Werke von Lucian Reich (German Edition)
This derivative of the prolific Czech Panzer 38 T was armed with a 20 mm 0. The Waffenamt designation was Flakpanzer 38 t auf Selbstfahrlafette 38 t Ausf. M SdKfz , or Flakpanzer 38 t Gepard. Given organically, after early , to the AA platoons of each Panzerbatallion. Quad 20 mm Flakvierling 38 in an open turret based on the Panzer IV chassis. Similar model by the same manufacturer, but armed with a single 3. Only a handful were built at the end of the war. Germans Tanks of ww2. I liked the encyclopedia of tanks from Germany.
I do not see information about the Pz. Those are rather obscure vehicles only made popular due to WoT. There were hundreds of German paper designs and prototypes. Not even looking at their practicality on an actual battlefield, could these have been built at any point in the war? Even early on, I imagine the Nazis would have been hard pressed to not only source material, but to actually build the thing. It is not unfeasable to think of the E 25, 50 or 75 as entering production the E 75 was basically a simplified Tiger II , but the E , the Maus or the Ratte were totally unfeasable from a production point of view.
They required a lot of resources, precious metals, manpower and time to be built, and were almost assuredly not worth it. Wunderwaffe was an umbrella term, which referred to all kinds of weapons aircraft, rockets, naval vessels, guns, in fact, all types of weapons. The vast majority were too big in every sense to be practical — cost too much, were physically massive, weighed too much, etc.
Sturer Emil a mm-armed, open-topped SPG was a pretty meh design that was rushed into production. Two prototypes saw service in roughly on the Eastern Front and were not bad at all. Big, heavy, but it has to have been cheaper than a Jagdtiger. Dual 30mm AA gun. Built on a Panzer IV. Like Stan Lucian said, the E series was a good idea until you consider the larger tanks. Also, they were working on SPGs with insanely powerful guns.
Similarly, the Americans had the Pershing which could deal with the heavier tanks. How many roads, bridges, or railroad cars could handle them? I would like to see one for it, unless you are not planning to do so. You give a lot of info in your articles, so I want to see one for the Jagdtiger. If there is already a page, please link me to it, as searching for it gave me nothing. Just be patient and you will be rewarded, you can check in the meantime the huge material already available on the net. How come the Pz. Also, is it possible if you make a page about the early German experimental light and scout tanks?
J and the Pz. Hello Panzerino, You can find out more about the Maus and the Lowe in the Prototype section of our website.
Also, the light tanks are already covered in the Panzer I and II articles albeit briefly. It is entirely possible they will be expanded upon. Cant seem to find any info in the Armoured car section. Seems a rather glaring error. We have an article on the Sd. Hello Tom, Not yet, but i imagine the time needed to convert the website into an app would be consequent. For the moment there is no volunteer for this but that could change.
The Gepard, Coelian are scheduled, but you already can find the Flakpanzer I: A small nit… in the blurb on Flakpanzer I above it says they were built on the B chassis. Every picture I have ever seen shows the A chassis. Just found your site, excellent job.
And a detailed Illustrator tutorial? Where did you get the information stating that tracks were created for P. I have never come across such information. Has anyone else found the information on the P. I still can not find the information. Any idea like I can identify a iron plate coming from a german vehicle?
It have waffenhamt but I never see it on a tank or armoured vehicle… Thanks. Hello Thomas, check this page: Hello Leca, nice to see you there! As a vehicle perhaps, but sooner as there is an armoured version Here are out of the Jagdtiger, pz35 t or FLAKpanzers currently started or well advanced the next long-terms planned entries in this category: Straussler V4 SdKfz Hello Mister Taxi, actually, the famous 88 is done as an illustration, but not as an article which it would deserve. Probably in the future, as the PAK 75, Pdr and others. Thank-you for your exeptionally informative work regarding tanks.
I have learned so much from your write-ups about each type of tank. If one day we are submerged by petitions to change these we will intervene. To my knowledge you are the first to do these remarks and we have some comments displayed on the website. German Empire was also a name of the country during World War I. And censoring German flag also enforces this feeling. Ausf H and E variants. Was it really possible to mount the MG 42 on tanks or is this just a typing mistake?
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Thank you for the most informative site on German armor. I have dozens of books on German Armor, wheeled and tracked armor and soft skin vehicles. Several of the books are in German and hard to find nowadays.. You know just when you think you know it all about the German war machines, I ran across this site and found I still have more to learn about German prototypes and paper panzers. Please direct me to this information? Fantastic site and very informative. Learned a lot here and would like to express my respect and admiration for your in-depth knowledge but also for the beautiful renders of the tanks themselves.
Excellent site with loads of useful information. Well, I know it makes for a catching name and instantly shows you who the bad guys are, but honestly do you really need this? All my collection is in 1: The question is, all of the vehicles of the poster are in the same scale? Thanks and best regards. Hello N E Lagrave First off, the illustrations displayed here are not shown to their real scale because of the repsonsive constraints: So the poster is indeed more trusted because the size of all vehicles are based on specs calculated with the same system.
But crossing the specs with those of our documentation could help to figure it out. I debunked in fact some of these specs by comparing the vehicles on the same basis and using the same parts like roadwheels. Out of curiosity, how many people work here and how long does it typically take to create an article? Article writing varies greatly depending on available sources, length, conflictual info. It can range from days to months. Hello, I want to learn about the tanks of WW2 and I was happy when I found this website, although there is not much info on these tanks.
I have not gone to the other countries yet I was wondering if these are being worked on? I was a bit disappointed when I noticed the only info on most tanks is how many were built. Just see the list at the top of the page. You guys do a great job with this site!
Excellent resource for information! But when is it going to get here?! Lol I know there are quite a few sites dedicated to just the Jagdtiger and there are many articles written about the acquisition of the remaining 3 Jagdtigers. Would just be great to see one on here! Your email address will not be published. Notify me of new posts by email. This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed. Panzer development Tanks available prior to the Campaign of France The Panzer I and II were considered transitional models, designed for training and to prepare the industry for future, more advanced, vehicles.
Panther and Tiger Both the Tiger and the Panther were, on paper, some of the best designs in the world when they came into service. A misjudged success story Both the Panzer III and IV were quite expensive, and new mass-producible, cheaper variants for infantry support and tank-hunting were sought. Hunting spirit As soon as the fall of Poland, German planners thought of converting existing platform in order to mount heavier ordnance than the regular 37 mm 1. Featured AT guns From to , the Wehrmacht took delivery to tens of thousands of antitank guns, from the puny standard 37 mm to the legendary 8.
Read More The wartime German arsenal comprised in all 15 models registered, like the unusual 2. Light tanks The Panzer II was a provisional, stopgap model, which was mostly used as a scout tank during the war. Karl mortar 7 built. Famous VW off-road car. Derivative VW amphibious car. Main German APC of the war. Anti-Aircraft vehicles — Flakpanzer I 25 built. September 28, at 4: September 28, at 9: August 13, at January 5, at 1: March 27, at 5: December 17, at 9: March 2, at 8: March 2, at March 3, at William D Hoy says: August 9, at 5: March 18, at 2: March 18, at 4: March 18, at 8: March 19, at March 20, at March 30, at 6: March 30, at 8: March 31, at 7: April 14, at 4: May 5, at May 6, at May 19, at 5: May 19, at 6: Tom kenneth De Leon says: May 28, at 5: August 18, at 6: August 30, at 2: August 30, at January 16, at 5: January 16, at 6: September 1, at 2: September 1, at 8: September 4, at September 5, at 9: October 12, at November 14, at January 5, at December 12, at 1: January 10, at 7: March 6, at 7: March 6, at 8: March 10, at 1: March 10, at 5: March 10, at 8: March 17, at 1: April 4, at 9: April 12, at 4: May 18, at 6: May 22, at 6: May 23, at May 26, at 2: June 20, at 8: The exposition ended up attracting more than thirty-one million visitors, and the pavilion, along with the extensive program of German cultural events organized for the fair, proved to be an overall propagandistic success.
This study analyzes the construction of German identity for an international audience, focusing specifically on the French reception of National Socialist culture and politics as rep- resented at the fair. Since the German pavilion effectively provided French audiences with an immediate, hands-on experience of the Third Reich on their own soil, it greatly influenced their formulation of an understanding of the new regime. In turn, French interpretations of the pavilion and National Socialism influenced their assessment of their own political system and national culture.
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French responses to the German pavilion were conditioned by the unstable and Figure 1. German and Soviet pavilions as charged climate of French domestic politics at the time of the fair. In the spirit of rapprochement, the Popular Front, having inherited the planning of the exposition from the previous administration, worked intensively at securing the participation of the Third Reich. Although the Popular Front government had not originated the project, its leaders nevertheless perceived the Paris Exposition as a showcase for their populist social and economic reforms.
Blum and his allies, determined to link the Popular Front with progress and modernity, commissioned modern architects and artists, including such figures: Other government officials, however, rejected the cosmopolitanism of modern art and: The nineteenth-century tower came to represent the outdated republicanism and gridlocked parliamentary politics of French democracy, and it contrasted sharply with the architectural manifestations of the newly invigorated totalitarian states that framed it.
What mass cultural strategies could the French develop to ensure their own political viability? This questioning of French identity was tied to significant shifts in traditional alliances and party demographics at both ends of the political spectrum. The transitional period from mid to early marked the peak not only of the Popular Front movement but also of French fascist activity. Labeled nonconformists, this heterogeneous group of mostly younger in- tellectuals was hardly marginal to French society. Zeev Sternhell convincingly argues that their fascist vision was not a philosophical import but had deep roots in French intellectual history stretching from the Boulangist crisis of the s to the establishment of Vichy.
In turn, the creation of an organic society demanded a new means of expression that could accommodate a mass Although many French nonconformists were not pro-Hitler, many of them identi- fied in National Socialism cultural and political elements that they wanted to appropriate for use in France. The gradual dissolution of a dominant moderate or mainstream discourse in France al- lowed fascist ideology to permeate sectors of public opinion not considered specifically fascist by historians today.
Xenophobia and anti-Semitism, long-standing tendencies within French culture, rose markedly during the s in every sector of society and became more comfort- ably situated in a growing quasi-ethnic definition of Frenchness. Commu- nism, not fascism, was perceived to be the greatest threat to France, not only by those on the Right but, surprisingly, also by individuals associated with the Left.
By , many Radicals and Socialists who had at one time rallied behind the Popular Front were driven primarily by anticommunist politics. An analysis of French reactions to the German pavilion and National Socialist mass cultural production illuminates how certain aspects of fascist ideology achieved a dan- gerous normalcy in prewar France.
At the heart of this study is the relationship between politics, aesthetics, and spectacle during this volatile period. Fascism has been described as the incursion of the aesthetic into the realm of the sociopolitical. It offered up the illusion of social revolution, creating a total- izing and organic image of national community, while in reality leaving property relations intact. Chapter 1 maps the history of Franco-German relations after the Great War, from the Briand-Stresemann era and early attempts to unite Europe to the Nazi exploitation of the discourse of rapprochement.
Of particular significance is the critical role that governmental and independent cultural organizations played in the formation of diplomatic relations and foreign policy during this period. Once in power, Nazi leaders launched an extensive cultural and psychological campaign that prepared the ground for their military victory in It discusses specifically how the policy of rapprochement was reflected in the special treatment given to the Nazi organizers by the French government.
Its iconography represented the Third Reich as the counterforce against the dehumanizing power of capitalism and the spreading threat of communism. The juxtaposition of these stylistically regressive artworks with the most advanced examples of German machinery enabled the regime to market itself as both a technologically avant-garde nation and a people tied to their timeless, preindustrial roots. The analysis of the pavilion is followed by a discussion of its French reception in chapter 3. In my analy- sis, the conditions surrounding the reception of the pavilion are then related to the lack of critical studies produced in France concerning the aesthetics and cultural policies of the Third Reich.
In addition to exhibits of Nazi art and technology, the German participation at the exposi- tion involved an extensive cinema program. The fourth chapter analyzes these films within the context of Franco-German coproductions, all of which by the s were being produced under the auspices of Nazi-controlled film companies. The German films shown in Paris at the time of the fair were mostly love stories, musicals, historical dramas, and westerns—escapist entertainment intended to appeal to large numbers of spectators both within Germany and abroad. The Nazis were determined to create a cinema industry that would rival Hollywood, and they emulated American film genres that had proven success rates with mass audiences.
These narrative films were supposed to exemplify a superior class of production and served a different sort of propagandistic function; they were highly Two state- commissioned films in particular were highlighted by the Third Reich as showpieces for their newly reorganized cinema industry: Close readings of these works in chapter 4 analyze how Nazi filmmakers combined entertainment with the propagation of Nazi sociopolitical ideals. French reviewers were impressed by the high production values of these films and generally suspended political judgment of them in order to extol their artistic merits.
Chapter 5 examines the French fascination with the aesthetic qualities of Nazi mass spec- tacle. Many French writers considered these choreographed political gatherings to be innovative artistic expressions of the collective German will. The cinematic employment of mass ornament like- wise functioned as a signifier for an avant-garde mode of filmmaking.
French fascist and non- conformist critics issued corresponding attacks on the Popular Front government for its lack of national pageantry, which they equated with political impotence and conflicted national identity. As one French cinema critic poignantly remarked when reviewing newsreels depicting Nazi torchlight parades: Hitler is greater than Napoleon or Bismarck—as he himself claims—but he is certainly just as strong as M. It therefore expresses itself above all in works destined for the masses. This is why until now architecture has benefited the most under the new regime.
However, it remains to be seen whether National Socialism has created a climate favorable to the creation of individual works, born from personalities of sufficient strength. As the epilogue to this study demonstrates, the cultural initiatives of the Third Reich launched before the war and the Franco-German relationships that developed around them laid the administrative and personal groundwork that would later allow the German forces occupying France to operate with such efficiency.
Many of the cultural and political figures who promoted rapprochement through expanded cultural contact would emerge after as prominent figures in the Vichy regime and collaborationist circles in Paris.
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Rather, my hope is that the dark subject of this book will make us that much more cognizant and appre- ciative of how valiant those rare individuals were who broke from the overwhelming forces of public opinion, fear, and prejudice in order to resist the brutal regime of the occupier. The man re- sponsible for downing their plane is Captain von Rauffenstein, commander of the lo- cal German squadron. The film depicts no military action; we see only Rauffenstein awaiting the arrival of the French officers while a Viennese waltz plays on a gramo- phone in the background.
In anticipation of company, Rauffenstein orders one of his men to mix up a celebratory champagne fruit punch. The civility of the encounter leaves us confused as to whether these French men are prisoners or merely houseguests. The Germans are consistently depicted as reluctant captors, just as fed up with the war as are their French counterparts.
Waiting outside the cell, the old soldier smiles upon hearing the French- man play a song. While film historians have generally agreed that the principal theme of the film is pacifist international- ism and human compassion overcoming the barriers of nation and language, it is interesting that the film does not demonstrate such a closeness between any other nationalities—the Rus- sians and British are kept quite apart from the emotional intensity of the Franco-German rela- tionships.
Indeed, one senses an antagonism on the part of the French prisoners toward their English allies, as several film historians have noted. The thought of them now turns my stomach: These things form a bond. The fact that we had been on opposite sides was the merest detail. Indeed, as I come to think of it, it was even better—a further instance of my theory of the division of the world by horizontal frontiers, and not into compartments enclosed in vertical frontiers. This was a large constituency, given that nearly half the men in France had served in the war.
They made up one-quarter of the electorate in the s still a time when only men were allowed to vote , and a profound pacifism would become their defining characteristic. Indeed their repudiation of war was not difficult to understand: In Verdun, one thousand soldiers had died per square meter. The traumas of the returning wounded also served as a continuous reminder of the horrors of Chapter 1 war—dangling empty sleeves, glass eyes, and wheelchairs were everyday sights.
Half of the 6. Scores of others would suffer from other physical and: Ten departments in the north and east had been ravaged, with railways, roads, factories, and farms destroyed or badly damaged. More than one thousand towns and villages had been razed and more than two thousand others virtually demolished: The First World War had a long-term demographic impact as well: This would lead to a severe lack of manpower as well as anxiety about the possibility of enlisting sufficient recruits if another war were to break out. France was determined not to repeat the tragedy. In a period of extreme internal po- litical conflict—civil war was considered a possibility, especially after the outbreak in Spain— pacifism was oddly one of the few things shared by the Left and Right.
On the Left, a distaste for the French nationalism of the past was replaced with the utopian vision of an international pacifist movement. A cascade of financial and political scandals further undermined public confidence in their political leaders. The result was a perilous instability: The internal jockey- ing for power overrode any sustained consideration of how to handle external affairs in an effective manner. Not even the Popular Front leaders questioned the belief that antifascism and pacifism could somehow be reconciled, though Blum did finally initiate a rearmament program in When the Popular Front government fell, pacifist sentiments throughout the country became even more fervent.
For example, Simone Weil, a well-known pacifist and intel- lectual who was active in the worker strikes of , wrote on several occasions that if forced One can quite well conceive that nothing essential would be affected. It thus alerted the public to German expansionism, but the society as a whole failed to acknowledge the real threat to France. Burrin notes that Nazi Germany aroused more interest among the French than the Weimar Republic ever had. Whereas in the s fewer than 30, French people visited Germany every year, more than , visited in , with this number falling only slightly in Despite the fact that the treaty violated a previous one between France and the Czechs, it nevertheless won massive support in the French Par- liament.
The film offered them an alternative, kinder vision of their German neighbors. Rauffenstein later berates himself for fatally wounding his friend, asks for his forgiveness, and explains that he had intended only to shoot his leg. As admirable as the concept of a moral war might be, it is a complete fallacy. France did its best to avoid any real action, engaging only briefly in fighting in the Saarland. In the fall of that year, La grande illusion was banned by the military authorities for its pacifism and for promoting friendship with the enemy.
But these were futile gestures; the opportunity for France to prepare adequately for war had passed. Some groups did con- tinue their attacks on Hitler, notably members of the French Communist Party, though news of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August had thrown the party into total disarray. The Germans entered Paris on June 14 and declared victory on June Following his rise to power, Hitler and his cohorts began laying the military and psychological groundwork for the victory that would come in They waged an intensive seven-year cultural campaign to convince the French that Germany shared their desire for a lasting peace in Europe.
The Nazis devoted significant resources to this cultural enterprise because they understood its future dividends in military terms: Germany could buy more time for its rearmament efforts and also ensure that France would choose not to intervene in its expansionist plans eastward. The Third Reich did not invent the idea of a Franco-German entente—rather, it built on the long history of rapprochement negotiations initiated in the s following World War I.
While each country had had its own agenda and national interests in mind, these earlier efforts at securing a lasting peace had been made in good faith and had resulted in several significant treaties. Hitler never had any intention of upholding these treaties; his interest in exploiting the discourse of peace was only an intermediary step toward the future domination of France and the rest of Europe.
Nevertheless, his leadership successfully appropriated the language of this previous era, a language that still had currency with the French public. The success of the Nazi campaign is surprising when one considers how far from reality the French needed to stray in order to believe German pacifist propaganda. Hitler saw France not only as a military threat but as a racial one as well. Hitler had written Mein Kampf during his imprisonment after the failed Nazi putsch of When unauthorized French translations did appear, a French court ordered them destroyed.
Only abridged ver- sions were available afterward. France chose instead to listen to a different Ger- man voice, one that offered the mirage of peace. Hitler used this polycratic organizational strategy in many other areas of government as well because it undermined traditional codes of institutional conduct, leaving him as the supreme authority in the com- peting hierarchies. His diplomatic voice offered the illusion of continuity with the Revisionspolitik of the previous decade, which sought to eradicate the injustices of the Versailles Treaty while creat- ing diplomatic bridges to guarantee European peace.
Franco-German student exchanges, youth movement con- ferences, war veteran reunions, art exhibits, academic symposia, joint mass rituals, publica- tions, and retreats. They involved some of the most notable leaders and intellectuals of the two countries as well as ordinary citizens. This intense cultural propaganda produced a complex and often baffling landscape of contradictions: Though the Third Reich initiated much of the cultural contact and many of the gestures of friendship between the two countries, the strength of pacifist emotion in France meant that the wave of rapprochement would gain a momentum of its own.
While some may dismiss the cultural contact between France and Germany as relatively insignificant in relation to the more serious world of politics, I would argue that the cultural discourse significantly influenced not only the general mass psychology of France but gov- ernment foreign policy decisions as well. Despite the repeated hostile actions Chapter 1 of the Third Reich—its withdrawal from the League of Nations, violations of the Versailles The Cultural Politics of Treaty, and racial persecution within its borders—France chose not to abandon its policy of Rapprochement rapprochement until late in or early , after the Munich accord and the German: It quickly became evident, however, that the endgame had finally materialized: Nonetheless, the Franco-German cultural initiatives begun in had helped keep the fantasy afloat for nearly the entire decade.
Yet in order to fully understand how the discourse of rapprochement developed in the s, we must briefly return to the moment when a Franco-German rapprochement was first initiated, in the early s. Dur- ing this time foreign ministers Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann embarked on a diplo- matic campaign to bring France and Germany into a more stable entente. As I have already mentioned, it was on the foundation of this history and its resulting Franco-German cultural network that the Nazis built their own deceitful campaign. Much of the treaty had been gutted by a series of disappointing agreements with the United States and Britain, and France was not convinced that its political alliances with the countries of Eastern Europe would function as a real counterweight to Germany particularly after the signing of the German-Polish pact.
In the absence of any Anglo-American guarantee, and faced with an economically resurgent Germany, the French government began to seek security through more conciliatory, diplomatic negotiations with its former enemy. This era in French diplomatic history was dominated by the eloquent politician Aris- tide Briand, foreign minister of France from to Briand believed that the only way to truly contain Germany was to integrate it fully into the economic and political life of the European community.
He developed a productive working relationship with his Ger- man counterpart, Gustav Stresemann, who served as foreign minister from until his death in These two statesmen worked together on several agreements that would bring the two countries into greater political and economic cooperation. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg, and delegates from several other countries, the multilateral treaty declared a shared opposition to war but established no real political provisions to make sure it was avoided.
That same year, with nationalism on the rise, the NS- DAP posted an enormous gain at the polls, becoming the second largest party in the Reich- stag. At the Conference of Lausanne, with the German government now under Franz von Papen, reparations were drastically reduced and replaced by a bond issuance. The Expansion of French and German Cultural Organizations During the Briand-Stresemann era, increased political contact between France and Germany was paralleled by a significant increase in the cultural activity of their foreign ministries.
By this time, the French and German foreign ministries had come to understand the importance of influencing public opinion abroad through cultural and educational projects and had be- gun setting up offices for this purpose. Each created new government agencies: German culture abroad and to maintain contact with ethnic Germans living in other coun- tries. It also took on such projects as establishing chairs in French literature at universities in Finland, Poland, Bulgaria, and other countries.
The importance placed on disseminating cultural capi- tal abroad was clear in the annual expenditures: According to ministry documents, the reason that spending was being increased for cultural propaganda at a time when budgets for other government departments including the military were being cut was fear concerning the rapid expansion of German cultural activity abroad. As one deputy expressed bitterly: Although the Reich cannot find a single pfennig to spend on repairing the devastated regions of France that it destroyed, it is finding millions and millions of marks.
The Nazi regime replaced Epting remained in this position until , after which he became director of the prominent Deutsches Institut or Institut alle- mand during the occupation from to Epting started the Center for Information and Documentation on the New Germany, which provided the French public with an extensive library of Nazi books, newspapers, and magazines. Epting also offered musical concerts and, beginning in , German language courses. He would regularly bypass the DAAD hierarchy entirely and address his business directly to the ministry. Unlike the DAAD, the DFG had not originated in the s as a government initiative but was organized by cultural leaders interested in furthering a Franco-German rapprochement.
Nevertheless, after it functioned much like a government propaganda organization. Since its membership cut across the upper ech- elons of French political and cultural life, the influence of the group was widespread and had significant impact on the direction of French politics and public opinion. The DFG was founded in Berlin in by the well-known art historian Otto Grautoff, Chapter 1 whose agenda very much reflected the spirit of the Locarno era. Grautoff and his colleagues The Cultural Politics of believed that by promoting cultural understanding between the peoples of France and Ger- Rapprochement many they could help establish an authentic peace in Europe.
Among its three thousand: Beginning in , the Sohlberg Circle organized meetings that brought together French and German youth groups to socialize and discuss various social and political issues. Young people were drawn to these meetings by the promise of peace and by their desire to distinguish their generation from that of Verdun, which had been responsible for so much destruction.
After , Abetz continued to organize these youth meetings, though now he worked in the service of the Hitler Youth. Nazi officials were pleased with the results of these organized meetings, since important French delegates came away with positive impressions of the new Reich. In these images, French and German youth engage in rituals of rapprochement on the snowy slopes and stage impromptu skits over wine and cheese figs.
Large Nazi and French flags serve as the backdrop for the performance, which takes place in a cozy mountain cabin. The humor makes the comingling of youth, swastika, and tricolore seem earnest and unthreatening. French and German members of the youth group Jeune Europe at a ski camp in Bavaria during a week-long meeting in the winter of French and German youth put on a stage show during their joint ski trip in Bavaria during the winter of In addition to the youth meetings, Abetz was responsible for a series of successful encoun- ters between the older generations of French and German veterans from World War I.
In France, the anciens combattants carried significant political clout as war heroes; their national loyalty and patriotism could not be questioned. Hitler understood the depth of their influence, and Nazi officials worked hard to win over this large constituency. Georges Scapini, a war veteran and deputy from Paris, also had a highly publicized meeting with Hitler. Torchlight marches and a solemn joint oath of peace marked the culmination of the event.
Franz Xaver Reich
As he recounts in his memoirs, the anciens combattants were well represented among the members of the CFA and also filled many of the leadership posi- tions: The veterans were responsible for engaging high-profile political leaders in the activities of the CFA and for expanding the scope of the organization to engage a wider public.
This was not an unintended result but a deliberate strategy. The CFA managed its public relations closely. His collaboration with Fernand de Brinon, who would become vice president of the CFA, proved to be particularly fruitful. As men- tioned above, de Brinon was the first French journalist granted an interview with Hitler in November In this interview, which was published in Le Matin, Hitler announced his desire for an entente with France.
Whereas past German leaders had failed to establish peace, Hitler claimed he would succeed because he had the full support of the German people. The appointment of Laval pleased Berlin because he did not favor, as Barthou had, a French alliance with the Soviet Union, instead preferring rapprochement with Germany. While the contributors to its cultural projects came from diverse academic fields, one can discern common threads in their arguments. Many of their ideas appear to be aligned more with the ideological wing of the party, as defined by Alfred Rosenberg, than with the propa- ganda eminating from Goebbels at its political center.
They offered what might be termed a reactionary form of European identity politics, asserting that Euro- pean peace depended upon acknowledgment of and respect for the differences between na- tions. Prominent writers for the journal strongly rejected the cosmopolitanism of a European Union, arguing that a people could learn to understand and respect the culture of another only once they had reaffirmed their own cultural heritage and specificity. Though differences between the two political revolts were noted, the overall purpose was to legitimize the Nazi takeover of power by placing it symbolically in the same category as the French Revolution.
The issue included a photoessay devoted to the French 14 July celebration that presented ac- cepted displays of nationalistic pride: This was not unusual for the Cahiers; it published many anti-Semitic articles justifying Nazi racial policy throughout its run in the s. DFG members further defended Nazi policies by emphasizing that Germany was not a co- lonial power and, unlike France and England, was not imposing an imperialist form of author- ity on another culture. The fact that Germany continued to protest the seizure of its colonies under the Versailles Treaty was conveniently omitted.
Defending these aggressive acts, the DFG explained that the Reich was not forcing itself as an imperialist power on a sovereign nation but rather was liberating German nationals from an oppressive regime. According to Friedrich Grimm in the September issue of the Cahiers, Germans had lived as second-class citizens in Czechoslovakia; the Sudetenland region suffered the highest unemployment rate in the country, its roads were left in disrepair, and German busi- nesses were boycotted.
DFG leaders also asserted that the future of world peace depended on a strong Germany to ensure that a reliable system of checks and balances existed both ideologically and geo- politically. As one writer explained, German and Latin cultures were not contradictory but complementary and should work together in a dialectical manner. Though the articles in each issue covered a wide range of topics, including literature, art, folksongs, and agricultural policy, they inevitably concluded with a call for Franco-Ger- man cooperation.
Cultural exchange was put forth as the most effective means of achieving a lasting peace between the two peoples. Intellectuals and artists were assigned the role of build- ing cross-cultural understanding while maintaining respect for differences. The importance of sharing knowledge and culture across borders was literalized in a photograph included in the January issue, which depicts the interlibrary loan office of the National Library in Berlin fig. Two large folios are placed conspicuously at the side of a librarian making notations in a registry: Accompanying this image are others depicting the facades of the French and German national libraries and Figure 7.
The interlibrary loan office of the National Library in Berlin. These images of intellectual exchange constitute one of the many prominent photoessays that were included in each issue of the Cahiers. For the most part, the photographs did not illustrate the articles but addressed their own subject matter with occasional exceptions, as noted above. The style of the photos remains remarkably consistent throughout the s: French and German cultures were clearly separate and needed to be respected as such; these cultures deeply resonated with each other and needed to recognize their mutual dependen- cy.
Simple captions introduced the themes, which for the most part focused on historic and vernacular architecture and rural life: Gothic cathedrals in Braunschweig and Rouen, snow- capped mountains in Bavaria and Mont Blanc, French and German farmers in the fields. Na- tional identity is inscribed in the most seemingly benign terms, such as smiling peasant women with baskets of grapes juxtaposed to idyllic landscapes suitable for any tourist brochure figs.
All references to modern life in these rural-themed essays, including contemporary farming methods of the period, were deliberately avoided. Instead, the DFG presented sober images of horse-drawn plows, farmers with hand scythes, and leather-skinned artisans at work figs. Women in Provence in Figure 8.
Grape harvest in Germany. Grape harvest in France. Chapter 1 The Cultural Politics of Rapprochement: As Romy Golan convincingly documents, the visual arts in France underwent a deep Allemands, October Emblematic depictions of French peasants were also common in interwar French paint- Private collection. This scene of dignified repose is significantly distanced from the chateau, the residence of the real beneficiaries of their toil, which in the painting is far away on a hill in the background. The ideological impetus behind the popularity of such painted subjects was consistent with the motives that drove the selection of photographic motifs in the Cahiers Franco-Allemands.
Not only did they lose more materially with the destruction of villages and farmland, but they also sacrificed more human lives in the conflict. More than 40 percent of the soldiers killed in the war had come from a rural background. However, when one considers that France was undergoing a rural exodus at this time, the embrace of the peasantry as moral compass and protector of French culture seems paradoxical and tragic.
Roger Chapelin- Midy, Le vin Wine, Photograph by Dominique Cornille. Another favored subject of Cahiers photoessays was the life of French and German youth. In the seg- ment of photographs from Germany, a band of Hitler Youth is depicted marching through the mountains of Bavaria singing in unison. An image of the German Work Service on the facing page depicts bare-chested members standing at attention in orderly rows, each with a: The next spread of photographs depicts two German Chapter 1 girls, also in youth-group uniform, singing and playing the accordion; on the facing page is The Cultural Politics of an image of French children playing in the Jardin du Luxembourg fig.
Two more photo- Rapprochement graphs of French youth follow: By juxtaposing militaristic photos to leisurely or pastoral images, the Cahiers attempted to neutralize the more ominous associations of youth being prepared for war. This interpreta- tion is supported by the argument proposed by Abetz in the accompanying essay. His piece is actually the transcript of a lecture he had presented the previous month to the Parisian Rive gauche society, a group that hosted many Nazi and French pro-Nazi speakers in the s.
Abetz is quick to point out that the organization of eight million children and adolescents was not under the authority of the army but independent and self-governing. Its leaders had risen from among the ranks of its youth members. This public relations campaign to transform the Hitler Youth organization into a peaceable Boy Scout troop would become an important propaganda tool in the course of Franco-Ger- man relations. The sojourn be- gan with a large reception hosted by the CFA, during which which the Hitler Youth leaders invited one thousand children of French war veterans for a two-week paid trip to Germany this subsequent trip took place in early Further, they convened with various French youth groups and representatives of the anciens combattants and left flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier fig.
While in Paris the Hitler Youth offered several well-attended Figure The newly created Hitler Youth songs had been introduced previously in an article in the Cahiers, which was accompa- nied by an article by Henri Jourdan of the French Institute of Berlin on the genre of French folk songs. Again, the intent of the juxtaposition was to normalize the culture of the Hitler Youth for the French readership by comparing it to their own national folk traditions. Conference sessions examined socio- political and cultural issues facing the two nations, and included presentations by the usual suspects: The talks covered political as well as cultural topics.
A talk by Hans Friedrich Blunck, hon- orary president of the Reich Chamber of Literature, focused on the influence of French think- ers on German literature and philosophy. A press committee was also created at the instigation of Fernand de Brinon during a session with French and German journalists.
This move was most likely a reaction to the increased political tension between the two countries—much had changed in the months between the Paris exposition and Baden-Baden. In March, Hitler had marched into Austria and soon after- ward began demanding territorial concessions from Czechoslovakia while amassing troops on its border.
Though France was theoretically obliged to aid Czechoslovakia in the event of an invasion according to the terms of their alliance, it became clear that Foreign Minister Bonnet: The desire to appease Hitler was shared by Brit- Chapter 1 ish premier Neville Chamberlain, who saw it as a means of avoiding war. We have had many clashes with the French nation in the course of history.
But we are nevertheless in some ways part of the same grand family of European peoples. We have not just caused each other irritating problems and much sorrow but are also indebted to each other for a tremendous cross-pollination. We have given each other many joys and much beauty. We must be fair to one another; then we will discover that we have fewer reasons to hate one another than to admire one another. For example, Josef Nadler, professor at the University of Vienna, gave a talk on the contemporary state of German literature in which he argued that Jewish Bolsheviks had overrun German publishing.
He maintains that by German literature was dominated by translated Soviet tracts aimed at inciting a proletarian revolution. Fischer asserts that all aspects of political and social life should be based on the laws of heredity. Sacha Gui- try, who had just released his polyglot film Les perles de la couronne The Pearls of the Crown, was also scheduled to present with Jacqueline Delubac a report on theater and film in France, but it seems that at the last minute he was not able to attend. Perret, who had designed the Museum of Public Works for the exposition, discussed the importance of classical principles in contemporary architec- ture.
Cahiers Franco-Allemands, June Rapprochement This question is particularly charged when one considers the career of a man such as Perret: Perret would serve on the honorary committee for the infamous Arno Breker ex- hibit that took place in Paris in In the end, the everyday decisions to accommodate made the job of the occupier much less onerous. French section of the exhibit Germany and France: Landscape and People, in Baden- Baden, June German section of the exhibit Germany and France: The French and German sections Chapter 1 were divided, with each containing photodocumentation of regional architectural sites, fish- The Cultural Politics of ermen, farmers, and other readily identifiable national subjects.
The photographs were inter- Rapprochement spersed with artisanal crafts, busts of important cultural figures, and historic paraphernalia. The sections devoted to French and German art, not surprisingly, contained work executed in a traditional, representational style—mostly landscape paintings and figurative sculpture. Again, the visual displays were intended to convey the message that Germany and France were separate nations whose peoples nevertheless remained spiritually connected: The organization of the Franco-German exhibit in Baden-Baden reflected the importance placed on visual culture exhibits during the s to legitimize a potentially controversial political discourse.
The German pavilion occupied a similar critical position: Indeed, as I have already pointed out, the German participation in the exposition represents the height of the Nazi campaign for a Franco-German rapprochement, as well as the height of French hopes that such a peace with their hereditary enemy could be achieved. As revealed in the next chapter, the discourse of rapprochement would have tangible, material benefits for the Third Reich, for it was supposedly in the spirit of cooperation that the French worked so hard to accommodate the demands of the Nazi regime during the planning and construction of the pavilion.
Archives Diplomatique de Nantes AN. Centre national de la recherche scientifique MAE. Septembre —Octobre Paris: Flammarion, , All translations in this book are my own unless otherwise noted. Contested Nationhood in Twentieth-Century France, ed. Steve Ungar and Tom Conley Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, , 19— For a comprehensive exami- nation of the conservative shift back to a pastoral and regional construction of French culture, see Romy Golan, Modernity and Nostalgia: Yale University Press, University of Minnesota Press, , — The surge of reactionary politics in was in part a direct response to the success of the Left in the French election of May See Robert Soucy, French Fascism: Yale University Press, , The Croix de Feu comprised , members by mid, when the Popular government banned Notes it along with two other extremist leagues.
In , Gringoire reached a total of , subscribers, while Candide counted , One can compare these figures to the subscription total for Vendredi, a periodical aligned with the Popular Front, which attracted about , regular read- ers. Defending Democracy, —38 Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, , —54; and Jackson, France: The Dark Years, — Oxford: Oxford University Press, , 78— France in the s New York: Norton, , Weber cites an American study of French journalism of the period that report- ed the vast majority of the Parisian press being on the Right.
According to the study, twelve publications of the Right and extreme Right had 1. The Dark Years, Fascist Ideology in France, trans. University of California Press, Sternhell examines the extent to which fascist ideology was embed- ded not only politically but also intellectually in French society. Philippe Burrin, France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise, trans. Janet Lloyd New York: New Press, , The Dark Years, 79— Kaplan, Reproductions of Banality, Hase und Koehler, Macmillan, , The film was also favored by the French government of the time.
See Olivier Curchod, La grande illusion Paris: Norman Denny New York: Atheneum, , Naomi Greene De- troit: Wayne State University Press, Halsey II and William H. Simon and Schuster, , Renoir, My Life and My Films, Curchod, La grande illusion, Weber, Hollow Years, Politics and Society, —, 2nd ed. Edward Arnold, , 79— McMillan, Twentieth-Century France, Perrin, , — However, his idea had no chance of succeeding, as the parties were so divided by this point.
Formative Writings, —, trans. University of Massachusetts Press, , — Cited also in Weber, Hollow Years, 19n. Raymond Rosenthal New York: Pan- theon, , Burrin, France under the Germans, 41— Members voting in favor of the Munich agreement came to , and there were just 75 against it—73 Communists and 2 others.
Jean Renoir, La grande illusion, trans. Lorrimer, , 8. Later, in February , forty-four Communist deputies would be put on trial; most were sentenced for up to five years. Quoted in Weber, Hollow Years, The Dark Years, — Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Houghton Mifflin, , , , Christian Leitz, Nazi Foreign Policy, — The Road to Global War London: Routledge, , Hitler, Mein Kampf, Philippe Burrin confirms that even though most of the French public had not read Mein Kampf, they were provided with good information about it.
See Burrin, France under the Germans, Democratic Revolution in Europe, — Chicago: University of Chicago Press, , Martin Broszat, The Hitler State: Longman, , — On the competition between the various leaders in foreign affairs as they vied for intelligence infor- mation, see Zachary Shore, What Hitler Knew: Oxford University Press, The debate over how National Socialist foreign policy developed and who shaped it is ongoing and the literature extensive.
For a useful summary of past studies on the subject— structural-functionalist, concept pluralist, and polycratic approaches—see Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictator- ship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 4th ed. Arnold, , — Leitz, Nazi Foreign Policy, Weinberg similarly concludes that Hitler remained hostile to France in formulating foreign policy: See also John Weitz, Joachim von Ribbentrop: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, , The Decline and Fall of a Great Power, ed.
In this article, Jackson argues that the French policy of appeasement lasted until after the Munich accord, when Prime Minister Edouard Daladier finally decided to counter the views of Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet. Germany and the West, — Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni- versity Press, , Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, trans. Richard Deveson New York: Princeton University Press, , — Society, Economy, and Politics in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed.
Cambridge University Press, , Holborn, History of Modern Germany, Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: Hoover Institution Press, , Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, — Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst, — Bonn: Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst, , Kleinheinrich, , Ina Belitz, Befreundung mit dem Fremden: Peter Lang, , — Belitz, Befreundung mit dem Fremden, Broszat, Hitler State, — Abetz had excellent Nazi credentials.
Rita Thalmann, La Mise au pas: Fayard, , 37; Burrin, France under the Germans, Scapini was introduced to Abetz by Bertrand de Jouvenel. Librairie Stock, , 57— Though Pichot was a devoted member of the CFA, he would become one of the few members to resign from the group after the events of Kristall- nacht changed his opinion of the Nazi regime. See Burrin, France under the Germans, 55, Unteutsch estimates that the Cahiers reached a circulation of two thousand by the late s.
Unteutsch, Von Sohlbergkreis zur Gruppe Collaboration, After the war, both men were tried and executed. Michael Marrus and Robert O. Basic Books, , 6, 78, — The German photographers included E. This premise is repeated frequently in the Cahiers. Whoever lives on the soil of France become what is called French by the effect of a mysterious law. University of North Carolina Press, , 28— Golan, Modernity and Nostalgia, See Christian Faure, Le projet culturel de Vichy: Folklore et revolution nationale, — Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon,: Nearly all the talks pre- sented at the conference were published in the Cahiers.
According to Gobineau, the purity of race alone decided the success of a culture, with the Aryan race being the purest among contemporary lineages. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Schocken, , Golsan Ha- nover, NH: University Press of New England, , Burrin, France under the Germans, n It appears that Guitry was replaced by Pierre de Lestringuez. Nevertheless, Guitry would continue to have a relationship with the group and would publish an article in the Cahiers under occupation.
His lecture was subsequently published in the Cahiers. Seuil, , Similarly, Gui- try would go on to make numerous films under the occupation and was known to have socialized with Tallandier, , —61; and Alan Williams, Republic of Images: Harvard University Press, , — Burrin, France under the Germans, Burrin does an excellent job of distinguishing the various forms and degrees of accommodation that occurred during the occupation.
He contends that the first form of accommodation was determined by the need to have the economy and public services of France con- tinue to operate. Although most of the accommodation in this category may not have been primarily prompted by politico-ideological motives, these were often present in some limited or diffuse form, establishing a connivance that rendered such gestures of coopera- tion all the easier to make.
MIT Press, , Nancy Troy has argued that the exposition was already marked by a strong competition between France and Germany, instilling in the French a feeling of national insecurity with regard to their accomplishments in design and modern production methods. Yale University Press, , 47— Museum of Modern Art, , Klaus Hildebrand et al. The German ambassador to Paris, Graf von Welczeck, likewise confirmed the political importance of the economic treaty.
On the occasion of the signing of the Franco-German trade agreement in July , he stated: Artemis, , Arms and Economics in the Third Reich Paris: Mouton, , , Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, —, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, , 23—35, 49, By dumping German prod- ucts abroad, the Nazis hoped to procure the needed foreign credits. On the competition between different ministries, see Carroll, Design for Total War, — Private businesses formed their own organizations in an attempt to improve commercial relation- ships.
The French government invited forty-nine foreign nations, and forty-seven responded affirma- tively. The Third Reich was one of the last nations to join the exposition. Its acceptance came a year and a half later than those of Italy accepted 25 March and the Soviet Union 30 April ; Belgium, Great Britain, Egypt, Hungary, and Japan, among others, all accepted before the end of Danilo Udovicki maintains that the placement of the foreign pavilions was determined in the course of the third concours in the first series of competitions for the design of the fairgrounds sponsored by the exposition committee.
Imprimerie Nationale, , 2: The plan directeur of 2 March indicates the final placement of the Soviet and German pavilions. French legislation at this time required goods to be marked with their country of origin. SICAP represented a combination of private and state interests; the state provided the company with working capital, controlled one-third of the stock, and accounted for one-third of its silent partners and administrators. The company also handled the Franco-German exchange of coke for iron ore. Through this mechanism, Germany very nearly became the sole provider of coke to France.
The level of French iron exports to Germany also rose dramatically, resulting in the development of closer ties between French and German industries. This occurred during a worldwide iron shortage, and therefore the SICAP agreement worked against the interests of other European nations, which also wanted to trade coke for French iron. France exported raw materials whereas it imported German manufactured goods. The goods ordered from Germany included steel, ceramic materials, rubber mats, linoleum, electrical equipment, and scientific instruments for physics, chemistry, and astronomy.
A concentrated network of water, gas, and sewage systems beneath the pavilion made the building: In addition, the pavilion was situated directly on the Notes heavily trafficked Avenue de Tokio. It was thus necessary to construct the pavilion on a platform 4. Traffic could travel freely through a tunnel under the pavilion. The French government ultimately assumed about 60 percent of the total cost of regional participation. See also David B.
Brownlee, Building the City Beautiful Phila- delphia: A report on these meetings appeared in Cahiers France-Allemagne 11 To counteract the flight of capital and to stimulate investment and trade, the French government implemented the first of two devaluations of the franc in September Jackson, Popular Front in France, 20, — One would presume that this memorandum was written by Campe, PA Paris a. Unsigned memorandum presumed by Campe from the German embassy in Paris, 7 December The total cost of the German pavilion was 17,, francs, or francs per cubic meter.
The extensive efforts of the Quoted from a report written by Campe, PA Paris b. The document is dated 22 January , although it would have been impossible for his report to predate the newspaper article in question from 23 January. In order to cover the cost of the pavilion 30, RM , the German government invented yet another means of acquiring funds hors clearing. The steel infrastructure of the pavilion had been completed by the beginning of March. About three thousand tons of steel were used to build the infrastructure, and approximately the same weight of Jura stone was needed to face the tower walls.
One thousand train wagons were used to bring the construction materials from Germany. Because the space around the pavilion was extremely limited, a separate ware- house fourteen kilometers away from the fairgrounds, in Pantin, was used to receive the arriving materials. Trucks were then used to haul the goods to the pavilion site. During the course of the construction as many as a thousand men at a time were working at the building site.
The Popular Front government required that French companies be hired for a proportion of the building work for the foreign pavilions. Many nations, however, employed French companies to construct the entire pavilion for them. Some structures, as in the case of Mexico, remained incomplete for the dura- tion of the exposition due to French labor unrest. The Third Reich, on the other hand, insisted on trans- porting German workers to Paris to build its pavilion. To comply with the terms of the exposition, the Germans hired the French branch of Siemens, a German construction company, to complete the initial foundation work.
The existence of the Siemens branch in France thus offered the Germans a useful means of satisfying the French proviso, while still allowing them to celebrate the pavilion as a completely Ger-: Jackson, Popular Front in France, — These instructions somehow reached the French press.
The earliest mention of plans for a pavilion was made in April , more than eight months before the official invitation was issued by the French government. For the Paris project, a professor from the Tech- nische Hochschule in Berlin-Charlottenburg suggested drilling seven hundred meters deep to reach water of 28 degrees Celsius.
The German embassy at the time claimed that the City of Paris had an interest in the project, with the possibility of making it a permanent institution after the closing of the exposition. This proposal was completely forgone in favor of a national pavilion. Speer, Inside the Third Reich, By mid-July, however, only Belgium had actually begun to break ground.
The reported dimensions of the German pavilion vary among the existing literature. In the official German catalog for the German pavilion, Robert Kain wrote that the hall was by 20 meters, and 15 meters in height. Deutsche Abteilung Berlin, , 24 hereafter referred to as Deutsche Abteilung.
Wilhelm Lotz reported the pavilion hall was meters long: Joachim Petsch, in his study, cited the same statistics as those reported by Kain: Baukunst und Stadtplanung im Dritten Reich Munich: Hanser, , While Nazi state architecture was intended to intimidate enemies of the regime, it was also supposed to play a role in psychologically preparing the German people for war, setting the ideological stage for mobilization. Europe under the Dicta- tors, —45 London: Hayward Gallery, , Manchester University Press, , The sculpture of the German eagle was created by Schmid-Ehmen.
The objectives behind the involvement of French architects in the building of the foreign pavilions were to reduce the severe unemployment plaguing the French architectural profession during this period and to assure some base level of architectural consistency to the fairgrounds overall. In the case of Germany, it seems that these architects had little impact on the actual design of the pavilion.
Rather, as outlined by the French exposition committee, their purpose was mainly to facilitate the bureaucratic aspects of under- taking a building project in a foreign country. They were responsible for guaranteeing structural soundness and were also available to prepare documents, write official correspondence, manage the bookkeeping, and oversee the worksite. The Secret Diaries, trans. Macmillan, , 3 December entry.
Routledge, , 2.