy precedes genetic psychology.

It cannot be doubted that, in a multitude of cases, progress in psychognosy is aided by genetic psychological knowledge. Our conceptual analysis was thus sufficient to arrive at this important conclusion. However, for it to be satisfactory in all other respects, certain additional clarifications may be necessary. We said that psychognosy aims to determine the elements of human consciousness and the ways in which they are connected. This implies that consciousness is something which consists of a multitude of parts.

This seems to contradict the old teaching that the soul is something strictly uniform and completely simple. Admittedly, we are by no means the first ones to deny this. David HUME already contested this claim as being contrary to the clearest and most immediate experience.

But of himself, and of everybody else with the exception of this species of metaphysician , he says that he is convinced of their being nothing but a bundle of different ideas [Vorstellungen] which succeed one another with unspeakable speed, and which are in constant flux and uninterrupted motion. In the case of human consciousness it is out of the question that there is something of this sort, or even just something analogous to it. This has already many times been demonstrated most rigourously.

Here, I shall restrict my demonstration to a few remarks. To claim that our present consciousness does not belong to one thing, but that it is distributed across a multitude of things, means that it does not fully consist in a real thing [in einem Realen] or in a collective of real things. This, however, is completely inconceivable. In looking at a picture, I have a presentation [Vorstellung] phenomenon of different colours. For, which [would be] a noticing [ein Bemerken] of the order? I see and hear and recognize the difference.

I draw a conclusion. I think something and want something. I desire something for its own sake, and something else as a means. Our consciousness does not present itself to our inner perception as something simple, but it shows itself as being composed of many parts. Unity of reality is something different from simplicity of reality.

Yet, even though these parts never occur side by side like the parts of a spatial continuum, many amongst them can in some way be actually separated from one another like the parts of a spatial continuum. The sense in which one of these parts can be actually separated from another one is that the former, having existed earlier as belonging to the same real unit [reale Einheit] as the latter, continues to exist when the latter has ceased to be.

There is therefore no doubt: Again, within these parts one may be able to distinguish parts which are actually separable from one another, until one reaches parts where such a one- or two-sided separation can no longer take place. These parts could be called the elements of human consciousness. However, even these ultimate actually separable parts, in some sense, can be said to have further parts.

Someone who believes in atoms believes in corpuscles which cannot be dissolved into smaller bodies. But even so he can speak of halfs, quarters, etc. To differentiate these from others, we may refer to them as distinctional [distinktionelle] parts. And, since distinguishing goes beyond actual separability, one could speak of parts or elements of elements. Nevertheless, it [human consciousness] is undoubted composed of many parts, some of which, like seeing-hearing, are mutually separable, others [of which], like the seeing and the noticing of what is seen, are at least one-sidedly separable.

We found that often these parts themselves have parts which similarly can be actually separated from one another. But we said that it is possible to speak in some sense of further partitions [Teilungen] even in the case of these ultimate actually separable parts. These partitions would be found, not through actual separation, but through distinction. I called them distinctional parts, in contrast to the actually separable ones.

Thus, here we have again, in a certain sense, parts of the elements. And as in the case of parts, so one may ultimately speak without contradiction of elements of elements namely of the last merely distinctional parts of the last separable parts.

This too requires some elucidation, because the sort of distinctional parts exemplified if there are atoms by the upper and lower half, or by the four quarters of an atom, cannot be distinguished [in the context of] consciousness. After all, consciousness does not appear [in a] spatially extended [manner]. But the fact that there are no merely distinctional spatial parts does not exclude [the possibility of] there being any distinctional parts, in the same way in which the circumstance that there are no spatially separable parts did not exclude that there are other separable parts.

The simplest way, for the time being, to show you how this is conceivable is I believe to use a fictitious example. Man has the innate tendency to trust his senses. He believes in the actual existence of colours, tones and whatever else may be contained in a sensory presentation. After all, this is why one has spoken of outer perception, which, in its reliability, was placed side by side with the inner kind. The experienced and, in particular, the scientifically enlightened [person] no longer has this trust. What would be the parts which this reality would reveal itself to be composed of?

Well, it would primarily reveal itself as being composed of spatial parts, which consequently, at least in many cases, may be separable from one another. Let us assume that in the space embraced by intuition [im durch die Anschauung umfassten Raume] we were to find two blue spots, a grey spot and a yellow one. The two blue spots would be different from one another, and each one of them would be different from the yellow one.

We say that between the two blue ones there is a spatial difference, while between the blue and the yellow ones there is a spatial difference and a qualitative difference. Thus, in the latter case there are two differences, while in the former there is, apart from a relation of difference, also a relation of agreement. Concerning the blue spot, we will hence have to differentiate two things: In the blue spot one must therefore distinguish a particularity of colour and a particularity of place [Besonderheit des Orts].

These particularities are thus actually contained in it, [they] are distinctional parts of them. Let us go on! Comparing the grey spot, on the one hand, with the yellow one and, on the other, with a blue one, we will in both cases find the double difference which we noticed between the blue and the yellow spot, [namely] the spatial [difference] and the qualitative one.

If we have one of the lighter shades of grey before us, it may happen that we find a difference between this grey and the blue which we are unable to discover between the grey and the yellow, and which we call a difference of lightness. As concerns lightness, we equate the given shade of grey with this yellow, whereas we say that it differs in lightness from the given blue.



So we would have a third thing [ein drittes] which could be distinguished in each of the three spots, and which would have to be referred to as a distinctional part of it: Someone might say at this point: It hence loses its given spatial particulatrity, while its qualitative particularity stays unchanged. This remark is erroneous. However, if the reflections up to now are new to you, you must be very careful to realize clearly the incorrectness of the claim. If we have two spots before us which agree in lightness, in quality and maybe in other parts, and which differ only spatially, then they will appear as two, regardless of the manifold agreement.

And, in fact, we do not only talk of two spatial determinations, but also of two individually different qualities [and] of two individually different lightnesses. Indeed, if it were individually, i. The spatial difference therefore individuates the otherwise identical spots. What is the consequence if only the spatial particularity is changed? Can the same individual blue-thing still continue to exist? Descriptive Psychology International Library of Philosophy. Set up a giveaway.

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