Battle of Kursk 1943 (Images of War)

Thus the total size of the Soviet force was 1,, men, with 1,, actual combat soldiers. Soviet armour strength included 4, tanks including KV-1s heavy tank and SPGs including 25 SUs , 56 SUs and 67 SUs [] Overall a third of the Soviet tanks at Kursk were light tanks , but in some units this proportion was considerably higher. With very thin armor and small gun, they were unable to effectively engage the frontal armour of German medium and heavy tanks or AFVs.

The most capable Soviet tank at Kursk was the T , the original version was armed with a Only the SU and SU self-propelled guns had the power to destroy the Tiger at short range, but they were not equal to the Tiger's 88mm gun at long range, and there were very few SU and the SU at Kursk.

Fighting started on the southern face of the salient on the evening of 4 July , when German infantry launched attacks to seize high ground for artillery observation posts prior to the main assault. To the north, at Central Front headquarters, reports of the anticipated German offensive came in. The hope was to disrupt German forces concentrating for the attack, but the outcome was less than hoped for. The bombardment delayed the German formations, but failed in the goal of disrupting their schedule or inflicting substantial losses.

The Germans began their own artillery bombardment at about After the barrage, the ground forces attacked, aided by close air support provided by the Luftwaffe. In the early morning of 5 July, the VVS launched a large raid against German airfields, hoping to destroy the Luftwaffe on the ground. This effort failed, and the Red Army air units suffered considerable losses. On the right flank, XLVI Panzer Corps consisted at this time of four infantry divisions with just 9 tanks and 31 assault guns.

While the corps contained no tanks, it did have 62 assault guns. Model chose to make his initial attacks using infantry divisions reinforced with assault guns and heavy tanks, and supported by artillery and the Luftwaffe. In doing so he sought to maintain the armoured strength of his panzer divisions to be used for exploitation once the Red Army defences were breached. Once a breakthrough had been achieved the panzer forces would move through and advance towards Kursk. If a breakthrough did occur the briefest delay in bringing up the panzer divisions would give the Red Army time to react.

His corps commanders thought a breakthrough extremely unlikely. Following a preliminary bombardment and Red Army counter bombardments, the 9th Army opened its attack at Behind them the remaining two panzer divisions followed, ready to exploit any breakthrough. Red Army formations countered with a force of around 90 Ts. In the resulting three-hour battle, Red Army armoured units lost 42 tanks while the Germans lost two Tigers and a further five more immobilized with track damage.

Goliath and Borgward IV remote-controlled engineer mine-clearing vehicles met with limited success. Most of these were later repaired and returned to service, but the recovery of these very large vehicles was difficult. Rokossovsky ordered the 17th Guards and 18th Guards Rifle Corps with the 2nd Tank Army and 19th Tank Corps, backed up by close air support, to counterattack the German 9th Army the following day on 6 July.

However, due to poor coordination, only the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army commenced the counterattack on the dawn of 6 July after the preparatory artillery barrage.

The attack commenced with an artillery barrage and was spearheaded by the 24 serviceable Tigers of the th Heavy Tank Battalion, [] but it failed to break the Red Army defence at Olkhovatka, and the Germans suffered heavy casualties. Over the next three days from 7 to 10 July, Model concentrated the effort of the 9th Army at Ponyri and Olkhovatka, which both sides considered as vital positions. A Soviet counterattack the following morning forced the Germans to withdraw, and a series of counterattacks ensued by both sides with control of the town being exchanged several times over the next few days.

By 10 July, the Germans had secured most of the town, but Soviet counterattacks continued. It became referred to by the troops as "mini-Stalingrad". The following day the attack frontage dropped to kilometre-wide 9.

Collected Pictures of the WW2 Battle of Kursk – The Biggest Tank Battle Ever

By 10 July, the Soviets had completely halted the German advance. On 12 July the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov , their counter-offensive upon the Orel salient, which threatened the flank and rear of Model's 9th Army. The 12th Panzer Division, thus far held in reserve and slated to be committed to the northern side of the Kursk salient, [] along with the 36th Motorized Infantry, 18th Panzer and 20th Panzer Divisions were redeployed to face the Soviet spearheads. Manstein's main attack was delivered by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, which was organized into densely concentrated spearheads.

It was supported on its flanks by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrage of Soviet anti-tank and artillery fire, which inflicted numerous casualties. Engineers were moved up and cleared paths through the minefield, but suffered casualties in the process. The combination of fierce resistance, minefields, thick mud and mechanical breakdowns took its toll. With paths cleared, the regiment resumed its advance towards Gertsovka. In the ensuing battle, heavy casualties were sustained including the regimental commander Colonel Kassnitz.

Due to the fighting, and the marshy terrain south of the village, surrounding the Berezovyy stream, the regiment once more bogged down. They were followed by infantry and combat engineers. By the end of 5 July, a wedge had been created in the first belt of the Soviet defences. To the east, during the night of 4—5 July, SS combat engineers had infiltrated no-man's land and cleared lanes through the Soviet minefields.

The main assault was led by a spearhead of 42 Tigers, but in total tanks and assault guns attacked across a twelve-kilometre front. The 2nd SS Panzer Division advanced between the two formations in the center. In addition, the advance was well supported by the Luftwaffe, which greatly aided in breaking Soviet strong points and artillery positions. Forty more Soviet tanks soon engaged the division.

However, the battle had bought enough time for units of the 23rd Soviet Guards Rifle Corps, lodged in the Soviet second belt, to prepare itself and be reinforced with additional anti-tank guns. It then pushed forward towards the second belt of defence at Yakovlevo, but its attempts to break through were rebuffed.

By the end of the day, the 1st SS Division had sustained 97 dead, wounded, and 17 missing and lost about 30 tanks. The 3rd SS Panzer Division was making slow progress. They had managed to isolate the th Guards Regiment, of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps , from the rest of its parent division, but its attempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the flank of the neighbouring th Rifle Division of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps had failed when the regiment was reinforced by the 96th Tank Brigade.

By the end of the day, the 3rd SS Division had made very limited progress due in part to a tributary of the Donets river. The lack of progress undermined the advance made by its sister divisions and exposed the right flank of the corps to Soviet forces. The two German corps were tasked with crossing the river, breaking through the 7th Guards Army and covering the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army.

The rd Heavy Tank Battalion , equipped with 45 Tigers, was also attached to the III Panzer Corps, with one company of 15 Tigers attached to each of the corps' three panzer divisions. At the Milkhailovka bridgehead, just south of Belgorod, eight infantry battalions of the 6th Panzer Division crossed the river under heavy Soviet bombardment.

Part of a company of Tigers from the rd Heavy Tank Battalion was able to cross before the bridge was destroyed. Those units of the division that had crossed the river attacked Stary Gorod, but were unable to break through due to poorly cleared minefields and strong resistance. To the south of the 6th Panzer Division, the 19th Panzer Division crossed the river but was delayed by mines, moving forward 8 kilometres 5. A new bridge had to be built specifically for the Tigers, causing further delays. Despite a poor start, the 7th Panzer Division eventually broke into the first belt of the Soviet defence and pushed on between Razumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing 10 kilometres 6.

The advance began well, with the crossing of the river and a swift advance against the 72nd Guards Rifle Division. A Soviet counter-attack supported by about 40 tanks was beaten off, with the assistance from artillery and flak batteries. After having suffered 2, casualties since the morning and still facing considerable resistance from the Soviet forces, the corps dug in for the night.

Delaying the progress of Kempf allowed Red Army forces time to prepare their second belt of defence to meet the German attack on 6 July. By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had committed all of its reserves, except for three rifle divisions under the 69th Army; yet it could not decisively contain the 4th Panzer Army. By midday, the dust rose in thick clouds, settling in a solid layer on roadside bushes, grain fields, tanks and trucks. The dark red disc of the sun was hardly visible. Tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery tractors, armoured personnel carriers and trucks were advancing in an unending flow.

The faces of the soldiers were dark with dust and exhaust fumes. It was intolerably hot. Soldiers were tortured by thirst and their shirts, wet with sweat, stuck to their bodies. Although intended to be concerted, the counterattack turned out to be a series of piecemeal attacks due to poor coordination.

The 2nd Tank Corps joined in the afternoon and was also repelled. But it was detected by German air reconnaissance just before the attack had materialized, and was subsequently decimated by German ground-attack aircraft armed with MK anti-tank cannons and at least 50 tanks were destroyed. On 10 July the full effort of the corps was shifted back to its own forward progress.

The direction of their advance now shifted from Oboyan due north to the northeast, toward Prokhorovka. Hoth had discussed this move with Manstein since early May, and it was a part of the 4th Panzer Army's plan since the outset of the offensive. Though the German advance in the south was slower than planned, it was faster than the Soviets expected. The next day, the first German infantry crossed the river. Despite the deep defensive system and minefields, German tank losses remained lower than the Soviet's.

On 11 July, Army Detachment Kempf finally achieved a breakthrough. In a surprise night attack, the 6th Panzer Division seized a bridge across the Donets. Once there, they were to strike southeast to attack the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka from the flanks and rear.

The 1st and 2nd SS Panzer divisions were to wait until 3rd SS Panzer Division attack had destabilised the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka; and once underway, the 1st SS Panzer Division was to attack the main Soviet defences dug in on the slopes southwest of Prokhorovka. To the division's right, the 2nd SS Panzer Division was to advance eastward, then turn southward away from Prokhorovka to roll up the Soviet lines opposing the III Panzer Corps' advance and force a gap.

Tasked with flanking the Soviet defences around Prokhorovka, the unit first had to beat off a number of attacks before they could go over onto the offensive. Most of the division's tank losses occurred late in the afternoon as they advanced through mine fields against well-hidden Soviet anti-tank guns. Although the 3rd SS succeeded in reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road, their hold was tenuous and it cost the division half of its armour.

The majority of German tank losses suffered at Prokhorovka occurred here. Though the Soviet counterattack failed with heavy losses, and were thrown back onto the defensive, yet they did enough to stop a German breakthrough. The threat of further Allied landings in Italy or along southern France made Hitler believe it was essential to move forces from Kursk to Italy and to discontinue the offensive. Kluge welcomed the news, as he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massive offensive against his sector, but Manstein was less welcoming.

Manstein's forces had just spent a week fighting through a maze of defensive works and he believed they were on the verge of breaking through to more open terrain, which would allow him to engage and destroy the Soviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle. Manstein stated, "On no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves he [has] committed [are] completely beaten. This removed the force Manstein believed was needed to succeed.

The offensive continued in the southern part with the launch of Operation Roland on 14 July. This marked the end of Operation Roland. One of the panzer corps' divisions was transferred to Italy and the other two were sent south to meet new Soviet offensives. The extent of Soviet reserves was far greater than he realised. These reserves were used to re-equip the mauled 5th Guards Tank Army, which launched Operation Rumyantsev a couple of weeks later. During Operation Citadel, Luftwaffe units in the area had 27, flying sorties with combat losses a 0.

Soviet units from 5 July to 8 July conducted 11, flying sorties with combat losses of aircraft 4. Despite German unit performance, the Wehrmacht was now lacking strategic reserves. During the defensive preparations in the months leading up to Citadel, the Soviets also planned and prepared counteroffensives operations that would be launched after the German offensive had halted. Soviet offensive operations for the summer of were planned to begin after the strength of the German forces had been dissipated by their Kursk offensive.

The Bryansk Front , under the command of Markian Popov , attacked the eastern face of the Orel salient while the Western Front , commanded by Vasily Sokolovsky , attacked from the north. The Soviet spearheads sustained heavy casualties, but pushed through and in some areas achieved significant penetrations. These thrusts endangered German supply routes and threatened the 9th Army with encirclement.

The thinly stretched 2nd Panzer Army stood in the way of this Soviet force.

Collected Pictures of the WW2 Battle of Kursk - The Biggest Tank Battle Ever

The German commanders had been wary of such an attack and forces were quickly withdrawn from the Kursk offensive to meet the Soviet offensive. Operation Kutuzov reduced the Orel salient and inflicted substantial losses on the German military, paving the way for the liberation of Smolensk. Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev was intended as the main Soviet offensive for Diversionary attacks , launched two weeks earlier across the Donets and Mius Rivers into the Donbass, drew the attention of German reserves and thinned the defending forces that would face the main blow.

They drove through the German positions, making broad and deep penetrations. By 5 August, the Soviets had liberated Belgorod.

By 12 August, the outskirts of Kharkov had been reached. In the ensuing tank battles, the Soviet armies suffered heavy losses in armour. After heavy fighting the city was liberated on 23 August. This battle is referred to by the Germans as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov, while the Soviets refer to it as the Belgorod—Kharkov offensive operation. The campaign was a strategic Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough.

The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armour than in previous years, were unable to break through the in-depth Soviet defences and were caught off guard by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This result changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front, with the Soviet Union gaining the operational initiative. The Soviet victory, however, was costly, with the Red Army losing considerably more men and materiel than the German Army.

However, the Soviet Union's larger industrial potential and pool of manpower allowed them to absorb and replenish these losses, with their overall strategic strength unaffected. With the failure of Zitadelle we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front Needless to say the [Soviets] exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front.

From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative. With victory, the initiative firmly passed to the Red Army. For the remainder of the war the Germans were limited to reacting to Soviet advances, and were never able to regain the initiative or launch a major offensive on the Eastern Front. Though the location, plan of attack, and timing were determined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his General Staff.

Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding generals the liberty to make important command decisions, Hitler's interference in German military matters progressively increased while his attention to the political aspects of the war decreased. Stalin stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions, resulting in the Red Army gaining more freedom of action during the course of the war.

The casualties suffered by the two combatants are difficult to determine, due to several factors. In regard to the Germans, equipment losses were complicated by the fact that they made determined efforts to recover and repair tanks. For example, tanks disabled one day often appeared a day or two later repaired. Many were transferred to the United States national archives and were not made available until , while others were taken by the Soviet Union, which declined to confirm their existence.

Russian military historian Grigoriy Krivosheyev , who based his figures on the Soviet archives, is considered by historian David Glantz as the most reliable source for Soviet casualty figures. The Voronezh Front suffered 27, irrecoverable casualties and 46, medical casualties, for a total of 73, The Steppe Front suffered 27, irrecoverable casualties and 42, medical casualties, for a total of 70, During the two Soviet offensives, total casualties amounted to , men.

During Operation Kutuzov, Soviet losses amounted to , irrecoverable casualties and , medical casualties, for a total loss of , men. The Bryansk Front suffered 39, irrecoverable casualties and , medical casualties. The Central Front lost 47, irrecoverable casualties and , medical casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48, irrecoverable casualties and , medical casualties, for a total of , The Steppe Front lost 23, irrecoverable casualties and 75, medical casualties, for a total of 98, The Soviet losses were roughly three times larger than the German losses.

The loss ratio suffered by the Soviets was roughly 5: Soviet tank strength went back up to 2, tanks by 3 August due to the repair of damaged vehicles. Total casualties are uncertain. Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archive record, calculated that during Operation Citadel 54, casualties were suffered. Of these, 9, were killed, 1, were reported missing and 43, were wounded. The 9th Army suffered 23, casualties, while Army Group South suffered 30, casualties. In facing Operation Kutuzov, 14, men were killed, 11, were reported missing presumed killed or captured and 60, were wounded.

Total casualties for the three battles were about 50, killed or missing and , wounded per German military medical data [ citation needed ]. During Operation Citadel, to tanks and assault guns were destroyed. By 5 July, when the Battle of Kursk started, there were only operational Panthers. Within two days, this had dropped to Due to enemy action and mechanical breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly during the first few days. By the evening of 10 July there were only 10 operational Panthers in the frontline.

Approximately 40 Panthers had already been repaired and were on the way to the front. About 25 still had not been recovered by the repair service On the evening of 11 July, 38 Panthers were operational, 31 were total writeoffs and were in need of repair. A slow increase in the combat strength is observable. The large number of losses by hits 81 Panthers up to 10 July attests to the heavy fighting. Thus, a report on 11 August showed that the numbers of total writeoffs in Panthers swelled to , with only 9 operational.

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The German Army was forced into a fighting retreat and increasingly lost tanks in combat as well as from abandoning and destroying damaged vehicles. Most of these occurred during their offensive at Kursk. The total number of German tanks and assault guns destroyed during July and August along the entire Eastern Front amount to 1, Of these, Frieser estimates that were destroyed during the Battle of Kursk.

Frieser reports Luftwaffe losses at planes, with lost during the German offensive, destroyed during Operation Kutuzov, and a further lost during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Battle of Kursk order of battle. Lloyd Clark Clark , p. Citino used the term to comment on the failure of the operation: There was no strategic breakthrough—no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement.

Instead it turned into World War I with tanks". Citino In The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, , Citino did not use the term "blitzkrieg", instead describing Citadel as an attempted operation in the classical tradition of Bewegungskrieg , literally: He listed three elements: Of these, surprise was by far the most important. Guderian , p. The great commitment certainly would not bring us equivalent gains. The figure for German manpower refers to ration strength which includes non-combatants and wounded soldiers still in medical installations.

The figures for guns and mortars are estimates based on the strength and number of units slated for the operation; the figure for tanks and assault guns include those in workshops. Some comrades became frightened, leaped out of the trenches, and began to run away. The commander saw who was running and quickly forced them back into the trenches, making it sternly clear that they had to stay put. The tanks reached the trench line and, with a terrible roar, clattered overhead In addition to the units listed below, there are also the 4th Guards, 27th, 47th and 53rd Armies.

Clark , p. Perhaps the order of battle below represents only the formations relevant to Operation Citadel. The German Freya radar stations at Belgorod and Kharkov in had only picked up Soviet air formations approaching Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of the entire Soviet preemptive air strike on the eve of Operation Citadel. Figures are from German archives. A Military, Political and Global History. Exact numbers are unknown; the entire German eastern front lost 1, tanks and assault guns for July and August, so the number of is an estimate. Weapons and military equipment.

Refresh and try again. Open Preview See a Problem? Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Preview — Battle of Kursk by Hans Seidler. Images of War - Battle of Kursk , is an illustrated account of this pivotal battle of the war on the Eastern Front, when the Germans threw , men and 2, tanks aga The greatest tank battle in world history, known as Operation CITADEL, opened during the early hours of 5 July , and its outcome was to decide the eventual outcome of the war on the Eastern Front.

Images of War - Battle of Kursk , is an illustrated account of this pivotal battle of the war on the Eastern Front, when the Germans threw , men and 2, tanks against 1,, soldiers and 3, tanks of the Red Army in a savage battle of attrition. Paperback , pages. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about Battle of Kursk , please sign up.

Lists with This Book. This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Apr 27, Karl rated it did not like it. This collection of photographs from the Battle of Kursk provides good coverage of the German side of the battle, but inexplicably has no pictures of the Soviet Army, except for a few shots of prisoners in German hands.

Susan Mathis rated it it was amazing Jul 18, Adrian rated it it was ok May 25, Lawrence rated it it was amazing May 23,