Les Intellectuels face à lévénement : Le cas de la NRF (ESSAI ET DOC) (French Edition)

Il faut calculer que les Cahiers ne sont pas aussi compacts que le Mouvement. Si vous voulez faire pages, il ne faut pas mettre plus de pages du Mouvement. L'article de la Revue socialiste: Mais il doit y en avoir. Pourquoi donc mettre dans les programmes, l'union internationale des travailleurs puisque ce n'est rien, ou presque rien? Suivez-vous Z'Avanguardia de Milan?

Il y a beaucoup de bonnes choses ; je vous recommande un article de Frati: Sandron ne se plaindrait pas J'ai enfin fini Renan! Jacques dit qu'il commencera l'impression incessamment. Je crois que c'est fort bien vu. Son opinion a du poids. Le volume de chez Sandron a paru; mais je n'en ai pas encore ; je vous en donnerai un quand j'en aurai. Vous pourriez avoir ainsi l'occasion de faire la connaissance de Flach. Je n'ai pas un besoin urgent de mon manuscrit, parce que j'ai de la copie pour le Mouvement jusqu'au mois de janvier. Que fait donc Lagardelle? Le 4e fascicule de Renan a enfin paru.

Je ne vois qu'Alcan qui puisse prendre la traduction de Croce ; mais il faudra attendre pour le lui proposer que le compte. Il devrait sacquer Morizet sans retard; mais il n'en fera rien Je ne crois pas que le Mouvement puisse marcher. Il aurait fallu changer le titre et le format. Il est probable qu'il a suivi le conseil de Landrieu ". Il n'a pas l'intention de discuter avec Bebel, je suppose! Il aurait fallu rompre le contrat quand la fusion des deux maisons s'est faite. Vous feriez bien de lui en parler vendredi, parce qu'il aura plus confiance en vous qu'en moi.

Cela fait 16 pages qui donneraient probablement 20 pages in-8 dans le nouveau format du Mouvement socialiste. Je vous apporterai dimanche en huit chez Lagardelle le volume sur Pascal et le [ Plus je lis ce livre, plus je me demande ce que peuvent y comprendre les gens qui sont admirateurs mondains de Bergson! J'ai peur que le Mouvement ne reprenne ses bonnes habitudes retardataires. En attendant, je revois le texte des Enseignements sociaux ; ce n'est pas amusant. Cela va me prendre une bonne partie.

J'aimerais mieux jaire du neuf que revenir sur du vieux. Je suis plus heureux que vous puisque je sais enfin ce qu'est devenu Lagardelle: Goethe est bien aussi le contraire du mystique! Le Dantec a voulu discuter dans la Revue du mois, mais il n'a pas perdu l'habitude de dire des. Ne pourriez-vous pas lui en envoyer? Son adresse est maintenant S. So we claim now, as you claimed in the matter of laws, that before threatening us harshly, you should first try to convince and teach us, by producing adequate proofs, that gods exist, and that they are too good to be wheedled by gifts and turned aside from justice.

Imagining the atheist's objections, the Athenian states that the believer must first convince him of the existence of the gods based upon reasoned proofs; and secondly, he must convince him that the gods are all good and cannot be seduced or bribed by gifts. The Athenian is intent here on demonstrating that the gods of the poets and orators never inspire good conduct in their believers, and that in order to distinguish themselves and thus their beliefs from the poets and storytellers, the law-givers must use persuasion and reasoned arguments to convince those who do not believe.

For as it is, this and such as this is the account of them we hear from those who are reputed the best of poets, orators, seers, priests, and thousands upon thousands of others; and consequently most of us, instead of seeking to avoid wrong-doing, do the wrong and then try to make it good. Now from law-givers like you, who assert that you are gentle rather than severe, we claim that you should deal with us first by way of persuasion; and if what you say about the existence of the gods is superior to the arguments of others in point of truth, even though it be but little superior in eloquence, then probably you would succeed in convincing us.

Try then, if you think this reasonable, to meet our challenge. Because we have already established a connection between Book X of the Laws and the Republic in this passage of the "Apologie" A Montaigne and Plato's Laws 51 C , it behooves us to look at yet another connection between the two Platonic works. The passage from the Republic which reinforces the sense of the Athenian's speech from the Laws X. We will certainly not believe these things, nor allow it to be said that Theseus, the son of Poseidon, and Peirithous, the son of Zeus, engaged in dreadful kidnappings, or that any other hero, son of a god, ventured upon dreadful and impious deeds as they now untruthfully tell against them.

We shall compel the poets to deny that these deeds were theirs or to deny that they were children of the gods; they must not say both or attempt to persuade our young men that the gods beget evil and that heroes are not better than ordinary men. As we said earlier, these things are both impious and untrue, for we have shown that evils cannot originate with the gods. And it is of the highest importance that our arguments, showing that the gods exist and that they are good and honour justice more than do men, should by all means possess some degree of persuasiveness; for such a prelude is the best we could have in defence, as one may say, of all our laws.

While the entire argument put forth by the Athenian X. Are not all gods the greatest of all guardians, and over the greatest things? Shall we say that those who watch over the fairest things, and who are themselves eminently good at keeping watch, are inferior to dogs and ordinary men, who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts impiously offered by unjust men?

By no means; it is an intolerable thing to say, and whoever embraces such an opinion would most justly be adjudged the worst and most impious of all the impious men who practise impiety in all its forms. May we now say that we have fully proved our three propositions,—namely, that the gods exist, and that they are careful, and that they are wholly incapable of being seduced to transgress justice? Certainly we may; and in these statements you have our support. We learn from these passages that the gods of the orators and poets are threatening and capable of evil, while the gods of the law-givers are beneficent and perforce capable only of good.

Certainly all four of these examples support Montaigne's interpretation of Platonic thought as he expresses it in C. But in the final sentence of this passage, lest Montaigne's discussion become too theoretical, he recounts a fact from the life of Bion which returns us not only to the conversation between Socrates and Cephalus in Book I of the Republic, but also to Montaigne's succinct reference to Book X of the Laws at the beginning of his passage in the "Apologie" A.

Along with the more general "dangier pressant" of passage A and the "terreur" of old age and approaching death in passage C, Montaigne and Plato's Laws 53 this anecdote from Bion's life imparts a certain realism to Montaigne's metaphysical considerations. The third and final part of the passage we are considering in the "Apologie" C B is actually a summation of the points which Montaigne has made in the preceding paragraphs.

Since the Plato of the Republic and the Laws is above all a social pragmatist, his main concern is to find the best way to affect social behaviour with the most lasting results. In each of the above examples from the Platonic works, persuasion through reasoned dialogue is indicated as the ideal way to teach men about the gods. Perhaps here, above all else, is where Plato and Montaigne diverge in their thinking.

For Montaigne's view in this part of the "Apologie" is that man cannot reason about God. Just as reason fails us in our attempt to establish belief in God, so does it fail those who profess to disbelieve: It is yet again, Montaigne reminds us, fear of death or sickness which brings man back to a belief in God. It is important to note that all of Montaigne's own examples in this part of the "Apologie" demonstrate that it is by fear, not by love or persuasion, that men are brought back to God.

Thus he speaks in his 7 In fact, the synthesis which Montaigne achieves with his allusions to the Laws and the Republic and his example of Bion in this part of the "Apologie" demonstrates a point well made by Regosin, "Montaigne's text could be said to be generated both by example and from examples," in "Le mirouer vague: Certainly it is left to the reader to decide if the anecdote about Bion from Diogenes Laertius generated Montaigne's return to the Platonic corpus or vice versa.

For a comprehensive discussion of the richness and intricacy of structure in Montaigne's examples, see John D. Princeton University Press, , pp. There is a certain irony in the fact that Montaigne has chosen the arguments of a pagan philosopher to buttress his own belief that reason has no place in theological quandaries. His statement that the above examples from Plato's works demonstrate that men are led back to a belief in God either by love or by fear C is really a statement about Montaigne and his own examples.

For while Plato touches on the emotions of fear and gratitude, the predominant argument in Book X is that men should come to a belief in the gods through reasoned dialogue. Montaigne's perspective in this part of the "Apologie" is quite different. Human reason is totally spurned as a means of knowing God, and the emotion of fear, Montaigne observes, is often the only inducement to belief.

Having borrowed from Plato's works in this part of the "Apologie," Montaigne concludes with his estimation of Plato, not as a thinker, but as a man with a religious viewpoint. Montaigne accuses paganism and the lack of Christian grace for leading Plato astray in his belief about the gods.

Plato is wrong to assert that children and old men are more susceptible to religion, as if religious belief was most amenable to an undeveloped reason, or a decrepit mind C B. Montaigne asserts that man should never rely on his logical faculties to determine the existence of God and that faith is the only basis for our belief. II, 12, A Montaigne concludes this part of the "Apologie" with a defense of Sebond's view that the universe does in fact attest to the existence of a supreme being. This seems a reversal of Montaigne's earlier opinion which was that man cannot know God from reasoning about his creatures or the elements of the universe.

In what could be termed a defense not only of Sebond's belief in God, but of his entire cosmic Montaigne and Plato's Laws 55 view, Montaigne speaks with praise of Sebond's labor to establish the existence of God through the evidence of his creatures: C'est ce qu'il nous dit luy mesme, que ses operations invisibles, il nous les manifeste par les visibles. Le ciel, la terre, les elemans, nostre corps et nostre ame, toutes choses y conspirent; il n'est que de trouver le moyen de s'en servir. II, 12, A Plato labors equally hard in Book X of the Laws to prove the existence of the gods, but his means of using reasoned arguments is rejected out of hand by Montaigne throughout the "Apologie.

Speaking of souls or prime movers, the Athenian describes the elements of the universe and the machine which orders them: Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same,—namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods, whether it be that they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it denied that "all things are full of gods"?

The Athenian's "one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness," finds a more precise 56 Ellen Sugg definition in Montaigne's "architecte" and "ouvrier. While the Athenian tells us that the stars, the moon, the years, months, and seasons are "all caused by one or more souls," X.

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Finally, the rhetorical nature of the Athenian's question, "Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it denied that 'all things are full of gods'" X. As in the other three examples, Montaigne fleshes out in precise and concrete images what the Athenian only sketches in a vague manner. In his attempt to defend Sebond's cosmic view, Montaigne appears to reverse his earlier opinion that man cannot know God from reasoning about his creatures or the elements of the universe.

And, if the similarity of content and language which the above passage from the "Apologie" shares with Book X of Plato's Laws is no more than coincidence, Montaigne's debt to Plutarch and ultimately to Plato in the next sentence is unarguable: For the universe is a most holy temple and most worthy of a god; into it man is introduced through birth as a spectator, not of hand- Montaigne and Plato's Laws 57 made or immovable images, but of those sensible representations of knowable things that the divine mind, says Plato, has revealed, representations which have innate within themselves the beginnings of life and motion, sun and moon and stars, rivers which ever discharge fresh water, and earth which sends forth nourishment for plants and animals.

More important for our study is the fact that Plutarch acknowledges his debt to Plato in this passage, summarizing Plato's description of the creation of the universe in the Timaeus. Part of Plutarch's description does bear a resemblance to a specific passage in the Platonic dialogue.

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When Plutarch states that man is introduced into the world to contemplate all "sensible representations of knowable things that the divine mind says Plato, has revealed," 6: We may now say that our discourse about the nature of the universe has an end. The world has received animals, mortal, and immortal, and is fulfilled with them, and has become a visible animal containing the visible—the sensible God who is the image of the intellectual, the greatest, best, fairest, most perfect—the one only-begotten heaven.

Timaeus 92C The second half of Plutarch's summary where he defines these "sensible representations" as the sun, moon, stars, rivers and earth and declares that they have the beginnings of life and motion within them is an accurate, though extremely succinct interpretation of a more detailed account in the Timaeus. There Plato describes the generation and function of each of these elements in the universe. Harvard University Press, 6: For while Plato's Timaeus served as a source of inspiration for Plutarch's piece, "On Tranquility of Mind," a source which Plutarch openly acknowledges, Montaigne fails to credit either Plutarch or Plato for the content and language of his passage in the "Apologie.

Montaigne was no doubt aware of Plutarch's debt to Plato, because Plutarch mentions it himself. In his reproduction of the passage from Plutarch, however, Montaigne fails to include any mention of Plutarch or of Plutarch's borrowing from the Timaeus. The fact that this passage in the "Apologie" can be traced back to the Timaeus through Plutarch is somewhat ironic. For the Timaeus, more than any of his other dialogues, was Plato's attempt to explain the creation of the universe—a universe which he believed to be inhabited by intelligent beings who share in the Divine Intellect.

Up to this point in the "Apologie" Montaigne eschews any attempt by man to prove the existence of a Divine Being by means of his intellect or rational faculties or by reasoning about the creatures or elements of the universe. And, as we shall see in the next part of the "Apologie," Montaigne will spurn any of man's attempts to define himself in terms of a greater or higher intellect.

In this part of the "Apologie," however, Montaigne comes closest to defending Sebond's view. That he does so with the help of Plato's Laws and Timaeus, along with a poetic passage from Plutarch's Moralia, should not surprise us. For often in the Essais Montaigne seems willing to borrow from his predecessors, and if necessary, to reinvent their message to corroborate his own views on a particular subject. In this case he did the borrowing and reinventing on Sebond's behalf, leaving his own thoughts on the matter momentarily aside. Rather than claiming that Sebond's arguments can weather human investigation, Montaigne instead attempts to show the arrogance men have in claiming such pretensions for human reason.

He accomplishes this by comparing men to the animals. Recalling Plato's account of the golden age when men communicated with the animals, supposedly sharing a more equal status, Montaigne praises the animals who share complete communication among themselves C-A. Nature, maintains Montaigne, shows herself equal and fair in her treatment of all living beings: J'ay dit tout cecy pour maintenir cette ressemblance qu'il y a aux choses humaines, et pour nous ramener et joindre au nombre. Nous ne sommes ny au dessus, ny au dessoubs du reste: II, 12, A-B Montaigne views man as an integral part of nature, then, but also as one composed of the same matter as all other creatures of the universe.

The quotation from Lucretius, "Indupedita suis fatalibus omnia vinclis," who was himself a disciple of Archelaus' school of materialism, serves to underscore Montaigne's message that all creatures of the universe have an identical fate, one which does not depend on man's ability to reason. That a large part of this section of the "Apologie" is inspired by Plutarch's Moralia and Pliny's Natural History has been well established.

The Rhetoric of Paradox," French Studies , pp. Determining exactly to whom Montaigne owes a debt for ideas will figure in our discussion. However, the opinion which Montaigne himself formulates about sexual desires in the animal and human worlds proves to be just as significant as the allusions which he makes to other writers and attests once again to the essayist's originality of thought. II, 12, A In these lines Montaigne has paraphrased lines from Plutarch's piece, "That the beasts use reason," adhering, nonetheless, to Plutarch's language: Entre les cupiditez vous voiez beaucoup de differences, comme celle du boire, oultre ce qu'elle est naturelle il est certain qu'elle est aussi necessaire: Amyot , 1: II, 12 A When he compares the influx of unnatural and unnecessary desires into man's being to the influx of foreigners into a city besieged by another power, Montaigne agains borrows directly from the passage in Plutarch's Moralia: Odysseus tries to convince Gryllus to return to the human world, but has little success, as Gryllus asserts that the existence which he leads as an animal is far superior to the one he led as a man.

Plutarch's main thesis, however, that animals are superior to men in the way in which they moderate their sexual desires as well as in the way they practice other virtues, is not fully acceptable to Montaigne.

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The essayist's judgement on this matter is qualified by what he has learned from other writings and his own experience. In the piece from Plutarch, Gryllus maintains that animals have much greater temperance in sexual matters, neither pursuing members of different species nor of the same sex. Cherniss and Hembold, commentators of the Moralia, note that Plutarch owes much of this discussion to the eighth book of Plato's Laws Moralia, Certainly in the following passage from Book VIII Plato makes an implicit claim for sexual relations within the same species only.

His claim that the animals avoid homosexual relations is explicit. Now that we have reached this point in regard to our regulation, but have fallen into a strait because of the cowardice of the many, I maintain that our regulation on this head must go forward and proclaim that our citizens must not be worse than fowls and many other animals which are produced in large broods, and which live chaste and celibate lives without sexual intercourse until they arrive at the age for breeding; and when they reach this age they pair off as instinct moves them, male with female and female with male; and thereafter they live in a way that is holy and just, remaining constant to their first contracts of love: Montaigne, a master of self-contradiction, has in this case called up two passages from Plutarch which essentially contradict each other.

The lesson of the first tale, "Que les bestes brutes usent de la raison," maintains that the animal world observes the prohibition of relations between different species, while the lesson of the second tale, "Quels animaux sont les plus advisez " asserts just the opposite. That Montaigne has made use of such contradictions in Plutarch should not really surprise us. Somewhat later in the "Apologie" when Montaigne and Plato's Laws 63 Montaigne deals with the subject of Pyrrhonism, he will comment himself on the contradictions inherent in the philosophical pursuit referring among others to the writings of Seneca and Plutarch: Cela se voit il pas aussi bien [C] et en Seneque [A] et en Plutarque?

Contrary to what Oppianus recounts, experience, claims Montaigne, proves the contrary. These lines from Book X of Ovid's Metamorphoses tell of the heifer who mates with her sire, the stallion who mates with his filly, the goats who pair with their young, and the birds who breed with their parent birds.

Joan Bodin Lutetiae, , I: Mary McKinley has examined in great detail the subtlety and intertextuality of Montaigne's use of Latin quotations in the Essais. See McKinley, Words in a Corner: Studies in Montaigne's Latin Quotations, 64 Ellen Sugg Montaigne's allusion to Oppianus in this passage certainly proves more than cursory, so powerfully does it unlock a tradition of literary borrowing within the Ancient world, as well as in the world of Montaigne and his contemporaries.

However, as Villey informs us, Bodin appears to have been partially mistaken in attributing the false principle to Plutarch. While Plutarch does make this principle—that animals never mate outside their species—the lesson of one of his tales, we have also seen how he contradicts the same principle in another tale.

Plato, on the other hand, maintains throughout Book VIII of the Laws the principle that animals of any species are exclusionary in their mating habits. Montaigne's ostensible intention in this part of the "Apologie" was to show that men are no better than the animals. Ironically, he ends by demonstrating instead that the animals are no better than men, and that in fact, man and the animals are very similar. Without losing ourselves in the semantic aspect of this argument, we should look to what Montaigne actually achieves in this passage.

In disputing the ideas of those who would establish a basis for human sexual behavior and mores in the natural or animal world in this case, Plato, Plutarch, and Oppianus Montaigne also counters those who would posit a basis for human custom and law in a higher socalled Natural law. French Forum Monographs 26 Lexington, Kentucky: French Forum Publishers, Imprimerie de Robert Estienne, , I. Montaigne and Plato's Laws 65 Before leaving this part of the "Apologie" let us reconsider Villey's contention that Montaigne did not really study Plato or his Laws before 4: The above passage from the "Apologie" A is an excellent example of Montaigne's owing a primary debt to one Ancient writer, in this case Plutarch, and at the same time a secondary debt to Plato, whose Book VIII of the Laws informed a good deal of the passage from the Moralia.

We do know, however, that after Montaigne returned to the same section of Book VIII of the Laws to enrich his discussion of sexual mores in a [C] addition to essay I, 23 and to say much the same thing as he had already said in the "Apologie. University of Exeter, , pp. Along these lines he maintains that the "Apologie" was composed around The Complete Essays, xii-xx. New York, , 1: So, while Montaigne owes a considerable debt to Plutarch's Moralia, borrowing from two separate tales in this passage of the "Apologie" A and a secondary debt to Book VIII of Plato's Laws which informed one of these tales, it is quite possible that he owes yet other debts to Oppianus and Bodin whose commentary on the De Venatione suggested another look at the Moralia.

This entire passage from the "Apologie" A , then, sheds particular light on Montaigne's methods of literary imitation and reinvention in the Essais. Greene's The Light in Troy: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance Oxford: Oxford University Press, More recently Timothy Hampton has brought to light certain examples of Montaigne's encounter with Ancient philosophers in his work, Writing from History. While the central argument of my article does not negate that of Hampton, it focuses rather on the reweaving and assimilation of Ancient texts in Montaigne's work and depends on a close reading and analysis of specific passages in the Laws which demonstrate the intertextuality of Montaigne's writing.

Indeed, Montaigne borrows and assembles in the "Apologie," sometimes through an intermediary such as Plutarch, the materials he needs to articulate his own more modern stance. As Geralde Nakam indicates, Bodin was much more systematic and authoritarian in his views than Montaigne could ever be. For a very instructive comparison of the two philosophers' political views see Nakam's Les 'Essais' de Montaigne. Miroir et Proces de Leur Temps Paris: Nizet, , pp. For an understanding of Bodin's role in forging a new jurisprudence, see Julian H.

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Columbia University Press, Neither the Delphic admonition, "Know thyself," nor the wisdom of St. Montaigne first attempts to show that knowledge, no matter in what form, can never make us happy. Philosophers have never had a happier, more comfortable existence than the common laborer or plowman. On the contrary, the innocent man, the one who remains ignorant of the mysteries of life and goes about his work as best he can, is actually wiser and happier, finding greater peace and tranquility.

It is even more incorrect, asserts Montaigne, to equate knowledge with virtue. He reminds us that it was a desire for knowledge which led man to his original fall and knowledge itself which has failed to redeem him. And a bit later: Finally, he reminds us of St. Paul's admonition that it is the simple man, without knowledge, who gains the kingdom of heaven, "Les simples, dit St. Paul, et les ignorans s'eslevent et saisissent du ciel: In this part of the "Apologie" Montaigne does not so much ponder the question of whether man should search for knowledge or not, but more to what degree man should pursue this knowledge.

His description of the man athirst for knowledge is often that of a man who has accelerated his descent into hell. Indeed, much of Montaigne's language in this section suggests a preoccupation with descents, plunges, falls and abysses. While the ignorant or simple 68 Ellen Sugg man remains steady and stable in his ignorance, the man motivated by a curiosity to know falls at a rate many times faster than his innocent counterpart. Reminding us that Christians are aware of the danger of seeking too great a knowledge of supernatural mysteries, he again speaks of a man who hurls himself to damnation.

Augustine on the necessity to believe in God rather than to know him. Plato, Montaigne tells us, also sees impiety in being too curious about supernatural mysteries. The passage to which Montaigne refers us in Book VII of the Laws extends from AD and, like this part of the "Apologie," is concerned with the degree to which men should seek knowledge of the supernatural. The Athenian's words, which Montaigne has correctly paraphrased in the "Apologie," follow: We commonly assert that men ought not to enquire concerning the greatest god and about the universe, nor busy themselves in searching out their causes, since it is actually impious to do so; whereas the right course, in all probability, is exactly the opposite.

My statement sounds paradoxical, and it might be thought to be unbecoming in an old man; but the fact is that, when a man believes that a science is fair and true and beneficial to the State and altogether well-pleasing to God, he cannot possibly refrain any longer from declaring it. Since in fact, the truth is just the opposite, were not the Greeks erring in their comprehension of the heavenly bodies?

Likewise, maintains the Athenian, when we err in our estimation of the gods are not the gods displeased with the falsehoods engendered about them? Clinias cannot help but agree with the Athenian and so the Athenian concludes his argument.

Knowledge of a subject, whether it be the stars or the gods, should be limited to what we can know and then left alone. Is that to be our agreement? When the Athenian declares that "subjects be learnt up to the point mentioned, and, failing that demonstration, be left alone," he is actually speaking for a wise limit to our knowledge, but a limit which can be pushed ever outward should new knowledge warrant it. While Montaigne correctly paraphrases the Athenian's words in Book VII of the Laws, he precedes them in his own text with a quote from Tacitus—that it is holier to believe about the actions of the gods than to know them—and follows with a quote from Cicero— that it is not only difficult to know the father of the universe, but it is sinful to reveal him to the vulgar if this knowledge ever be found II, 12, C.

This is clearly a case where Montaigne borrows lines from the Laws and manipulates them for his own purposes. For, as we have seen, the Athenian's words in Book VII actually precede a lengthier discussion on the importance of limiting one's knowledge about the gods to what we can know. While the Athenian's "what we can know" remains a somewhat vague entity, it surpasses, nevertheless, what Montaigne believes we can ever know about the actions of God. Along these lines, we should also recall that Plato goes to great length in Book X of the Laws to establish the existence of the "greatest god" and the first causes of the universe.

Montaigne makes no secret of eschewing both of these tasks in the "Apologie. Not least among these is the ability and willingness of the Pyrrhonist to adapt to the laws and customs of his place and time. Since man can never know the truth about these matters and must suspend his judgement, one set of laws appears to be as good as another.

II, 12, A Montaigne himself expresses the opinion that man is better off not knowing, that the majority of the arts are based upon conjecture rather than certain knowledge. From a religious or political point of view the man who professes not to know, merely suspending his judgement, is a better citizen and hence, better off in the long run. Such a view can also accommodate the fideist's practice which is to depend entirely upon faith in God in order to know Him.

Montaigne has recourse to Platonic thought several times in this part of the "Apologie" and makes several comments from which we could infer his opinion of the Greek philosopher. In A, for example, Montaigne notes that some have thought Plato to be a dogmatist while others have considered him a doubting philosopher. Montaigne and Plato's Laws 71 l'autre" A. Indeed, Montaigne claims, the Pyrrhonist stance affects Plato's political and social thought as well as his literary style.

Let us look at three separate passages in the "Apologie" where Montaigne demonstrates Plato's affinity for the Pyrrhonist perspective. The first of these passages C incorporates ideas from both the Laws and the Republic, and as he did in the opening section of the "Apologie," Montaigne again links the two Platonic works as he explores an idea of no small political significance. Montaigne precedes his allusions to Plato by recounting a story about Diogenes.

It seems that when others reproached the Greek philosopher for practicing philosophy, Diogenes responded that it is in the nature of a philosopher to weigh every aspect of a question. However, Montaigne himself reminds us that when composing ideas for the masses, philosophers have always had to take care not to permit their intellectual meanderings to carry them too far afield of the popular beliefs and practices. Plato himself maintained this dichotomy, remarks Montaigne, and in the passage which follows Montaigne draws a clear distinction between Plato the author and Plato the legislateur: Platon traicte ce mystere d'un jeu assez descouvert.

Here Montaigne is most probably referring to Book VII of the Laws where Plato discusses the proper music to be taught to children in his ideal society. In the relevant passage, the Athenian's admonition about music forms part of his disquisition on the regulation of drama and tragedy VII. The most shocking lines in Montaigne's passage, however, contain what he judges to be Plato's estimation of the common man and complete those quoted from above: Montaigne's interpretation of Platonic thought comes from a passage at the end of Book II of the Republic.

In the relevant passage Socrates makes a distinction between the "true lie" and the "verbal lie. What about the verbal lie? When and to whom is is useful and not deserving hatred? Montaigne and Plato's Laws 73 No doubt his conclusion is based on his belief not unlike Plato's in the Laws and the Republic that the mass of men are incapable of following the truth and at the same time peacefully co-existing.

But Montaigne's Pyrrhonism takes him even further along this route. For if knowledge is unattainable, it behooves men to live simply and in accord with the laws and customs of their country.

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The philosophical pursuit of truth can continue to occur on an individual basis, but men must not seek to find its meaning in the political or judicial arenas. The next time Montaigne refers us to Plato's Laws in the "Apologie" occurs in a summary fashion where the essayist presents us with a catalogue of Ancient philosophers and their beliefs in the Divinity C. After telling us what such thinkers as Thales, Pythagoras, Parmenides, and Empedocles thought about God, he gives us a fairly succinct account of Plato's thought on the subject. Montaigne's interpretation of Platonic belief depends on the Timaeus as well as the Laws: II, 12, C The major effect of presenting such a catalogue of thinkers is to demonstrate both diversity of belief and the inability of man to really know God.

In the above passage from the "Apologie" Montaigne claims a similar fragmentation or multifaceted aspect to the images which Plato chooses to speak about God, pointing to the contradictions inherent in the corpus of Platonic dialogues. We should recall that Montaigne refers us to Book VII of the Laws when he discusses the futility of man's effort to learn about metaphysical matters C. Although in that passage VII. As we saw in the early pages of the "Apologie," Montaigne refers to Book X of the Laws where Plato describes the world, heavens, stars, and even human souls as gods in themselves X.

This 74 Ellen Sugg deification of the various elements in the universe finds a more subtle expression in Montaigne's use of a passage from the Moralia where Plutarch defines the celestial bodies as "sensible representations" of the Divine intellect. As we have seen, Plutarch borrowed this concept from Plato's Timaeus, the dialogue in which Plato attempted more than in any other to explain the creation of the universe.

The third instance in this part of the "Apologie" where Montaigne has recourse to Platonic thought occurs in a passage where Montaigne considers the immortality of the soul A. While this notion has always been disputed by philosophers and thinkers, there are those, Montaigne tells us, who have maintained it to be plausible opinion, "cette opinion plausible" A for two reasons. The first reason involves the hope of greater glory after death, and incentive for living the virtuous life. The second, that justice be realized, if not in this world, then in the world hereafter. II, 12, A-C-A Villey maintains that even though Montaigne attributes his second reason, the hope of divine justice, to Plato, "comme dict Platon" that Montaigne did not learn this himself from Plato 4: Though he disputes Plato as the source of Montaigne's idea, Villey indicates no other source and suggests that if Montaigne is referring to a Platonic text, it is most probably a general reference to Book X of the Laws where the Athenian convinces his companions that the gods cannot be bribed by wrongdoers and are the watchful guardians of all matters in the universe X.

While the entire ninth book of the Laws is devoted to establishing the Montaigne and Plato's Laws 75 proper penalties for specific crimes with a view to rehabilitating the criminal and compensating the victim, the passage we are interested in, IX. Indeed, in the last half of Book IX there are several passages in which the Athenian attempts to add the force of divine justice as portrayed in myth and stories to his own well-wrought plan of human justice.

Concerning all these matters, the preludes mentioned shall be pronounced, and, in addition to them, that story which is believed by many when they hear it from the lips of those who seriously relate such things at their mystic rites,—that vengeance for such acts is exacted in Hades, and that those who return again to this earth are bound to pay the natural penalty,—each culprit the same, that is, which he inflicted on his victim,—and that their life on earth must end in their meeting a like fate at the hands of another.

In the above passage D-E he speaks of a penalty for those "who return again to this earth," and in a later passage he states that "the doer of such a deed must of necessity suffer the same as he has done" E. But Plato's underlying presence is there throughout the entire passage A-C-A in the argument that divine justice is a useful tool for exacting virtue from men.

This suggests again that Montaigne had read the Laws before , although in this case, he makes no precise reference to Plato until after It is commonly believed that Montaigne undertook his "Apologie" at the request of the princess, Margaret of Valois, and though he failed in large part to defend Sebond, he nevertheless took advantage of the opportunity to advance his own views of fideism and the dangers of relying too much on human knowledge Frame, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, p.

A large part of this section of the "Apologie" is devoted to a discussion of the necessity of upholding the laws of a state, a view in line with Montaigne's Pyrrhonism. Taken in its entirety, this passage in Book IX ED can be viewed as a subtext for the part of the "Apologie" in which Montaigne warns the princess about the social and political struggle of their time.

Concerning all such cases we must make a prefatory pronouncement to this effect: He speaks of the lack of integrity among men of his time, even though they may possess intellectual quickness or excellence of one sort or another. In spite of these attributes they are incapable of conforming to a high level of social conduct. Nostre esprit est un util vagabond, dangereux, et temeraire: C'est miracle s'il s'en rencontre un rassis et sociable. II, 12, A Plato speaks likewise of the rarity of finding men capable of administering the civic good, and in a passage which directly follows his statement that men would live as beasts if it were not for laws, the Athenian addresses the problem of finding men enlightened enough to be rulers.

The reason thereof is this,—that no man's nature is naturally able both to perceive what is of benefit to the civic life of men and perceiving it, to be alike able and willing to practice what is best. For, in the first place, it is difficult to perceive that a true civic art necessarily cares for the public, not the private, interest,—for the public interest bind States together, whereas the private interest rends them asunder,—and to perceive also that it benefits both public and private interests alike when the public interest, rather than the private, is well enacted.

The Athenian finds fault with man's nature which is incapable of perceiving what is best for the civic good and at the same time practicing it. Montaigne lays the fault with the human spirit which he believes to be a wandering, dangerous and bold tool, incapable of acting with order or moderation, "un util vagabond, dangereux, et temeraire: Even those individuals who evince signs of superior intellect and extraordinary quickness, claims Montaigne, more often than not disappoint us in their opinions and behavior, "nous les voyons quasi tous desbordez en licence d'opinions et de meurs" A.

Thus, even among those who offer the possiblity of becoming civic-minded and public-spirited there is little hope. Montaigne implies that the only hope for a virtuous ruler is a thoughtful and virtuous man and the hope of finding one who combines both qualities is scant. For the Athenian who views the entire question in terms of the dichotomy between public and private interests there is just as little hope that such a ruler can be found among men.



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• Savannah Storm (Savannah Stories Book 1).
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• La production de l'espace - Persée?
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Maintaining a principle found in the other Platonic 78 Ellen Sugg dialogues, he claims that what is good for the state will of necessity be good for the individual, but finding the individual capable of understanding this principle is the real challenge IX.

Yet if ever there should arise a man competent by nature and by a birthright of divine grace to assume such an office, he would have no need of rulers over him; for no law or ordinance is mightier than Knowledge, nor is it right for Reason to be subject or in thrall to anything, but to be lord of all things, if it is really true to its name and free in its inner nature.

But at present such a nature exists nowhere at all, except in small degree; wherefore we must choose what is second best, namely, ordinance and law, which see and discern the general principle, but are unable to see every instance in detail. The Athenian's comment that "such a nature exists nowhere at all, except in small degree" corresponds with Montaigne's belief that there are few men strong and well-born enough to keep their own guidance and to whom others can look for guidance: Perhaps the only point in the Athenian's speech with which Montaigne would take issue is the Athenian's contention that knowledge and Reason are "lord of all things," and that the completely enlightened ruler would be allknowing and all reasonable.

For throughout the "Apologie" Montaigne contends that knowledge and human reason often precipitate man's downfall. This one point notwithstanding, it is clear that this passage from the Laws IX. Further, the lines from the "Apologie" which betray this influence belong to either [A] or [B] passages, suggesting once again Montaigne and Plato's Laws 79 that Montaigne's initial reading of Book IX occurred before A common phenomenon in the Essais, the explicit reference in the [C] material acknowledges Montaigne's implicit debt to Plato in the [A] and [B] strata.

If we accept the Athenian's speech in IX. But even she would fall short of the task. This would hardly be to her disgrace, since even the finest and quickest minds of the time do not possess the stability and moderation required of an enlightened ruler. In lieu of an enlightened ruler we must choose "ordinance and law" IX. Elle interdit d'en partir. Mais qu'est-ce que l'architecture? De telles notions existent- elles? Ce que Hegel nommait Vuniversel concret a-t-il encore un sens? Il faudra le montrer. Ne faut-il pas d'abord les inventorier 17 , puis chercher quel paradigme leur donne une signification et selon quelle syntaxe ils s'organisent?

En est-il la condition ou la formulation? Dans quelle mesure un espace se lit-il? En effet, si les notions de message, de code, d'information, etc. Il implique un processus signifiant. Elle se situe au niveau des concepts.

La production de l'espace

L'espace entier, mental, physique et social, se saisit tragiquement. Lafitte poursuivait certaines recher-. A partir de ces concepts, J.