Genocide in Rwanda. The Role of the Media in Confusing Public Opinion and Encouraging the Killings.

Acceptance of the right to life necessarily implies others, such as the subsistence needs of food, water, shelter and security. Although scholars do not agree on a comprehensive or prioritized list of rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of is instructive in this regard. It lists, in order, the right to life, liberty and security of person, freedom from slavery or servitude and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The second key element of human rights is that there exists an obligation on the part of others to guarantee them. This obligation leads to the solidarist assertion that states are responsible mainly for the preservation and promotion of their citizens' welfare.

While individuals have obligations to respect one another's rights, it is in the context of society, organized as a state, that humans are best able to realize their rights. Herein lies a great dilemma: A solidarist conception of international society does not deny the necessity or legitimacy of the state's role in ordering the relations and pursuing the interests of its citizens.

Rather, solidarists question whether a state has any moral legitimacy independent of the people within its borders: Unless some independent sense can be given to the idea of the state as a moral agent, this view cannot be very persuasive. The sovereign authority of states implies that each enjoys autonomy and freedom from external interference in pursuing its interests. Solidarists argue, though, that this autonomy must not be seen as absolute, but rather within the context of human rights.

They believe it is in order to protect the rights of its citizens, promote their welfare and pursue their common ends that a state requires freedom from external interference. If a state government is failing to meet its obligations in fulfilling the basic human rights of its citizens, solidarists suggest there is no reason to recognize its claim to sovereign authority as legitimate. This is precisely the point Fernando Teson makes in asserting that "a government that engages in substantial violations of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy, but its international legitimacy as well.

First, it loses its claim to autonomy and freedom from external interference.

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Second, the obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens ultimately defaults to all of humanity. Given that the community of humans is for practical purposes organized into states, the policing of human rights abuses is best dealt with by the society of states.

The Media and the Rwanda Genocide

Solidarists point to Chapter VII of the UN Charter as providing the legal basis for intervention in the event of gross human rights abuses. Article 42 of this chapter authorizes the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Of particular note is the Convention on Genocide which makes genocide a crime under international law and commits all members to "prevent and punish" it.

Solidarists assert that human rights violations and widespread suffering cause instability and thereby threaten international peace. The authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seem to acknowledge this in stating that "it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected.

A solidarist conception of international society, then, argues that all humans are ends in themselves and thus possess basic inalienable human rights. While human rights are best realized within the context of sovereign states, a state may lose its claim to non-interference if it fails to protect these basic rights for its citizens.

The international community is justified, and the UN Security Council is authorized under international law, to intervene in a sovereign state to safeguard basic human rights. The maintenance of order does not preclude the pursuit of justice in international society; the former does not and must not always "trump" the latter.

This is the solidarist argument in favor of humanitarian intervention. A pluralist conception of international society denies the existence of basic human rights and is based on the belief that no common community of mankind exists. Pluralists argue that a variety of political cultures, based on different moral values, exists among the society of states. In order to protect these values and preserve the distinct ways of life of each state's citizens, pluralists believe the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are key to both order and justice in the international community.

Pluralists do not deny that certain rights and duties exist in international society, but claim these only exist with regard to states and not peoples, noting that the members of the United Nations are undisputedly the former and not the latter. They point to Article 2 7 of the UN Charter which recognizes the sovereign equality of all states and declares "nothing [in the Charter] shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

Legacy of Rwanda genocide includes media restrictions, self-censorship

Based on the above, pluralists criticize the solidarist advocacy of humanitarian intervention on three main grounds: Each of these criticisms is serious and requires some consideration. The argument for cultural relativism is based on the assertion that there is no universal conception of human rights. Advocates of cultural relativism note that it is only Western democracies that place great emphasis on human rights, while in many other parts of the world individual freedoms rank below the needs of family or community.

Vincent summarizes well the case for cultural relativism: There is no universal morality, because the history of the world is the story of the plurality of cultures, and the attempt to assert universality. In order to preserve and protect cultural distinctiveness, state sovereignty must be respected, thereby creating a "presumption against intervention. However, as Simon Caney has noted, there are two weaknesses to this argument.

First, it denies any commonality of values among the world's cultures when in fact some consistency does exist: All cultures, be they Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, secular or Christian, value the sanctity of human life. Similarly, it is difficult to think of any culture that welcomes drought, famine, disease, murder and malnutrition. Consequently cosmopolitan principles of humanitarian intervention that seek to eradicate these are not imposing values on societies which those societies reject.

The second weakness is that it equates cultures with states, assuming that all governments promote pluralism and protect the cultural values of their citizens. In some situations intervention may. Consider a situation in which a state is persecuting a cultural minority. In such a scenario humanitarian intervention can be justified if it prevents this state of affairs and protects the minority. Thus, states have no claim to absolute sovereignty on the basis of cultural uniqueness if they constantly abuse basic human rights.

Even if a basic set of human rights is accepted across all cultures, many argue that there is no international consensus on specifically what these rights are, what priority they have and which would have to be violated to justify intervention. This criticism is of a different nature because, while accepting that "in theory" there may be basic human rights, it argues that "in practise" they are not currently definable.

Or as Adam Roberts writes: Any attempt to devise a general justification for humanitarian intervention, even if such a doctrine were to limit intervention to very extreme circumstances, would run into difficulty. A blind humanitarianism, which fails to perceive the basic truth that different states perceive social and international problems very differently, can only lead into a blind alley.

Indeed, advocacy of any general principle of humanitarian intervention could well make some states more nervous than before about international discussion of human rights, since they might see this as a stalking horse for intervention. Moreover, if talk of humanitarian intervention might encourage some states to withdraw from the discussion, a lack of international will to address the subject might encourage others to continue, or even increase, human rights abuses within their borders. The argument for armed humanitarian intervention will always be made in extreme cases and will not develop into a general license to interfere in the domestic affairs of states: Not every evil, nor every violation of human rights, therefore, merits external intervention, even when it takes such grotesque and unacceptable forms as apartheid, human sacrifice, bonded labour, female infanticide, untouchability, and racial or religious discrimination.

In many cases, influencing the state by other means is enough to achieve the desired results. This implies that intervention is justified when lives are threatened or there is human suffering on a large scale. The difficulty of defining conditions for international humanitarian intervention should not stop the international community from trying to do so. The arguments of cultural relativism, then, do not preclude intervention in the event of a humanitarian crisis; rather they make us cautious in proceeding.

Arguments against humanitarian intervention based on the dangers of establishing precedents raise concerns with regards to the collapse of international order and the potential for abuse or selectivity. Concern over the collapse of order due to an erosion of the principle of state sovereignty is at best alarmist.

It fails to take into consideration that the concept of sovereignty has taken several centuries to develop and that it continues to evolve. It is reasonable to expect that norms of humanitarian intervention will also take considerable time to develop as international society continues to modify and adapt notions of state sovereignty. Besides alarmism, the concern over dangerous precedents unjustifiably places an emphasis on issues of order and non-intervention over those of justice.

The preference for order and the principle of sovereignty is wrongly presented as an objective, and thus more desirable, goal while justice and the principle of intervention are characterized as having bias toward a particular moral view. It is rooted in a substantive conception of how the world should be arranged of which a necessary element is the belief that there is no 'coherent and pervasive morality which transcends international frontiers and which might then inform and justify particular acts of intervention.

As Caney observes, "the problem is that it is not clear why international order is assumed to be unconditionally valuable. The second charge with regard to establishing dangerous precedents is that it is open to abuse or selectivity. Both of these concerns are valid and are based on the likelihood that states will intervene to serve their own interests and not humanitarian interests. If a general right of humanitarian intervention was recognized by the international community, it could be used as an excuse by any state to interfere in the affairs of another. Historically, such abuses have occurred.

Michael Walzer has written that an historical study of interventions reveals: Indeed, I have not found any, but only mixed cases where the humanitarian motive is one among several. However, most such interventions have been unilateral and have been roundly condemned by the United Nations and its members. The requirement for an international consensus based on the support of the Security Council should prevent abuse of the principle by one or even several powers. If the UN Security Council authorises an intervention, the risks of competitive chaos and insecurity and of pursuit of unilateral advantage may be greatly reduced.

The role of the UN, especially the Security Council, has given a degree of international legitimacy to uses of force that might otherwise have been open to extensive criticism. Selectivity is a significant concern, particularly given the monopoly of control that the permanent members the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China exercise over the Security Council. If a security or humanitarian crisis does not affect one or more of these great powers, it is unlikely to be given much emphasis in the Security Council agenda. Crises in more obscure regions of the world depend on the UN Secretariat's methodical but time-consuming process for identifying issues requiring international attention or action.

With regard to selectivity, it can only be suggested that while every case of human rights abuse may not be treated in the same manner or resolved with the same determination by the international community, this does not mean all such attempts are futile. Selectivity is likely to exist for some time, however, if the aim is to deal one day with all human rights abuses, the first step is to deal with some, and eventually most, of the worst cases. Arguments in favor of maintaining order, then, are overly alarmist and place too high a moral value on the principle of state sovereignty.

Recognizing a right to humanitarian intervention will not result in international anarchy and sanctioning by the United Nations should prevent abuse and selectivity from becoming the norm. A third criticism of humanitarian intervention is that it is largely ineffective. Military intervention, it is argued, is a simple and short-term solution to complex and long-term problems. In short, it is too little too late. No doubt, there is a great deal of truth to this criticism.

Eradicating human suffering and firmly establishing basic human rights must be seen as a long-term project of economic and social development encouraged by international assistance to countries in need. However, two points must be made regarding this argument. First, if long-term development is taken as the alternative to humanitarian intervention it is clear that the international community is failing in this regard: Vincent argues, seriousness about human rights is tested by success in addressing the human wrongs of poverty and starvation.

In an examination of military responses to humanitarian crises Barry Posen, while arguing that armed intervention is highly problematic, claims that there is the potential to save lives given the right circumstances and a sufficient commitment of resources. Solidarist and pluralist conceptions of international society have been examined with regard to humanitarian intervention. It has been suggested that, in keeping with a solidarist conception of humanity, all humans are ends in themselves and thus have a claim to basic human rights. It is in the context of sovereign states that humans are currently best able to realize their common rights.

While respect for pluralism or the cultural uniqueness of different societies requires that states do not normally interfere in one another's affairs, this autonomy is not absolute. States which fail to provide for the most basic rights of their citizens lose their claim to complete autonomy and the international community must by default step in to protect human lives. Humanitarian intervention can be criticized on grounds of cultural relativism, the threat it poses to international order and its overall effectiveness.

However, these concerns do not rule out such international action but rather demonstrate the need for prudence and consideration on a case by case basis. The UN Charter and international law permit intervention under Chapter VII, if one accepts that human rights are not just a domestic affair and have implications for international peace and security as a whole. Even pluralists will acknowledge that "humanitarian intervention is justified when it is in response to acts 'that shock the moral conscience of mankind. Really, then, solidarist and pluralist conceptions of international society both admit to justifications for humanitarian intervention, albeit to quite different degrees.

Solidarists forcefully advocate intervention to protect human rights and prevent suffering. Ultimately, pluralists recognize that occasionally intervention may be justified, but argue for extreme caution and prudence in so doing. Having established that intervention on humanitarian grounds is justified in cases of gross human rights abuses or catastrophic human suffering, it is necessary to determine whether this justification is recognized by the international community. While the debate over humanitarian intervention is centuries old, it has enjoyed a minor renaissance since the end of the Cold War.

International crises that previously would have been viewed through the lenses of east-west rivalries are now being approached in a more pragmatic, if not cooperative, manner. Although there have been moves to ease restrictions on the media, the penal code still threatens prison for criminal defamation and the vaguely defined crimes of divisionism and discrimination. Criminal defamation is often used across Africa to lash out at journalists who criticize authorities, and the African Union, of which Rwanda is a member state, has called for such laws to be removed from the statutes.

But even the limited reforms appear to have not been accepted by some authorities. Even those who support the media reforms and participate in the new structures express doubts about whether the military will respect the spirit of the law. Muvunyi is optimistic but cited incidents when the RMC had to intervene to protect journalists.

He said there had been five instances in the eight months since the RMC was formed where the commission interceded to convince police to release arrested journalists and hand their cases to the self-regulatory body. In one case, Stanley Gatera, editor of the privately owned Umusingi , was arrested in April and accused of corruption. Gatera, who is now living in exile, told me that police accused him of threatening to write about a tavern owner who failed to observe the year anniversary of the genocide if the owner did not pay Gatera a bribe.

He was released after the intervention of the RMC. Gatera, who was forced in to stop publishing and served a year in prison for divisionism and gender-based discrimination , denied the bribery allegation and told me he was set up after giving an interview to Al-Jazeera television on media freedom. Warned by contacts in the police after his release that he was going to be killed, Gatera fled, he told me. In another case, Jeannette Mukamana and Rose Nishimwe, from the campus radio station Radio Salus, were arrested in May after broadcasting material that authorities said was offensive.

The police have no case. They simply say they broke the penal code by insulting the president. The case was resolved, and Mukamana, a journalist, and Nishimwe, a journalism student who had an internship at the station, were reinstated, he said. For some, these cases prove that reforms are kicking in and the RMC is standing its ground, but it is also proof that harassment and threats continue. RMC members acknowledged to me that a high degree of self-censorship remains, though they view it as a legacy from the past.

Many journalists I spoke to blame a continued fear of harassment, threat, and arrest. One of those, the independent journalist Mugabe, told me he had been questioned at secret prisons. Kigali has two types of prison: The government did not respond to a CPJ request for comment about these claims, but Mbanda, of the RGB, denied the country had secret prisons. The cases were highlighted by the U.

State Department, which stated in June that some were held incommunicado for up to two months, according to news reports. State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf called on the Rwandan government to account for dozens of people who had been forcibly disappeared or reported missing since March. One of those who had been missing, Cassien Ntamuhanga, turned up in court a week after he disappeared.

Ntamuhanga, the director of the faith-based radio station Amazing Grace, which focuses on religion and social issues, disappeared on April 7 and, according to police, was arrested on April 14, news reports said. He was charged in court, along with three others, with endangering state security, complicity in terrorism, and treason. The trial was still under way in October, according to news reports.

The local journalists said they could not identify anything sensitive in his reporting that may have led to his arrest. These incidents took place against a backdrop of repression of opposition figures. In , Bernard Ntaganda, founder of the PS-Imberakuri opposition party who was arrested as part of a pre-election crackdown, was given a four-year sentence for endangering national security and divisionism. Around the same time, Victoire Ingabire, the leader of the opposition FDU-Inkingi party, was charged with collaboration with armed groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, genocide ideology, and divisionism.

His family accused the Rwandan government of complicity. The government denied involvement, according to news reports.

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Nobody has been convicted for the murder. Some opposition figures who left Rwanda have not found safety in exile. In , former military chief of staff Kayumba Nyamwasa, who fell out with the government and was living in South Africa, survived a shooting in Johannesburg. A second failed attack was made against him and his family at a safe house in March Those who criticize Rwanda know how far they go to protect their own nation. Regardless, the cases have had a chilling effect on exiled journalists and those who might wish to go into exile to avoid harassment at home.

To understand media issues in Rwanda, one must take into account this broader context, Mugabe said. It is how society is organized here— strong government, no legitimate opposition, no civil society. Economic issues also have an impact on the media. Asiimwe, the director general of the public broadcaster, said: People are not investing in it as a business, so there are no serious investors.

Even if you were a plumber, you could start a newspaper and not even know the law, not even have a basic understanding. Most papers were run by school dropouts. Muvunyi argued that there was little investigative journalism because few could afford to do it. The financial situation also makes media vulnerable to political pressure. The bulk of potential advertising comes from the government, and these advertisements seldom appear in independent papers. The poll found 43 percent also said they sometimes received their salaries late because of financial constraints faced by employers.

A manager of the popular privately owned Kigali Today website who had been in public relations and asked not to be named because of fear of retaliation, told me: Now he provides transport for his journalists and instructs them not to take brown envelopes. We had a general staff meeting, and some said they took the money. I told them if we heard of that again, there would be immediate dismissal. Margaret Jjuuko and Joseph Njuguna, professors at the University of Rwanda, said the brown envelope phenomenon is difficult to avoid when the media cannot properly remunerate staff.

The public broadcaster, by far the biggest media organization in the country, is trying to address the problem. A firm policy was now in place that accepting a brown envelope meant instant dismissal, he added. This is part of a drive to shake up the public broadcaster, which had been losing ground as private media takes off. Asiimwe sits in a relatively plush office but in a run-down, crumbling building. Asiimwe, who sits under an outsize portrait of Kagame, is part of a new generation brought in to engineer an era of change.

We have a new board now, chosen by a selection panel of five people, and put to the cabinet for approval. We have rewritten our internal statutes and rules.

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How does it reflect what people say and need to know? We are trying to go out to the public and get to see their lives. We have to show what government is doing for the country, and look at the impact on the lives of people. We are beginning to do that. I have been here for only one year, and the institution had been in a culture of working as a government mouthpiece. Many government officials still think we are, but overall we are moving toward becoming a public broadcaster.

It is going well. There is a lot of goodwill from government. Ignatius Kabagambe, a former journalist now with the public agency the Rwanda Governance Board, is troubled by the quality of journalism as a result of the economics of publishing, but argued that the government was starting to address this. Because it is a poor country, probably there was not enough focus on spending money and making [the] effort to train and invest.

Although the partnership, supported by the government, has come to an end, during it Carleton lecturers went to Rwanda and the top Rwandan graduates spent time in Canada. One editor of a small, independent Kinyarwanda newspaper, who asked not to be named for fear of repercussions, said that there was progress, but conditions remained tight. It is a big challenge, but it is also workable.

Meanwhile propagandists spewed out increasingly vitriolic attacks against Tutsi, calling for their extermination, and against those Hutu political leaders who refused to rally to Hutu Power. In addition to preparing the militia as an increasingly effective strike force, political and military leaders affiliated with Habyarimana moved to establish the long-discussed self-defense organization. A week after the Hutu Power rally in late October , a commission of Rwandan army officers met to organize the program.

It was neither signed nor dated, but its authenticity was established by Jean Kambanda, prime minister of the interim government during the genocide. In a statement to the ICTR Appeals Chamber, Kambanda identified the document, said it was regarded as highly confidential, and said that it clearly predated April Through analysis of the content and through comparison with other documents and witness interviews, it appears that the document dates to mid-February or at the latest to March It is important to note who is to participate in the planned program, the proposed organizational structure, the weapons called for, and the description of the groups to be targeted by its activities.

The plan, to be implemented under the general chairmanship of the ministers of interior and defense, created a complex hierarchy of organs and committees to coordinate military, administrative, and political actors. It assigned a variety of tasks from the level of the presidency and the military general staff down to the level of the administrative sector, but in a striking omission, it assigned no task to the prime minister. The prime minister in the months before April , Agathe Uwiliyigiyimana, was not counted among the supporters of Hutu Power and so despite her office, her ethnicity Hutu , and her political credentials, she was not included in the plan.

Similarly, of the four burgomasters in the city of Kigali, one was not involved in implementing the plan: In a detailed analysis of requirements by commune, the plan called for supplying participants with 4, firearms and , bullets. He said that the minister of defense and minister of interior were to be contacted to obtain the necessary firearms for the civilians.

The military commander for operations in the city, present at the meeting, indicated that some parts of the city were already organized and awaiting arms and other supplies. It was reported that other civilian self-defense efforts were already underway in areas outside the city and should continue in collaboration with administrative authorities. Given the scarcity of firearms, it was suggested that the burgomasters should instruct people in the use of traditional weapons, including swords, spears, bows and arrows, and machetes.

The commander of operations in the city was asked to quickly prepare lists of members of the armed forces living in residential areas, and the prefect was asked to provide similar information on reservists and reliable civilians as soon as possible. The next day the prefect of the city of Kigali sent the chief of staff a list of several hundred reservists and others presumably civilians chosen for civilian defense. Their names were listed by cell, sector, and commune, the standard administrative units.

Genocide in Rwanda New York: Human Rights Watch, , p. Race, Power and War in Rwanda Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming , chapter 6. Ideology and Organization Organizers of the genocide used ideology to bring Hutu to fear and hate Tutsi. Among the false ideas drawn on by political leaders and propagandists backing Habyarimana were the following: Tutsi were foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there. Despite the revolution, Tutsi continued to enjoy higher status and greater wealth than Hutu and were in some way responsible for continuing Hutu poverty.

Tutsi posed a danger to Hutu, who were always the victims, whether of Tutsi military power or of Tutsi cunning use of their women to seduce Hutu, use of their money to buy Hutu , and so Hutu had a right and a duty to defend themselves.