Bolzanos Theoretical Philosophy: An Introduction (History of Analytic Philosophy)

Dummett was not the only philosopher who held that the development of semantic theory was the key to dealing with a whole host of problems in the philosophy of language and mind. In a series of papers from the late s, Davidson had advocated a similar programme. In his introduction to Frege: The controversy over the interpretation of Frege brought to a head the growing sense, even within the analytic tradition, of the impoverished understanding that analytic philosophers had of their own history and of historiographical issues.

This had encouraged more detailed investigation of the historical development of science, and deeper reflection about methodology, led, most notably, by Lakatos, whose work was published in the s. Part I contains historiographical essays and Part II case-studies, including three in history of analytic philosophy: In his own contribution to Part I Rorty distinguishes and discusses four genres in the historiography of philosophy: His own Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature clearly falls into this category.

Geistesgeschichte play a central role in canon-formation, unlike doxography, which takes a canon for granted. Doxography, as Rorty conceives it, is based on the assumption that philosophical positions are eternally given, implying p. Rational reconstructions and Geistesgeschichte inevitably prompt historical reconstruction, where antiquarian impulses seek to correct the distortions that the former involve.

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Sometimes this results in very detailed studies where antiquarianism rules; but it usually inspires accounts that combine rational and historical reconstruction in more satisfying ways. This is exactly what happened in the history of analytic philosophy—or the history of the historiography of analytic philosophy. At the beginning of the s a wealth of works appeared that marked the beginning of history of analytic philosophy as a recognized subfield of philosophy. Uebel also published a monograph on logical positivism , elucidating the internal debates within the Vienna Circle.

Simons brought out a collection of essays on the Central European tradition in analytic philosophy Dummett made two further important contributions: Two years later he also published Origins of Analytical Philosophy a , goaded by the Zeitgeist, but bizarrely, discussing only Frege and Husserl. These books transformed the landscape of analytic philosophy. In general, however, standards of historical scholarship in history of analytic philosophy have not yet reached the level that they are in history of ancient Greek philosophy and early modern philosophy.

Rational reconstructions are still offered that have not learnt from the historical studies that are now available. It is all too easy to take a canon for granted and ignore broader questions of context and connection, questions that are essential to address in developing awareness of the contingency and negotiability of canons.

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In his discussion of historiography, Rorty criticizes doxography for its complacency about canon-formation. But he stresses how the other three genres complement one another. A more tolerant attitude is to recognize the diversity of approaches and encourage that diversity in the hope that the balance will be achieved over time in the ongoing and self-correcting work of the academic community as a whole. In both cases, too, the interaction between history of analytic philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy is stressed, an interaction that is seen as mutually beneficial.

The present Oxford Handbook draws on and deepens the historical turn that has taken place in analytic philosophy, and the range of contributions from leading scholars that it contains testifies to the richness and significance of the work that is now being done in the field. The historical turn in analytic philosophy has given fresh impetus and added relevance to the debates about the relationship between philosophy and history of philosophy that have taken place since the emergence of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers are now more aware that their rational reconstructions are contested, that interpretations of the views even of their own immediate predecessors cannot be taken for granted, that their own concepts, doctrines, positions, and problems have a history, that their assumptions have a context that may need to be explained, that there have been changes and fashions in their own tradition, and so on.

I conclude this chapter by saying something in defence of the historical turn that has taken place. As we have seen, from its origins in the work of Frege and Russell, analytic philosophy has had ahistorical tendencies. Analytic philosophers have engaged in history of philosophy, but often only to the extent of offering—or sometimes simply borrowing—rational p.

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They have tended to be uninterested in doing justice to the philosophers whose work they reconstruct, or in getting the historical facts right. Their mathematical and scientific realism, or epistemological and metaphysical realism, seems not to have been matched by any respect for historical realism. Such analytic philosophers need not repudiate historical realism; they may complain as loudly as anyone else when their own views are misinterpreted. Rather, they simply deny its relevance: On their view, philosophical concepts, doctrines, positions, and problems are independent of their articulation by any particular person, and hence their attribution or misattribution to anyone is of no ultimate significance.

This is not the place for a full critique of ahistoricism. First of all, philosophical terminology is created and shaped by the uses of the past, and is essentially and inevitably contested, even if there are periods of consensus or local contexts where there is relative agreement.

In the historical longer run, clarification is always needed, which requires serious engagement with past philosophical views. To use such terms is to accept a commitment to justify that use by reference to some view that Kant, Frege, or Russell, respectively, actually held at some point. Of course, one might respond that as long as one defines what one means by a term, one can use it Humpty-Dumpty-like in whatever way one wants. So elucidation, as he called it, is always required; and this, too, as I suggested in section 2.

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Debates involving those concepts, doctrines, positions, and problems depend on these shared presuppositions, which may not be explicitly articulated by the protagonists, but some of which may well need to be recognized for the debates to progress—whether to deepen the arguments, resolve the disagreements, overcome any stalemates, or diagnose any mistaken assumptions. As mentioned in section 2. Arguably, Collingwood went too far in the other direction, in advocating too strong a form of historicism, but I think he was right to see the identification of presuppositions as an important aim of philosophy, and one which requires history of philosophy in its pursuit.

Logicism provides a good example. In denying that mathematics is reducible to logic, Kant presupposed that logic was Aristotelian logic and was right in his denial. In arguing that arithmetic can be reduced to logic, Frege had to expand the domain of logic, and today it is often presupposed that logic means Fregean logic or some extension of it. Once we recognize this presupposition and understand its historical source, however, we see that it is shared with neo-Kantianism and British idealism, and hence that ahistoricism is not an inevitable consequence.

It may have been questioned only relatively recently in the analytic tradition; but history of philosophy reveals alternative views of the relationship between philosophy and history of philosophy that are much healthier. Ahistoricism is undermined, thirdly, when we appreciate how much of actual philosophical discourse involves engagement with the ideas of past philosophers. This is reflected, for example, in views of philosophical research based on scientific models: To read only the very latest articles, however, is not to philosophize in some purified atmosphere: The past is simply telescoped into a shorter time-frame; and once debate develops, the time-frame inevitably expands to reveal its historical roots and engagement with tradition becomes more and more explicit.

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Finally, bringing these last two points together, philosophizing always reflects, invokes, or presupposes some kind of underlying narrative, whether grand or modest, which reveals the location in the historical space of philosophical traditions. It is imbibed in learning to philosophize in a certain way, and is in turn transmitted through teaching and discussion. It may be publicly defended, but will typically be taken for granted in the culture or context in which the philosophizing occurs, and may function at subconscious levels.

We are thrown into a particular philosophical life-world, in other words, and history of philosophy is required to appreciate our philosophical Dasein and hence to transcend our historical embodiment. The narratives that form our philosophical self-identity may well involve distorted views of the past, myths, misinterpretations, and so on. All four points suggest ways in which philosophy has an intrinsically historical dimension and in which history of philosophy is essential to philosophy.

History of philosophy plays a crucial role in clarifying concepts, doctrines, positions, and problems; it identifies presuppositions and opens up alternative views; it makes us appreciate the tradition in which our conversations take place; and it develops self-consciousness and corrects shadow histories. In this context, it is inevitable that history of analytic philosophy should have emerged. History of analytic philosophy is analytic philosophy come to self-consciousness; it provides the forum for richer dialogues with the past, combining in multifarious ways monumental, antiquarian, and critical history, rational and historical reconstruction.

This has also expanded the repertoire of methods of analysis on which philosophers can draw, through various forms of historical and textual analysis—genealogical analysis, presuppositional analysis, hermeneutics, deconstructional analysis, among others. The spread of analytic philosophy across the world, and its ramification into all subfields of philosophy and into interdisciplinary projects, is also cultivating new dialogues with other traditions and disciplines, which will in turn transform them all, reconfiguring their conceptual and historical interconnections.

This will require new analyses, interrogations, and narratives that renegotiate the positioning and oppositioning involved in those traditions and disciplines, in the ways we have seen exemplified in the account given here of the construction of the analytic tradition. The future for history of analytic philosophy—and for augmented and invigorated analytic philosophy—promises new enlightenment. Have courage to offer your own historically informed analyses! In its narrowest sense, it covers the philosophy of the so-called Marburg and Southwest Schools, originating in the work of Hermann Cohen and Wilhelm Windelband, respectively, dating from the early s.

In his helpful account of the relationship between neo-Kantianism and anti-psychologism, Anderson defines orthodox neo-Kantianism precisely by its commitment to anti-psychologism, in emphasizing both the objectivity and the normativity of logical and philosophical principles.

The concern with normativity is an important feature, according to Anderson, and rules out as orthodox neo-Kantians others such as Frege and Husserl who also stressed the objectivity of logic , pp. On the nature of neo-Kantianism, cf. On the importance of the distinction between psychological genesis and logical justification in analytic philosophy, see Beaney a.

On the relationship between philosophy and psychology, see also Reed ; Hatfield , For substantial accounts of British idealism, American pragmatism, and phenomenology, see Mander , Misak , and Moran , respectively. For further discussion of elucidation, see e. Weiner , ch. His book on Leibniz was published in October, but he had finished writing it in March and had received the proofs in June. He was asked to give a course of lectures on Leibniz in Cambridge in Lent Term , in place of McTaggart, who was away at the time. Russell , p. Another review was by the Leibniz scholar and translator Robert Latta Both reviews are briefly discussed in Hunter , pp.

Schickore and Steinle For discussion of the Oxford realists, and in particular, Case and Cook Wilson, see Marion , a , b , See also Sellars For a brief account of early twentieth-century American realism, see Kuklick , ch. The movement is often forgotten: Living Schools of Thought , edited by Runes It opens Part II , which also includes chapters on Kantianism, Hegelianism, Thomist humanism, transcendental absolutism by Santayana , personalism, phenomenology, logical empiricism by Feigl , American realism, pragmatism by Dewey , dialectical materialism, naturalism, and philosophies of China.

For an account of his critique of the Oxford realists, see Beaney b. Ryle, by contrast, never uses the term. Davidson , p.

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As I hope this chapter shows, the history of the construction of the analytic tradition is much more complex—and explicable—than Preston makes out in his claim that it is just the history of an illusion on the grounds that there are no defining doctrines ; cf. The first and second editions open with a chapter on philosophy and language, aimed at showing how philosophical problems can be clarified and some of them solved or dissolved by attention to the language in which they are formulated.

The chapter was deleted in the third edition of , but—after complaints—restored in a shorter form in the fourth edition of , a history that is itself revealing of the development of analytic philosophy. The original title was restored in the fourth edition. For some other articles published in , see the chronology that follows this chapter. On the distinction between reductive and connective analysis, see Strawson , ch.

However, he does add justifiably some paragraphs on Cook Wilson. On developments in ethics and political philosophy in the analytic tradition, see the chapters by Dancy, Driver, and Wolff in this Handbook.

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A far more monumental construction is provided by Schrift —. Anscombe , p. For further discussion of the influence of Frege on Wittgenstein, see the works cited in n. The rise and fall and historical construction of linguistic philosophy deserves its own separate treatment.

For accounts, see Hacking ; Hanfling ; Hallett ; Beaney a. For classic critiques of linguistic philosophy, see Gellner ; Mundle For elaboration of this, see e. Beaney d , a , b. On the mathematical background, see the papers in vol. Investigation of the influences on Carnap was spearheaded by Coffa and Friedman in the early s. Today most medium or large English-speaking departments have at least one person who gives this as one of their areas.

For reviews, see e. Kremer ; Rorty ; Beaney b ; Hacker ; Wilson b. For his replies to critics, see Soames a , b. The first volume was Nasim , and there are now over 20 volumes published, with many more in the pipeline. For the record, the volumes are, in order: For details, see the website for the series: See also the chronology that follows this chapter.

See also Glock , ch. For an account of the German historicist tradition, see Beiser Satisfying this interpretive need will also have an historical dimension. Conversing with tradition is thus constitutive of understanding meaning. But, one might say, if he is so important, why is he not better known than he is?

In stating the latter she touches upon a second explanation: Rosenkranz was an Hegelian, and the dense mathematical works of Bolzano did not fit in the idealistic mainstream philosophy which ruled Germany at the time. In doing so, he neglected the demonstrative condition according to which deductive sciences should be inferred logically from their axioms to their theorems.

This discussion is important for what Bolzano thinks really matters in the concept of analyticity: According to Bolzano, relations of inclusion, however, are not interesting for logical deductive sciences like geometry.

In return, Bolzano offers his substitutional theory. Kant says that logic is concerned with the form, and not with the matter of thought. Bolzano refuses this definitions because if logic would be concerned merely with thoughts, it would be subjective. Instead, Bolzano focuses upon the syntactic structure of sentences in combination with his substitutional theory. This gives him the means to determine the universally validity of propositions.

For example, the sentence: Lapointe stresses the fact that most interpreters have underestimated the importance of this universal validity: However, for the relevance with the main argument of the book one must concentrate on the next chapter: A is an example of analyticity in the broad sense, with respect to the part Caius: B A which is B, is A wherein all non-logical parts can be substituted arbitrarily, without the truth value of B to change.

Only the narrow notion satisfies the earlier mentioned condition that the truth value of a proposition must not depend upon the parts out of which it consists. Analyticity has become a property of propositional forms. With regard to the broader notion, it cannot be used to exclusively define a priori knowledge, since a posteriori analytic judgments do occur in this notion of analyticity. The narrow notion is not liable to this epistemological shortcoming. It is only constituted out of logical parts and so the truth of B can be seen with only logical knowledge. Lapointe links up with Quine when she says that everything which is analytic according to the latter, can be called quasi-analytic in the logical sense of Bolzano.

The quasi part is due to the fact that they are not yet completely logically analytic, but can be turned into them when replacing certain expressions by other ones who have the same meaning. But can Bolzano offer a criteria for synonymy meaning preservation where Quine fails? Lapointe says that terms are defined in deductive systems in Bolzano, and synonymy is hence a relative term.

So, what is deductive knowledge then? Derivability is a special case of compatibility, namely if the truth of one proposition depends upon the truth of an other proposition s. However, in the case of the following modus ponens: D If Caius is a man, then he is mortal E Caius is a man then F Caius is mortal which is a case of derivability, we cannot infer F from D and E , due to the condition of truth preservation: But this account of inference is not what Bolzano has in mind when one needs to answer the question why something is as it is within a scientific discourse.

In this situation, we have to speak about ground abfolge and consequence.