Active Ageing in the European Union: Policy Convergence and Divergence

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Skin care Face Body. Low to High Price: Regulatory Divergence and Convergence in the Age of Megaregionals The National Black Independent Party: Political Insurgency or Ideological Convergence? Studies in African American History and Culture In the LSE scenario, a fall in immigration to 1. These age- and sex-specific numbers are related to population numbers in the base year in order to estimate emigration rates.

Based on these rates, the level of extra-Europe migration in amounted to 1. The scenarios assume different developments in the emigration rates. In the two economic prosperous scenarios, the GSE and EME scenarios, rising emigration rates are assumed, with the latter having a steeper rise. In the less prosperous scenarios, a decline is assumed, with the LSE scenario having a larger decrease than the CME scenario.

Quantitative assumptions on intra - Europe migration are based on age- and sex-specific out-migration rates, i. The quantitative assumptions about future levels of out-migration rates for international migration flows between countries within Europe follow similar patterns as extra-Europe emigration: The resulting number of intra-Europe migrants in counted 1. By the end of the projection period, 2. In order to make assumptions about the country of destination, a measure of regional attractiveness was used.

Attraction factors are assumed to change up to according to the convergence or divergence assumption in each scenario. In the final step, a regional distribution model was used to assign immigrants and emigrants to NUTS2 regions. This distribution is based on data provided by Eurostat and some National Statistical Offices NSOs , and in some cases completed with estimations.

The regional distribution of emigrants from sending countries and immigrants in receiving countries is kept constant during the scenario period. Apart from international migration, assumptions were made for internal migration. Internal migration is defined as the movement of population between NUTS2 regions within a single country. The remaining 23 countries have internal migration for between two and 39 NUTS2 regions.

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This variation and its potential to change over time due to social, economic, political, and climatic conditions were key components of the internal migration analysis. For the 23 countries concerned, a comprehensive database of statistics has been produced, created from Eurostat sources, from a number of individual NSOs and in some cases through estimation. The objective has been to derive: Using the available time series of OD migration data for each country, the most recent trend in both migration flows and migration rates has been examined.

The policy scenarios for internal migration are driven by adjustments to the relative attractiveness of individual destinations under varying assumptions. The attractiveness of an individual NUTS2 region is measured using a destination attractiveness ratio DAR , which is calculated as the share of migration inflow divided by the share of population. Outlying values comprise a mixture of relatively small areas plus dominant destinations within a country for instance London in the UK.

The level of internal out-migration rates remains unchanged, with scenarios modifying only the range of values and not the scale. Total internal migration flows in amounted to 6. Due to different population developments under the four policy scenarios, by the end of the scenario period between 6. Finally, assumptions had to be made on labor force participation rates. The labor force is defined as the total number of people employed and those actively seeking for work. In general, fluctuations in participation rates the sum of employment and unemployment rates are caused by changes in participation in three broad categories of inactive persons: The assumptions on labor force participation are predominantly formulated in terms of developments in these three categories.

The results of the expert survey showed that most governments are trying to increase labor force participation. The general expectation is that policies to raise female participation can be quite effective. To a lesser extent, the same applies to participation of the elderly. The experts were less optimistic as far as raising participation of youngsters was concerned. In the GSE scenario, labor force participation rates will increase in all age groups. Participation rates of males in the prime working ages, however, show only small increases, as current rates already are very high.

In the EME scenario, labor force participation rates will even increase more, but less policy measures are needed as a significant rise in labor demand is expected related to rather favorable economic developments. In the LSE scenario, participation is declining as a result of adverse economic developments.

While males in the prime working ages will only experience a small decrease in labor force participation, female participation will be confronted with a serious fall back. Due to the free-market system, in the CME scenario large companies are still making large profits notwithstanding the unfavorable economic prospects. Therefore, only minor changes in labor force participation are expected in this scenario.

European Regional Populations: Current Trends, Future Pathways, and Policy Options

Furthermore, the model is designed to facilitate the modeling of the impact of migration on population dynamics, by handling migration on three levels: A revised version of the model has been used in order to be able to use regional level input rates for all NUTS2 regions and all demographic components Kupiszewski and Kupiszewska The total population size of Europe is estimated to be around million inhabitants in under all scenarios. At the regional level, significant differences in population growth have occurred.

Migration has been the main source of regional population change. The impact of natural growth the balance of births and deaths has become very small.

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Relatively high population growth is mainly found in Western Europe and in several southern regions, while population decline is mainly found in Eastern Europe and in several regions in the north. In the last decade, more than one-quarter of the NUTS2 regions had to face a decline in the size of the working-age population. On the other hand, many regions in the eastern part of Spain, the southern part of France, Ireland, and Poland still have increasing working-age populations. In most regions, the main cause of changes in the size of the working-age population is cohort turnover, i.

Only in a small number of regions does the size of the working-age population increase despite negative cohort turnover that is new cohorts entering the labor force are smaller than old cohorts leaving because of compensating additions to the working-age population through positive net migration. Most of these regions can be found in Italy and Germany. In many Eastern European regions, the growth of the working-age population would have been greater, had not there been a steady stream of out-migrants. Sources Van der Erf et al. At the regional level, migration can be split into two components: In about half of these regions, the impact of internal migration was negative, but these net outflows of migrants were compensated by a positive international migration balance.

The reverse pattern, i. These depopulation regions are found mainly in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland. A further distinction can be made between international migration to and from countries within and outside Europe. A negative international migration balance is almost exclusively the result of migration outflows to other countries within Europe.

Federal Ministry of Finance - The EU’s Ageing Report and the outlook for Germany

Almost all regions experience population growth due to immigration from outside of Europe. The directional mix of international migration varies between countries: This pattern is related to former imperial history, to geographical position in the interior of Europe, or location on its Mediterranean littoral. Regional differences are considerable. In most of the cases, increasing populations are the result of net immigration from outside Europe.

The main cause of population decline is negative natural change. The overall impact of migration on population size is considerable. Three-quarters of all regions would have a larger population in if current migration flows continue than if there were to be no migration Fig. The impact of migration both internal and international goes beyond the simple increase or decrease of population. It also affects the age structures of populations and the labor force. As most migrants are in the young-adult age group, their internal out-migration or international emigration raises the ODR as it reduces the number of working-age people.

At the same time, in regions attracting migrants the newcomers will raise the number of young adults and the economically active population will increase. In general, migration is beneficial for most affluent regions, whereas poor regions lose population due to migration. Migration therefore reduces ageing in affluent regions and increases it in poor ones and thus will be a strong factor increasing regional disparities. The GSE scenario produces the second highest population, but Europe experiences some losses in the working ages.

The EME scenario projects the highest population and a slight increase in the working ages. The ODR for Europe increases to by 2. Even though the social versus market orientation of policy appears not to make much difference to the overall outcome for Europe, there is a considerable difference in regional inequalities. The higher standard deviations in the regional ODRs for the market scenarios compared with the social scenarios are, of course, a product of our assumptions: The net migration is positive in all scenarios except for the CME where the European economy has become unattractive to immigrants and many have returned to their emerging country economies, which are experiencing much better growth the pattern of the last two decades.

Under the EME scenario, the net immigration rises to circa 4. This level will require Europe to commit to be a world region that welcomes and integrates its immigrant population in a more positive way than at present. Most of the rest of Western Europe will experience small population gains. Most of the former Iron Curtain regions are projected to lose population but in the capital city regions of Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Bucharest, this loss is small.

The GSE map is a smoothing of the EME map with fewer regions in the top or bottom classes and thus represents a gain in terms of cohesion. Only in one-quarter of the regions would the labor force increase. In all European regions, the ratio of the inactive to the active population would be higher without extra-European migration. Extra-European migration would have a beneficial, albeit unequal, impact on the balance between the labor force and economically inactive population. Only if activity rates increase and if extra-European migration is high, will the total size of the labor force in Europe increase to If economic conditions are poor as under the LSE and CME scenarios, activity rates will not increase and immigration will be low.

Also, many regions in Germany and Austria will have to cope with similar losses of labor supply. Market-oriented policies combined with high economic growth the EME scenario would result in a substantially growing labor force in many regions in the western and northern part of Europe. However, the contrast with the eastern part is sharp, where a majority of the regions will have an enduring shrinking labor force.

If policies focus on regional cohesion the contrast between regions with a severe decline of the labor force and those with a steep growth is smaller. Sources Rees et al. The administrative boundaries are copyright of the EuroGeographics Association. Although the size of the labor force continues to grow if labor force participation rates increase, the rate of growth will slow due to the decline in the size of the working-age population. This implies that an increase in labor productivity will have to become the main driver of economic growth. According to the Lisbon strategy, policies should not just aim to improve capital investment, but should also include investment in human capital, training, and capacity building.

The Europe strategy asserts that labor productivity should be raised through a focus on new skills and jobs.

The scenarios show that if productivity does not improve, there is the risk that growth in GDP per capita will become negative. The effects of policies affecting the levels of fertility and migration on the rate of ageing are limited. The differences in the ageing process do not vary much between the different scenarios. When we look at the ratio of older people to people in the working ages the old-age dependency ratio or ODR , however, we see that the potential changes are truly huge Fig.

Even more dramatic will be increases in the VODRs. If current demographic trends and migration flows continue, the European working-age population will shrink and disparities across regions will increase. This has led to calls for policies to improve European competitiveness and regional cohesion. Policies may be aimed to accommodate these demographic changes or policies may be aimed to directly affect the demographic trends. Growth cannot simply be enhanced and disparities cannot simply be reduced by policies aimed at directly affecting demographic developments and migration flows since these depend on the economic situation.

If young couples do not have faith in the future they tend to have only a small number of children. Therefore, policies aiming to raise the level of fertility will not be effective if the general economic situation fails to improve. Moreover, policies affecting the level of fertility will have effects on the growth of the working-age population in the long run only.

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These policies will not help in reducing labor shortages in the next two decades or so. Policies aimed at increasing mobility between European regions and countries may reduce rather than increase cohesion since young adults tend to migrate from disadvantaged to affluent regions. Thus policies aimed to stimulate migration can be effective only if they are part of policy bundles aimed to improve living conditions in poor regions, for example by improving the availability of jobs, housing, schools, and the quality of the environment.

Policies that are aimed at allowing economic migration from outside Europe in order to meet the needs of the labor market will be effective only if integration policies are successful. Furthermore, as migrants tend to move to economically healthy regions, regional disparities may increase, particularly as regions with a healthy economy tend to be better able to attract higher-skilled migrants.

Policies to address demographic challenges should therefore not just be aimed to affect the size and direction of demographic trends and migration flows, but should be combined with policies in other spheres as well.



There exists a debate about whether population decline is good or bad for countries and regions Reher ; Coleman and Rowthorn ; Van Dalen and Henkens The arguments pointing to the benefits of population decline include reduction of environmental impact, greater sustainability, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, lowering of traffic congestion, and release of more housing space for improving living standards.

Regional landscapes can be improved and forests can be regenerated. However, the region still remains one of poorest in the UK. The case against regarding population decline as beneficial is mainly economic. As economic activity declines, regional markets shrink, investment by business is discouraged, firms fail to innovate and a downward spiral of economic activity occurs Myrdal and regional competitiveness is lost. The key to reducing environmental impact is technical innovation and planning regulations that protect the environment. Money incomes decline balanced against some quality of life improvements and the smartest and most active people migrate out of declining regions in a process that reinforces the outflows.

The people left behind are the poorest and most dependent on transfers subsidies, benefits, remittances. To date, the European Commission has viewed any population decline as unsatisfactory and sought to design policies to turn decline around or to provide some compensation CEC a , b. If the jobs are created the people will come.

The difficulty of creating jobs in the most deprived regions should not be under-estimated. Relative population decline will mean a shift of people to more prosperous regions. All scenarios show significant increases in old age and labor market dependency ratios. The direction that policy must take is clear: This should be achieved through raising the age of entitlement to state pension, reducing those entitlements through generating benefits through savings rather than tax transfers, ensuring healthy ageing that leaves people well enough to work well beyond current retirement ages and planning new career and work patterns that enable older workers to downshift in terms of physical effort, responsibility, or working hours.

In the debate about these needed reforms to our system of social support in old age, there is a contention that older workers working beyond current retirement age will take up jobs that would otherwise have become available for younger workers. However, our projections show that the population of working age will fall in most regions under most scenarios. In fact, the most effective and productive working teams are inter-generational, benefiting from the energy of youth and the wisdom of age but in organizations that are less hierarchical and more democratic.

Policies aimed at affecting the size of the labor force should be supplemented by policies aimed to affect productivity growth through investment in human capital. If the labor force declines, productivity growth will need to become the main driver of economic growth. The pattern of regional population decline and population loss goes hand in hand with poorer regions exporting people to richer regions. This has benefits for both kinds of regions. Surplus labor in poorer regions transfers to where it can be productive and earn a living. Labor shortages in richer regions are relieved and regional product enhanced.

The net welfare of Europe is improved as a result of the process, but we continue to worry that poorer regions are somehow subsidizing the richer regions by investing in the education and training of young people and then seeing that investment move elsewhere. Earlier we suggested that inter-country and inter-region migration would lead to increasing inequality between regions.

How can this process coincide with a claim that migration processes improve the net welfare of the European population? If we measure regional inequality using the regional mean values of welfare indicators e. Using people as the observation units rather than regions measures inequality more fairly. Recent work makes the case that migration benefits the sending country as well as the receiving country Goldin et al. The main arguments are that remittances make a contribution to sending country income that is huge much much larger than aid flows , that the prospect of emigration opportunities encourage sending country populations to invest more in education and that the productivity of the fraction of emigrants who return is higher than that of stayers.